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THE  HISTORY  OF  NATIONS 

HENRY  CABOT  LODGE  ,Ph.D.,LLD.  EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 


ROME 

From  earliest  times  to  44  B.C. 

by 

THEODOR  MOMMSEN 

Edited 
by 

ARTHURC.HOWLANUPkD. 

Department  of  History 
University  of  Pennsylvania 


Volume    III 


Illustrated 


The  H.W.  Snow  and  Son  Company 

C  h  i   c   a   g    o 


Copyright,  1907,  by 
JOHN  D.  MORRIS  &  COMPANY 


Copyright,  1910 
THE  H.  W.  SNOW  &  SON  COMPANY 


ocy  \mu>u5 


THE   HISTORY   OF  NATIONS 


EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 


HENRY  CABOT  LODGE,  PLD.,  L.L.D. 


Associate  Editors  and  Authors 


ARCHIBALD  HENRY  SAYCE,  LL.D., 

Professor    of    Assyriology,     Oxford    Uni- 
versity 


SIR  ROBERT  K.  DOUGLAS, 

Professor  of  Chinese,  King's  College,  Lon- 
don 


CHRISTOPHER  JOHNSTON,  M.D.,  Ph.D., 

Associate  Professor  of  Oriental  History  and 
Archaeology,  Johns  Hopkins  University 


C.  W.  C.  OMAN,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  History,  Oxford  University 


JEREMIAH  WHIPPLE  JENKS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D., 

Professor  of   Political   Economy  and   Pol- 
itics, Cornell  University 


KANICHI  ASAKAWA,  Ph.D., 

Instructor    in    the    History    of    Japanese 
Civilization,  Yale  University 


THEODOR  MOMMSEN, 

Late   Professor   of   Ancient    History.    Uni- 
versity of  Berlin 


ARTHUR  C.  HOWLAND,  Ph.D., 

Department  of  History,  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania 


WILFRED  HAROLD  MUNRO,  Ph.D., 

Professor    of    European    History,     Brown 
University 


G.  MERCER  ADAM, 

Historian  and  Editor 


FRED  MORROW  FLING,  Ph.D., 

Professor  of  European  History,  University 
of  Nebraska 


CHARLES  MERIVALE,  LL.D., 

Late   Dean  of  Ely,   formerly   Lecturer  in 
History,  Cambridge  University 


FRANCOIS  AUGUSTE  MARIE  MIGNET, 
Late  Member  of  the  French  Academy 


J.  HIGGINSON  CABOT,  Ph.D., 

Department  of  History,  Wellesley  College 


JAMES  WESTFALL  THOMPSON,  Ph.D., 

Department     of     History,     University    of 
Chicago 


SIR  WHXIAM  W.  HUNTER,  F.R.S., 

Late  Director- General  of  Statistics  in  India 


SAMUEL  RAWSON  GARDINER,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  Modern  History,  King's  Col- 
lege, London 


R.  W.  JOYCE,  LL.D., 
GEORGE  M.  DUTCHER,  Ph.D.,  Commissioner  for  the   Publication  of  the 

Professor  of  History,  Wesleyan  University  Ancient  Laws  of  Ireland 

vi 


ASSOCIATE  EDITORS  AND  AUTHORS-Continued 


justih  McCarthy,  ll.d.. 

Author  and  Historian 


AUGUSTUS  HUNT  SHEARER.  Ph.D.. 

Instructor    in     History,     Trinity    College- 
Hartford 


W.  HAROLD  CLAFLIN.  B.A.. 

Department    of    History,     Harvard    Uni- 
versity 


PAUL  LOUIS  LEGBR, 

Professor  of  the  Slav  Language*.  CoHeee 
de  France 


WILLIAM  E.  LINGLEBACH,  Ph.D., 

Assistant   Professor  of  European   History. 
University  of  Pennsylvania 

BAYARD  TAYLOR, 

Former  United  States  Minister  to  Germany 


CHARLES  DANDLIKER,  LL.D.. 
President  of  Zurich  University 


SIDNEY  B.  FAY.  Ph.D., 

Professor  of  History,    Dartmouth   College 


ELBERT  JAY  BENTON.  Ph.D., 

Department  of  History,  Western  Reserve 
University 


SIR  EDWARD  S.  CREASY, 

Late  Professor  of  History,  University  Col- 
lege, London 


ARCHIBALD  CARY  COOLIDGE,  Ph.D., 

Assistant    Professor   of    History,    Harvard 
University 

WILLIAM  RICHARD  MORFILL,  M.A., 

Professor  of  Russian  and  other  Slavonic 
Languages,  Oxford  University 

CHARLES  EDMUND  FRYER,  Ph.D., 

Department  of  History,  McGill  University 

E.  C.  OTTE, 

Specialist  on  Scandinavian  History 

EDWARD  S.  CORWIN,  Ph.D., 

Instructor    in     History,     Princeton     Uni- 
versity 


J.  SCOTT  KELTIE,  LL.D., 

President  Royal  Geographical  Society 


ALBERT  GALLOWAY  KELLER,  Ph.D.. 

Assistant  Professor  of  the  Science  of  So- 
ciety, Yale  University 


EDWARD  JAMES  PAYNE.  M.A.. 

Fellow  of  University  College,  Oxford 

PHILD?  PATTERSON  WELLS,  Ph.D., 

Lecturer  in   History  and  Librarian  of  the 
Law  School,  Yale  University 


FREDERICK  ALBION  OBER. 

Historian,  Author  and  Traveler 


JAMES  WILFORD  GARNER,  Ph.D., 

Professor  of   Political  Science,   University 
of  Illinois 


JOHN  BACH  McMASTER,  Litt.D.,  LL.D, 

Professor  of  History.  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania 


JAMES  LAMONT  PERKINS,  Managing-  Editor 


The  editors  and  publishers  desire  to  express  their  appreciation  for  valuable 
advice  and  suggestions  received  from  the  following:  Hon.  Andrew  D.  White. 
LL.D.,  Alfred  Thayer  Mahan,  D.C.L.,  LL.D.,  Hon.  Charles  Emory  Smith. 
LL.D.,  Professor  Edward  Gaylord  Bourne,  Ph.D.,  Charles  F.  Thwing, 
LL.D.,  Dr.  Emil  Reich,  William  Elliot  Griffis,  LL.D.,  Professor  John 
Martin  Vincent,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Melvil  Dewey,  LL.D.,  Alston  Ellis,  LL.D., 
Professor  Charles  H.  McCarthy,  Ph.D.,  Professor  Herman  V.  Ambs,  Ph.D., 
Professor  Walter  L.  Fleming,  Ph.D.,  Professor  David  Y.  Thomas,  Ph.D., 

Mr.  Otto  Reich  and  Mr.  O.  M.  Dickerson. 

vii 


PREFACE 


The  death  of  Theodor  Mommsen  in  November,  1903,  brought 
to  a  close  the  fruitful  activity  of  one  who  was,  in  the  words  of 
Freeman,  "  almost  the  greatest  scholar  of  all  time,"  and  deprived 
Germany  of  the  last  and  greatest  of  that  line  of  historical  investi- 
gators who  made  her  in  the  nineteenth  century  the  Mecca  of  stu- 
dents from  all  parts  of  the  world.  From  1843  down  to  within  a  few 
weeks  of  his  death  Mommsen  continued  to  pour  forth  a  flood  of 
dissertations,  articles,  and  books  that  revolutionized  the  study  of 
Roman  history.  The  number  of  his  writings,  great  and  small, 
is  almost  incredible.  A  Heidelberg  librarian  prepared  a  bibliography 
of  his  works  in  1887  as  a  memorial  for  the  historian's  seventieth 
birthday,  in  which  the  titles  aggregated  somewhat  over  nine  hun- 
dred, while  at  the  time  of  his  death,  sixteen  years  later,  it 
was  estimated  that  the  number  of  his  learned  productions  of  every 
kind  would  reach  the  grand  total  of  1300. 

Not  only  are  the  results  of  Mommsen's  activity  astounding  in 
quantity,  but  his  work  is  equally  remarkable  in  quality.  No  branch 
of  Roman  history  was  left  untouched  by  him,  and  in  many  de- 
partments his  researches  were  epoch-making,  and  rendered  the 
labors  of  his  predecessors  obsolete.  This  is  true  of  his  investiga- 
tions in  the  field  of  early  Italian  dialects,  of  Roman  coinage, 
and  of  the  constitutional  history  of  the  republic,  as  well  as 
in  various  other  lines.  Such  achievements  were  due  to  the  union 
of  striking  mental  characteristics  supplemented  by  exceptional 
training.  Mommsen  was  an  indefatigable  worker  with  a  capacity 
for  infinite  pains  and  a  powerful  grasp  of  details.  He  also  possessed 
the  power  of  organization  and  combination,  and  a  vivid  imagina- 
tion which  clothed  the  abstruse  facts  of  Roman  history  with  the 
flesh  and  blood  of  real  life.  He  had  been  trained  as  a  philologist 
and  as  a  lawyer,  and  thus  brought  a  double  faculty  of  interpreta- 
tion to  his  work.  Finally  he  took  an  active  interest  in  the  political 
life  of  his  own  time,  and  in  this  way  was  able  to  employ  in  the 
solution  of  the  problems  of  history  the  practical  experiences  of  a 

ix 


x  PREFACE 

political  career.  He  was  driven  from  his  native  Schleswig  in  1848 
for  joining  in  the  efforts  of  the  young  patriots  to  free  the  duchy 
from  Denmark;  he  was  expelled  from  the  chair  of  Roman  Law 
at  the  University  of  Leipzig  in  1850  and  banished  from  Saxony 
for  championing  Prussia,  through  whom  he  hoped  to  see  the  at- 
tainment of  German  unity ;  and,  as  a  member  of  the  Prussian  Diet 
from  1873  to  1882,  he  incurred  the  bitter  hostility  of  Bismarck 
for  opposing  the  latter's  domestic  policy,  and  was  prosecuted  for 
libel  for  characterizing  that  policy  as  a  "  swindle."  Though  finally 
acquitted  by  the  superior  court,  this  incident  caused  his  retirement 
from  active  political  life. 

The  work  by  which  Mommsen  is  most  widely  known  is  his 
"  History  of  Rome,"  in  three  volumes,  published  in  1854- 1856.  The 
original  plan  of  the  author  was  to  cover  the  whole  field  from  the 
foundation  of  the  city  to  the  German  invasions,  in  five  volumes. 
Of  these,  the  first  three,  bringing  the  story  down  to  the  battle  of 
Thapsus,  appeared  in  rapid  succession,  but  the  fourth,  covering  the 
dynastic  history  of  the  empire,  was  never  written,  owing  partly  to 
the  fact  that  the  period  was  already  treated  in  easily  accessible 
works  and  partly  to  his  distaste  for  the  intrigues  and  bloodshed  of 
the  early  empire.  In  1885,  however,  appeared  the  fifth  volume  on 
a  somewhat  different  plan,  covering  the  imperial  administration  of 
the  provinces  from  Caesar  to  Diocletian.  From  the  student's  point 
of  view  this  is  more  important  than  the  earlier  portion  of  the  work, 
as  it  surveys  a  practically  untrodden  field.  Mommsen's  work  as 
editor  of  the  great  "  Corpus  Inscriptionum  Latinarum  "  had  put 
into  his  hands  a  wealth  of  information  derived  from  inscriptions  in 
every  part  of  the  empire,  and  enabled  him  to  set  forth  for  the  first 
time  the  true  significance  and  value  to  the  world's  progress  of 
the  four  hundred  years  of  imperial  administration  in  Mediterra- 
nean lands.  But  this  fifth  volume  never  attained  the  popularity  of 
the  three  earlier  ones.  It  dealt  with  the  dry  facts  of  organization 
and  government,  and  lacked  the  dramatic  qualities  and  brilliant 
characterizations  which  have  made  the  history  of  the  republican 
period  one  of  the  literary  masterpieces  of  the  German  language. 

The  first  three  volumes  of  the  "  History  of  Rome  "  were  writ- 
ten in  the  midst  of  the  German  struggle  for  unity,  and  show 
throughout  the  author's  political  convictions  and  philosophy.  This 
is  especially  true  of  that  portion  which  deals  with  the  last  century 
of  the  republic.     Here  his  dislike  of  a  narrow  aristocracy  such  as 


PREFACE 


XI 


had  for  so  long  controlled  the  destinies  of  the  German  states,  and 
his  admiration  of  the  strong  arm  which  is  capable  of  guiding  the 
blind  efforts  of  the  common  people,  led  him  to  form  estimates  of 
the  leading  statesmen  of  Rome  which  have  provoked  the  sharpest 
criticism.  His  condemnation  of  Cicero  as  a  man  of  words  rather 
than  deeds,  of  Pompeius  as  a  mere  soldier,  and  of  Cato  as  a  tactless 
visionary,  has  perhaps  not  excited  so  much  opposition  as  his  ex- 
treme laudation  of  Caesar  and  his  undisguised  hero-worship  for  a 
man  who  accomplished  things  without  hesitating  as  to  the  means 
employed.  But  a  readiness  to  form  opinions  as  to  character  and  to 
judge  men  by  a  clearly  defined  standard  does  not  make  history  less 
interesting  to  read,  nor  indeed  less  valuable  to  the  reader,  provided 
that  the  author's  bias  is  kept  constantly  in  mind. 

The  popularity  and  importance  of  the  "  History  of  Rome  "  is 
attested  by  the  fact  that  by  1875  tne  work  nad  run  through  six 
German  editions  and  had  been  translated  into  Italian,  English, 
French,  Russian,  Polish,  and  Spanish.  The  English  version  in 
four  volumes  was  prepared  in  1862  by  the  Rev.  W.  P.  Dickson, 
D.D.,  and  passed  into  a  fourth  edition  in  1894.  The  work  also 
appeared  in  English  in  1889,  condensed  into  one  volume  by  C. 
Bryans  and  F.  J.  Hendy,  and  it  is  this  abridgment  which  now 
appears  with  such  changes  as  were  necessary  in  order  to  bring  it 
within  the  required  compass  for  the  series  in  which  it  is  published. 
The  alterations  in  Bryans  and  Hendy's  text  consist  mainly  in  the 
omission  of  details  of  military  campaigns  and  the  condensation  of 
certain  paragraphs  of  less  interest  to  the  general  reader.  Mommsen's 
views  as  expressed  in  his  original  work  remain  unaltered.  On 
many  points  they  have  been  strongly  controverted  by  other  schol- 
ars, but,  where  no  new  evidence  has  come  to  light  since  he  wrote, 
Mommsen's  opinions  are  still  regarded  with  the  greatest  respect. 
Conflicting  interpretations  and  views  may  be  found  in  many  of 
the  works  indicated  in  the  bibliography  appended  to  this  volume. 
In  only  one  important  field  have  Mommsen's  conclusions  lost  all 
weight  owing  to  an  untenable  method  pursued  by  him,  viz.,  in  regard 
to  the  primitive  races  of  Italy.  It  is  now  generally  agreed  that 
the  ethnologists  and  not  the  philologists  have  the  last  word  to 
speak  concerning  the  relationships  of  prehistoric  peoples,  and  there- 
fore this  part  of  the  history  has  ceased  to  be  of  much  value. 

University  of  Pennsylvania 


CONTENTS 

PART   I 

LATIN  SETTLEMENT  AND  CONQUEST  OF  ITALY 
753-268  B.  C 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  Italy 3 

II.  Latin  Settlements  and  Origin  of  Rome.    753  b.  c.        7 

III.  The  Roman  Constitution  and  the  Reforms  of  Ser- 

vius  Tullius 11 

IV.  Rome  and  the  other   Italian   Powers  during  the 

Regal  Period.    753-509  b.  c 20 

V.  Establishment  of  the  Republic.     509-508  b.  c.  -29 

VI.  The  Tribunate  of  the  Plebs  and  the  Decemvirate. 

495-449  b.  c 37 

VII.  Strife  of  Patricians  and  Plebeians.    445-265  b.  c.   .    47 
VIII.  Fall  of  Etruscan  Power  and  the  Coming  of  the 

Celts.     500-343  b.  c. 56 

IX.  Advance  of  Rome  to  the  Conquest  of  Italy.    500- 

290  b.  c 62 

X.  War    with    Pyrrhus — Union    with    Italy.    280-268 

b.c 74 


PART   II 

CONQUEST  OF  THE  MEDITERRANEAN  STATES 
264-133  B.C. 

XL  Carthage.     500-264  b.  c. 89 

XII.  The  First  Punic  War.    264-241  b.  c.  .        .        .99 

XIII.  The  Second  Punic  War.    218-202  b.c.        .        .        .111 

XIV.  A  Review  of  the  West  and  East.    201-194  b.  c.        .  133 
XV.  War  with  Antiochus  and  the  Final  Conquest  of 

the  East.     192-168  b.  c. 143 

XVI.  The  Government  and  the  Governed  .        .        .  153 

xiii 


xiv  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XVII.  The  Subject  Countries  Down    to   the  Gracchan 

Epoch.     168-133  b.  c. 161 

PART   III 

THE  REVOLUTION  PERIOD.     133-78  B.  C. 

XVIII.  The  Reforms  of  the  Gracchi.     133-121  b.  c.   .        .  171 
XIX.  The  Rule  of  the  Restoration.    121-101  b.  c.   .        .  185 
XX.  Marius  as  Revolutionist  and  Drusus  as  Reformer. 

100-91  b.  c 196 

XXI.  The  Revolt  of  all  Italy.     91-87  b.  c.  .        .  205 

XXII.  The  Mithradatic  War.     88-84  B-  c-  •         •         •  213 

XXIII.  The  Democratic   Revolution  and  its  Overthrow 

by  Sulla.    87-82  b.  c 221 

XXIV.  The  Sullan  Constitution.     81-78  b.  c.  .        .  230 
XXV.  Economic   Condition  of  the  Empire  During  the 

Revolution  Period.     133-78  b.  c.  .        .        .  242 

PART    IV 

FALL  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  AND  ESTABLISHING  OF 
THE  MONARCHY.     78-44  B.C. 

XXVI.  The  Rule  of  the  Sullan  Restoration.    78-70  b.  c.  253 
XXVII.  Fall  of  the  Oligarchy — Rule  of  Pompeius.     70- 

63  b.  c 265 

XXVIII.  Party  Struggles  in  Rome — Pompeius,  Caesar  and 

Crassus.    65-58  b.  c 278 

XXIX.  Caesar  in  Gaul.     58-51  b.  c 292 

XXX.  The  Joint  Rule  of  Pompeius  and  Caesar.     57-52 

B.  C. 311 

XXXI.  Crassus  and  the  Rupture  between  Pompeius  and 

Caesar.     54-49  b.  c 322 

XXXII.  The  Civil  War.     49-46  b.  c 334 

XXXIII.  The  Old  Republic  and  the  New  Monarchy.    46- 

44   B.C. 362 

Bibliography 397 

Index 403 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

Vercingetorix  Surrenders  to  Caesar  (Photogravure)  Frontispiece 

FACING  PACE 

The  Sabine  Women  making  Peace  between  their  Husbands 

and  Relatives 20 

The  Capitoline  Geese 58 

The    Blind    Appius    Claudius    is    Led    into    the    Roman 

Senate 78 

The  Death  of  Archimedes 124 

Hasdrubal  Crosses  the  Alps 128 

Hannibal  Crosses  the  Rhone 130 

Publius  Cornelius  Scipio  Africanus 144 

Hannibal 146 

Eumenes  II.,  King  of  Pergamos,  Appealing  to  the  Roman 

Senate 148 

Capture  of  the  Fortress  of  Numantia 162 

Storming  the  Byrsa  of  Carthage 164 

The  Cimbric  Fury  Annihilates  the  Roman  Armies     .        .  192 

Gaius  Marius 222 

Gnaeus  Pompeius  the  Great 266 

Cicero  Denounces  Catilina 282 

The  Invasion  of  the  Barbarians 302 

Marcus  Tullius  Cicero 3*6 

Gaius  Julius  Caesar 362 

"  Police  Verso  "  382 


TEXT  MAPS 

PAGE 

Ancient  Latium 8 

The  Peoples  of  Early  Italy.     343-290  b.  c 60 

Rome  as  Mistress  of  Italy 86 

XV 


xvi  LIST     OF     ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Carthage  and  her  Maritime  and  Colonial  Dominion  .        .    92 
Rome  and  Carthage  at  End  of  First  and  Second  Punic 

Wars 110 

Rome  and  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  States      .        .        .  166 
The  East  in  the  Time  of  Mithradates  and  Tigranes  .  214 

Gaul  in  the  Time  of  Caesar 293 

Scene  of  Caesar's  African  Campaign 361 

The  Roman  Empire  at  Death  of  Caesar        ....  375 


PART  I 

LATIN  SETTLEMENT  AND   CONQUEST 
OF  ITALY.    753-268   B.C. 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Chapter  I 

ITALY 

THE  division  between  ancient  and  modern  history  is  not 
one  of  mere  convenience ;  it  has  a  reality,  in  that  it  marks 
the  distinction  in  point  of  time,  place,  and  character  be- 
tween the  civilization  of  the  old  and  new  worlds. 

Ancient  history  is  in  the  main  an  account  of  the  rise  and  fall 
of  those  peoples  whose  civilization  had  a  common  origin,  and  pre- 
sented similar  features.  In  each  case,  however,  the  individuality 
of  each  nation  impressed  its  own  peculiar  stamp  on  the  character 
of  that  civilization. 

The  Mediterranean  Sea  was  the  theater  of  the  growth  and 
decay  of  the  great  nations  who  may  be  included  in  the  same  cycle 
of  civilization,  and  whose  culture  found  its  highest  point  in  Thebes 
in  Egypt,  Carthage  in  Africa,  Athens  in  Greece,  Rome  in  Italy. 
When  their  work  was  finished,  new  peoples  arose,  a  new  cycle  of 
civilization  was  begun,  a  new  center  was  found  in  the  Atlantic 
Ocean  in  place  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  province  of  the  Roman 
historian  is  to  record  the  closing  scene  of  the  great  drama  of  ancient 
history  as  enacted  in  Italy. 

Geographically,  this  peninsula  is  formed  by  the  mountain  chain 
of  the  Apennines  breaking  off  from  the  Western  Alps  and  crossing 
the  northern  portion  of  the  country  in  an  easterly  direction,  thence 
turning  southeast  and  south,  and  terminating  finally  at  the  strait 
that  divides  Italy  from  Sicily.  It  must  be  especially  remembered 
that  the  ancient  boundary  of  Italy  on  the  north  was  not  the  Alps, 
but  the  Apennines ;  therefore,  the  flat  country  on  the  north,  extend- 
ing between  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines  as  far  down  as  the  Abruzzi, 
does  not  belong  geographically  nor  historically  to  the  Italy  of  our 
history.  As  the  Apennines  nowhere  rise  precipitously,  but  inclose 
many  valleys  and  tablelands  connected  by  easy  passes,  the  country 
is  well  adapted  for  human  habitation.  This  is  especially  the  case 
with  the  adjacent  slopes  and  coast  districts.     On  the  east  coast 


4  ROME 

stretches  the  plain  of  Apulia,  on  the  south  well-watered  and  fertile 
lowlands  adjoin  the  hill  country  of  the  interior,  and  on  the  west 
we  find,  not  merely  the  extraordinarily  rich  and  irrigated  lands  of 
Etruria,  Latium,  and  Campania,  but,  owing1  to  the  action  of  the 
sea  and  of  volcanoes,  the  country  is  varied  with  hill  and  valley, 
harbor  and  island.  Although  Italy  lacks  the  island-studded  sea 
which  gave  the  Greeks  their  seafaring  character,  and  is  deficient 
in  bays  and  harbors,  except  on  the  southwest  coast,  yet  it  resembles 
Greece  in  its  temperate  climate  and  wholesome  mountain  air,  while 
it  excels  it  in  rich  alluvial  plains  and  grassy  mountain  slopes.  All 
Italian  interests  center  in  the  west;  the  reverse  is  the  case  with 
Greece.  Thus,  the  Apulian  and  Messapian  coasts  play  a  subordinate 
part  in  Italian,  as  Epirus  and  Acarnania  did  in  Greek  history.  The 
two  peninsulas  lie  side  by  side,  but  turn  their  backs  on  each  other, 
and  the  Italians  and  Greeks  rarely  came  into  contact  in  the 
Adriatic  Sea. 

The  history  of  Italy  falls  into  two  main  sections,  its  internal 
history  down  to  its  union  under  the  leadership  of  the  Latin  stock, 
and  the  history  of  its  sovereignty  over  the  world.  It  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  what  has  been  called  the  conquest  of  Italy  by  the 
Romans  is  really  the  consolidation  and  union  of  the  whole  Italian 
stock — a  stock  of  which  the  Romans  were  the  most  powerful  branch, 
but  still  only  a  branch.  Our  attention  must  now  be  fixed  on  the  first 
of  the  two  sections — on  the  settlement  of  the  Italian  stock:  on  its 
external  struggles  for  existence  against  Greek  and  Etruscan  in- 
truders ;  on  its  conquest  of  these  enemies ;  finally,  on  its  internal 
strife,  and  the  contest  between  the  Latins  and  Samnites  for  the 
leadership  of  Italy,  resulting  in  the  victory  of  the  Latins,  at  the 
end  of  the  fourth  century  before  Christ. 

With  regard  to  the  earliest  migrations  into  Italy  we  have  no 
evidence  to  guide  us,  not  even  the  uncertain  voice  of  tradition.  No 
monuments  of  a  savage  primitive  race  have  ever  been  unearthed, 
such  as  exist  in  France,  Germany,  and  England.  But  the  remains 
of  the  Italian  languages  show  that  the  three  primitive  stocks  were 
Iapygian,  Etruscan,  and  Italian.  The  last  is  divided  into  two  main 
branches:  Latin  and  Umbro-Samnite,  or  more  fully  that  branch 
to  which  the  dialects  of  the  Umbri,  Marsi,  Volsci,  and  Samnites 
belong.  The  center  of  Italy  was  inhabited,  from  a  remote  period, 
by  the  two  divisions  of  the  Italian  people.  Philological  analysis 
of  the  Italian  tongue  shows  that  they  belong  to  the  Indo-Germanic 


ITALY  5 

family,  and  that  the  Italians  are  brothers  of  the  Greeks  and  cousins 
of  the  Celts,  Germans,  and  Slavonians.1 

In  regard  to  the  graver  problems  of  life,  in  moral,  social, 
political,  and  religious  development,  we  find  a  marked  difference 
between  the  Greeks  and  the  Italians.  In  the  Greek  world  we  see 
the  full  and  free  play  of  individual  life,  and  individual  thought, 
whether  in  the  political  arena  or  that  of  literature,  whether  in  the 
games  at  Olympia  or  in  religious  festivals.  The  whole  was  sac- 
rificed to  its  parts,  the  nation  to  the  township,  the  township  to  the 
citizen.  Thus,  solemn  awe  of  the  gods  was  lessened  and  at  last 
extinguished  by  that  freedom  of  thought  which  invested  them  with 
human  attributes  and  then  denied  their  existence.  The  Romans, 
on  the  contrary,  merged  the  individual  in  the  state,  and  regarded 
the  progress  and  prosperity  of  the  latter  as  the  ideal  for  which  all 
were  bound  to  labor  unceasingly.  With  them  the  son  was  bound 
to  reverence  the  father,  the  citizen  to  reverence  the  ruler,  all  to 
reverence  the  gods.  This  distinction  becomes  more  evident  when  we 
consider  the  length  to  which  paternal  and  marital  authority  was 
carried  by  the  Romans,  and  the  merciless  rigor  with  which  a  slave 
was  treated  by  them.  The  meager  and  meaningless  character  of 
individual  names  among  the  Romans,  when  contrasted  with  the 
luxuriant  and  poetic  fullness  of  those  among  the  Greeks,  points  to 
the  wish  of  the  Romans  to  reduce  all  to  one  uniform  level,  instead 
of  promoting  the  development  of  distinctive  personality.  But  we 
must  not  forget  that  the  basis  was  the  same  with  both  nations.  In 
both,  the  clan  arose  from  the  family  and  the  state  from  the  clan; 
but,  as  the  relations  in  a  Roman  household  differed  widely  from 
those  in  a  Greek,  so  the  position  of  a  clan,  as  a  separate  power, 
in  a  Greek,  was  far  higher  than  in  a  Roman  state.  Again,  although 
the  fundamental  ideas  of  the  Roman  constitution — a  king,  a  senate, 
and  an  assembly  authorized  merely  to  accept  or  reject  proposals 
submitted  to  it — are  also  found  in  Greek  states,  as  in  the  earlier 
constitution  of  Crete,  yet  widely  different  was  the  development 

1  Since  Mommsen  wrote  this  the  whole  subject  of  the  relationship  of  primi- 
tive peoples  has  been  revolutionized  by  the  investigations  of  the  ethnologists, 
whose  conclusions  are  now  being  accepted  by  the  philologists  also.  The  Greeks 
and  Latins  are  admitted  to  be  related  to  each  other,  and  are  members  of  the 
great  Mediterranean  or  Eurafrican  race,  but  no  race  affinity  is  admitted  by  many 
between  them  and  the  Celts,  Germans,  and  Slavs,  who  are  supposed  to  have  come 
from  the  east  and  to  have  conquered  and  mixed  with  certain  sections  of  the 
Mediterranean  race.  For  a  popular  exposition  of  this  view  see  Sergi,  "  The 
Mediterranean  Race,  a  Study  of  the  Origin  of  European  Peoples."    London,  igoi. 


6  ROME 

which  these  ideas  received  in  each  nation.  So,  too,  in  religion, 
both  nations  founded  their  faith  on  the  same  common  store  of 
symbolic  and  allegorical  views  of  nature.  But  the  Greek  lost  sight 
of  the  spiritual  abstractions,  and  gave  all  the  phenomena  of  nature 
a  concrete  and  corporeal  shape,  clothing  all  with  the  riches  of  his 
poetic  fancy.  The  Roman,  casting  aside  all  mythical  legends  of 
the  gods,  sanctified  every  action  of  life  by  assigning  a  spirit  to 
everything  existing — a  spirit  which  came  into  being  with  it,  and 
perished  with  it ;  and  thus  the  very  word  Religio,  "  that  which 
binds,"  shows  what  a  hold  this  faith  in  the  unseen  and  this  power 
of  spiritual  abstraction  had  upon  the  Roman  mind.  Thus  the  two 
nations  in  which  the  civilization  of  antiquity  culminated  stand 
side  by  side,  as  different  in  development  as  they  were  in  origin 
identical.  The  points  in  which  the  Hellenes  excel  the  Italians  are 
more  universally  intelligible,  and  reflect  a  more  brilliant  luster; 
but  the  deep  feeling  in  each  individual,  that  he  was  only  a  part  of 
the  community,  a  rare  devotedness  and  power  of  self-sacrifice  for 
the  common  weal,  an  earnest  faith  in  its  own  gods,  form  the  rich 
treasure  of  the  Italian  nation.  Wherever  in  Hellas  a  tendency 
towards  national  union  appeared,  it  was  based  not  on  elements 
directly  political,  but  on  games  and  art;  the  contests  at  Olympia, 
the  poems  of  Homer,  the  tragedies  of  Euripides,  were  the  only 
bonds  that  held  Hellas  together.  Resolutely,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Italian  surrendered  his  own  personal  will  for  the  sake  of  free- 
dom, and  learned  to  obey  his  father  that  he  might  know  how  to 
obey  the  state.  Amid  this  subjection  individual  development  might 
be  marred,  and  the  germs  of  fairest  promise  might  be  arrested  in 
the  bud ;  the  Italian  gained  in  their  stead  a  feeling  of  fatherland  and 
of  patriotism  such  as  the  Greek  never  knew,  and,  alone  among  all 
civilized  nations  of  antiquity,  succeeded  in  working  out  national 
unity  in  connection  with  a  constitution  based  on  self-government — 
a  national  unity  which  at  last  placed  in  his  hands  the  mastery,  not 
only  over  the  divided  Hellenic  stock,  but  over  the  whole  known 
world. 


Chapter  II 

LATIN   SETTLEMENTS   AND   ORIGIN  OF   ROME 

753    B.C. 

WE  have  no  data  enabling  us  to  accurately  determine  the 
migration  of  the  Italians  into  Italy.  The  Italian  names 
Novla  or  Nola  (new  town),  Campani,  Capua,  Voltur- 
nus,  Opsci  (laborers),  show  that  an  Italian  and  probably  Latin 
stock,  the  Ausones,  were  in  possession  of  Campania  before  the 
Samnite  and  Greek  immigrations;  but  all  traces  of  the  Itali,  who 
were  the  primitive  inhabitants  of  the  country  subsequently  occu- 
pied by  the  Lucani  and  Bruttii,  were  entirely  obliterated  by  these 
two  races.  It  is  also  not  improbable  that  the  Latins  in  primitive 
times  spread  over  Latium,  Campania,  Lucania,  and  the  eastern  half 
of  Sicily.  But  those  settled  in  Sicily,  Magna  Graecia,  and  Cam- 
pania came  into  contact  with  the  Greeks  at  a  time  when  they  were 
unable  to  resist  so  superior  a  civilization,  and  were  consequently, 
as  in  Sicily,  completely  Hellenized,  or  so  weakened  that  they  fell 
an  easy  prey  to  Sabine  hordes.  The  Latins,  however,  who  settled 
just  north  of  Campania,  in  Latium,  where  no  Greek  colony  was 
founded,  succeeded  in  maintaining  their  ground  against  the  Sa- 
bines  and  more  northern  foes.  Latium  itself  is  a  plain  traversed 
by  the  Tiber  and  Anio,  bounded  on  the  east  by  the  mountains  of 
the  Sabines  and  Aequi,  which  form  part  of  the  Apennines ;  on  the 
south,  by  the  Volscian  range,  which  is  separated  from  the  main 
chain  of  the  Apennines  by  the  ancient  territory  of  the  Hernici ;  on 
the  west,  by  the  sea,  whose  harbors  on  this  part  of  the  coast  are 
few  and  poor ;  on  the  north,  by  the  broad  highlands  of  Etruria,  into 
which  it  imperceptibly  merges.  This  plain  is  dotted  with  isolated 
hills,  and  the  Alban  range,  free  on  every  side,  stands  between  the 
Volscian  chain  and  the  Tiber.  Here  were  settled  the  old  Latins 
(Prisci  Latini),  as  they  were  later  on  called,  to  distinguish  them 
from  the  Latins  settled  outside  Latium.  But  in  early  times  the 
Tiber  formed  the  northern  boundary,  and  only  the  center  of  the 
region  between  the  Tiber,  the  spurs  of  the  Apennines,  the  Alban 
mount,  and  the  sea,  consisting  of  some  seven  hundred  square  miles, 

7 


8 


ROME 


Circa  753 


formed  Latium  proper — the  real  plain  land  as  it  seems  from  the 
height  of  the  Alban  mount.  This  plain  is  broken  by  hills  of  tufa 
of  moderate  height,  and  by  deep  fissures  in  the  ground.  Owing  to 
this  uneven  character  lakes  are  formed  in  winter,  and  as  there  is 
no  natural  outlet  for  the  water,  malaria  arises  from  the  noxious 
exhalations  in  summer  heat.  This  malaria  the  ancient  inhabitants 
avoided  by  wearing  heavy  woolen  clothing,  and  by  keeping  a  con- 


ANCIENT     LATIUM 


stant  blazing  fire,  and  thus  a  dense  population  existed  where  now 
no  one  can  support  a  healthy  life. 

The  conditions  of  early  society  among  the  settlers  in  Latium 
must  be  a  matter  of  conjecture.  There  were  a  number  of  inde- 
pendent political  communities  called  cantons,  composed  of  little 
villages.  The  latter  were  in  turn  probably  made  up  of  family 
groups  whose  association  was  based  upon  relationship  and  the  need 
of  cooperation  in  getting  a  living,  so  that  each  village  was  a  sort 
of  clan.  No  doubt  each  canton  had  its  local  center,  which  served 
alike  as  a  place  of  meeting  and  of  refuge;  these  were  called,  from 
their  position,  mountain-tops  (capitolia)  or  strongholds  (arces).  In 
time  houses  began  to  cluster  round  the  stronghold,  and  were  sur- 
rounded with  the  "  ring"  (urbs)  ;  thus  the  nucleus  of  a  town  was 
formed,  which  tended  gradually  to  absorb  the  different  villages. 


LATIN    SETTLEMENTS  9 

Circa  753 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Alban  range,  from  its  natural 
strength  and  advantages  of  air  and  water,  was  occupied  by  the 
first  comers.  Here,  among  other  ancient  canton-centers,  stood 
preeminent  Alba,  the  mother-city  of  all  the  old  Latin  settlements. 
Therefore,  when  the  various  cantons,  though  each  independent  and 
governed  by  its  own  constitution  of  prince,  elders,  and  general  as- 
sembly of  warriors,  expressed  their  sense  of  the  ties  of  blood  and 
language  by  forming  what  is  known  as  the  Latin  League,  it  was 
but  natural  that  Alba  should  be  the  center  of  that  league,  and 
therefore  president  of  the  thirty  cantons  which  composed  it  We 
have  no  certain  knowledge  as  to  the  powers  or  legal  rights  this 
confederacy  exercised  over  the  various  members.  Probably  dis- 
putes between  cantons  were  settled  by  the  league,  wars  against 
foreign  foes  decided,  and  a  federal  commander-in-chief  appointed. 
What  we  do  know  is  that  on  the  annual  day  of  assembly  the  Latin 
festival  was  kept,  and  an  ox  sacrificed  to  the  Latin  god,  Jupiter 
Latiaris.  Each  community  had  to  contribute  to  the  sacrificial  feast 
its  fixed  proportion  of  cattle,  milk,  and  cheese,  and  to  receive  in 
return  a  part  of  the  roasted  victim.  During  this  festival  a  "  truce 
of  God  "  was  observed  throughout  all  Latium,  and  safe-conducts 
were  probably  granted,  even  by  tribes  at  feud  with  one  another. 
It  is  impossible  to  define  the  privileges  of  Alba,  as  presiding  can- 
ton. Probably  it  was  a  purely  honorary  position,  and  had  no  polit- 
ical signification,  certainly  none  as  denoting  any  sort  of  leadership 
or  command  of  the  rest  of  the  Latin  cantons.  But,  vague  as  the 
outlines  of  this  early  canton  life  must  necessarily  be,  they  show 
us  the  one  great  fact  of  a  common  center,  which,  while  it  did  not 
destroy  the  individual  independence  of  the  cantons,  kept  alive  the 
feeling  of  national  kinship,  and  thus  paved  the  way  for  that  national 
union  which  is  the  goal  of  every  free  people's  progress. 

In  tracing  the  beginnings  of  Rome,  her  original  constitution, 
and  the  first  changes  it  underwent,  we  are  on  ground  which  the  un- 
certain light  of  ancient  tradition  and  modern  theory  has  made  most 
difficult,  if  not  impossible  to  traverse  with  any  certainty.  The  very 
name  of  Romans,  with  which  the  settlement  on  the  low  hills  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tiber  has  so  long  been  associated,  was  originally 
not  Romans,  but  Ramnes  (possibly  "bushmen").  Side  by  side 
with  this  Latin  settlement  of  Ramnians  two  other  cantons  settled, 
the  Luceres  and  the  Tities,  the  latter  considered  to  be  of  Sabellian, 
not  Latin,  stock.    From  the  combination  of  these  three  arose  Rome. 


10  ROME 

Circa  753 

The  unfavorable  character  of  the  site  renders  it  hard  to  understand 
how  the  city  could  so  early  attain  its  prominent  position  in  Latium. 
The  soil  is  unfavorable  to  the  growth  of  fig  or  vine,  and  in  addition 
to  the  want  of  good  water-springs,  swamps  are  caused  by  the  fre- 
quent inundations  of  the  Tiber.  Moreover,  it  was  confined  in  all 
land  directions  by  powerful  cities.  But  all  these  disadvantages  were 
more  than  compensated  by  the  unfettered  command  it  had  of  both 
banks  of  the  Tiber  down  to  the  mouth  of  the  river.  The  fact  that 
the  clan  of  the  Romilii  was  settled  on  the  right  bank  from  time 
immemorial,  and  that  there  lay  the  grove  of  the  creative  goddess, 
Dea  Dia,  and  the  primitive  seat  of  the  Arval  festival  and  Arval 
brotherhood,  proves  that  the  original  territory  of  Rome  compre- 
hended Janiculum  and  Ostia,  which  afterwards  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Etruscans.  Not  only  did  this  position  on  both  banks  of  the 
Tiber  place  in  Rome's  hands  all  the  traffic  of  Latium,  but,  as  the 
Tiber  was  the  natural  barrier  against  northern  invaders,  Rome  be- 
came the  maritime  frontier  fortress  of  Latium.  Again,  the  situa- 
tion acted  in  two  ways :  Firstly,  it  brought  Rome  into  commercial 
relations  with  the  outer  world,  cemented  her  alliance  with  Caere, 
and  taught  her  the  importance  of  building  bridges.  Secondly,  it 
caused  the  Roman  canton  to  become  united  in  the  city  itself  far 
earlier  than  was  the  case  with  other  Latin  communities.  And  thus, 
though  Latium  was  a  strictly  agricultural  country,  Rome  was  a 
center  of  commerce;  and  this  commercial  position  stamped  its 
peculiar  mark  on  the  Roman  character,  distinguishing  them  from 
the  rest  of  the  Latins  and  Italians,  as  the  citizen  is  distinguished 
from  the  rustic.  Not,  indeed,  that  the  Roman  neglected  his  farm, 
or  ceased  to  regard  it  as  his  home ;  but  the  unwholesome  air  of  the 
Campagna  tended  to  make  him  withdraw  to  the  more  healthful  city 
hills ;  and  from  early  times  by  the  side  of  the  Roman  farmer  arose 
a  non-agricultural  population,  composed  partly  of  foreigners  and 
partly  of  natives,  which  tended  to  develop  urban  life.1 

1  One  of  the  most  potent  influences  in  the  growth  of  Rome  was  undoubtedly 
this  habit  of  association  engendered  by  her  peculiar  location.  The  settlements 
on  neighboring  hills,  originally  of  separate  cantons,  were  too  near  together 
to  permit  independence  except  at  the  cost  of  perpetual  and  mutually  destructive 
warfare,  so  that  the  only  alternative,  that  of  union  on  a  basis  of  equality  of 
rights,  was  adopted.  This  at  an  early  day  broke  down  the  political  and  religious 
exclusiveness  characteristic  of  the  Italian  cantons  and  of  all  primitive  com- 
munities and  gave  to  the  Romans  a  liberality  of  mind  and  an  adaptability  which 
was  one  of  the  chief  elements  of  their  success  in  dealing  with  other  peoples. 
Rome  thus  absorbed  other  communities  instead  of  destroying  them. 


Chapter   III 

THE   ROMAN   CONSTITUTION   AND   THE  REFORMS 
OF   SERVIUS   TULLIUS 

THE  basis  of  the  Roman  constitution  was  the  family,  and 
the  constitution  of  the  state  was  but  an  expansion  of  that 
of  the  family.  The  head  of  the  household  was  of  necessity 
a  man,  and  his  authority  alike  as  father  or  husband  was  supreme, 
and  in  the  eye  of  the  law  as  absolute  over  wife  and  child  as  over 
slave.  Though  a  woman  could  acquire  property,  she  was  under 
the  absolute  dominion  of  her  father,  or,  if  married,  under  that  of 
her  husband,  or,  if  he  died,  under  the  guardianship  of  her  nearest 
male  relations.  This  authority  of  the  pater  familias  was  alike  irre- 
sponsible and  unchangeable;  nor  could  it  be  dissolved  except  by 
death.  Although  a  grown-up  son  might  establish  a  separate  house- 
hold of  his  own,  all  his  property,  however  acquired,  belonged  legally 
to  his  father;  and  it  was  easier  for  a  slave  to  obtain  release  from 
his  master  than  for  a  son  to  free  himself  from  the  control  of  his 
father.  A  daughter,  if  married,  passed  out  of  her  father's  hand 
into  that  of  her  husband,  to  whose  clan  or  gens  she  henceforth 
belonged.  On  the  father's  death  the  sons  still  preserved  the  unity 
of  the  family,  nor  did  it  become  broken  till  the  male  stock  died 
out,  but,  as  the  connecting  links  became  gradually  weaker  in  suc- 
ceeding generations,  there  arose  the  distinction  between  members 
of  a  family,  agnati,  and  members  of  a  clan,  gentiles.  The  former 
denoted  those  male  members  of  a  family  who  could  show  the  suc- 
cessive steps  of  their  descent  from  a  common  progenitor,  the  latter, 
those  who  could  no  longer  prove  their  degree  of  relationship  by 
pointing  out  the  intermediate  links  of  connection  with  a  common 
ancestor.  Slaves  belonging  to  a  household  were  regarded  by  the 
law,  not  as  living  beings,  but  as  chattels,  whose  position  was  not 
affected  by  the  death  of  the  head  of  the  house.  Attached  to  the 
Roman  household  was  an  intermediate  class  of  persons  called 
clients  ("listeners"),  or  dependents.  These  consisted  partly  of 
refugees  from  foreign  states ;  partly  of  slaves  living  in  a  state  of 
practical  freedom ;  partly  of  persons  who,  though  not  free  citizens 

11 


12  ROME 

of  any  community,  lived  in  a  condition  of  protected  freedom. 
Although  these  formed  with  the  slaves  the  familia,  or  "  body  of 
servants,"  and  were  dependent  on  the  will  of  the  head  of  the  house 
or  patron,  their  position  was  practically  one  of  considerable  free- 
dom; and  in  the  course  of  several  generations  the  clients  of  a 
household  acquired  more  and  more  liberty.  Everyone  who  was  a 
member  of  a  Roman  family,  and  therefore  of  one  of  the  gentes, 
or  clanships,  whose  union  formed  the  state,  was  a  true  citizen  or 
burgess  of  Rome.  Everyone  born  of  parents  united  by  the  cere- 
mony of  the  sacred  salted  cake  was  also  a  full  citizen ;  and  therefore 
the  Roman  burgesses  called  themselves  "  fathers'  children,"  patricii, 
as  in  the  eye  of  the  law  they  alone  had  a  father.  Thus  the  state 
consisted  of  gentes,  or  clans,  and  the  clans  of  families,  and  although 
the  relations  of  the  various  members  of  the  household  were  not 
altered  by  their  incorporation  with  the  state,  yet  a  son  outside  the 
household  was  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  father  in  respect 
of  political  rights  and  duties.  So,  too,  the  various  clients,  though 
not  admitted  to  the  rights  and  duties  proper  to  true  burgesses,  were 
not  wholly  excluded  from  participation  in  state  festivals  and  state 
worship;  and  this  would  be  especially  true  of  those  who  were  not 
clients  of  special  families,  but  of  the  community  at  large. 

Since  the  family  served  as  the  model  for  the  constitution  of 
the  state,  it  was  necessary  to  choose  someone  who  should  stand  in 
the  same  relation  to  the  body-politic  as  the  head  of  the  family  did 
to  the  household.  He  who  was  so  chosen  rex,  or  leader,  possessed 
the  same  absolute  power  over  the  state  as  the  house-father  had  over 
his  household,  and,  like  him,  ruled  for  life:  there  was  no  other 
holder  of  power  besides  him.  His  "command"  (imperium)  was 
all-powerful  in  peace  and  war,  and  he  was  preceded  by  lictors,  or 
"  summoners,"  armed  with  axes  and  rods  on  all  public  occasions. 
He  nominated  priests  and  priestesses,  and  acted  as  the  nation's 
intercessor  with  the  gods.  He  held  the  keys  of  the  public  treasury, 
and  alone  had  the  right  of  publicly  addressing  the  burgesses.  He 
was  supreme  judge  in  all  private  and  criminal  trials,  and  had  the 
power  of  life  and  death ;  he  called  out  the  people  for  military  serv- 
ice, and  commanded  the  army.  Any  magistrates,  any  religious 
colleges,  any  military  officers,  that  he  might  appoint,  derived  all 
their  power  from  him,  and  only  existed  during  his  pleasure.  His 
power  only  ended  with  death,  and  he  appointed  his  successor,  thus 
imparting  a  sense  of  permanence  to  the  kingship,  despite  the  per- 


ROMAN    CONSTITUTION  13 

sonal  change  of  the  holders  of  the  sovereign  power.  But,  although 
the  king's  authority  was  so  absolute,  he  never  came  to  be  regarded 
by  the  Romans  as  other  than  mortal,  nor,  as  by  divine  right,  higher 
and  better  than  his  fellow-citizens.  This  view  of  the  kingship  was 
at  once  the  moral  and  practical  limitation  of  its  power.  The  king 
was  the  people's  representative,  and  derived  his  power  from  them, 
and  was  accountable  to  them  for  its  use  and  abuse.  Moreover,  the 
legal  limitation  to  his  power  lay  in  the  principle  that  he  was  entitled 
only  to  execute  the  law,  not  to  alter  it.  Any  deviation  from  the 
law  had  to  receive  the  previous  sanction  of  the  assembly  of  the 
people  and  the  council  of  elders.  There  is  no  parallel  in  modern 
life  to  the  Roman  family,  or  Roman  state,  or  Roman  sovereign. 

The  principle  on  which  the  division  of  the  burgesses  rested  was 
that  ten  houses  formed  a  clan,  ten  clans  a  wardship  (curia),  ten 
wardships  the  community.  Each  householder  furnished  a  foot- 
soldier  and  each  clan  a  horseman  and  senator.  If  communities  com- 
bined, each  was  a  part  or  tribe  of  the  whole  community.  Originally 
each  household  had  its  own  portion  of  land,  but  when  households 
combined  into  a  gens,  each  clan  had  its  lands,  and  this  system 
naturally  extended  to  curies  and  communities,  whether  single  or 
combined.  Thus  clan-lands  formed  in  primitive  times  the  smallest 
unit  in  the  division  of  land.  Although  this  division  into  ten  curies 
early  disappeared  in  Rome,  we  find  it  in  later  Latin  communities, 
which  always  had  one  hundred  acting  councilors,  each  of  whom 
was  "  head  of  ten  households."  This  constitutional  scheme  did  not 
originate  in  Rome,  but  was  a  primitive  institution,  common  to  all 
Latins.  What  the  precise  object  and  value  of  this  division  was  we 
cannot  now  determine,  and  it  is  clear  that  any  attempt  to  rigidly 
fix  the  number  of  households  and  clans  must,  through  ordinary 
human  accidents,  have  failed.  The  really  important  unit  in  the 
division  was  the  curia,  the  members  of  which  were  bound  by  re- 
ligious ties,  and  had  a  priest  of  their  own.  Military  levies  and 
money  valuations  were  made  according  to  curial  divisions,  and  the 
burgesses  met  and  voted  by  curies.  Although  all  full  citizens  or 
burgesses  were  on  a  footing  of  absolute  equality  as  regarded  one 
another,  the  distinction  between  those  who  were  burgesses  and 
those  who  were  not  was  most  sharply  and  rigidly  defined.  If  a 
stranger  were  adopted  into  the  burgess-body  he  could  not  retain 
his  rights  as  citizen  elsewhere.  If  he  did.  he  merely  possessed 
honorary  citizenship  at  Rome,  and  was  entitled  to  the  privileges 


14  ROME 

and  protection  of  a  guest,  not  to  the  exercise  of  full  citizen  rights. 
There  were  no  class  privileges  at  Rome.  All  wore  the  simple 
woolen  toga  in  public,  although  certain  officers  by  virtue  of  their 
office  were  distinguished  by  dress.  As  the  Latin  immigrants  had 
no  conquered  race  to  deal  with,  the  nobility  of  Greece  and  the 
caste  of  India  were  unknown  to  them.  The  most  important  duty 
of  the  burgesses  was  military  service,  as  they  alone  had  the  right 
of  bearing  arms.  Hence  the  name  populus  ("body  of  warriors," 
connected  with  populari,  "  to  lay  waste  ")  ;  hence,  too,  the  name  of 
quirites  ("  lancemen"),  given  them  by  the  king.  Other  duties  in- 
cumbent on  the  burgesses  were  such  as  the  king  laid  upon  them; 
among  these  was  the  all-important  task  of  building  walls,  to  which 
the  name  of  moenia  ("  tasks")  was  given.  As  there  was  no  state 
pay  for  services  so  rendered,  there  was  no  direct  state  expenditure 
of  state  taxation.  The  very  victims  for  sacrifice  were  provided  by 
the  deposit,  or  cattle-fine,  which  the  defeated  party  in  a  lawsuit  was 
bound  to  pay.  In  cases  of  urgent  need  a  direct  contribution  was 
levied,  but  this  was  regarded  as  a  loan  and  repaid  when  times  im- 
proved. Although  the  king  managed  the  state  exchequer,  the  state 
property,  e.  g.,  the  land  won  in  war,  was  not  identified  with  the 
private  property  of  the  king.  His  exchequer  was  filled  partly  by 
the  land-taxes,  *.  e.,  the  scriptura,  or  pasture  tribute,  paid  by  those 
who  fed  cattle  on  the  common  pasture,  and  the  vectigalia,  or  pay- 
ment in  kind  in  place  of  rent,  by  those  who  were  lessees  of  the  state 
lands ;  partly  by  gains  in  war ;  partly  by  harbor  dues  levied  on  the 
exports  and  imports  of  Ostia ;  partly,  perhaps,  by  the  tax  which  the 
non-burgesses  settled  at  Rome  paid  him  for  protection.  In  addi- 
tion to  these  duties  the  burgesses  had  also  rights.  They  were 
convoked  by  the  king  in  formal  assemblies  (comitia  curiata)  twice 
a  year,  or  in  such  other  meetings  as  the  king  thought  fit  to  hold. 
They  had  no  right  of  speech  on  such  occasions,  unless  the  king  saw 
fit  to  grant  it;  their  duty  was  merely  to  listen  and  return  simple 
answers  without  discussion  to  the  king's  questions.  As  long  as  the 
king  was  executor  of  existing  laws,  no  intervention  was  necessary 
on  the  part  of  the  citizens ;  but  where  abnormal  events  arose  which 
necessitated  any  change  of  or  deviation  from  existing  laws,  the 
cooperation  and  assent  of  the  burgess  body  was  essential.  The 
king  put  the  question  and  the  people  returned  answer ;  and  the  lex, 
or  law,  which  was  the  outcome  of  this  process,  was  not  in  its  origin 
a  command  of  a  king,  but  a  contract  proposed  by  the  king  and 


ROMAN    CONSTITUTION  15 

accepted  or  refused  by  his  hearers.  The  citizens  alone  could  allow 
a  man  to  make  such  a  will  as  transferred  his  property  on  his  death 
to  another;  they  alone  could  sanction  the  adoption  of  a  man  into 
the  burgess-body,  or  allow  a  burgess  to  surrender  his  rights  as 
citizen;  they  alone  could  pardon  a  condemned  criminal,  whence 
arose  the  right  of  appeal,  which  was  allowed  only  to  those  who 
pleaded  guilty.  Thus  far  the  assembly  of  the  community,  restricted 
and  hampered  as  it  first  appears,  was  yet  from  antiquity  a  constitu- 
ent element  of  the  Roman  commonwealth,  and  was  in  law  superior 
to,  rather  than  coordinate  with,  the  king. 

The  origin  of  the  senate  can  with  probability  be  ascribed  to 
that  remote  period  when  each  clan  in  Latium  was  under  the  rule 
of  its  own  elder.  As  the  clans  became  amalgamated,  the  position 
of  such  an  elder  was  necessarily  subordinated  to  that  of  the  head 
or  king  of  the  community;  but  that  the  senate  was  not  a  mere  con- 
clave of  trusty  councilors  called  into  being  by  the  king,  but  an  in- 
stitution as  old  as  that  of  king  and  burgess-assembly,  admits  of 
little  doubt.  It  resembled  the  assembly  of  princes  and  rulers,  gath- 
ered in  a  circle  round  the  king  as  described  by  Homer.  The  number 
was  fixed  at  three  hundred,  corresponding  to  the  three  hundred  clans 
of  which  the  three  primitive  communities,  forming  the  whole  state, 
were  composed.  All  senators  sat  for  life;  they  were  chosen  by 
the  king,  and  it  is  only  natural  to  suppose  that,  if  originally  the 
senate  consisted  of  the  ancient  body  of  clan  elders,  the  king  always 
chose,  when  a  senator  died,  a  man  of  the  same  clan  to  fill  his  place. 
The  senators  were,  therefore,  so  many  kings  of  the  whole  com- 
munity, although  the  chief  power,  as  in  the  household,  was  vested 
in  one  of  their  body,  namely  the  king;  their  insignia,  though  in- 
ferior to  those  of  the  king,  were  of  the  same  character ;  the  purple 
border  being  substituted  for  the  purple  robe  of  the  king,  and  the 
red  shoes  of  the  senator  being  lower  and  less  striking  than  those 
which  the  king  wore.  Should  the  king  die  without  appointing  a 
successor,  one  of  the  senators,  chosen  by  lot  as  interrex,  exercised 
his  authority  for  five  days,  and  this  interrex  appointed  the  next, 
thus  passing  on  the  five  days'  sovereign  power  to  one  of  his  own 
body.  Finally,  one  of  these  interreges,  but  never  the  one  first 
chosen,  nominated  the  king,  and  his  choice  was  ratified  by  the  whole 
assembly  of  the  citizens.  Thus  the  senate  was  the  ultimate  holder 
of  the  ruling  power,  and  was  a  guarantee  of  the  permanence  of  the 
monarchy.     Further,  it  was  the  guardian  of  the  constitution,  ex- 


16  ROME 

amining  every  new  resolution  which  the  king  suggested  and  the 
burgesses  adopted,  and  having  the  right  of  vetoing  these  resolu- 
tions, should  they  appear  to  violate  existing  rights.  The  senate's 
consent  had  also  to  be  obtained  before  war  could  be  declared.  And 
thus  the  senate's  duty  was  to  guard  against  any  innovation  or  viola- 
tion of  the  constitution,  whether  coming  from  king  or  burgess- 
assembly.  In  consequence  of  this  power  of  the  senate,  or  at  least 
in  close  connection  with  it,  arose  the  very  ancient  custom  of  the 
king's  convoking  the  senate,  and  submitting  to  it  the  proposals  he 
intended  to  bring  before  the  citizens.  By  thus  ascertaining  the  opin- 
ions of  the  individual  members,  the  king  avoided  the  possibility 
of  any  subsequent  opposition  from  that  body.  On  most  questions, 
involving  no  breach  of  the  constitution,  the  senate's  part  was  doubt- 
less merely  that  of  compliance  with  the  king's  wishes.  The  senate 
could  not  meet  unless  convoked  by  the  king,  and  no  one  might 
declare  his  opinion  unasked ;  nor  was  the  consultation  of  the  senate 
on  ordinary  matters  of  state  business  legally  incumbent  on  the  king ; 
but  this  consultation  soon  became  usual,  and  from  this  usage  the 
subsequent  extensive  powers  of  the  senate  were  in  great  measure 
developed.  To  sum  up,  the  oldest  constitution  of  Rome  was  in 
some  measure  constitutional  monarchy  inverted.  In  the  Roman 
constitution  the  community  of  the  people  exercised  very  much  the 
same  functions  as  belong  to  the  king  in  England.  The  right  of 
pardon,  which  in  England  is  the  prerogative  of  the  crown,  was  in 
Rome  the  prerogative  of  the  community ;  while  all  government  was 
vested  in  the  president  of  the  state,  whose  royal  power  was  at  once 
absolute  and  limited  by  the  laws.  Further,  in  the  relations  of  the 
state  to  the  individual,  we  find  that  the  family  was  not  sacrificed 
to  the  community,  but  that,  though  power  of  imprisonment  or  death 
was  vested  in  the  state,  no  burgess  could  have  his  son  or  his  field 
taken  from  him,  or  even  taxation  imposed  on  him.  In  no  other  com- 
munity could  a  citizen  live  so  absolutely  secure  from  encroachment, 
either  on  the  part  of  his  fellows  or  of  the  state  itself.  This  consti- 
tution was  neither  manufactured  nor  borrowed;  it  grew  and  de- 
veloped with  the  growth  and#  development  of  the  Roman  people, 
and  as  long  as  there  existed  a  Roman  community,  in  spite  of  changes 
of  form,  it  was  always  held  that  the  magistrate  had  absolute  com- 
mand, that  the  council  of  elders  was  the  highest  authority  in  the 
state,  and  that  every  exceptional  resolution  required  the  sanction  of 
the  sovereign,  or,  in  other  words,  of  the  community  of  the  people. 


ROMAN    CONSTITUTION  17 

We  have  already  stated  that  the  earliest  amalgamation  in  the 
history  of  Rome  was  that  which  blended  together  the  Ramnes, 
Tities,  and  Luceres.  This  was  followed  by  the  union  of  cantons 
located  on  the  other  hills  in  the  same  neighborhood,  but  no  new  tribe 
was  added  to  the  original  three,  the  new  burgesses  being  distributed 
among  the  existing  tribes  and  curies.  Henceforth  each  of  the  three 
tribes  contained  two  divisions  or  ranks,  and  these  ranks  were  de- 
noted by  the  names  "  first"  (priores)  and  "  second  "  (posteriores). 
But  no  increase  was  made  in  the  number  of  the  senate,  the  primitive 
number  of  three  hundred  remaining  unchanged  down  to  the  seventh 
century  of  the  city's  history.  So  also  the  magistrates  or  king's 
deputies  remained  the  same.  This  amalgamation  increased  the  bulk, 
but  did  not  change  the  character  of  the  Roman  state.  But  another 
process  of  incorporation,  the  first  steps  of  which  may  be  traced  to 
this  period,  and  which  proceeded  very  gradually,  did  profoundly 
affect  the  community.  We  refer  to  the  development  of  the  plebs — a 
problem  most  intricate  and  elusive.  On  a  previous  page  the  posi- 
tion of  "  clients  "  was  described  as  twofold — that  of  those  depend- 
ent on  and  protected  by  the  master  of  the  household,  and  that  of 
those  dependent  on  and  protected  by  the  state,  i.  e.,  by  the  king. 
Every  fresh  amalgamation  doubtless  brought  in  an  accession  of 
clients,  but  the  principal  increase  must  have  been  due  to  the  attraction 
that  Rome,  as  a  commercial  center,  possessed  for  foreigners,  who 
became  metics,  or  resident  aliens,  and  to  the  influence  of  war,  which 
while  it  transferred  the  citizens  of  conquered  towns  to  Rome,  at  the 
same  time  thinned  the  ranks  of  the  Roman  citizens,  who  alone  had 
the  doubtful  privilege  of  bearing  the  brunt  of  such  wars.  In  truth 
this  latter  fact  was  the  chief  cause  in  promoting  the  amalgamation 
of  the  clients  and  the  citizens.  With  the  increase  of  the  whole  body 
of  clients,  and  especially  of  that  portion  consisting  of  foreigners,  at- 
tached as  clients  to  the  Roman  state,  but  often  retaining  the  citizen- 
ship of  other  communities,  the  old  restrictions,  which  were  more 
easily  observed  in  the  case  of  household  clients,  must  have  broken 
down.  Many,  in  fact,  must  have  enjoyed  practical  freedom,  though, 
of  course,  not  the  full  rights  of  Roman  citizens.  The  immemorial 
principle  of  Roman  law  that,  when  once  a  master  or  owner  had 
renounced  his  ownership,  he  could  never  resume  it  over  the  freed- 
man  or  the  freedman's  descendants;  the  liberal  concessions,  made 
by  Roman  law  especially  to  foreigners,  as  regarded  marriage  and 
the  acquisition  of  property;  the  increasing  number  of  manumitted 


18  ROME 

slaves;  the  influx  alike  of  traders,  and  still  more  of  Latins  van- 
quished in  war;  the  corresponding  decrease  of  true  Roman  patri- 
cians, the  constant  vexation  of  the  relations  between  client  and 
patron — these  and  other  causes  must  have  all  sufficed  to  threaten  a 
revolution  of  the  direst  consequences  to  the  Roman  state.  The  new 
name  of  plebes,  or  multitude  (from  pleo,  plenus),  by  which  the 
clients  were  now  called,  was  ominous,  signifying,  as  it  did,  that  the 
majority  no  longer  felt  so  much  their  special  dependence  as  their 
want  of  political  rights.1  The  danger  was  averted  by  the  reform 
associated  with  the  name  of  Servius  Tullius,  although  the  new 
constitution  assigned  the  plebeians  primarily  only  duties,  not  rights. 
Military  service  was  now  changed  from  a  burden  upon  birth  to  a 
burden  on  property.  All  freeholders,  from  seventeen  to  sixty  years 
of  age,  whether  burgesses,  metics,  or  manumitted  slaves,  provided 
only  they  held  land,  were  bound  to  serve ;  and  they  were  distributed, 
according  to  the  size  of  their  property,  into  five  classes.  The  first 
class,  who  were  obliged  to  appear  in  complete  armor,  consisted  of  the 
possessors  of  an  entire  hide  of  land,  and  were  called  classici.  The 
remaining  four  classes  consisted  of  the  respective  possessors  of 
three-quarters,  half,  a  quarter,  or  an  eighth  of  a  nominal  farm,  I.  e., 
of  a  farm  whose  size  served  as  the  standard  by  which  such  divisions 
were  regulated  (probably  such  a  farm  contained  at  least  twenty 
jugera  2).  The  cavalry  was  dealt  with  in  the  same  way:  its  exist- 
ing six  divisions,  which  retained  their  old  names,  were  tripled ;  only 
the  richest  landholders,  whether  burgesses  or  non-burgesses,  served 
as  horsemen.  All  those  who  held  land  and  were  incapable  of  serv- 
ice, either  from  sex  or  age,  were  bound  to  provide  horses  and 
fodder  for  special  troopers.  To  facilitate  the  levying  of  the  infan- 
try, the  city  was  divided  into  four  parts.  Each  of  these  four  divi- 
sions contributed  a  fourth  part,  not  merely  of  the  force  as  a  whole, 
but  of  each  of  its  military  subdivisions,  and  this  arrangement  tended 
to  merge  all  distinctions  of  clan  and  place,  and  also  to  blend,  by  its 
leveling  spirit,  burgesses  and  metics  into  one  people.  The  army 
was  divided  into  two  levies:  the  first  comprised  the  juniors,  who 
served  in  the  field  from  their  seventeenth  to  their  forty-sixth  year; 
the  second,  the  seniors,  who  guarded  the  walls  at  home.  The  whole 
force  of  infantry  consisted  of  four  legions,  each  of  4200  men,  or  42 

1  There  are  various  other  theories  as  to  the  origin  of  the  plebeian  class.  For 
a  discussion  of  the  question  see  Soltau,  "  Entstehung  der  alts  romischen  Volks- 
versammlungen,"  Berlin,  1881. 

2  A  jugera  was  approximately  three-fifths  of  an  acre. 


ROMAN    CONSTITUTION  19 

centuries,  3000  of  whom  were  heavy  armed,  and  1200  light  armed; 
two  of  these  legions  were  juniors  and  two  seniors.  Added  to  these 
were  1800  cavalry,  thus  bringing  the  whole  force  to  about  20,000 
men.  The  century,  or  body  of  one  hundred,  formed  the  unit  of  this 
military  scheme,  and  by  the  arrangement  above  indicated  there 
would  be  18  centuries  of  cavalry  and  168  of  infantry.  To  these, 
other  centuries  of  supernumeraries  must  be  added,  who  marched 
with  the  army  unarmed  and  took  the  place  of  those  who  fell  ill  or 
died  in  battle.  The  whole  number  of  centuries  amounted  to  193  or 
194 ;  nor  was  it  increased  as  the  population  rose.  Out  of  this  mili- 
tary organization  arose  the  census  or  register  of  landed  property, 
including  the  slaves,  cattle,  etc.,  that  each  man  possessed,  and  this 
was  strictly  revised  every  fourth  year.  This  reform,  though  in- 
stituted on  purely  military  lines  and  for  military  purposes,  had 
important  political  results.  In  the  first  place,  every  soldier,  whether 
a  full  citizen  or  not,  would  be  certain  to  have  it  in  his  power  to 
become  a  centurion  and,  further,  a  military  tribune.  In  the  second, 
those  rights  which  the  burgesses  had  formerly  possessed,  not  as  an 
assembly  of  citizens  in  curies,  but  as  a  levy  of  armed  burgesses, 
would  now  be  shared  by  the  whole  army  of  centuries.  These  rights 
conferred  the  power  on  the  military  centuries  of  authorizing  sol- 
diers to  make  wills  before  battle,  and  of  granting  permission  to  the 
king  to  make  an  aggressive  war.  In  the  third  place,  although  the 
rights  of  the  old  burgess-assembly  were  in  no  way  restricted,  there 
thus  arose  three  classes:  the  full  burgesses  or  citizens,  the  clients 
possessing  freeholds,  called  later  "  burgesses  without  the  right  of 
voting,"  who  shared  in  the  public  burdens,  i.  e.,  military  service, 
tribute,  and  task-work,  and  were,  therefore,  called  municipals,  and 
those  metics  who  were  not  included  in  the  tribes,  and  who  paid 
protection-money,  and  were  non-freeholders.  Analogy  from  Greek 
states  inclines  to  the  view  that  this  reform  was  modeled  on  Greek 
lines,  and  produced  by  Greek  influence.  The  adoption  of  the  armor 
and  arrangements  of  the  Greek  hoplite  system  in  the  legion,  the 
supply  of  cavalry  horses  by  widows  and  orphans,  point  in  this  direc- 
tion; moreover,  about  this  time  the  Greek  states  in  lower  Italy 
adopted  a  modification  of  the  pure  clan  constitution,  and  gave  the 
preponderance  of  power  to  the  landholders. 


Chapter    IV 

ROME  AND   THE   OTHER   ITALIAN   POWERS   DURING 
THE   REGAL   PERIOD.     753-509   B.C. 

THE  steps  by  which  Rome  rose  to  the  proud  position  of  head 
state  in  Latium,  the  union  of  the  Latin  communities  under 
her  headship,  the  extension  alike  of  Latin  territory  and  of 
the  city  of  Rome,  and  her  early  relations  with  the  Etruscans  and 
Greeks,  cannot  now  be  described,  save  in  faint  outline.  We  may, 
however,  briefly  summarize  the  results,  the  details  of  which  have 
either  been  buried  in  oblivion  or  falsified  by  mythical  legend. 
Firstly,  those  Latin  communities  situated  on  the  Upper  Tiber,  and 
between  the  Tiber  and  the  Anio — Antemnae,  Crustumerium,  Ficul- 
nea,  Medullia,  Caenina,  Corniculum,  Cameria,  Collatia,  which  on 
the  east  side  sorely  hampered  Rome — were  very  early  subjugated; 
the  only  one  which  retained  its  independence  was  Nomentum, 
probably  by  alliance  with  Rome.  Constant  war  was  waged  be- 
tween the  Romans  and  the  Etruscan  people  of  Veii  for  the  pos- 
session of  Fidenae,  on  the  left  (Latin)  bank  of  the  Tiber,  about 
five  miles  from  Rome,  but  apparently  without  the  Romans 
becoming  permanent  masters  of  this  important  outpost. 

Secondly,  Alba  was  conquered  and  destroyed;  to  her  position 
as  the  recognized  political  head  and  sacred  metropolis  of  Latium, 
Rome  succeeded.  Rome  thus  became  president  of  the  Latin  league 
of  thirty  cantons,  and  the  seat  of  the  religious  ceremonial  observed 
at  the  Latin  festival.  An  alliance  was  concluded  on  equal  terms 
between  Rome  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Latin  confederacy  on  the 
other,  establishing  lasting  peace  throughout  Latium,  and  a  per- 
petual league  for  offense  and  defense.  Equality  of  rights  was 
established  between  the  members  of  this  federation,  alike  as  to 
commerce  and  intermarriage.  No  member  of  the  league  could 
exist  as  a  slave  within  the  league's  territory,  and,  though  every 
member  only  exercised  political  rights  as  member  of  the  com- 
munity to  which  he  belonged,  he  had  the  private  right  of  living 
anywhere  he  liked  within  the  Latin  territory ;  and,  further,  although 

20 


THE    REGAL   PERIOD  21 

753-509  B.C. 

Latin  law  was  not  of  necessity  identical  with  Roman,  the  league 
naturally  brought  the  two  into  more  complete  harmony  with  one 
another.  The  difference  between  the  position  occupied  by  Rome 
and  that  formerly  held  by  Alba,  was  that  the  honorary  presidency 
of  the  latter  was  replaced  by  the  real  supremacy  of  the  former. 
Rome  was  not,  as  Alba,  a  mere  member  of  the  league,  and  included 
within  it,  but  rather  existed  alongside  it ;  this  is  shown  by  the  com- 
position of  the  federal  army,  the  Roman  and  Latin  force  being  of 
equal  strength,  and  the  supreme  command  being  held  by  Rome  and 
Latium  alternately.  In  accordance  with  this  principle,  all  land  and 
other  property  acquired  in  war  by  the  league  was  divided  equally 
between  Rome  and  Latium.  Each  Latin  community  retained  its 
own  independent  constitution  and  administration,  so  far  as  its  obli- 
gations to  the  league  were  not  concerned;  and  the  league  of  the 
thirty  Latin  communities  retained  its  independence,  and  had  its  own 
federal  council,  in  contradistinction  to  the  self-government  and 
council  of  Rome.  As  to  the  treatment  of  those  Latin  communities 
which,  like  Alba,  were  actually  subjugated  by  Rome,  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case  doubtless  decided  the  question,  as  to 
whether  the  inhabitants  of  a  conquered  town  were  forced  to  migrate 
to  Rome,  or  allowed  to  remain  in  the  open  villages  of  their  old  dis- 
trict. Strongholds  in  all  cases  were  razed,  and  the  conquered  coun- 
try was  included  in  the  Roman  territory,  and  the  vanquished 
farmers  were  taught  to  regard  Rome  as  their  market-center  and  seat 
of  justice.  Legally  they  occupied  the  position  of  clients,  though  in 
some  cases  of  individuals  and  clans  full  burgess-rights  were 
granted ;  this  was  especially  the  case  with  Alban  clans.  The 
jealousy  with  which  the  Latin  cantons,  and  especially  the  Roman, 
guarded  against  the  rise  of  colonies  as  rival  political  centers  is  well 
shown  in  Rome's  treatment  of  Ostia ;  the  latter  city  had  no  polit- 
ical independence,  and  its  citizens  were  only  allowed  to  retain,  if 
they  already  possessed,  the  general  burgess-rights  of  Rome.  Thus 
this  centralizing  process,  which  caused  the  absorption  of  a  number 
of  smaller  states  in  a  larger  one,  though  not  essentially  a  Roman 
nor  even  Italian  idea,  was  carried  out  more  consistently  and  perse- 
veringly  by  the  Roman  than  by  any  other  Italian  canton;  and  the 
success  of  Rome,  as  of  Athens,  is  doubtless  due  to  the  thorough 
application  of  this  system  of  centralization. 

Thirdly,  although  Rome  failed  to  master  Fidenae,  it  kept  its 
hold  upon  Janiculum,  and  upon  both  banks  at  the  mouth  of  the 


22  ROME 

753-50S  B.C. 

Tiber.  In  the  direction  of  the  Sabines  and  Aequi,  Rome  advanced 
her  position,  and,  by  the  help  of  an  alliance  with  the  Hernici,  held  in 
check  her  eastern  neighbors.  On  the  south,  constant  wars,  not 
without  success,  were  waged  against  the  Volscians  and  Rutulians; 
and  in  this  quarter  we  first  meet  with  Latin  colonies,  *.  e.,  com- 
munities founded  by  Rome  and  Latium  on  the  enemy's  soil,  which 
shows  that  the  earliest  extension  of  Latin  territory  took  place  in 
this  direction. 

Fourthly,  in  addition  to  this  enlargement  of  the  Latin  borders 
towards  the  east  and  south,  the  city  of  Rome,  owing  to  its  increase 
of  inhabitants,  and  commercial  and  political  prominence,  needed 
new  defenses.  In  consequence  the  Servian  wall  was  constructed, 
enlarging  the  old  Palatine  city  so  as  to  include  the  Aventine,  Coelian, 
Esquiline,  Viminal,  Quirinal  and  Capitoline  hills,  and  the  inter- 
vening spaces.1  The  citadel  or  acropolis  of  the  city  was  removed 
from  the  Palatine  to  the  Capitoline  hill,  which  was  easier  to  defend, 
and  Janiculum,  the  hill  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Tiber,  was  also 
fortified  and  united  by  a  bridge  with  the  southern  bank. 

Finally  the  relations  of  Rome  during  the  regal  period  with  the 
two  foreign  races  with  which  her  early  history  is  interwoven  must 
be  considered.  These  races  are  the  Etruscans  and  the  Italian 
Greeks.  A  mystery  shrouds  the  first  people  as  to  their  origin,  lan- 
guage, race-classification,  and  original  home.  Their  heavy  bodily 
structure,  gloomy  and  fantastic  religion,  strange  manners  and  cus- 
toms, and  harsh  language,  point  to  their  original  distinctness  from 
all  Italian  and  Greek  races.  No  one  has  been  able  either  to  decipher 
the  numerous  remains  of  their  language  or  to  classify  with  precision 
the  language  itself.  Whatever  was  their  original  home,  the  fact 
of  the  Etruscan  dialect  being  still  spoken  in  Livy's  time  by  the  in- 
habitants of  the  Raetian  Alps,  and  of  Mantua  remaining  Tuscan  to 
a  late  period,  proves  that  Etruscans  dwelt  in  the  district  north  of  the 
Po,  bounded  on  the  east  by  the  Veneti,  and  on  the  west  by  the  Ligu- 
rians.  To  the  south  of  the  Po,  and  at  its  mouths,  the  Umbrians, 
who  were  the  older  settlers,  were  mingled  with  and  under  the  su- 
premacy of  the  Etruscan  immigrants ;  and  the  towns  of  Hatria  and 
Spina,  founded  by  the  Umbrians,  and  Felsina  (Bologna)  and  Ra- 

1  It  is  necessary  to  remark  that  this  enlarged  Rome  was  never  looked  upon 
as  the  "  city  of  seven  hills,"  which  title  was  exclusively  reserved  for  the  narrower 
old  Rome  of  the  Palatine.  The  modern  list  of  the  seven  hills,  as  comprising  those 
embraced  by  the  Servian  wall,  viz.,  Palatine,  Aventine,  Coelian,  Esquiline,  Vimi- 
nal, Quirinal,  Capitoline,  is  unknown  to  any  ancient  author. 


THE    REGAL   PERIOD  23 

753-509  B.C. 

venna,  founded  by  the  Etruscans,  point  to  this  joint  settlement ;  but 
the  irruptions  of  the  Celts  forced  the  Etruscans  early  to  abandon 
their  position  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Po,  and  later  that  on  the  right 
bank  of  that  river. 

The  great  settlement  of  the  Tuscans  in  the  land  that  still  bears 
their  name  completely  effaced  all  traces  of  Ligurian  or  Umbrian 
predecessors  in  that  country,  and  maintained  its  position  with  great 
tenacity  down  to  the  time  of  the  empire.  Etruria  proper  was 
bounded  on  the  east  by  the  Apennines,  on  the  north  by  the  Arnus, 
on  the  south  at  first  by  the  Ciminian  forest,  and  later  by  the  Tiber. 
The  land  north  of  the  Arnus,  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Macra  and 
the  Apennines,  was  debatable  border  territory,  held  now  by  Ligu- 
rians,  now  by  Etruscans.  The  land  between  the  Ciminian  range  and 
the  Tiber,  with  the  towns  of  Sutrium,  Nepete,  Falerii,  Veii,  and 
Caere,  was  occupied  at  a  later  date,  possibly  in  the  second  century 
of  Rome,  and  the  Italian  population  there  held  its  ground,  though 
in  a  state  of  dependence.  When  the  Tiber  became  the  boundary, 
the  relations  between  Rome  and  the  Etruscan  invader  were  on  the 
whole  peaceful  and  friendly,  especially  with  the  town  of  Caere.  But 
where  an  Etruscan  town  threatened  Rome's  commercial  position  on 
the  Tiber,  as  was  the  case  with  Veii,  constant  war  naturally  resulted. 
Any  trace  of  Etruscans  to  the  south  of  the  Tiber  must  be  ascribed  to 
plundering  expeditions  by  sea,  never  to  regular  land  invasions ;  nor 
is  there  any  reliable  evidence  of  any  Etruscan  settlement  south  of 
the  Tiber  being  planted  by  settlers  who  came  by  land.2  Traditions 
indicate  that  Tuscan  settlements  took  place  in  Rome;  but  the  un- 
doubted fact  that  a  house  of  Etruscan  origin — the  Tarquins — held 
the  royal  scepter  does  not  warrant  the  conclusion  that  the  Etrus- 
cans ever  were  dominant  in  Rome.  There  is  no  evidence  that 
Etruria  exercised  any  essential  influence  on  the  language  or  customs 
or  political  development  of  Rome.  The  passive  attitude  of  Etruria 
towards  Rome  was  probably  due  to  two  causes,  their  struggles  with 
the  Celtic  hordes  from  the  North  and  their  seafaring  tendency, 
which  is  especially  shown  in  their  Campanian  settlements. 

The  commercial  instincts  of  the  Etruscans  caused  them  to  form 
cities  earlier  than  any  other  Italian  race.  Hence  Caere  is  the  first 
Italian  town  mentioned  in  Greek  records.  This  same  instinct  dis- 
posed them  less  to  war,  and  led  them  to  employ  mercenaries  at  a 

2  Others— e.g.,  O.  Muller  and  Pelham  ("Encyclopaedia  Britannica")— hold 
the  contrary  view. 


24  ROME 

753-509  B.C. 

very  early  period.  They  were  governed  by  kings  with  powers 
probably  similar  to  those  of  Roman  kings.  They  seem  to  have  had 
a  system  of  clans  not  dissimilar  from  that  of  the  Romans,  the  nobles 
being  marked  off  strictly  from  the  common  people.  They  were 
formed  into  loose  confederacies,  each  consisting  of  twelve  communi- 
ties, with  a  metropolis  and  federal  head,  or  high  priest  of  the  league. 
The  whole  nation  was  not  embraced  in  one  confederation,  as  the 
Etruscans  in  the  north  and  those  in  Campania  had  leagues  of  their 
own,  though  these  were  so  lax  that  they  allowed,  or  rather  pre- 
ferred, that  separate  communities  should  carry  on  ordinary  wars; 
nor  did  all  the  towns  join,  when,  in  exceptional  cases,  a  war  was  re- 
solved on  by  the  confederacy.  The  Etruscan  confederations  appear 
to  have  been  from  the  first  deficient  in  a  firm  and  paramount  central 
authority. 

When  the  tide  of  Greek  invasion  swept  over  Italy,  it  met  a 
firm  but  not  bitter  resistance  from  the  Latins  and  the  inhabitants  of 
the  southern  part  of  Etruria.  Caere,  in  fact,  attained  its  early 
prosperity  by  its  tolerance  of,  and  benefit  from,  commercial  inter- 
course with  the  Greeks.  But  the  "  wild  Tyrrhenians,"  alike  on  the 
banks  of  the  Po  and  on  the  west  coast,  proved  a  deadly  foe  to  the 
Greek  intruders;  they  dislodged  them  from  Aethalia  (Elba)  and 
Populonia.  The  depredations  of  Etruscan  privateers  were  the  dread 
of  all  Greek  merchants,  and  caused  the  Greeks  to  call  the  western 
sea  of  Italy  by  their  name  (Tyrrhenum  mare).  Although  the 
Etruscans  failed  to  effect  a  settlement  in  Latium,  or  to  dislodge  the 
Greeks  at  Vesuvius,  they  held  sway  in  Antium  and  Surrentum.  The 
Volscians  became  their  clients,  and  they  founded  a  league  of  twelve 
cities  in  Campania.  Their  very  piracy  helped  them  to  develop  their 
commercial  instincts ;  and,  though  at  war  with  Italian  Greeks,  they 
were  often  on  peaceful  and  intimate  relations  with  Greece  proper 
and  Asia  Minor.  Their  position  as  inhabitants  of  northern  Italy 
from  sea  to  sea,  and  thus  commanding  the  mouths  of  the  Po  on  the 
Adriatic  and  the  great  free  ports  on  the  western  sea,  as  holding  the 
land  route  from  Pisae  on  the  western  coast  to  Spina  on  the  eastern, 
and  as  masters  in  the  south  of  the  rich  plains  of  Capua  and  Nola, 
gave  them  exceptional  advantages,  and  the  luxury  thus  speedily  in- 
troduced was  doubtless  no  small  factor  in  their  rapid  decline.  The 
part  they  played,  as  allies  of  the  Phoenicians,  and  especially  of  the 
Carthaginians,  in  opposing  Hellenic  influence,  belongs  to  another 
chapter ;  but  the  main  result  at  first  was  to  increase  their  trade  and 


THE    REGAL   PERIOD  25 

753-509  B.C. 

establish  their  naval  power.  Corsica,  with  the  towns  of  Alalia  and 
Nicaea,  became  subject  to  them,  while  Carthage  seized  the  sister 
island  of  Sardinia. 

In  regard  to  art  and  religion,  Livy's  statement  that  Etruscan 
culture  was  in  early  times  the  basis  of  Roman  education,  as  Greek 
was  in  later  days,  cannot  be  accepted.  The  chief  characteristic  of 
the  Etruscan  religion  was  a  gloomy  mysticism,  and  Etruscan  art 
exercised  very  little  influence  on  that  of  the  Italians.  Their  close 
commercial  connection  with  Greece  in  early  times  accounts  for  cer- 
tain resemblances  in  the  art  of  the  two  countries,  and  Tuscan  skill 
reached  its  height  only  in  those  districts  towards  the  south  where 
Greek  influence  was  strongest.  Far  from  being  the  most  cultured 
people  in  the  peninsula,  the  Etruscans  must  be  assigned  the  lowest 
place  in  the  history  of  Italian  art. 

The  second  foreign  race  which  deeply  affected  the  development 
of  Rome  was  the  Greek,  which  early  established  itself  in  southern 
Italy.  All  civilizing  influences  reached  Italy  by  sea,  and  not  by 
land;  but  it  is  remarkable  that  the  Phoenicians,  who  established 
trading  stations  on  almost  every  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  have 
left  only  one  trace  in  Italy.  Their  factory  at  Caere,  however,  was 
probably  no  older  than  the  stations  established  by  the  Greeks  on 
the  same  coast;  and  the  name  Poeni,  which  the  Latins  gave  to  the 
Phoenicians,  was  borrowed  from  the  Greeks,  and  points  to  the 
probability  that  the  Greeks  introduced  the  Phoenicians  to  Italian 
knowledge.  The  name  of  the  Ionian  sea  applied  to  the  waters 
between  Epirus  and  Sicily,  and  that  of  Ionian  gulf,  applied  by  early 
Greeks  to  the  Adriatic,  prove  that  seafarers  from  Ionia  first  dis- 
covered the  southern  and  eastern  coasts  of  Italy.  Kyme  (Cumae), 
the  oldest  Greek  settlement  in  Italy,  was  founded  by  the  town  of  the 
same  name  on  the  Anatolian  coast.  The  Phocaeans  are  said  to  have 
been  the  first  to  explore  the  western  sea,  and  doubtless  they  were 
soon  followed  by  other  Greeks,  not  only  from  Asia  Minor,  but  from 
Greece  itself  and  the  larger  islands  of  the  Aegean.  These,  in  their 
new  homes  in  southern  Italy  or  Magna  Graecia,  as  it  was  called,  and 
in  Sicily,  recognizing  their  community  of  character  and  interests, 
became  blended  together,  as  in  our  own  time  different  settlers  from 
the  old  world  have  combined  in  their  new  homes  in  North  Amer- 
ica. These  Greek  colonies  may  be  grouped  in  three  divisions.  The 
original  Ionian  group  included  in  Italy  Cumae  with  the  other  Greek 
settlements  at  Vesuvius  and  Rhegium,  and  in  Sicily  Zankle  (later 


26  ROME 

753-509  B.C. 

Messana),  Naxos,  Cantana,  Leontini,  and  Himera.  The  Achaean 
group  embraced  Sybaris  and  most  of  the  cities  of  Magna  Graecia. 
The  Dorian  group  comprehended  Syracuse,  Gela,  Agrigentum,  and 
most  of  the  Sicilian  colonies;  but  in  Italy  it  possessed  only 
Tarentum  and  Heraclea.  As  to  the  period  at  which  these  several 
settlements  took  place,  we  rely  on  the  fact  that,  while  in  Homer's 
time  Sicily  and  Italy  were  practically  unknown,  in  Hesiod's  poems 
the  outlines  of  these  two  lands  are  more  clearly  defined ;  and  in  the 
literature  subsequent  to  Hesiod  a  general  and  fairly  accurate 
knowledge  appears  to  have  been  possessed  by  the  Greeks.  That 
Cumae  was  the  oldest  Greek  settlement  in  Italy  is  generally  al- 
lowed; that  between  that  settlement  and  the  main  Greek  immigra- 
tion into  Sicily  and  lower  Italy  a  considerable  period  elapsed  is 
also  probable;  but  the  first  two  dates  in  Italian  history  which  can 
be  regarded  as  fairly  accurate  are  the  founding  of  Sybaris  by  the 
Achaeans  in  721  B.C.,  and  that  of  the  Dorian  Tarentum  in  708  B.C. 
It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  Italian  and  Sicilian 
Greeks  always  retained  the  closest  connection  with  their  old  homes, 
and  that  therefore  their  history  is  always  a  history  of  Greeks,  never 
of  true  Italians  or  Sicilians.  This  is  most  clearly  shown  by  the 
league  of  the  Achaean  cities,  comprising  Siris,  Pandosia,  Metapon- 
tum,  Sybaris  with  its  offshoots  Posidonia  and  Laus,  Croton,  Cau- 
lonia,  Temesa,  Terina,  and  Pyxus;  which,  like  the  Achaean  league 
in  the  Peloponnese,  preserved  its  own  nationality,  distinct  alike  from 
the  barbarians  of  Italy  and  the  other  Greek  colonies.  These 
Achaean  Greeks  attained  a  very  rapid  prosperity,  especially  in  the 
case  of  Sybaris,  Croton,  and  Metapontum;  but  they  did  so  more 
from  the  fertility  of  their  soil,  which  they  compelled  the  natives  to 
cultivate  for  them,  than  from  their  own  efforts  in  commerce  or 
agriculture.  This  rapid  bloom  bore  no  fruit.  Demoralized  by  a 
life  of  luxury  and  indolence,  these  Italian  Greeks  produced  no  fa- 
mous names  in  Greek  art  or  literature,  and  their  political  constitu- 
tion, sapped  in  the  first  place  by  the  attempt  of  a  few  families  under 
the  guise  of  Pythagorean  philosophy  to  seize  absolute  power,  and 
later  torn  by  party  feuds,  slave  insurrections,  and  the  grossest  social 
abuses,  completely  broke  down.  Thus  the  Achaeans  exercised  but 
little  influence  on  the  civilization  of  Italy ;  and  the  bilingual  mongrel 
people,  that  arose  out  of  the  remains  of  the  native  Italians  and 
Achaeans  and  the  more  recent  immigrants  of  Sabellian  descent, 
never  attained  any  real  prosperity. 


THE    REGAL    PERIOD  27 

753-509  B.C. 

The  other  Greeks  settled  in  Italy  had  a  very  different  effect  on 
that  country.  Although,  unlike  the  Achaeans,  they  founded  their 
cities  by  the  best  harbors,  and  mainly  for  trading  purposes,  they  did 
not  despise  agriculture  and  the  acquisition  of  territory.  The  two 
cities  of  greatest  influence  on  Italy  were  the  Doric  Tarentum  and 
the  Ionic  Cumae.  The  first  named,  from  its  possession  of  the  only 
good  harbor  on  the  southern  coast,  from  the  rich  fisheries  on  its  gulf, 
from  the  excellence  of  its  wool,  and  the  dyeing  of  it  with  the  purple 
juice  of  the  Tarentine  murex,  rapidly  acquired  an  unrivaled  com- 
mercial position  in  the  south  of  Italy.  The  fact,  moreover,  that  the 
Greeks  planted  no  colony  on  the  Italian  shore  of  the  Adriatic,  and 
only  two  of  importance  on  the  Illyrian  coast,  viz.,  Epidamnus  and 
Apollonia,  caused  Tarentum  to  have  no  small  share  in  the  Adriatic 
commerce,  carried  on  by  Corinth  and  Corcyra ;  and,  as  Ancona  and 
Brundisium  rose  at  a  far  later  period,  the  ports  at  the  mouths  of  the 
Po  were  the  only  rivals  of  Tarentum  along  the  whole  east  coast. 
Her  intercourse  by  land  with  Apulia  sowed  the  seeds  of  civilization 
in  the  southeast  of  Italy;  but  it  is  noteworthy  that,  as  a  rule,  the 
eastern  provinces  of  Italy  acquired  the  elements  of  civilization,  not 
from  the  scanty  Greek  settlements  on  the  Illyrian  and  Italian  coasts 
of  the  Adriatic,  but  from  the  more  numerous  colonies  on  the  west 
coast  of  Italy.  The  people  of  Cumae,  and  of  the  other  Greek  sta- 
tions near  Vesuvius,  attained  a  more  moderate  prosperity  than  either 
the  Achaeans  or  Tarentines.  The  district  they  occupied  was  small, 
and  they  contented  themselves  with  spreading  Greek  civilization  by 
peaceful  commercial  intercourse  rather  than  by  a  policy  of  conquest 
and  oppression.  There  is  no  doubt  that  in  very  early  times  the 
western  coast  north  of  Vesuvius  was  visited  by  Greek  voyagers,  but 
the  Latins  and  Etruscans  successfully  resisted  the  intruders,  and 
north  of  Vesuvius  no  independent  Greek  community  existed  in  his- 
torical times.  Nay,  we  may  conclude  that  the  danger  from  Greek 
depredations  first  turned  the  attention  of  the  Italians  in  central  Italy 
to  navigation  and  the  founding  of  towns ;  Spina  and  Hatria  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Po,  and  Ariminum  further  south,  were  Italian,  not 
Greek  foundations.  Although  this  firm  resistance  was  offered  to 
the  Greeks,  yet,  as  far  as  Latium  and  southern  Etruria  were  con- 
cerned, commercial  intercourse  was  welcomed  and  fostered.  Caere, 
Rome,  and  the  cities  at  the  mouth  of  the  Po,  not  only  prospered 
commercially  by  this  friendly  connection,  but,  as  their  earliest  tradi- 
tions show,  enjoyed  religious  intercourse  with  the  Greek  oracles  of 


28  ROME 

753-509  B.C. 

Delphi  and  Cumae.  The  Greek  voyagers  met  with  a  different  treat- 
ment from  the  Etruscans  proper,  who  wrested  from  their  grasp  the 
iron  trade  of  Elba,  and  the  silver  mines  of  Populonia,  and  did 
not  even  allow  individual  traders  to  enter  their  waters.  The  union 
of  the  Etruscans  with  the  Phoenicians,  and  the  sudden  rise  of 
Carthage  itself,  arrested  that  Greek  colonization  which  had,  up  to 
the  middle  of  the  second  century  of  Rome,  threatened  to  sweep  the 
Phoenicians  out  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  establishment  of 
Massilia,  in  600  B.C.,  on  the  Celtic  coast  marks  the  limit  of  Greek 
enterprise ;  an  attempt  in  579  B.C.  to  settle  at  Libybaeum  was  frus- 
trated by  the  natives  and  the  Phoenicians,  and  a  similar  fate  befell 
the  Phocaeans  at  Alalia  in  Corsica,  which  they  evacuated  after 
a  naval  battle  with  the  combined  Etruscans  and  Carthaginians  in 
537  b.cv  preferring  to  settle  at  Hyele  (Velia)  in  Lucania.  In  this 
struggle  between  the  Greeks  and  the  combined  Etruscans  and 
Phoenicians,  Latium  observed  a  strict  neutrality,  being  on  friendly 
and  commercial  relations  with  Caere,  and  Carthage  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Velia  and  Massilia  on  the  other.  Although  the 
Greeks  did  not  give  up  the  struggle,  and  even  founded  fresh  sta- 
tions, they  no  longer  gained  ground;  and,  after  the  foundation  of 
Agrigentum  in  580  B.C.,  they  gained  no  important  additions  of  terri- 
tory on  the  Adriatic  or  on  the  western  sea,  and  remained  excluded 
from  the  Spanish  waters  as  well  as  from  the  Atlantic  ocean. 


Chapter  V 

ESTABLISHMENT   OF  THE   REPUBLIC 
509-508   B.C. 

THE  close  of  the  regal  period,  and  the  causes  which  led  to 
the  subsequent  changes  in  the  Roman  constitution,  render 
it  necessary  for  us  to  revert  to  the  internal  state  of  Rome 
itself.  Three  distinct  movements  agitated  the  community.  The 
first  proceeded  from  the  body  of  full  citizens,  and  was  confined  to  it : 
its  object  was  to  limit  and  lessen  the  life-power  of  the  single  presi- 
dent or  king ;  in  all  such  movements  at  Rome,  from  the  time  of  the 
Tarquins  to  that  of  the  Gracchi,  there  was  no  attempt  to  assert  the 
rights  of  the  individual  at  the  expense  of  the  state,  nor  to  limit  the 
power  of  the  state,  but  only  that  of  its  magistrates.  The  second 
was  the  demand  for  equality  of  political  privileges,  and  was  the 
cause  of  bitter  struggles  between  the  full  burgesses  and  those, 
whether  plebeians,  freedmen,  Latins,  or  Italians,  who  keenly  re- 
sented their  political  inequality.  The  third  movement  was  an 
equally  prolific  source  of  trouble  in  Roman  history;  it  arose  from 
the  embittered  relations  between  landholders  and  those'  who 
had  either  lost  possession  of  their  farms,  or,  as  was  the  case 
with  many  small  farmers,  held  possession  at  the  mercy  of  the  cap- 
italist or  landlord.  These  three  movements  must  be  clearly  grasped, 
as  upon  them  hinges  the  internal  history  of  Rome.  Although  often 
intertwined  and  confused  with  one  another,  they  were,  nevertheless, 
essentially  and  fundamentally  distinct.  The  natural  outcome  of  the 
first  was  the  abolition  of  the  monarchy — a  result  which  we  find 
everywhere,  alike  in  Greek  and  Italian  states,  and  which  seems  to 
have  been  a  certain  evolution  of  the  form  of  constitution  peculiar 
to  both  peoples.  What  is  remarkable  in  the  change  at  Rome,  is  that 
violent  measures  had  to  be  adopted,  and  that  the  Tarquins,  both  the 
king  and  all  the  members  of  his  clan,  had  to  be  forcibly  expelled. 
The  romantic  details  coloring  this  event  do  not  affect  the  fact  itself, 
nor  are  the  reasons  assigned  by  tradition  undeserving  of  belief. 
Tarquin  "  the  proud  "  is  said  to  have  neglected  to  consult  the  senate, 

m 


30  ROME 

509-508  B.C. 

and  fill  up  the  vacancies  in  it;  to  have  pronounced  sentences  of 
death  and  confiscation  without  consulting  his  counselors;  to  have 
stored  his  own  granaries,  and  exacted  undue  military  service  and 
other  duties  from  the  citizens.  The  formal  vow  registered  by  each 
citizen  that  no  king  should  even  again  be  tolerated,  the  blind  hatred 
felt  at  Rome  ever  afterwards  for  the  name  of  king,  the  enactment 
that  the  "  king  of  sacrifice  "  (rex  sacrorum)  should  never  hold  any 
other  office, — all  these  sufficiently  testify  to  the  exasperation  of  the 
people.  There  is  no  proof  that  foreign  nations  took  part  in  the 
struggle  which  ensued  between  the  royal  house  and  its  expellers,  nor 
can  we  regard  the  great  war  with  Etruria  in  that  light,  since,  al- 
though successful,  the  Etruscans  neither  restored  the  monarchy  nor 
even  brought  back  the  family  of  the  Tarquins.  The  change,  vio- 
lently accomplished  as  it  was,  did  not  abolish  the  royal  power;  the 
one  life-king  was  simply  replaced  by  two  year-kings,  called  either 
generals  (praetores)  or  judges  (judices)  or,  more  commonly,  col- 
leagues (consules).  Although,  probably  from  the  first,  the  consuls 
divided  their  functions — the  one,  for  instance,  taking  charge  of  the 
army,  the  other  of  the  administration  of  justice — such  a  partition 
was  not  binding,  and  each  possessed  and  exercised  the  supreme 
power  as  completely  as  the  king  had  done.  In  consequence  of  this 
each  consul  could  forbid  what  the  other  enjoined,  and  thus  the 
consular  commands,  being  both  absolute,  would,  if  they  clashed, 
neutralize  one  another.  It  is  hard  to  parallel  this  system  of  co- 
ordinate supreme  authorities,  which,  if  not  peculiarly  Roman,  was 
a  peculiarly  Latin  institution.  The  object  clearly  was  to  preserve 
the  regal  power  undiminished,  but,  by  doubling  the  holder  of  this 
power,  to  neutralize  its  effects.  The  limit  of  a  year,  fixed  for  the 
duration  of  the  consular  office,  was  reckoned  from  the  day  of  entry 
upon  office  to  the  day  of  the  solemn  laying  down  of  power  by  the 
consuls ;  and,  as  the  consuls  to  a  certain  extent  laid  down  their  power 
of  their  own  free  will,  and  as,  even  if  they  overstepped  the  year's 
limit,  their  consular  acts  were  still  valid,  they  were  not  so  much 
restricted  directly  by  the  law,  as  induced  by  it  to  restrict  them- 
selves. Still,  the  effect  of  this  tenure  of  office  for  a  set  term  was  to 
abolish  the  irresponsibility  of  the  king,  who,  as  supreme  judge,  had 
been  accountable  to  no  tribunal  and  liable  to  no  punishment.  The 
consul,  on  the  other  hand,  when  his  term  had  expired,  and  the 
protection  given  by  his  office  had  been  removed,  was  liable  to  be 
called  to  account  just  like  any  other  burgess.     Together  with  the 


THE    REPUBLIC  31 

509-508  B.C. 

abolition  of  the  monarchy,  the  ancient  privilege  of  the  king  to  have 
his  fields  tilled  by  the  burgesses,  and  the  position  which  the 'luetics 
held  as  special  clients  of  the  king,  naturally  came  to  an  end.  The 
contrast  between  the  old  royal  power  and  the  new  consular  office 
was  brought  out  more  clearly  by  the  following  restrictions :  The 
old  right  of  appeal,  which  the  king  had  granted  or  not  at  his  pleasure 
in  all  criminal  procedure,  was  now  established  by  the  Valerian  law 
in  509  B.C.;  the  consul  was  now  bound  to  grant  this  right  to  every 
criminal  who  was  condemned  to  suffer  capital  or  corporal  punish- 
ment; unless,  indeed,  the  sentence  was  pronounced  under  martial 
law.  In  token  of  this  right,  which  before  451  B.C.  was  extended  to 
cases  of  heavy  fines,  the  consular  lictors  laid  aside  the  axes, 
which  had  been  the  sign  of  the  king's  penal  jurisdiction.  The 
need  of  deputies,  which  had  caused,  but  not  compelled,  the  king  to 
appoint  a  city- warden  (urbi  praefectus)  to  act  in  his  absence,  ceased 
with  the  substitution  of  two  consuls  for  one  king.  If  the  consul  in 
time  of  war  did  intrust  the  supreme  command  to  a  deputy,  such  a 
deputy  was  only  adjutant  or  lieutenant  of  the  consul.  It  is  true 
that,  in  times  of  special  emergency,  the  consuls  could  nominate  a 
third  colleague,  who,  under  the  name  of  dictator,  revived  the  old 
single  supremacy  of  the  king,  and  who  for  the  time  was  obeyed  by 
the  consuls  and  the  whole  state;  but  such  an  office  was  a  special 
creation  to  meet  an  exceptional  state  of  things.  Although  in  the 
field  a  consul  could  delegate  his  functions  to  a  deputy,  at  home  he 
had  no  free  will  in  the  matter.  The  two  questors  ("trackers  of 
murder"),  whose  appointment  by  the  king  to  deal  with  criminal 
cases  had  not  been  obligatory  although  usual,  became  now  regular 
state  officers.  The  consul  was  obliged  to  nominate  them,  and  their 
province  was  enlarged,  so  as  to  include  the  charge  of  the  state  treas- 
ure and  state  archives ;  their  tenure  of  office,  like  that  of  the  consuls, 
lasted  for  one  year.  On  the  other  hand,  the  chief  magistrate  in  the 
city  had  to  act  in  person,  or  not  at  all,  in  those  cases  in  which  a 
delegation  of  his  authority  was  not  expressly  incumbent  on  him. 
Thus  in  the  home  government  no  deputy  acting  for  a  city  magistrate 
(pro  magistratu)  was  possible,  while  military  deputies  (pro  consule, 
pro  praetore,  pro  quaest ore)  were  only  possible  in  the  field,  and  had 
no  power  to  act  within  the  community  itself.  The  consul  retained 
the  right,  which  the  king  had  exercised  absolutely,  of  nominating 
his  successor,  but  he  was  bound  to  follow  the  expressed  wishes  of 
the  community  in  his  nomination.      He  might  reject  particular 


32  ROME 

509-508  B.C. 

candidates,  and  at  first  even  limit  the  choice  to  a  list  of  candidates 
proposed  by  himself ;  and,  what  was  more  important,  the  candidate, 
once  appointed,  could  never  be  deposed  by  the  community.  The 
consuls  had  not  the  right,  which  had  belonged  to  the  kings,  of  ap- 
pointing the  priests;  the  colleges  of  priests  now  filled  up  the  va- 
cancies in  their  own  body,  and  the  appointment  of  the  vestals  and 
single  priests  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  president,  or  pontifex 
maximus,  now  nominated  for  the  first  time  by  the  pontifical  college. 
Thus  the  supreme  authority  in  religion  was  separated  from  the  civil 
power,  and  the  semi-magisterial  position  of  the  pontifex  maximus 
is  a  further  proof  of  the  wish  to  impose  limits  on  the  consular 
power.  The  insignia  of  the  consul  were  markedly  inferior  to  those 
which  had  distinguished  the  king.  The  lictor's  ax  was  taken  away, 
the  purple  robe  of  the  king  was  replaced  by  the  purple  border  of  the 
consul's  toga,  the  royal  chariot  was  abolished,  and  the  consul  was 
obliged,  like  every  other  citizen,  to  go  on  foot  within  the  city. 

We  have  above  alluded  to  the  revival  of  the  royal  power  in  the 
person  of  the  dictator.  His  other  title,  "  master  of  the  army  " 
(magister  populi),  as  also  that  of  his  chief  assistant  (magister 
equitum,  "master  of  the  horse"),  coupled  with  what  we  know 
about  the  circumstances  and  causes  of  his  appointment,  prove  that 
the  dictatorship  was  an  essentially  military  institution.  No  doubt  it 
was  designed  to  obviate  the  disadvantage  of  divided  power  in  the 
field,  and  its  restriction  to  a  maximum  limit  of  six  months  indicates 
that  the  office  was  not  to  last  longer  than  the  duration  of  a  summer 
campaign.  The  dictator  was  nominated  by  one  of  the  consuls ;  and, 
as  their  colleague,  he  was  obliged  to  lay  down  his  office  when  they 
did.  All  magistrates  were  subject  to  him,  and  no  appeal  was 
allowed  from  his  sentence ;  the  community  had  no  part  in  his  elec- 
tion. The  consuls,  then,  were,  with  certain  restrictions,  what  the 
kings  had  been,  the  supreme  administrators,  judges,  and  generals; 
in  matters  of  religion,  too,  they  offered  prayers  and  sacrifices  for  the 
community,  and  with  the  aid  of  skilled  interpreters  ascertained  the 
will  of  the  gods.  The  very  restrictions  which  hampered  the  con- 
suls could,  in  time  of  need,  be  broken  through  by  the  dictatorship, 
and  Rome  could  see  again,  under  a  new  name,  the  absolute  authority 
of  the  king.  In  this  way  the  problem  of  legally  retaining  and  prac- 
tically restricting  the  regal  authority  was  solved  in  genuine  Roman 
fashion,  with  equal  acuteness  and  simplicity,  by  the  nameless  states- 
men who  worked  out  this  revolution. 


THE    REPUBLIC  83 

509-508  B.C. 

A  further  change  of  great  importance  followed  the  new  powers 
given  to  the  community  as  a  whole.  The  right  of  annually  electing 
the  consuls,  and  of  deciding,  upon  appeal  from  a  criminal,  the  life  or 
death  of  a  citizen,  gave  the  public  assembly  something  more  than 
the  passive  formal  part  in  state-administration  which  it  had  played 
under  the  kings.  The  growth,  wealth,  and  importance  of  the  plebs, 
and  the  necessity  of  their  help  in  making  the  reform,  rendered  it 
impossible  for  all  power  to  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  smaller  body 
of  the  patriciate,  which  by  this  time  had  practically  become  an  order 
of  nobility.  Therefore  the  new  community  was  extended  so  as  to 
embrace  the  whole  body  of  plebeians;  all  the  non-burgesses,  who 
were  neither  slaves  nor  citizens  of  foreign  states,  living  at  Rome 
under  the  jus  hospitii,  were  admitted  into  the  curies,  and  the  old 
burgesses,  who  had  hitherto  formed  the  curies,  lost  the  right  of 
meeting  and  passing  resolutions.  Further,  the  curiate  assembly 
(comitia  curiata)  had  thus  lost  its  fundamental  character  of  bur- 
gesses belonging  to  different  clans,  and  included  many  plebeians, 
who  belonged  to  no  clan,  but  were  legally  on  an  equal  footing  with 
the  most  aristocratic  citizens.  To  obviate  the  results  of  such  a 
democratic  leveling,  all  political  power  was  taken  away  from  the 
comitia  curiata,  and  was  transferred  to  the  assembly  of  the  cen- 
turies (comitia  centuriata)  ;  that  is,  to  the  assembled  levy  of  those 
bound  to  military  service,  who  now  received  the  rights,  as  they  had 
previously  borne  the  burdens,  of  citizens.  This  body,  originally 
constituted  for  purely  military  purposes,  now  decided  cases  of 
appeal,  nominated  magistrates,  adopted  or  rejected  laws.  There 
was  no  debate  in  this  assembly,  any  more  than  in  that  of  the  curies ; 
but  the  constitution  of  the  assembly  gave  the  preponderance  of 
power  to  the  possessors  of  property,  and  the  peculiar  system,  by 
which  the  decision  of  an  election  was  often  determined  by  the  voting 
of  the  first  centuries,  gave  a  manifest  advantage  to  the  possessors 
of  property,  whose  centuries  had  the  privilege  of  giving  their  votes 
first. 

The  prerogatives  of  the  senate  were  increased  by  the  reform  of 
the  constitution.  In  addition  to  its  old  rights  of  appointing  the 
interrex,  and  of  confirming  or  rejecting  the  resolutions  passed  by 
the  community,  the  senate  could  now  either  reject  or  confirm  the 
appointment  of  the  magistrates  elected  by  the  public  assembly.  The 
senate  was  still  composed  exclusively  of  patricians,  but  on  occasions 
when  its  advice  was  asked,  side  by  side  with  the  patres,  or  true 


84  ROME 

509-508  B.C. 

patrician  senators,  a  number  of  non-patricians  were  admitted  and 
"added  to  the  senate-roll  "  (conscripti) .  These  plebeians  were  not 
by  this  admission  placed  on  a  footing  of  equality ;  they  did  not  be- 
come true  senators,  and  were  not  invested  with  the  senatorial  in- 
signia; they  had  no  share  in  the  magisterial  prerogatives  of  the 
senate,  nor  were  they  allowed  to  express  their  opinion  on  those  oc- 
casions when  the  senate  met  in  the  character  of  a  state-council,  and 
discussed  what  advice  should  be  tendered  the  community :  they  were 
simply  silent  voters  in  the  divisions  of  the  house,  and  called  "  foot- 
members  "  by  the  proud  nobility,  or  "  men  who  voted  with  their 
feet."  Still,  this  admission  of  plebeians  into  the  senate-house  was  a 
most  important  step,  and  one  fraught  with  no  slight  consequences. 
The  consuls  in  office  did  not  vote,  but  they  selected  the  new  members 
of  the  senate,  alike  the  patres  and  the  plebeian  conscripti,  although 
they  were  no  doubt  more  restricted  by  the  opinions  of  the  nobility 
in  their  selection  than  the  king  had  been.  Two  rules  early  obtained ; 
that  the  consulship  entailed  upon  the  holder  of  it  admission  to  the 
senate  for  life;  that  vacancies  in  the  senate  were  not  filled  up  at 
once,  but  on  the  occasion  of  the  census,  taken  every  fourth  year, 
when  the  roll  of  senators  was  revised  and  completed.  The  number 
of  senators  remained  unchanged,  and,  from  the  fact  that  the  con- 
scripti were  included  in  the  number,  we  may  infer  the  diminution 
of  the  number  of  patriciate  clans.  It  is  easy  to  see  what  an  immense 
preponderance  of  power  the  revolution  gave  the  senate.  Its  right 
of  rejecting  the  proposals  of  the  comitia  centuriata,  its  position  as 
adviser  of  the  chief  magistrate,  its  tenure  of  office  for  life,  as  con- 
trasted with  the  annual  duration  of  magistracies, — all  tended  to 
place  the  government  in  its  hands.  But  what  chiefly  did  so,  was  the 
fact  that  the  consul  ruled  for  but  a  brief  space,  and  was,  on  the 
expiration  of  his  term  of  office,  merely  one  of  the  nobility;  and 
thus,  even  if  a  consul  were  inclined  to  question  the  senate's  influ- 
ence, he  lacked  the  first  element  of  political  power,  viz.,  time; 
while  his  authority  was  paralyzed  alike  by  the  priestly  colleges  and 
his  own  colleague,  and,  if  need  be,  could  be  suspended  by  the  dic- 
tatorship. The  result  was  that  the  senate  became  the  real  govern- 
ing power,  and  the  consul  subsided  into  a  president,  acting  as  its 
chairman  and  executing  its  decrees.  The  senate  also  drew  into  its 
own  hands  the  management  of  the  state  finances,  by  causing  the 
consul  to  commit  the  administration  of  the  public  chest  to  two 
quaestors,  who  naturally  became  dependent  on  the  senate. 


THE    REPUBLIC  35 

509-508  B.C. 

The  revolution  thus  accomplished  at  Rome  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  conservative  in  its  character,  in  that  the  fundamental  elements 
of  the  old  constitution  were  retained.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  compromise 
between  the  two  state  parties — the  old  burgesses  and  the  plebeians — 
who,  for  the  time  being,  sank  their  party  quarrels,  and  united  under 
the  pressure  of  the  common  danger  of  a  despotism.  The  necessity 
of  their  cooperation  caused  those  mutual  concessions  we  have 
described  above,  and  the  importance  of  the  revolution  lay  far  more 
in  the  indirect  effects  of  those  concessions  than  in  the  limit  of  time 
imposed  on  the  supreme  magistracy.  Among  these  indirect  effects 
was  the  rise  of  the  Roman  citizens  in  the  later  sense  of  the  term. 
The  plebeians  had  hitherto  been  little  better  than  aliens  or  metics 
in  the  eye  of  the  law.  Now  they  were  enrolled  in  the  curies  as  citi- 
zens, they  voted  in  the  common  assembly  and  in  the  senate,  and  they 
were  protected  by  the  right  of  appeal.  The  elevation  of  the  old 
burgess-body,  or  patriciate,  into  an  exclusive  aristocracy  was  an- 
other result  of  the  revolution.  The  very  incorporation  of  the 
plebeians  into  the  burgess-body  caused  the  patres  to  close  up  their 
ranks,  and  hold  stubbornly  to  the  privileges  that  remained  to  them ; 
the  admission  of  new  clans  into  their  body,  which  had  not  been  very 
rare  under  the  kings,  now  ceased.  Although  the  plebeians  might 
become  military  officers  and  senators,  they  could  hold  no  public 
magistracy  or  priesthood :  and  the  patres  still  maintained  the  legal 
impossibility  of  marriage  between  their  order  and  the  plebeians.  It 
further  became  necessary  to  define  the  distinction  between  the  en- 
larged burgess-body  and  those  who  were  now  the  non-burgesses. 
To  this  epoch,  therefore,  we  may  trace  back — in  the  views  and  feel- 
ings of  the  people — both  the  invidiousness  of  the  distinction  between 
the  patricians  and  plebeians,  and  the  strict  and  haughty  line  of 
demarcation  between  cives  Romani  and  aliens. 

The  provinces  of  civil  and  military  authority  were  now  finally 
separated.  The  power  of  the  consul  within  the  city  limits  was 
restricted  by  law,  as  shown  above;  his  power  as  general  was  abso- 
lute. Therefore  the  general  and  the  army  could  not  in  their  military 
capacity  enter  the  city  proper,  unless  allowed  to  do  so.  Thus  the 
distinction  between  quirites  and  soldiers  became  deeply  rooted  in  the 
minds  of  the  people. 

Viewing  the  revolution  as  a  whole,  its  immediate  effect  was  to 
establish  an  aristocratic  government,  by  making  the  senate  practi- 
cally supreme.   But  the  germs  of  a  more  representative  constitution 


36  ROME 

509-508  B.C. 

were  visible.  The  enrollment  of  the  plebeians  among  the  burgesses, 
the  admission  of  certain  of  them  to  the  senate,  were  victories  of 
happy  augury  for  the  future.  Those  plebeian  families  admitted  on 
account  of  their  wealth  or  position  into  the  senate  naturally  held 
aloof  from  the  mass  of  the  plebs.  In  addition  to  this  distinction  in 
the  plebeian  body,  there  arose  another  out  of  the  system  of  voting  in 
the  comitia  centuriata,  which  placed  the  chief  power  in  that  class  of 
farmers  whose  property  was  in  excess  of  that  of  the  small  freehold- 
ers, but  inferior  to  that  of  the  great  proprietors;  and  this  arrange- 
ment further  enabled  the  seniors,  although  less  numerous,  to  have 
as  many  voting  divisions  as  the  juniors.  While  in  this  way  the  ax 
was  laid  to  the  root  of  the  old  burgess-body  and  their  clan-nobility, 
and  the  basis  of  a  new  burgess-body  was  laid,  the  preponderance  in 
the  latter  rested  on  the  possession  of  land  and  on  age,  and  the  first 
beginnings  were  already  visible  of  a  new  aristocracy,  based  pri- 
marily on  the  consideration  in  which  the  families  were  held — the 
future  nobility. 


Chapter  VI 

THE    TRIBUNATE    OF   THE    PLEBS     AND   THE 
DECEMVIRATE.    495-449   B.C. 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  last  chapter  we  noted  the  importance 
of  the  struggle  which  was  intimately  connected  with  land- 
L  occupation.  Before  proceding  to  describe  the  constitu- 
tional changes  which  arose  from  this  struggle,  we  must  revert  for  a 
time  to  the  original  land-tenure  among  the  Romans,  and,  as  far  as 
possible,  strive  to  clearly  present  the  main  features  of  this  most 
difficult  and  important  question.  From  the  first,  agriculture  was 
felt  to  be  the  main  support  and  fundamental  basis  of  every  Italian 
commonwealth.  The  Roman  state  in  particular  secured  by  the 
plow  what  it  won  by  the  sword ;  it  felt  that  the  strength  of  man  and 
of  the  state  lay  in  their  hold  over  the  soil ;  and  this  feeling  caused 
the  state  to  avoid,  if  possible,  the  cession  of  Roman  soil,  and  caused 
the  farmers  to  cling  tenaciously  to  their  fields  and  homesteads.  The 
main  object  of  war  was  to  increase  the  number  of  freeholders ;  this 
object  was  also  evident  in  the  Servian  constitution,  which  showed 
the  original  preponderance  of  the  agricultural  class  in  the  state ;  and 
which,  by  its  division  of  the  community  into  "  freeholders  "  and 
"producers  of  children"  (proletarii) ,  without  reference  to  their 
political  position,  proved  that  a  large  portion  of  the  landed  property 
had  passed  into  the  hands  of  non-burgesses.  This  division,  by  im- 
posing upon  the  freeholders  the  duties  of  citizens,  paved  the  way, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  conceding  them  political  rights.  In  the  earliest 
times  no  burgess  had  any  special  property  in  land:  all  arable  land 
was  the  common  possession  of  the  several  clans ;  each  clan  tilled  its 
own  portion  and  divided  the  produce  among  its  constituent  house- 
holds. When  and  how  the  distribution  of  land  among  the  individ- 
ual burgesses  was  made  we  cannot  tell — at  any  rate  it  was  previous 
to  the  Servian  constitution ;  and  that  same  constitution  leads  us  to 
conclude  that  the  mass  of  the  land  was  divided  into  medium-sized 
farms  of  not  less  than  20  jugera,  or  12  J  acres.  Landed  estates  were 
successfully  guarded  against  excessive  subdivision  by  custom  and 

37 


88  ROME 

495-449  B.C. 

the  sound  sense  of  the  population.  Evidence  is  also  furnished  by 
the  Servian  constitution  that  even  in  the  regal  period  of  Rome  there 
were  small  cottagers  and  garden  proprietors,  with  whom  the  mat- 
tock took  the  place  of  the  plow.  In  addition  to  the  ordinary  farm- 
ers, it  is  clear  from  the  same  constitution  that  large  landed  proprie- 
tors had  also  come  into  existence — partly  perhaps  from  the  nu- 
merical inequality  of  the  members  of  the  various  clans,  when  the 
clan-lands  were  divided  among  the  members ;  partly,  too,  from  the 
great  influx  of  mercantile  capital  into  Rome.  But,  as  we  cannot 
suppose  that  there  were  many  slaves  at  this  time,  by  whose  labor 
such  large  estates  were  afterwards  worked,  we  must  conclude  that 
a  landowner  assigned  lots  to  tenants  of  such  portion  of  his  estate  as 
he  could  not  farm  in  person.  Such  tenants  were  composed  of 
decayed  farmers,  clients,  and  freedmen,  and  formed  the  bulk  of  the 
agricultural  proletariate.  They  were  often  free  men,  and  were  then 
called  "  tenants  on  sufferance  "  as  their  possession  was  only  held  at 
the  pleasure  of  the  owner.  For  this  usufruct  of  the  soil  the  tenant 
did  not  necessarily  pay  rent  in  kind,  and,  when  he  did,  his  position 
was  not  quite  the  same  as  that  of  the  lessee  of  later  times.  The 
relation  between  the  landlord  and  his  tenants  was  all  the  closer, 
because  the  landlords  did  not  employ  middlemen,  but  lived  them- 
selves on  their  estates,  and  took  the  greatest  interest  in  the  welfare 
of  those  dependent  on  them ;  their  lodging  in  the  city  was  only  for 
business  purposes,  and  for  avoiding,  at  certain  seasons,  the  un- 
healthful  atmosphere  of  the  country.  Such  slaves  as  were  employed 
were,  as  a  rule,  of  Italian  race,  and  must  have  occupied  very  differ- 
ent relations  towards  their  masters  from  those  held  by  Syrians  and 
Celts  in  later  days.  It  was  from  these  large  landowners,  and  the 
system  above  described,  that  there  sprang  up  in  Rome  a  landed, 
and  not  an  urban,  nobility ;  and  further,  these  tenants-on-sufferance 
were  of  the  greatest  service  to  the  state,  in  furnishing  trained  and 
intelligent  farmers  to  carry  out  the  Roman  policy  of  colonization.  A 
sharp  line  divided  arable  from  pasture  land.  The  latter  belonged  to 
the  state  and  not  to  the  clan,  and  was  consequently  not  subjected  to 
the  distribution,  which  has  been  described  above.  The  state  used 
such  land  for  its  own  flocks  and  herds  which  were  intended  for  sac- 
rifices and  other  purposes,  and  which  were  kept  up  by  cattle-fines; 
and  such  land  was  also  used  by  individuals  who  paid  a  certain  tax 
(scriptura)  for  the  right  to  graze  their  cattle  on  the  common  pas- 
ture.    This  right  was  a  special  privilege  of  the  burgess,  and  was 


TRIBUNATE     OF    THE     PLEBS  39 

495-449  B.C. 

never  granted  to  a  plebeian,  except  under  extraordinary  circum- 
stances. In  the  regal  period  such  common  pasture  land  was  prob- 
ably not  extensive,  and,  as  a  rule,  any  conquered  territory  was 
parceled  out  as  arable  land,  originally  among  the  clans,  and  then 
among  individuals.  This  description  of  land  tenure  in  the  earliest 
period  now  allows  us  to  resume  our  history  at  the  point  of  our 
digression. 

Although  the  new  government  at  Rome  passed  certain  meas- 
ures— such  as  the  reduction  of  port-dues ;  the  state-purchase  of  corn 
and  salt,  so  as  to  supply  the  citizens  at  reasonable  prices,  the  addition 
of  a  day  to  the  national  festival,  the  limitation  of  the  magisterial 
power  of  fining, — which  seemed  intended  for  the  good  of  the  more 
numerous  and  less  wealthy  classes,  unfortunately  such  regulations 
were  exceptional.  The  object  of  the  kings  had  probably  been  to 
check  the  power  of  capital  and  increase  the  number  of  farmers.  The 
object  of  the  new  aristocratic  government  was  to  destroy  the  middle 
classes,  and  especially  the  smaller  independent  farmers ;  and  thus  to 
develop  the  power  of  the  capitalists,  and  of  large  landowners,  and 
to  increase  the  number  of  the  agricultural  proletariate.  Out  of  this 
action  on  the  part  of  those  in  power  arose  the  evil  influence  of  the 
capitalists.  The  extension  of  the  financial  province  of  the  state 
treasury  to  such  matters  as  the  purchase  of  grain  and  salt  caused  the 
state  to  employ  agents,  or  middlemen,  to  collect  its  indirect  revenues 
and  more  complicated  payments.  These  men  paid  the  state  a  set 
sum,  and  farmed  the  revenues  for  their  own  benefit.  Thus  there 
grew  up  a  class  of  tax-farmers  and  contractors,  who,  in  the  rapid 
growth  of  their  wealth,  in  their  power  over  the  state,  to  which  they 
appeared  to  be  servants,  and  in  the  absurd  and  sterile  basis  of  their 
moneyed  dominion,  are  completely  on  a  parallel  with  the  speculators 
on  the  stock-exchange  of  the  present  day. 

The  mismanagement  of  the  public  land  brought  out  these  evils 
most  clearly.  The  patricians  now  claimed  the  sole  right  of  the 
use  of  the  public  pasture  and  state  lands :  a  right  which,  as  shown 
above,  belonged  by  law  to  every  burgess.  Although  the  senate 
made  exceptions  in  favor  of  the  wealthy  plebeian  houses,  the  small 
farmers  and  tenants-on-sufferance,  who  needed  it  most,  were  ex- 
cluded from  the  common  pasture.  Moreover,  to  oblige  men  of  their 
own  order,  the  patrician  quaestors  gradually  omitted  to  collect  the 
pasture-tax,  and  thus  diminished  the  state  revenues.  And  further, 
instead  of  making  fresh  assignations  of  land,  acquired  by  conquest, 


40  ROME 

495-449  B.C. 

to  the  poorer  citizens,  the  ruling  class  introduced  a  pernicious  system 
of  what  was  practically  permanent  occupation,  on  the  condition  of 
the  state  receiving  from  the  occupier  one-tenth  of  corn,  or  one-fifth 
of  oil  and  wine.  Thus  the  system  of  "  precarium,"  or  tenure-on- 
sufferance,  above  described,  was  now  applied  to  the  state  lands; 
and  not  only  did  this  tenure  become  permanent,  but  it  was  allowed 
only  to  the  privileged  patricians  and  their  favorites;  nor  was  the 
collection  of  the  fifths  or  tenths  enforced  with  more  rigor  than  that 
of  the  pasture-tax.  Thus  the  smaller  landholders  were  deprived  of 
the  usufructs  which  were  their  right  as  burgesses,  were  more  heavily 
taxed  in  consequence  of  the  lax  collection  of  the  revenues  from  the 
use  of  the  public  land,  and  lost  the  old  outlet  for  their  energies, 
which  had  been  provided  by  the  assignations  of  land.  Added  to 
these  evils  was  the  system  of  working  large  estates  by  slaves,  which 
at  this  time  was  introduced,  and  which  dispossessed  the  small 
agrarian  clients,  or  free  laborers.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  enforced 
absence  from  his  farm  in  time  of  war,  and  the  exorbitant  taxation 
and  other  state-imposed  works  which  war  entailed,  the  farmer 
often  lost  possession  of  his  farm,  and  was  reduced  to  the  position 
of  bondsman,  if  not  slave,  of  his  creditor.  This  creditor  was  often 
a  capitalist,  to  whom  speculation  in  land  offered  a  new  and  lucra- 
tive field ;  if  left  as  nominal  proprietor,  and  actual  possessor  of  the 
farm,  the  debtor  was  perhaps  saved  from  utter  ruin,  but  was 
demoralized  by  the  consciousness  that  his  person  and  estate  really 
belonged  to  another,  and  that  he  was  entirely  dependent  on  his 
creditor's  mercy.  The  misery  and  distress  caused  by  these  evils 
threatened  to  annihiliate  the  middle  class  of  smaller  farmers,  and 
matters  were  not  long  in  coming  to  a  crisis.  About  495  B.C.  a  levy 
was  called  for.  Owing  to  the  exasperation  produced  by  the  strict 
enforcement  of  the  law  of  debt,  the  farmers  refused  to  obey.  One 
of  the  consuls,  Publius  Servilius,  induced  them  to  do  so,  by  sus- 
pending the  law  and  liberating  the  imprisoned  debtors.  On  their 
return  from  the  field  of  victory,  the  other  consul,  Appius  Claudius, 
enforced  the  debtor-laws  with  merciless  rigor.  The  war  was  re- 
newed in  the  following  year;  and  this  time  the  authority  attaching 
to  the  dictatorship  and  the  personal  popularity  of  the  dictator, 
Manius  Valerius,  were  found  necessary  to  win  over  the  reluctant 
farmers.  Victory  again  was  with  the  Roman  army;  but  on  its 
return  the  senate  refused  to  agree  to  the  reforms  proposed  by  the 
dictator.     On  the  news  of  this  refusal  reaching  the  army,  arrayed 


TRIBUNATE    OF    THE     PLEBS  41 

495-449  B.C. 

outside  the  city  gates,  the  whole  force  left  its  general  and  encamp- 
ment, and  marched  to  a  hill  between  the  Tiber  and  the  Anio.  This 
celebrated  secession,  to  what  was  afterward  called  "the  sacred 
mount"  (Mons  Sacer),  was  terminated  by  the  mediation  of  the 
dictator  and  the  submission  of  the  senate.  The  consequences  of 
the  movement  undertaken  by  the  multitude  without  a  settled  leader, 
and  accomplished  without  bloodshed,  were  felt  for  many  centuries. 
It  was  the  origin  of  the  tribunate  of  the  plebs. 

The  following  were  the  chief  characteristics  of  the  tribunate. 
The  two  tribunes  were  of  plebeian  rank,  and  elected  by  the  plebeians 
assembled  in  curies.  Their  power  was  confined  to  the  city's  limits, 
and  thus  could  not  oppose  the  military  imperium  of  the  consul, 
which  was  all-powerful  outside  those  limits,  nor  the  authority  of 
the  dictator,  whether  exercised  inside  or  outside  the  city.  Within 
these  limits  the  tribunes  stood  on  an  equal  and  independent  footing 
with  the  consuls,  and  had  the  right  to  cancel  any  command,  issued 
by  a  magistrate,  upon  a  formal  protest  from  the  burgess  aggrieved 
by  such  a  commalnd.  This  power  of  intercession  made  it  possible 
for  the  tribunes  to  bring  the  ordinary  administration  and  execution 
of  the  law  to  a  deadlock  while  an  appeal  against  the  sentence  of  a 
judge  or  decree  of  the  senate  was  being  investigated.  Their  judi- 
cial powers,  owing  to  the  vague  and  ill-defined  laws  touching 
offenses  against  order,  and  crime  against  the  community,  were  alike 
extensive  and  arbitrary.  They  could  by  their  messengers  summon 
before  them  any  burgess,  even  the  consul,  arrest  him  on  refusal, 
imprison  him,  or  allow  him  bail  pending  investigation,  and  finally 
sentence  him  to  death  or  the  payment  of  a  fine.  An  appeal  from 
their  sentence  was  heard,  not  by  the  whole  body  of  burgesses,  but 
by  the  whole  plebeian  body,  and  the  tribunes  defended  themselves 
before  this  assembly  in  case  of  such  an  appeal.  Out  of  this  right 
of  defense  sprang  the  right  of  holding  assemblies  of  the  people,  and 
addressing  them  on  other  matters,  a  right  expressly  guaranteed  to 
the  tribunes  by  the  Icilian  law  of  492  B.C.,  which  rendered  liable  to 
severe  punishment  anyone  who  interrupted  a  tribune  while  speak- 
ing, or  who  bade  the  assembly  disperse.  They  could  take  the  vote 
of  the  people  at  such  meetings,  and  the  "  plebiscites,"  or  resolutions 
thus  passed,  soon  came  to  have  a  force  and  validity  which  did  not 
properly  belong  to  them.  Lastly,  the  persons  of  the  tribunes  were 
declared  inviolable,  and  the  man  who  laid  hands  on  them  was 
counted  accursed  in  the  sight  of  gods  and  men. 


4»  ROME 

495-449  B.C. 

This  outline  of  the  tribuniciari  power  serves  to  show  that  it 
was  really  a  copy  of  the  consular  power.  In  both  cases  the  Roman 
check  of  intercession,  or  veto,  plays  a  prominent  part ;  as  one  con- 
sul could  veto  his  colleague,  so  one  tribune  could  thwart  the  other. 
The  special  power  of  vetoing  the  consul,  or  any  other  state  magis- 
trate, belonged  to  the  tribune,  in  virtue  of  his  position  as  protector 
and  counsel  of  the  plebs.  Again,  the  duration  of  office  was  limited 
to  a  year  in  both  cases,  and  in  both  cases  the  holder  of  the  office 
could  not  be  deposed.  Further,  in  their  criminal  jurisdiction,  two 
aediles  were  associated  with  the  tribunes,  just  as  two  quaestors  had 
been  attached  to  the  consuls ;  but  the  consul  submitted  to  the  prohi- 
bition of  the  tribune,  while  the  tribune  was  unrestricted  by  any  such 
prohibition  from  the  consul.  Still,  although  a  copy,  the  tribunician 
power  presented  a  contrast  to  the  consular.  It  was  essentially  nega- 
tive, while  that  of  the  consuls  was  essentially  positive.  The  con- 
suls alone  were  magistrates  of  the  Roman  people,  as  being  elected 
by  the  whole  burgess-body,  and  not  merely  by  the  plebeians.  There- 
fore the  consul  alone  had  the  outward  insignia  of  office ;  the  tribune 
lacked  official  attendants  and  the  purple-bordered  robe,  and  had  no 
seat  in  the  senate.  Thus  in  this  remarkable  institution  absolute 
prohibition  was  in  the  most  stern  and  abrupt  fashion  opposed  to 
absolute  command;  the  quarrel  was  settled  by  legally  recognizing 
and  regulating  the  discord  between  rich  and  poor. 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  what  was  the  political  value  of 
the  tribunate.  Springing  as  it  did  from  the  miseries  caused  by  over- 
taxation, the  baleful  system  of  credit,  and  the  pernicious  occupation 
of  the  state  lands,  it  yet  put  no  stop  to  these  evils.  The  reason  of 
this  is  simply  that  the  wealthy  plebeians  had  as  much  interest  in  these 
abuses  as  the  patricians.  The  good  that  the  office  might  do  in  indi- 
vidual cases  of  hardship,  and  in  helping  plebeians  to  gain  admission 
to  state  offices,  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  evil  of  ren- 
dering the  administration  of  criminal  law  subject  to  the  party  pas- 
sion of  politics.  For  party  purposes,  too,  the  tribunes  could  employ 
their  power  to  veto,  and  throw  out  of  gear  the  machine  of  state, 
and  thus  pave  the  way  for  that  very  tyranny  which  they  were  created 
to  render  impossible.  In  the  latter  days  of  the  republic  we  shall 
find  that  this  was  the  very  course  they  pursued;  and  the  odium 
thus  incurred  found  expression  in  the  contemptuous  definition  of 
the  tribunate  as  a  "  pestiferous  power,  the  offspring  of  sedition,  with 
sedition  for  its  end  and  aim."    The  events  which  followed  the  insti-* 


TRIBUNATE    OF    THE     PLEBS  43 

491-466   B.C. 

tution  of  the  tribunes  indicate  a  state  of  organized  civil  war  between 
the  two  parties  of  the  state.  Among  minor  conflicts  stands  out  the 
story  of  Gaius  Marcius,  surnamed  Coriolanus,  from  the  storming 
of  Corioli.  Romance  has  doubtless  colored  his  bitter  opposition  to 
the  tribunes  in  491  B.C.,  his  expulsion  by  them  from  Rome,  his  re- 
turn at  the  head  of  the  Volscian  army,  his  withdrawal  on  the  appeal 
of  his  mother,  his  death  at  the  hands  of  the  exasperated  Volscians; 
but  the  truth  of  these  disgraceful  conflicts  between  the  Roman  orders 
remains  unshaken.  The  murder  of  the  tribune,  Gnaeus  Genucius, 
who  had  dared  to  impeach  two  men  of  consular  rank  in  473  B.C., 
had  a  more  lasting  result,  giving  rise  two  years  later  to  the 
Publilian  law.  The  proposer  of  this  law,  Volero  Publilius,  who 
was  tribune  in  471  B.C.,  established  in  the  first  place  the  comitia 
tributa,1  or  plebeian  assembly  of  tribes.  Hitherto  the  plebeians 
had  voted  by  curies,  and  numbers  alone  had  determined  their  de- 
cision. The  clients  of  patrician  families  voted  in  these  assemblies, 
and  thus  enabled  the  nobility  to  exercise  no  small  influence  on  the 
result.  The  new  plebeian  assembly  was  composed  solely  of  those 
who  were  freeholders,  and  thus  excluded  the  great  majority  of 
freedmen  and  clients,  as  well  as  all  the  patricians.  Owing  to  this 
the  comitia  tributa  was  practically  an  assembly  of  the  independent 
middle  class,  and  was,  owing  to  its  exclusion  alike  of  patricians 
and  non-freeholder  plebeians,  less  representative  of  the  burgesses 
than  the  assembly  of  curies  had  been.  In  the  second  place  we  must 
ascribe,  if  not  directly  to  the  provisions  of  the  Pubilian  law,  at  least 
indirectly  to  its  effects,  the  fact  that  the  resolutions  of  the  plebs 
(plebiscita)  were  recognized  as  legally  binding  on  the  whole  com- 
munity, and  had  the  same  validity  as  the  decrees  of  the  comitia 
centuriata.  Probably,  also,  the  increase  of  the  number  of  tribunes 
from  two  to  five  was  due  to  this  law,  and  their  election  was  now 
transferred  to  the  comitia  tributa.  Previous  to  this  outcome  of 
party  triumph  and  party  legislation,  a  far  wiser  and  far  more 
serious  attempt  to  deal  with  the  real  source  of  evil  was  made  by 
Spurius  Cassius,  a  patrician  of  the  patricians,  and  personally 
illustrious  by  two  triumphs.  He  proposed  to  reform  the  public 
land  system  by  distributing  a  portion  of  it  among  the  needy  citi- 
zens; but  the  cry  of  "king"  was  raised,  and  the  commons,  irri- 
tated by  the  proposed  association  of  the  Latins  in  the  distribution, 

1  The  origin  of  the  comitia  tributa  is  a  much  disputed  question.   For  another 
view  of  the  question  see  Ihne,  "  Early  Rome,"  144-147- 


44  ROME 

466-450  B.C. 

and  ever  ready  to  believe  that  royal  power  was  being  aimed  at, 
refused  to  save  their  champion.  Cassius  fell,  and  his  law  was 
buried  along  with  him;  but  its  specter  thenceforward  incessantly 
haunted  the  eyes  of  the  rich,  and  again  and  again  it  rose  from  the 
tomb  against  them,  until,  amid  the  conflicts  to  which  it  led,  the 
commonwealth  perished. 

Later,  in  462  B.C.,  a  further  attempt  to  abolish  the  tribunate 
came  from  one  holding  that  office.  Gaius  Terentilius  Arsa  proposed 
to  nominate  a  commission  of  five  men  for  the  purpose  of  preparing 
a  legal  code  which  should  bind  the  consuls  in  the  exercise  of  their 
judicial  powers.  Ten  years  of  party  strife  elapsed  before  this  pro- 
posal was  carried  into  effect,  and  during  that  strife  two  concessions 
were  made  to  induce  the  plebeians  to  give  up  this  legal  code.  In 
457  B.C.  the  tribunes  were  increased  from  five  to  ten;  in  456  B.C., 
the  Aventine,  which  had  hitherto  been  sacred  ground  and  uninhab- 
ited, was  distributed  among  the  poorer  burgesses,  for  them  to  build 
on  and  occupy.  But  these  concessions  did  not  turn  aside  the  plebs. 
The  legal  code  was  agreed  to,  and  in  451  B.C.  ten  men  were  elected 
by  the  centuries,  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  it  up.  These  decem- 
virs had  full  powers  as  supreme  magistrates  in  the  place  of  the 
consuls ;  no  appeal  was  allowed  in  their  case ;  the  tribunate  was  sus- 
pended; and,  what  was  more  important,  plebeians,  as  well  as  pa- 
tricians, were  eligible  for  the  new  office.  The  first  plebeians  were 
elected  at  the  second  election  in  450  B.C.,  and  these  were  the  first 
non-patrician  magistrates  of  the  Roman  community.  The  object 
of  this  new  creation  was  to  substitute  a  limitation  of  the  consular 
powers  by  written  law  for  the  more  turbulent  veto  of  the  tribunes. 
The  pledge  given  by  the  decemvirs  not  to  infringe  the  liberties  of 
the  plebs  did  not,  perhaps,  imply  the  abolition  of  the  tribunate ;  but 
a  wise  compromise  would  doubtless  have  brought  this  about,  had 
the  decemvirs  retired  when  their  task  was  done.  In  451  B.C.  the 
law,  engraven  on  ten  tables  of  copper,  was  affixed  in  the  Forum  to 
the  rostra  in  front  of  the  senate-house.  Two  more  tables  were  added 
in  the  following  year,  and  thus  originated  the  first  and  only  legal 
code  of  Rome — the  Twelve  Tables.  The  changes  introduced  by 
this  code  were  of  a  comparatively  slight  character;  the  maximum 
of  interest  was  fixed  at  ten  per  cent.,  and  the  usurer  was  rendered 
liable  to  heavy  penalties.  The  legal  distinction  between  freeholders 
and  non-freeholders  was  retained,  as  also  the  invalidity  of  marriage 
between  patricians  and  plebeians.   The  chief  feature  was  the  denial 


TRIBUNATE    OF    THE    PLEBS  45 

451-449  B.C. 

of  appeal  to  the  comitia  tributa  in  capital  cases,  and  the  confirma- 
tion of  it  in  the  case  of  the  comitia  centuriata.  The  political  sig- 
nificance of  this  code  lay  not  so  much  in  the  particulars  of  its  legis- 
lation, as  in  the  fact  that  the  consuls  were  now  bound  to  administer 
justice  according  to  set  forms  and  rules;  while  the  exhibition  of 
the  code  in  public  subjected  the  administrator  to  the  control  of  the 
public  eye.  The  downfall  of  the  decemvirs,  who  under  various  pre- 
texts refused  to  abdicate  their  office,  has  been  ascribed  by  legend 
to  the  tyranny  of  their  chief,  Appius  Claudius.  The  murder  of 
Lucius  Siccius  Dentatus,  the  bravest  soldier  in  Rome,  and  a  former 
tribune,  was  laid  at  the  door  of  the  decemvirs;  and  the  act  of  the 
centurion  Lucius  Verginius,  who  slew  his  own  daughter  to  save 
her  from  the  brutal  lust  of  Appius,  caused  the  storm  of  popular 
indignation  to  break  forth.  The  two  armies,  which  a  double  war 
against  the  Sabines  and  Volscians  had  called  into  the  field,  on 
hearing  the  story  from  Verginius  and  Lucius  Icilius,  the  betrothed 
lover  of  the  dead  maiden,  straightway  left  their  camps,  and  once 
more  seceded  to  the  Sacred  Mount.  They  there  nominated  their 
tribunes,  and,  as  the  decemvirs  still  remained  obstinate,  returned  to 
the  city,  and  encamped  on  the  Aventine.  The  decemvirs  now  gave 
way,  and  Appius  Claudius  and  Spurius  Oppius  put  an  end  to  their 
lives,  while  the  remaining  eight  went  into  exile.  It  is  hard  to  believe 
that  the  decemvirate,  one  of  the  triumphs  of  the  plebs,  was  abolished 
by  that  body.  Possibly  the  whole  story  is  a  myth  of  the  aristocrats. 
The  overthrow  of  the  decemvirate  would  more  naturally  have  come 
from  the  patricians.  A  subsequent  contest  may  possibly  have  en- 
sued to  force  the  patricians  to  restore  the  tribunate,  resulting  in 
the  victory  of  the  plebs,  and  in  the  compromise  which  was  confirmed 
by  the  Valerio-Horatian  laws,  the  so-called  Magna  Charta  of  Rome. 
At  any  rate  the  tribunate  was  restored,  and,  under  the  Valerio- 
Horatian  laws,  gained  the  following  new  powers  in  449  B.C. :  The 
consuls  were  forced  to  administer  justice  in  accordance  with  the 
twelve  tables  of  the  decemvirs ;  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  right 
of  appeal  in  capital  cases  to  the  comitia  tributa,  every  magistrate, 
the  dictator  among  the  rest,  was  obliged  to  allow  the  right  of  appeal ; 
the  tribunes  could,  as  before,  inflict  fines  without  limitation,  and 
submit  their  sentences  to  the  comitia  tributa;  the  management  of 
the  military  chest  was  taken  from  the  consuls,  and  intrusted  to  two 
quaestors,  who  were  chosen  by  the  whole  body  of  freeholders,  both 
patrician  and  plebeian;   the  votes  of  this  assembly  were  taken  by 


46  ROME 

451-449  B.C. 

districts,  which  gave  the  plebeian  farmers  far  more  weight  than  they 
possessed  in  the  comitia  centuriata;  the  tribunes  were  allowed  to 
sit  on  a  bench  at  the  door  of  the  senate-house,  and  thus  have  a  share 
in  the  proceedings  of  that  body.  And  from  this  important  conces- 
sion gradually  arose  the  principle,  that  the  tribune  could  by  his 
veto  stop  any  resolution  of  the  senate  or  of  the  public  assembly. 
No  attempt  to  abolish  this  magistracy  was  ever  from  this  time  for- 
ward made  in  Rome. 


Chapter    VII 

STRIFE   OF   PATRICIANS   AND   PLEBEIANS 
445-265   B.C. 

THE  contest  between  the  patricians  and  plebeians  was  not 
yet  ended.  For  two  hundred  years  the  bitter  strife  con- 
tinued; each  successive  struggle  wrested  from  the  old 
aristocracy  one  or  more  of  their  dearly  loved  privileges,  until  at 
last  not  one  remained,  save  that  which  birth  alone  gives  and  naught 
can  take  away,  the  exclusive  pride  of  caste.  To  present  a  continu- 
ous history  of  the  internal  strife  of  parties,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
confine  this  chapter  to  a  narrative  of  the  inner  life  of  Rome,  and  to 
summarize  as  briefly  as  possible  the  events  of  each  blow  to  the 
patrician  power,  and  the  results  of  the  conflict  as  a  whole.  The  his- 
tory of  Rome's  foreign  relations,  although  they  exercised  no  slight 
influence  on  her  internal  discord,  must  be  reserved  for  another 
place. 

Social  discontent,  rather  than  political,  had  given  rise  to  the 
tribunician  movement,  a  movement  viewed  with  suspicion  by 
wealthy  plebeians  as  well  as  by  patricians.  Doubtless  some  of  the 
leading  plebeians  had  supported  their  less  powerful  brethren  in  the 
struggle,  whether  from  motives  of  justice  or  self-interest.  But,  now 
that  the  office  of  tribune  was  firmly  established,  the  whole  plebeian 
body,  comprising  both  those  wealthier  families  and  the  general  mass 
of  the  citizens,  became  firmly  united  together,  and  used  the  tribunate 
as  a  lever  to  remove  the  political  disabilities  of  their  order.  The 
first  blow  was  dealt  by  the  Canuleian  law  in  445  B.C.  This  law 
legalized  the  validity  of  marriage  between  a  patrician  and  plebeian, 
giving  the  children  of  such  a  marriage  the  rank  of  their  father. 
It  further  yielded  to  the  demand  of  the  plebeians  to  be  admitted  to 
the  consulship  by  a  compromise  which  sought  to  retain  many  of 
the  privileges  of  the  office  for  the  patricians.  Each  year  the  people 
were  to  vote  whether  there  should  be  the  usual  consuls  or  whether 
their  place  should  be  taken  by  six  military  tribunes.  In  the  latter 
case  the  plebeians  were  eligible  to  the  office,  but  the  military  tribunes 

47 


48  ROME 

444-409  B.  C. 

were  not  to  enjoy  all  the  honors  of  the  consuls.  They  could  not  cele- 
brate triumphs  or  have  their  ancestors'  images  set  up  in  the  family 
hall  and  exhibited  on  public  occasions,  nor  could  they  speak  or 
vote  in  the  senate — rights  which  the  regular  consuls  enjoyed.  Dur- 
ing the  period  of  nearly  eighty  years,  from  444  B.C.  to  the 
throwing  open  of  the  consulship  to  the  plebeians  by  the  Licinian 
law  in  367  B.C.,  we  find  that  the  military  tribunes  were  elected  fifty 
times,  and  the  patrician  consuls  twenty-three  times.  The  miserable 
shifts  by  which  the  patricians  thus  sought  to  baffle  their  opponents 
found  further  expression  in  the  creation  of  the  censorship  in  435 
B.C.  The  two  officers,  or  "  valuers  "  (censores),  thus  created,  were 
chosen  from  the  patricians,  and  held  office  for  a  period  of  not  more 
than  eighteen  months.  They  had  charge  of  the  registration  of  the 
whole  body  of  citizens  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  and  the  duty 
of  ascertaining  the  age  and  property  of  each  man,  and  of  assign- 
ing him  his  proper  position  on  the  burgess-roll.  This  task  had 
hitherto  been  managed  by  the  consuls  every  fourth  year.  The 
censorship,  although  at  this  period  lacking  its  subsequent  importance 
and  moral  supremacy,  from  its  influence  in  filling  up  the  vacancies 
in  the  senate  and  the  equites,  and  from  its  power  to  remove  persons 
from  the  lists  of  senators,  equites,  and  burgesses,  came  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  palladium  of  the  aristocracy.  The  second  great  vic- 
tory over  the  patricians  was  gained  in  421  B.C.,  when  the  questor- 
ship  was  thrown  open  to  the  plebeians.  Hitherto  the  consuls  had 
nominated  the  two  city  questors,  who  had  charge  of  the  public 
money ;  their  election  was  now  transferred  to  the  same  body  which 
elected  their  two  colleagues  who  had  charge  of  the  military  chest. 
Thus  the  plebeians  became  eligible  for  the  first  time  to  one  of  the 
ordinary  magistracies,  although  we  do  not  find  that  they  were  able 
to  avail  themselves  of  this  privilege  until  409  B.C.,  when  they 
secured  three  places  out  of  the  four.  In  their  bitter  resistance  to 
the  plebs  the  aristocracy  had  resort  to  every  artifice  which  could 
influence  elections;  the  aristocratic  colleges  of  priests,  under  the 
guise  of  religion,  seconded  the  bribery  and  intimidation  freely 
practiced  on  the  electorate.  Laws  could  be  arrested,  elections  made 
null  and  void,  by  the  convenient  discovery  of  portentous  omens, 
whether  from  the  flight  of  birds  or  other  phenomena.  The  blood 
of  Rome's  best  and  bravest  citizens  was  shed  in  the  vain  hope  of 
stemming  the  tide  of  plebeian  victory. 

At  last  a  solution  of  the  troubles  arising  from  political  dis- 


PATRICIANS    AND     PLEBEIANS  49 

377-337  B.C. 

content  and  social  wretchedness  sprang  out  of  the  combination  of 
the  chief  plebeians  with  the  farmers.  This  solution  was  found  in 
the  famous  proposals  brought  forward  in  377  B.C.  by  the  tribunes 
Gaius  Licinius  and  Lucius  Sextius.  Their  proposals. were  that  the 
military  tribunes  should  be  abolished,  and  that  at  least  one  of  the 
consuls  should  be  a  plebeian;  that  plebeians  should  be  admitted  to 
one  of  the  three  great  priest-colleges,  viz.,  that  of  the  custodians  of 
the  oracles;  that  no  one  should  keep  on  the  common  pasture-land 
more  than  a  hundred  oxen  and  five  hundred  sheep,  or  hold  more  than 
five  hundred  jugera  (about  three  hundred  acres)  of  the  state  lands 
left  free  for  occupation;  that  every  landlord  should  be  obliged  to 
employ  in  land  cultivation  a  certain  number  of  free  laborers,  in 
proportion  to  that  of  his  rural  slaves;  that  debtors  should  be  re- 
lieved by  the  deduction  of  the  interest  already  paid  from  the  capital, 
and  by  arranging  set  terms  for  the  payment  of  arrears. 

The  three  watch-words  of  this  great  movement  were  clearly 
social  reform,  civil  equality,  the  abolition  of  privilege.  The  heredi- 
tary distinctions  associated  with  the  curule  magistracy,  the  right 
to  speak  in  the  senate-house,  the  possession  of  spiritual  dignities, 
were  no  longer  to  be  the  exclusive  property  of  the  nobles.  Social 
distress  was  to  be  relieved,  and  the  poorest  burgess  was  to  have  his 
rightful  share  in  those  lands  from  which  the  selfishness  of  the  rich 
had  so  long  excluded  him.  That  the  patricians  struggled  hard  to 
prevent  these  proposals  becoming  law  is  not  surprising;  but  that 
they  were  passed,  after  a  struggle  of  eleven  years,  in  367  B.C.,  proves 
the  strength  of  the  united  forces  of  the  farmers  and  rich  plebeians. 
The  passing  of  these  laws  was  marked  by  founding  the  Temple 
of  Concord  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol — the  last  act  of  the  aged  war- 
rior and  statesman  Marcus  Furius  Camillus,  who  perhaps  trusted 
that  the  struggle,  too  long  continued,  was  now  at  an  end.  But  the 
patrician  spirit  still  showed  itself  in  the  creation  of  a  third  consul, 
or,  as  he  was  usually  called,  a  pretor.  However,  this  office  among 
others  was  thrown  open  to  the  plebeians  in  337  B.C.,  having  re- 
mained in  the  hands  of  the  aristocracy  only  twenty-nine  years.  The 
last  blows  which  destroyed  aristocratic  exclusiveness  were  that  by 
which  the  dictatorship  was  thrown  open  to  the  plebeians  in  356  B.C. ; 
that  which  gave  the  plebeians  access  to  the  censorship  in  351  B.C.: 
that  dealt  by  the  Publilian  law  in  339  B.C.,  which  ordained  that  at 
least  one  of  the  censors  must  be  a  plebeian;  and  that  which  ren- 
dered  it    impossible    for  the   senate   to   reject   a   decree   of   the 


50  ROME 

300-287  B.C. 

community  by  compelling  that  body  to  give  their  consent  before- 
hand to  any  measures  which  might  be  passed  by  the  comitia  tributa. 
The  next  blow,  aimed  at  the  religious  privileges  of  the  patricians, 
fell  later.  In  300  b.c.  the  Ogulnian  law  increased  the  number  of 
pontifices  from  five  to  eight,  and  that  of  the  augurs  from  six  to  nine, 
and  distributed  the  stalls  in  the  two  colleges  between  the  patricians 
and  plebeians.  Lastly,  owing  to  another  secession  of  the  plebs, 
the  final  blow  was  given  by  the  law  of  the  dictator  Quintus  Hor- 
tensius,  in  287  B.C.  This  law  declared  that  the  decrees  of  the  plebs, 
passed  in  their  tribal  assembly,  should  have  equal  force  with  the 
decrees  of  the  whole  populus,  or  community.  Thus  it  was  brought 
about  that  those  very  burgesses  who  had  once  exclusively  possessed 
the  right  of  voting,  no  longer  had  even  a  vote  in  that  assembly  whose 
resolutions  were  binding  on  the  whole  state. 

The  end  had  at  last  come  to  a  strife  of  two  hundred  years. 
The  clan  nobility,  as  such,  was  no  longer  a  political  factor  in  the 
Roman  Republic ;  but,  although  its  power  and  privileges  were  gone, 
its  exclusive  patrician  spirit  was  ever  a  disturbing  element  of  dis- 
content in  the  public  and  private  life  of  Rome.  To  understand 
rightly  the  history  of  Rome  in  the  third  and  second  centuries  B.C., 
we  must  never  overlook  this  sulking  patricianisrh ;  it  could,  indeed, 
do  little  more  than  irritate  itself  and  others,  but  this  it  did  to  the 
best  of  its  ability. 

It  remains  for  us  to  estimate  the  result  of  these  changes,  as  to 
whether  they  checked  social  distress  and  established  political  equality. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  any  lasting  benefit  was  enjoyed  by  the 
poorer  classes  from  the  new  laws.  No  legislation  could  really 
check  the  system  of  large  estates,  or  the  employment  of  slave-labor, 
without  at  the  same  time  shaking  the  foundations  of  the  civil  organ- 
ization of  that  time,  in  a  way  that  would  entail  far-reaching  conse- 
quences. The  true  advantages  of  the  reform  legislation  obtained 
by  the  alliance  of  the  poor  farmers  and  the  rich  plebeians  accrued 
to  the  latter  alone.  Relief  for  the  former  came  not  from  legislation, 
but  from  the  successes  of  Rome,  and  the  necessity  of  sending  out 
large  colonies  to  consolidate  the  Roman  rule  in  Italy.  Added  to 
this,  the  general  increase  of  prosperity  from  successful  war  and 
commerce,  and  the  flourishing  condition  of  the  state  finances,  must 
have  lightened  the  burdens  of  the  farmers,  and  diffused  material 
well-being  among  the  whole  community. 

As  to  political  equality,  it  was  now  practically  attained.     In 


PATRICIANS    AND     PLEBEIANS  51 

300-287  B.C. 

the  eye  of  the  law,  at  least,  all  arbitrary  distinctions  were  abolished. 
The  different  gradations,  which  age,  wisdom,  and  wealth  always 
produce  in  society,  were  lessened  by  the  system  that  pervaded  Ro- 
man life.  That  system  aimed  rather  at  a  uniform  level  of  ability 
than  at  bringing  into  prominence  those  more  highly  gifted.  Rich 
and  poor  alike  lived  frugal  lives,  avoiding  even  the  luxury  of  silver 
plate.  From  the  last  war  with  Veii  down  to  that  against  Pyrrhus, 
the  farmers  played  a  more  important  part  than  the  old  patriciate; 
the  exploits  of  a  plebeian,  like  Decius,  and  of  a  poor  farmer,  like 
Manius  Curius,  now  began  to  take  equal  rank  with,  and  even  eclipse, 
those "  of  the  noblest  aristocrat.  But,  great  as  the  strides  to  this 
republican  equality  were,  the  government  still  remained  aristocratic. 
The  mere  opening  of  state  magistracies  to  the  humblest  and  poorest 
burgess  does  not  remove  the  difficulties  which  always  hinder  the 
rise  of  a  man  from  the  ranks.  Moreover,  a  new  aristocracy,  con- 
sisting of  the  wealthy  plebeians,  had  existed  from  the  first,  and 
now  developed  fresh  powers.  Their  policy  had  always  followed 
lines  distinct  from,  and  often  opposed  to,  that  of  the  plebs.  This 
new  aristocracy  coalesced  with  the  old  patriciate,  and  largely  adopted 
its  views,  and  soon  practically  took  its  place.  A  natural  result  of  this 
development  was  the  rise  of  a  new  opposition.  This  new  demo- 
cratic party  was  formed  no  longer  of  plebeians,  as  such,  but  of  the 
lower  classes  and  the  small  farmers.  But,  fortunately  for  Rome, 
her  struggles  with  foreign  foes  caused  the  leaders  of  the  two  new 
state  parties  to  forego  their  quarrels  in  the  face  of  a  common  dan- 
ger; and  thus  we  find  the  patrician  Appius  Claudius  uniting  with 
his  personal  foe,  the  farmer  Manius  Curius,  for  the  purpose  of 
crushing  Pyrrhus.  The  breach  was  already  formed;  but  the  ad- 
versaries still  shook  hands  across  it. 

Finally,  let  us  consider  what  effect  the  political  abolition  of 
the  old  nobility  had  upon  the  relations  between  the  burgesses,  the 
magistrates,  and  the  senate.  Although  the  powers  of  the  burgess 
assemblies  were  increased  in  certain  directions,  chiefly  with  respect 
to  the  number  of  magistrates  nominated  by  them,  they  did  not  as 
a  rule  interfere  with  the  administration  of  government.  They  kept 
a  firm  hold  on  their  right  to  declare  war,  and  occasionally  settled 
disputes  between  the  governing  powers,  when  appealed  to  by  the 
disputants,  and  in  390  B.C.  they  even  annulled  a  decree  of  the  senate. 
The  Hortensian  law  probably  marks  the  extension  of  the  powers 
of  the  comitia  tributa,  which  came  to  be  consulted  as  to  the  conclu- 


52  ROME 

390-265  B.C. 

sion  of  peace  and  alliances.  Still,  the  influence  of  these  assemblies 
on  public  affairs  towards  the  close  of  this  period  began  to  wane. 
This  was  mainly  due  to  the  extension  of  the  bounds  of  Rome,  whose 
burgess-body  no  longer  composed  a  city,  but  a  state.  Thus  the  in- 
terest felt  in  their  proceedings  on  ordinary  occasions  was  compara- 
tively slight,  inasmuch  as  only  those  residing  in  the  capital  as  a 
rule  attended.  Moreover,  the  magistrate  who  convoked  the  assem- 
bly could  prevent  all  discussion ;  hence  the  assemblies  became  mere 
instruments  in  his  hands,  and  played  a  passive  part,  neither  helping 
nor  hindering  the  administration  of  the  government. 

With  regard  to  the  Roman  magistrates,  a  great  loss  of  power 
was  the  outcome  of  party  contests.  The  close  of  the  struggle  left 
the  consular  power  subdivided  and  weakened.  Jurisdiction,  city 
police,  election  of  senators  and  equites,  the  census  and  financial  ad- 
ministration, were  all  transferred  to  magistrates  elected  by  the 
community,  and  occupying  a  position  coordinate  with,  rather  than 
subordinate  to,  the  consuls.  In  addition  to  this  creation  of  col- 
lateral standing  offices  such  as  the  pretorship,  the  senate  now  an- 
nually defined,  though  it  did  not  directly  assign,  the  different  de- 
partments of  the  consuls;  and  the  senate  no  longer  allowed  the 
consuls  to  conclude  peace,  without  first  receiving  instructions  from 
the  assembled  senators.  Lastly,  the  senate  could  in  emergencies 
sustain  a  consul  by  creating  a  dictator;  and,  although  nominally 
designated  by  the  consul,  the  consul-elect  was,  as  a  rule,  really 
chosen  by  the  senate.  Even  the  dictator's  power  was  no  longer  re- 
garded as  absolute  and  unlimited.  The  definition  of  the  functions 
of  the  dictator,  as  of  that  of  the  consul  and  other  magistrates,  came 
to  be  regarded  as  a  constitutional  necessity.  Thus  we  find  in  363 
B.C.,  and  again  in  351  B.C.,  a  dictator  appointed  for  a  special  and 
limited  duty,  such  as  the  performance  of  a  religious  ceremony. 
Moreover,  restrictions  were  imposed  in  342  B.C.  by  plebiscites, 
enacting  that  no  one  should  hold  two  magistracies  in  the  same  year, 
and  that  the  same  man  should  not  hold  the  same  office  twice  within 
a  period  of  ten  years.  Later,  again,  in  265  B.C.,  the  Marcian  law 
forbade  anyone  holding  the  censorship  twice.  Although  the  rule 
forbidding  pluralism,  i.e.,  the  holding  of  two  offices  at  the  same 
time,  was  strictly  observed,  we  frequently  find  instances  of  a  relax- 
ation of  the  other  restriction.  The  change,  which  thus  transformed 
the  supreme  power  of  the  state  into  a  limited  magistracy  with 
definite  functions,  also  affected  the  tribunate.    Now  that  this  office 


PATRICIANS    AND     PLEBEIANS  53 

390-265  B.C. 

had  accomplished  the  purpose  for  which  it  had  been  used,  by  secur- 
ing the  abolition  of  the  legal  disabilities  of  the  commons  and  of  the 
privileges  of  the  old  nobility,  the  original  object  of  the  tribunate  as 
counsel  and  protector  of  the  humblest  and  weakest  was  as  odious 
to  the  new  plebeian  aristocracy  as  it  had  been  to  the  patrician. 
Therefore,  under  the  new  organization  the  office  lost  its  old  char- 
acter of  a  weapon  of  opposition,  and  became  an  instrument  of  gov- 
ernment. The  tribunes  no  longer  sat  on  a  bench  at  the  door  of 
the  senate-house,  but  took  their  seats  by  the  side  of  the  other 
magistrates,  and  took  part  in  the  discussions.  Like  the  other  act- 
ing magistrates,  they  did  not  during  their  year  of  office  vote  in  the 
senate,  but  they  had  the  right  of  convoking  it,  of  consulting  it,  and 
of  procuring  decrees  from  it.  Thus,  by  becoming  magistrates  of 
the  state,  the  tribunes  for  the  time  lost  their  old  revolutionary  and 
obstructive  character,  and  paved  the  way  for  the  steady  growth 
of  the  power  of  the  new  aristocracy;  indeed,  the  tribunes  were, 
as  a  rule,  members  of  that  body.  Yet  the  preservation  and  the  asso- 
ciations of  the  name  of  tribunate  might  well  forbode  danger  in  the 
future.  For  the  moment,  however,  and  for  a  long  time  to  come, 
the  aristocracy  was  so  absolutely  powerful,  and  so  completely  pos- 
sessed control  over  the  tribunate,  that  no  trace  is  to  be  met  with 
of  a  collegiate  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  tribunes  to  the  senate. 
What  opposition  did  arise  came  from  single  independent  tribunes, 
and  was  easily  crushed,  often  by  the  aid  of  the  tribune-college  itself. 
The  real  governing  power  became  vested  in  the  senate.  The 
Ovinian  law,  probably  passed  soon  after  the  Sexto-Licinian  laws, 
regulated  the  composition  of  that  body.  All  who  had  been  curule 
ediles,  pretors,  or  consuls  became  members.  The  action  of  the 
censors  was  in  this  way  greatly  restricted,  although  it  was  still  their 
duty  to  fill  up  all  the  vacancies  which  remained  after  the  above- 
mentioned  officers  had  been  placed  on  the  senatorial  roll.  Even 
in  making  this  selection  the  censors  were  bound  by  oath  to  choose 
all  the  best  citizens.  Moreover,  usage,  if  not  law,  seemed  to  have 
ordained  that  burgesses,  who  had  filled  a  non-curule  office,  or  who 
were  eminent  for  personal  valor,  or  who  had  saved  the  life  of  a 
fellow-citizen,  should  be  selected  for  the  honor.  Those  thus  chosen 
by  the  censor  voted,  but  took  no  part  in  debate.  The  main  part  of 
the  senate,  whose  election  was  determined  by  the  Ovinian  law,  and 
not  by  the  selection  of  the  censors,  and  who  held  the  reins  of  gov- 
ernment, were  in  this  way  indirectly  elected  by  the  people.     The 


54,  ROME 

307-265  B.C. 

Roman  government  in  this  way  made  some  approach  to,  although 
it  did  not  reach,  the  great  institution  of  modern  times,  representa- 
tive popular  government,  while  the  aggregate  of  the  non-debating 
senators  furnished — what  it  is  so  necessary,  and  yet  so  difficult  to 
get  in  governing  corporations — a  compact  mass  of  members,  capa- 
ble of  forming  and  entitled  to  pronounce  an  opinion,  but  voting 
in  silence.  No  magistrate  submitted  a  proposal  to  the  people  witb- 
out,  or  in  opposition  to,  the  senate's  opinion;  if  he  did  so,  the 
senate,  by  means  of  the  vetoing  power  of  the  magistrates  and  the 
annulling  powers  of  the  priests,  easily  thwarted  him;  and  in  ex- 
treme cases  the  senate  could  refuse  to  execute  the  decrees  of  the 
people.  Through  the  presiding  magistrate  the  senate  practically 
exerted  a  paramount  influence  on  the  elections,  and,  as  was  shown 
above  in  the  case  of  the  consuls,  bore  no  small  part  in  settling  what 
was  to  be  the  special  sphere  of  the  elected  magistrates.  Further, 
the  senate  acquired  the  right,  which  by  law  belonged  only  to  the 
community,  of  extending  the  term  of  office  to  the  consul  or  pretor, 
acting  outside  the  city's  limits;  and  the  consul  or  pretor,  whose 
term  was  thus  prolonged,  was  said  to  be  acting  "  in  a  consul's 
or  pretor's  stead"  (pro  consule,  pro  praetore).  From  the  year 
307  b.c.  the  term  of  the  commander-in-chief  was  regularly  pro- 
longed by  a  mere  decree  of  the  senate.  Finally,  as  regards  adminis- 
tration, war,  peace,  and  alliances,  the  founding  of  colonies,  the 
assignation  of  lands,  and  the  whole  system  of  finance,  the  senate 
became  practically  supreme.  Great  as  the  powers  intrusted  to  the 
senate  were,  the  senate  proved  fully  worthy  of  the  trust.  Although 
it  is  clear  that  the  steps  above  described  arrested  the  free  action  of 
the  burgesses,  and  reduced  the  magistrates  to  mere  executors  of  the 
senate's  will,  the  assembly,  by  its  ability  to  govern,  justified  its 
usurpation  of  power.  Its  members  owed  their  position  to  merit 
and  the  people's  choice,  not  to  birth ;  those  unworthy  of  their  high 
position  were  liable  to  removal  by  the  censors  every  fifth  year. 
Their  life-tenure  of  office  freed  them  from  the  necessity  of  trimming 
their  sails  to  the  shifting  breeze  of  public  opinion,  and  gave  them 
a  complete  control  over  the  executive  magistrates,  whose  office  an- 
nually changed  hands.  This  continuity  of  existence  rendered  pos- 
sible a  firm,  unwavering,  and  patriotic  foreign  policy;  and  never 
was  a  state  more  firmly  and  worthily  represented  in  its  external 
relations  than  Rome  in  its  best  times  by  its  senate.  We  cannot 
deny  that,  in  matters  of  internal  administration,  the  senate  too 


PATRICIANS    AND     PLEBEIANS  55 

307-265  B.C. 

often  favored  the  selfish  interests  of  the  moneyed  and  landed  aris- 
tocracy, which  was  largely  represented  in  that  body.  But,  when 
we  consider  its  conduct  as  a  whole,  we  must  allow  that  the  Roman 
senate  was  the  noblest  organ  of  the  nation,  and  in  consistency  and 
political  sagacity,  in  unanimity  and  patriotism,  in  grasp  of  power, 
and  unwavering  courage,  the  foremost  political  corporation  of  all 
times — still  even  now  "  an  assembly  of  kings,"  which  knew  well  how 
to  combine  despotic  energy  with  republican  self-devotion. 


Chapter    VIII 

FALL    OF   ETRUSCAN    POWER    AND    THE    COMING    OF 
THE   CELTS.    500-343  B.C. 

THE  last  three  chapters  have  been  devoted  to  the  internal 
struggles  of  Rome,  and  their  political  results;  we  can 
now  turn  to  the  external  history  both  of  Rome  and  of 
Italy.  Two  notable  events  meet  our  eyes — firstly,  the  collapse  of 
the  Etruscan  power:  secondly,  the  incursions  of  the  Celts.  About 
500  b.c.  the  Etruscans  had  reached  their  zenith  of  prosperity. 
Allied  with  the  Carthaginians,  who  were  absolute  masters  of  Sar- 
dinia, and  had  a  firm  foothold  in  Sicily,  they  ruled  the  Etruscan 
and  Adriatic  seas.  Although  Massilia  retained  her  independence, 
the  seaports  of  Campania  and  of  the  Volscian  land,  and  the  island 
of  Corsica,  were  in  their  hands.  The  possession  of  Latium,  which 
interposed  a  firm  barrier  between  Etruria  proper  and  the  Tuscan 
settlements  in  Campania,  was  naturally  of  the  utmost  importance; 
and,  for  a  short  time,  the  conquest  of  Rome  by  Lars  Porsena  in 
507  b.c.  seemed  to  open  out  a  prospect  of  the  realization  of  Tus- 
can supremacy  in  Italy.  But  the  advance  of  the  victorious  Etrus- 
cans into  Latium  received  a  check  beneath  the  walls  of  Aricia,  from 
the  timely  succor  of  the  people  of  Cumae  in  506  B.C.  The  end  of  this 
war  is  unknown ;  possibly  the  disgraceful  terms  of  the  peace,  which 
Rome  had  concluded  with  Lars  Porsena  the  previous  year,  were 
somewhat  modified ;  but,  for  a  time  at  least,  Latium  was  in  immi- 
nent danger  of  being  reduced  to  subjection  by  Etruscan  arms. 
Fortunately,  however,  for  Rome,  the  main  strength  of  the  Etruscan 
nation  was  diverted  from  Latium,  and  called  to  do  battle  elsewhere ; 
while  Veii  and  the  neighboring  towns  grappled  with  Rome,  the 
rest  of  the  Etruscans  were  engaged  in  another  cause. 

The  arrest  of  Greek  colonization  by  the  combined  Etruscans 
and  Carthaginians  has  been  already  described ;  a  more  deadly  blow, 
on  a  far  grander  scale,  if  we  may  believe  tradition,  threatened  the 
whole  Greek  world.  The  simultaneous  defeat  of  the  Persians  at 
Salamis  and  the  Carthaginians  at  Himera  by  the  rulers  of  Syracuse 

56 


FALL     OF    ETRUSCAN    POWER  57 

4S3-310  B.C. 

and  Agrigentum,  Gelon,  and  Theron,  in  480  B.C.,  utterly  crushed 
the  great  combination  of  Persians,  Carthaginians,  and  Etruscans 
against  liberty  and  civilization.  Six  years  later  the  Cumaeans  and 
Hiero  of  Syracuse  vanquished  the  Etruscan  fleet  off  Cumae;  and 
the  rise  of  Syracuse  to  the  chief  power  in  Sicily,  and  of  Tarentum 
to  the  leading  position  in  the  south  of  Italy,  put  an  end  to  the  mari- 
time supremacy  of  both  Etruscans  and  Carthaginians.  Syracuse 
in  453  B.C.  ravaged  the  island  of  Corsica  and  the  Etrurian  coast, 
and  occupied  Elba;  and  later,  in  415  to  413  B.C.,  the  Athenian  ex- 
pedition against  Syracuse,  which  received  support  from  Etruscan 
galleys,  ended  in  ignominious  failure,  and  left  Syracuse  free  to  turn 
on  her  old  enemy  with  redoubled  vigor.  Dionysius,  who  reigned 
from  406  to  367  B.C.,  founded  Syracusan  colonies  on  the  Illyrian 
coast  at  Lissus  and  the  island  of  Issa,  and  on  the  eastern  coast  of 
Italy  at  the  ports  of  Ancona,  Numana,  and  Hatria;  thus  ousting 
the  Etruscans  from  the  Adriatic.  In  addition  to  this,  he  captured, 
in  358  B.C.,  Pyrgi,  the  rich  seaport  of  Caere,  a  blow  from  which 
the  Etruscans  never  recovered.  Later,  too,  when  the  death  of 
Dionysius  and  the  ensuing  political  troubles  of  Syracuse  opened  the 
way  to  Carthaginian  arms,  we  find  that  the  revival  of  maritime 
supremacy  by  Carthage  brought  no  similar  revival  to  their  old 
allies  the  Etruscans.  On  the  contrary,  the  relations  between  the 
two  powers  had  become  so  strained,  that  in  310  B.C.  Tuscan  men- 
of-war  assisted  Agathocles  of  Syracuse  in  his  war  against  Carthage, 
and  the  old  alliance  was  thus  severed.  This  rapid  collapse  of  the 
naval  power  of  the  Etruscans  was  due  in  great  measure  to  the  fact 
that,  at  the  same  time  that  they  were  struggling  with  the  Sicilian 
Greeks  by  sea,  they  were  assailed  on  all  sides  by  foes  on  land.  Dur- 
ing the  period  of  the  combination  of  Persians,  Carthaginians,  and 
Etruscans,  above  alluded  to,  a  bitter  war  raged  between  Rome  and 
Veii  from  483  to  474  B.C.  Its  result  was  so  far  favorable  to  Rome 
that  the  Etruscans  gave  up  Fidenae,  and  the  district  they  had  won 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tiber.  Moreover,  the  Samnites  attacked 
the  Etruscan  settlements  in  Campania ;  Capua  fell  in  424  B.C.,  and 
the  Etruscan  population  was  extirpated  or  expelled.  But  in  north- 
ern Italy  a  new  nation  was  knocking  at  the  gates  of  the  Alps.  It 
was  the  Celts;  and  the  brunt  of  their  inroad  fell  first  upon  the 
Etruscans. 

The  character  of  the  Celtic  nation,  their  origin,  and  the  part 
they  played  in  Italian  history  at  this  period  now  claim  our  attention. 


58  ROME 

426-406  B.C. 

Nature,  though  she  lavished  upon  the  Celts  her  most  brilliant  gifts, 
had  denied  them  those  more  solid  and  enduring  qualities  which  lead 
to  the  highest  human  development,  alike  in  morality  and  politics. 
They  preferred  a  pastoral  life  to  an  agricultural,  and  had  none 
of  that  attachment  to  their  native  soil  which  characterized  the 
Italians  and  the  Germans.  Their  fondness  for  congregating  in 
towns  and  villages  did  not  lead  them  to  develop  political  constitu- 
tions. As  a  nation  they  had  little  sense  of  unity;  their  individual 
communities  were  equally  deficient  in  sincere  patriotism,  consistent 
purpose,  and  united  effort.  Ever  ready  to  rove,  they  were  the  true 
soldiers-of-fortune  in  antiquity,  and  possessed  all  the  qualities  of 
good  soldiers,  but  of  bad  citizens, — qualities  which  explain  the  his- 
torical fact  that  the  Celts  have  shaken  all  states  and  founded  none. 
These  people  at  a  very  early  period  settled  in  modern  France; 
from  there  they  crossed  over  to  Britain  in  the  north,  and  in  the  south 
passed  the  Pyrenees,  and  contested  the  possession  of  Spain  with  the 
Iberian  tribes.  Our  history  is  immediately  concerned  with  their 
movements  in  the  opposite  direction,  when,  leaving  their  homes  in 
the  West,  they  retraced  their  steps  and  poured  over  the  Alps  in 
ceaseless  streams.  Their  hordes,  on  passing  the  Graian  Alps  by  the 
little  St.  Bernard,  first  formed  the  Celtic  canton  of  the  Insubres, 
with  Milan  as  its  capital.  The  canton  of  the  Cenonmani,  with  the 
towns  of  Brescia  and  Verona,  soon  followed.  The  Ligurians  were 
dislodged,  and  the  possessions  of  the  Etruscans  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Po  were  soon  wrested  from  their  grasp ;  Melpum  fell,  and  soon 
the  invaders  crossed  the  Po,  and  assailed  the  Etruscans  and  Um- 
brians  in  their  original  home.  Isolated  roving  bands  no  doubt 
reached  the  borders  of  Etruria  proper,  and  about  the  middle  of  the 
fourth  century  the  Tuscan  nation  were  practically  restricted  to 
that  land  which  still  bears  their  name.  About  the  year  426  b.c.  the 
Etruscans  were  thus  engaged  in  war  with  three  enemies :  in  the 
north  with  the  encroaching  Celts ;  in  the  south  with  the  Samnites, 
who  had  invaded  Campania;  and  with  the  Romans.  A  fresh  out- 
break of  hostilities  between  Rome  and  Veii  was  due  to  the  revolt 
of  the  people  of  Fidenae,  who  had  murdered  the  Roman  envoys 
and  called  in  the  help  of  Lars  Tolumnius,  king  of  Veii.  This  king 
was  slain  by  the  consul  Aulus  Cornelius  Cossus,  and  the  war  ended 
favorably  to  the  Romans.  After  a  truce,  during  which  the  position 
of  Etruria  grew  more  and  more  critical,  war  broke  out  again  in 
406  B.C.  between  Rome  and  Veii:  the  latter  received  support  from 


t.AKKISMV 


CAPITOLINE    GEESE     AWAKENING     THE     SI.EEPINI 

THE   IMPENDING   DANCER  OF   SURPRISE    BY   THE  GAUI-S 

I'oinitng   by   Henri   Mattt 


FALL     OF    ETRUSCAN     POWER  59 

396-358  B.C. 

Capena  and  Falerii,  but,  owing  to  their  struggles  with  the  Celts, 
and  their  dislike  for  the  regal  form  of  government  in  Veii,  the 
Etruscan  nation  as  a  whole  gave  no  aid  to  the  hard-pressed  Veien- 
tines.  The  city  fell  in  396  B.C.,  and  was  destroyed  by  the  triumphant 
Romans,  to  whom  the  heroism  of  Marcus  Furius  Camillus  had 
first  opened  up  the  brilliant  and  perilous  career  of  foreign  conquest. 
Tradition  tells  us  that  Melpum  and  Veii  fell  on  the  same  day; 
whether  this  be  so  or  not,  the  double  assault  from  the  north  and  the 
south,  and  the  fall  of  the  two  frontier  strongholds,  were  the  begin- 
ning of  the  end  of  the  great  Etruscan  nation.  For  a  moment, 
however,  it  seemed  as  if  the  folly  of  Rome  was  destined  to  turn 
aside  from  the  head  of  the  Etruscans  the  sword  of  the  foreign  bar- 
barian. In  391  B.C.  Clusium,  situated  in  the  heart  of  Etruria, 
was  hard  pressed  by  the  Celtic  Senones;  so  low  was  Tuscan  pride, 
that  Clusium  begged  aid  from  the  destroyers  of  Veii.  Rome,  how- 
ever, in  place  of  substantial  help,  dispatched  envoys,  who  attempted 
to  impose  on  the  Celts  by  haughty  language ;  when  this  failed,  the 
envoys  violated  the  law  of  nations  by  fighting  in  the  ranks  of  the 
men  of  Clusium.  To  the  demand  of  the  barbarians  for  the  sur- 
render of  these  envoys  the  Romans  refused  to  listen.  Then  the 
Brennus,  or  king  of  the  Gallic  host,  abandoned  the  siege  of  Clusium, 
and  turned  against  Rome.  The  battle  of  the  Allia  in  390  b.c,  and 
the  capture  and  destruction  of  Rome,  taught  the  Romans  a  bitter 
lesson.  The  horrors  of  this  catastrophe,  the  burning  of  the  city, 
the  saving  of  the  Capitol  by  the  sacred  geese,  and  the  brave  Marcus 
Manlius,  the  scornful  throwing  down  into  the  scale  of  the  Gallic 
sword,  have  left  a  lasting  impression  on  the  imagination  of  pos- 
terity ;  but  the  victory  of  the  Gauls  had  no  permanent  consequences 
— nay,  it  only  served  to  knit  more  closely  the  ties  of  union  be- 
tween Latium  and  rebuilt  Rome.  The  Gauls  often  returned  to 
Rome  during  this  century.  Camillus,  indeed,  crowned  his  great 
career  by  defeating  them  at  Alba  in  367  b.c.  ;  the  dictator  Gaius 
Sulpicius  Peticus  routed  a  Gallic  host  in  358  B.C.,  and  eight  years 
later  Lucius  Furius  Camillus,  the  son  of  the  celebrated  general, 
dislodged  the  Gauls  from  the  Alban  mount,  where  they  had  en- 
camped during  the  winter.  But  these  plundering  incursions  only 
served  to  make  all  Italy  regard  Rome  as  the  bulwark  against  the 
barbarians,  and  thus  to  further  her  claim,  not  only  to  supremacy 
in  Italy,  but  also  to  universal  empire.  The  Etruscans  had  attempted 
to  recover  what  they  had  lost  in  the  Veientine  war,  while  the  Celts 


60 


ROME 


387-343   B.C. 

were  assailing  Rome.  When  the  barbarians  had  departed,  Rome 
turned  once  more  on  her  old  enemy.  The  whole  of  southern  Etruria, 
as  far  as  the  Ciminian  range,  passed  into  Roman  hands,  and  the 
advanced  frontier  line  was  secured  by  the  fortresses  of  Sutrium  and 
Nepete,  established  respectively  in  383  and  373  B.C.  Moreover, 
four  new  tribes  were  formed  in  the  territories  of  Veii,  Capena, 


and  Falerii,  in  387  B.C.,  and  the  whole  country  became  rapidly 
Romanized.  A  revolt  of  Tarquinii,  Falerii,  and  Caere,  about  358 
B.C.,  against  Roman  aggression  was  soon  crushed;  and  Caere  had 
to  cede  half  its  territory,  and  withdraw  from  the  Etruscan  league. 
The  relation  of  political  subjection  in  which  Caere  stood  to  Rome 
was  called  "  citizenship  without  the  power  of  voting  "  (civitas  sine 
suffragio)  ;  thus  the  state  lost  its  freedom,  but  could  still  administer 
its  own  affairs.    This  occurred  in  351  B.C.;  and  eight  years  later 


FALL     OF     ETRUSCAN     POWER  61 

387-343  B.C. 

Falerii  withdrew  from  the  Etruscan  league,  and  became  a  per- 
petual ally  of  Rome.  Thus  the  whole  of  southern  Etruria  became 
subject  to  Roman  supremacy. 

Gradually  the  conflicts  in  northern  Italy  ceased,  and  the  various 
nations  settled  side  by  side  within  more  defined  limits.  The  stream 
of  Celtic  immigrations  over  the  Alps  flowed  back;  whether  from 
the  desperate  efforts  of  the  Etruscans,  and  the  strong  barrier  of  the 
Romans,  or  from  some  causes  operating  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Alps,  we  cannot  determine.  In  a  general  way  the  Celts  now  ruled 
between  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines,  and  as  far  south  as  the 
Abruzzi:  but  their  dominion  did  not  sink  deep  into  the  land,  nor 
had  it  the  character  of  exclusive  possession.  In  the  flat  country 
occupied  by  the  Celts  Etruscan  settlements  still  existed.  Mantua 
was  a  Tuscan  city  even  in  the  days  of  the  empire,  as  also  was 
Hatria  on  the  Po;  and  Etruscan  corsairs  still  rendered  the  Adri- 
atic unsafe  far  on  into  the  third  century  B.C.  Further,  although 
mere  fragments  of  the  former  supremacy  of  the  Etruscans  were  now 
left  in  these  districts,  such  civilization  as  we  find  among  the  Celts 
and  Alpine  peoples  was  due  to  Tuscan  influence.  To  this  we  must 
ascribe  the  fact  that  the  Celts  in  the  plains  of  Lombardy  abandoned 
their  roving  warrior-life,  and  permanently  settled  in  that  district. 
But  the  Etruscan  nation  was  now  hemmed  in  on  all  sides.  Its  pos- 
sessions in  Campania,  and  in  the  district  north  of  the  Apennines 
and  south  of  the  Ciminian  forest,  were  lost  forever — its  day  of 
power  had  passed  away.  Socially  and  politically  the  whole  nation 
had  completely  degenerated.  Unbounded  luxury  and  gross  im- 
morality had  eaten  out  the  heart  of  the  people.  Gladiatorial  com- 
bats first  came  into  vogue  among  the  Etruscans ;  sensual  indulgence 
of  every  sort  sapped  the  nation's  vigor.  The  abolition  of  royalty, 
which  had  been  carried  out  in  every  city  about  the  time  of  the  siege 
of  Veii,  introduced  the  worst  form  of  aristocratic  government.  The 
federal  bond  had  always  exercised  but  little  restraint;  now  the 
abuse  of  power  by  the  nobles  caused  social  revolution  and  bitter 
distress.  The  energies  of  the  nation  were  broken  from  the  day  of 
Veii  and  of  Melpum.  Earnest  attempts  were  still  once  or  twice 
made  to  escape  from  the  Roman  supremacy,  but  in  these  instances 
the  stimulus  was  communicated  to  the  Etruscans  from  without — 
from  another  Italian  stock,  the  Samnites. 


Chapter  IX 

ADVANCE    OF   ROME   TO   THE    CONQUEST    OF    ITALY. 

500290   B.C. 

WE  have  now  reached  a  turning-point  in  the  fortunes  of 
Rome.  In  the  last  chapter  it  was  shown  that  she  had 
abandoned  her  old  defensive  attitude  towards  Etruria, 
and  had  succeeded  in  annexing  the  southern  portion  of  that 
country,  and  in  repelling  the  restless  Celtic  hordes.  Her  next 
foes  are  no  longer  foreign  intruders,  but  men  of  her  own  stock, 
or  of  Italian  race. 

We  may  briefly  summarize  the  steps  by  which  Rome  became 
mistress  of  Italy  as  follows:  The  subjugation  of  the  Latins  and 
Campanians;  the  gallant  struggles  of  the  Samnites,  both  on  their 
own  behalf  and  on  behalf  of  the  rest  of  the  still  independent  Ital- 
ians; and  the  invasion  and  defeat  of  Pyrrhus.  With  regard  to  the 
first  point,  we  must  for  a  moment  revert  to  the  old  position  of  Rome 
in  Latium,  as  exercising  a  hegemony,  based  upon  complete  equality 
between  the  Roman  state  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Latin  confeder- 
acy on  the  other.  That  these  relations  were  violently  shaken  by 
the  abolition  of  the  monarchy  at  Rome  we  know  from  tradition, 
which  has  painted  in  glowing  colors  the  victory  at  Lake  Regillus, 
gained  by  the  Romans  about  499  b.c.  More  certain  proof  is 
afforded  by  the  renewal  of  the  perpetual  league  between  Rome  and 
Latium  by  Spurius  Cassius  six  years  later.  At  what  time  the  rest 
of  Latium  followed  Rome's  lead  and  abolished  the  regal  power 
we  do  not  know,  but  probably  this  took  place  at  an  early  period. 
Although  we  are  without  definite  information  on  each  point,  it  is 
easy  to  understand  how  the  basis  of  equal  rights  soon  became  im- 
practicable ;  how  Rome  not  only  bore  the  brunt  of  most  of  the  wars, 
but  also  naturally  appropriated  the  substantial  fruits  of  the  vic- 
tories; how  she  not  only  decided  the  question  of  war  or  peace, 
but  practically  appointed  from  her  own  body  the  federal  generals 
and  chief  officers,  and  assumed  the  direction  of  every  campaign, 
and  how  in  founding  colonies  she  supplied  most  of  the  colonists. 


CONQUEST     OF     ITALY  63 

495-382  B.C. 

Although  the  public  rights  of  the  federal  Latins  were  thus  en- 
croached upon,  their  private  rights  remained  the  same.  To  what- 
ever federal  town  a  Latin  migrated,  he  was  a  passive  burgess, 
could  hold  property,  marry,  make  wills;  and,  though  not  eligible 
for  office,  he  shared  in  all  other  political  rights  and  duties,  and 
could  vote  m  the  comitia  tributa,  if  not  in  the  other  assemblies. 
Long  ere  the  allied  Latins  dared  penetrate  Etruria,  they  suc- 
cessfully extended  their  power  towards  the  east  and  south.  The 
Sabines  between  the  Tiber  and  Anio  offered  but  a  feeble  resistance 
to  the  confederate  arms,  possibly  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  Sabine 
hordes  were  pouring  into  lower  Italy.  It  was  not  even  found 
necessary  to  plant  colonies  in  this  Sabine  land  to  keep  it  in  subjec- 
tion. Their  neighbors,  the  Aequi,  on  the  upper  Anio,  and  the 
Volscians  on  the  coast,  proved  far  tougher  foes.  In  their  constant 
struggles  with  these  two  peoples,  the  Romans  and  Latins  made  it 
their  chief  aim  to  sever  the  Aequi  from  the  Volsci.  This  object 
they  partly  obtained  by  planting  Latin  colonies  at  Cora,  Norba,  and 
Signia,  about  495  B.C.,  and  still  more  by  forming  a  league  with  the 
Hernici  in  486  B.C. ;  the  accession  of  this  state  isolated  the  Vol- 
scians, and  formed  a  bulwark  against  the  Sabellian  tribes  on  the 
south  and  east.  The  power  of  the  Aequi  was  thus  broken,  but  it 
was  not  till  the  system  of  fortresses  or  colonies  had  been  extended 
throughout  the  Volscian  land  that  the  Volsci  ceased  to  resist.  Chief 
among  these  colonies  were  Velitrae,  founded  in  494  B.C.,  Suessa 
Pometia  and  Ardea  in  442  B.C.,  Circeii  in  393  B.C.;  and  finally, 
after  two  great  victories,  won  by  the  dictator  Camillus  in  389  B.C., 
and  the  dictator  Aulus  Cornelius  Cossus  in  385  b.c,  the  Pomptine 
territory  was  secured  by  the  founding  of  the  fortresses  Satricum 
in  385  b.c,  and  Setia  in  382  B.C.,  and  the  territory  itself  was  dis- 
tributed into  farm  allotments  and  tribes  about  383  b.c.  These  suc- 
cesses of  the  league,  which  now  embraced  Rome,  Latium,  and  the 
Hernici,  only  rendered  it  more  liable  to  disunion.  The  allies  felt 
all  the  more  acutely  the  overshadowing  burden  of  Rome's  increased 
power,  and  were  naturally  indignant  at  her  overbearing  acts  of 
injustice.  A  glaring  instance  of  wrong  was  the  appropriation  by 
Rome  of  a  border  territory  between  the  lands  of  the  people  of  Aricia 
and  Ardea,  to  which  both  cities  laid  claim,  and  had  called  in  Rome 
to  act  as  arbiter  in  446  B.C.  Dissensions,  owing  to  this,  arose  in 
Ardea  between  the  aristocratic  party,  which  held  to  Rome,  and  the 
popular  party,  which  sided  with  the  Volscians.     The  chief  cause 


64  ROME 

384-358  B.C. 

of  the  disruption  of  the  league  was  the  absence  of  a  common  foe. 
The  capture  of  Rome  by  the  Celts,  and  the  appropriation  by  Rome 
of  the  Pomptine  territory  caused  the  most  famous  Latin  towns  to 
break  off  from  their  alliance.  Separate  wars,  in  consequence,  oc- 
curred with  the  revolted  towns — with  Lanuvium,  383  B.C.;  Prae- 
neste,  382-380  b.c;  and  Tusculum,  381  b.c.  The  latter  was  re- 
duced to  the  position  of  a  municipality,  and  was  incorporated  in 
the  Roman  state  with  the  full  rights  of  Roman  citizenship,  retaining 
certain  powers  of  self-government.  This  was  the  first  instance  of 
a  municipium  in  its  later  sense.  In  addition  to  these  towns,  Tibur, 
in  360  b.c,  and  some  of  the  colonies  planted  in  Volscian  land,  re- 
volted from  Rome;  and  Tibur  even  made  common  cause  with  the 
again  advancing  Celtic  hordes,  whom  the  dictator  Ahala  defeated 
in  360  b.c.  But,  owing  to  the  want  of  concert  between  the  various 
Latin  cities,  Rome  subdued  each  separately,  and  also  proved  vic- 
torious in  the  later  and  severer  struggle  with  her  allies,  the  Her- 
nicans,  from  362-358  b.c.  In  the  latter  year  the  treaty  between 
Rome  and  the  Latins  and  Hernicans  was  renewed,  but  the  terms 
were  doubtless  greatly  to  Rome's  advantage. 

To  this  period  must  be  referred  the  closing  of  the  Latin  con- 
federation, which  took  place  about  384  b.c.  Probably  this  was  in 
no  small  degree  the  cause  of  the  revolt  of  Latium  above  described. 
The  league,  as  now  constituted,  included  thirty  towns  with  full 
Latin  rights.  In  addition,  there  were  the  colonies  founded  by 
Rome  and  the  Latin  league.  A  second  class  of  seventeen  towns 
had  no  right  of  voting,  but  shared  in  the  Latin  festival.  Such 
communities  as  were  subsequently  founded,  e.  g.,  Sutrium,  Nepete, 
Cales,  and  Tarracina,  were  not  incorporated  in  the  league;  nor 
were  those  communities  whose  independence  was  afterwards  taken 
away,  such  as  Tusculum  and  Satricum,  erased  from  the  list.  The 
geographical  limits  of  Latium  were  fixed  by  the  closing  of  the 
league.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  all  Latin  communities  subse- 
quently founded,  right  of  commerce  and  marriage  was  granted 
to  them  only  in  relation  to  Rome;  they  could  not  enjoy  the  inter- 
change of  these  privileges  with  any  other  Latin  community. 
Further,  all  special  leagues  between  Latin  communities,  irrespec- 
tive of  Rome,  were  for  the  future  prevented,  as  being  dangerous 
to  Rome's  preeminence.  Owing  also  to  Rome's  influence,  ediles 
were  created  in  the  Latin  communities,  and  their  constitutions  were 
remodeled  on  the  Roman  pattern.     After  the  fall  of  Veil  and  the 


CONQUEST     OF     ITALY  65 

450-345  B.C. 

conquest  of  Pomptine  land,  Rome  tightened  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment over  the  practically  subject  Latins;  and  the  exasperation 
arising  therefrom  caused  Latin  volunteers  to  join  foreign  foes  in 
their  conflicts  with  Rome ;  and,  in  349  B.C.,  the  Latin  league  refused 
the  Romans  its  regular  contingent.  The  defeat  of  the  Aurunci 
and  the  capture  of  Sora  in  345  b.c.  had  advanced  Roman  arms  to 
the  Liris.  Thus  Rome  was  brought  into  contact  with  the  Samnites 
and  the  struggle  with  this  brave  people  now  claims  our  attention. 

The  Samnites  were  a  people  belonging  to  the  Umbrian  branch 
of  the  Italian  stock  who  had  settled  in  the  mountainous  regions 
of  the  interior  to  the  east  of  Latium  and  Campania.  They  were 
for  the  most  part  a  simple  race  of  sturdy  husbandmen  united  in  a 
loose  confederacy  wherein  no  one  community  preponderated,  as 
did  Rome  in  Latium.  The  policy  they  pursued  was  the  exact  op- 
posite of  that  of  Rome.  They  were  content  with  the  defense  of  their 
territory,  and  rarely  sought  to  enlarge  it;  and  new  lands  gained 
were  the  result  of  adventurous  bands  who  left  their  homes  in  search 
of  plunder,  and  were  left  to  their  own  resources  by  their  native 
state.  Thus  their  gains  were  not  direct  gains  to  the  Samnite  nation, 
while  Rome  secured  every  success  by  a  system  of  colonization.  The 
movements  of  the  Samnites  had  hitherto  been  partly  checked  by 
the  Greeks  and  Etruscans.  The  rapid  collapse  of  the  Etruscans, 
and  the  decline  of  the  Greek  colonies  from  450-350  B.C.,  left  them 
free  to  march  west  and  south.  Capua  was  captured  by  them  in 
424  b.c.  ;  four  years  later  they  dealt  a  fatal  blow  to  the  Campanian 
Greeks  by  taking  Cumae.  It  is  about  this  time  that  another  Sam- 
nite stock,  called  Lucanians,  made  its  appearance  in  southern  Italy. 
The  Lucanians  proved  too  powerful  for  the  demoralized  Greeks; 
and,  despite  the  united  efforts  of  the  chief  Achaean  cities,  who 
reconstructed  their  league  in  393  b.c,  in  a  very  short  time  but 
few  Greek  towns  remained.  Their  speedy  downfall  was  due  in 
great  measure  to  the  fact  that  Dionysius  the  elder,  of  Syracuse, 
sided  with  the  Lucanians  against  his  countrymen.  Even  Tarentum, 
powerful  and  warlike  as  she  was,  was  forced  to  turn  for  aid  to  her 
mother  country. 

Thus,  at  the  period  when  Roman  power  began  to  advance 
southward,  the  Samnites  and  their  kinsfolk  the  Lucanians  and 
Bruttians  had  practically  swept  over  the  whole  of  southern  Italy. 
Isolated  Greek  towns  continued  to  exist,  such  as  Tarentum,  Thurii. 
Croton,   Metapontum,   Heraclea,   Rhegium,   and  Neapolis;    some 


66  ROME 

450-345  B.C. 

of  these  retained  their  independence.  Other  Greek  cities,  such  as 
Cumae,  Posidonia,  Laus,  and  Hipponium,  were  under  Samnite  rule. 
In  this  way  mixed  populations  arose;  this  was  especially  the  case 
with  the  bilingual  Bruttii,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  with  the  Samnites 
in  Lucania  and  Campania.  The  very  extent  of  the  Samnite  con- 
quests, owing  to  the  want  of  a  settled  policy,  and  of  some  bond  by 
which  the  Lucanians,  Bruttians,  and  Samnites  proper  might  be 
closely  united,  proved  a  source  of  weakness  rather  than  strength. 
The  space  they  occupied  was  out  of  proportion  to  their  numbers, 
and  the  hold  they  exercised  over  their  possessions  was  loose  and 
insecure.  Moreover,  Greek  culture  exercised  a  fatal  influence  on 
the  Samnite  nation.  Thus  in  Campania  the  Samnite  population  of 
Capua,  Nola,  Nuceria,  and  Teanum  adopted  Greek  manners,  and  a 
Greek  form  of  constitution.  Capua  became  notorious  for  its  wealth 
and  luxury,  for  its  gladiatorial  combats,  and  its  warlike,  if  dissolute, 
youth  whose  plundering  excursions  to  Sicily  and  other  places  had 
no  small  effect  on  the  history  of  Italy.  The  Campanian  Samnites 
■ — especially  in  Capua,  where  Etruscan  influences  still  lingered — 
thus  completely  changed  their  old  habits  of  life;  and,  though  they 
did  not  lose  their  love  of  enterprise  and  bravery,  they  were  unable 
to  resist  the  demoralizing  influences  with  which  they  were  there 
surrounded.  The  same  result  in  a  lesser  degree  is  observable  in  the 
Lucanians  and  Bruttians.  Treasures  of  Greek  art  have  been  dis- 
covered in  their  tombs,  and  they  abandoned  their  old  national  mode 
of  writing  for  that  of  the  Greeks.  The  stock  inhabiting  Samnium 
proper  alone  retained  its  old  character,  and  was  free  from  all  the 
debasing  effects  of  a  superior  but  immoral  civilization.  The  Hel- 
lenized  Samnites  of  Campania  soon  learned  to  fear  their  hardier 
and  purer  kinsmen  in  Samnium,  who,  pouring  down  from  their 
mountain  strongholds,  ravaged  the  rich  plains  of  their  weaker 
brethren. 

Roman  interference  sprang  from  this  very  cause.  The 
Sidicini  in  Teanum,  and  the  Campanians  in  Capua,  called  in  Rome 
to  protect  them  against  the  Samnites  in  343  B.C.  When  Rome 
at  first  refused,  the  Campanians  offered  to  submit  to  Roman  su- 
premacy; this  offer  was  too  tempting  to  be  rejected.  Rome  and 
Samnium,  whether  after  a  campaign  or  not  is  doubtful,  came  to 
terms;  Capua  was  left  under  Roman,  and  Teanum  under  Sam- 
nite sway,  and  the  upper  Liris  was  left  in  Volscian  hands.  Both 
sides  were  glad  to  lay  down  arms — the  Samnites,  because  Tarentum 


CONQUEST     OF     ITALY  67 

384-332  B.C. 

was  threatening  her  Sebellian  neighbors;  the  Romans,  because  a 
fresh  storm  was  brewing  in  Latium.  The  old  grievances  of  the 
Latin  towns  were  aggravated  by  the  prospect  of  Roman  rule  ex- 
tending to  the  south  of  them,  and  once  more  they  broke  into  open 
revolt.  All  the  original  Latin  communities,  except  the  Laurentes, 
took  up  arms  against  Rome ;  but  all  the  Roman  colonies  in  Latium, 
except  Velitrae,  remained  firm  to  the  Roman  side.  Capua  seized 
the  opportunity  to  get  rid  of  Roman  rule,  and  other  Campanian 
cities  joined  the  revolted  Latins.  The  Volscians  also  felt  that  still 
another  chance  was  given  them  of  recovering  their  liberty;  but 
the  Hernici  and  the  Campanian  aristocracy  did  not  unite  with  the 
insurgents.  The  battle  of  Trifanum  in  340  B.C.,  gained  by  Titus 
Manlius  Torquatus  over  the  joint  forces  of  the  Latins  and  Cam- 
panians,  broke  the  neck  of  the  rebellion.  The  old  Latin  league 
was  dissolved  in  338  B.C.,  and  was  changed  from  a  political  federa- 
tion into  a  mere  association  for  religious  purposes.  The  Latin  com- 
munities were  isolated  from  one  another  by  the  application  to  the 
whole  of  Latium  of  the  principle  which  was  introduced  in  the  case 
of  those  colonies  founded  after  the  closing  of  the  Latin  league  in 
384  B.C.  Moreover,  each  community  had  to  form  a  separate 
alliance  with  Rome,  as  the  old  confederacy  no  longer  existed.  In 
certain  cases  harsh  measures  were  adopted.  Tibur  and  Praeneste 
had  to  give  up  part  of  their  territory  to  Rome.  Colonists  were  sent 
to  Antium,  the  most  important  and  strongest  town  of  the  Volscians ; 
and  the  town  was  treated  as  Tusculum  had  been  in  381  B.C.  Lanu- 
vium,  Pedum,  Aricia,  and  Nomentum  also  lost  their  independence 
and  became  Roman  municipia.  Velitrae  lost  its  walls,  and  its  senate 
was  deported  to  the  interior  of  south  Etruria,  while  the  town  was 
probably  treated  as  Caere  had  been  in  351  B.C.  The  land  thus 
acquired  by  Rome  was  partly  distributed  among  Roman  citizens, 
and  two  new  tribes  were  instituted  in  332  B.C.,  thus  bringing  the 
total  up  to  twenty-nine.  The  decoration  of  the  orators'  platform  in 
the  Forum  with  the  beaks  of  the  galleys  of  Antium  by  the  dictator 
Gaius  Maenius,  in  338  B.C.,  and  the  erection  of  a  column  in  the 
Forum  to  his  honor,  attested  the  Roman  sense  of  the  great  results 
achieved  by  this  war.  Roman  rule  was  secured  in  similar  fashion 
in  the  Volscian  and  Campanian  provinces.  A  number  of  towns, 
among  which  were  Capua,  Fundi,  Formiae,  and  Cumae,  became  de- 
pendent on  Rome  in  the  same  way  that  Caere  was.  Privernum, 
under  Vitruvius  Vaccus,  struck  the  last  blow  for  Latin  freedom; 


68  ROME 

338-328  B.C. 

but  in  329  B.C.  the  town  was  stormed,  and  its  leader  executed. 
About  ten  years  later  two  new  tribes  were  formed  out  of  the  numer- 
ous settlers  planted  in  the  Falernian  and  Privernate  territories.  The 
two  strong  colonies  of  Cales,  in  the  middle  of  the  Campanian  plain, 
and  Fregellae,  commanding  the  passage  of  the  Liris,  finally  secured 
the  newly  won  land.  These  were  founded  in  334  and  328  B.C.  re- 
spectively. The  Romans  even  established  a  garrison  in  Sora,  which 
properly  belonged  to  Samnite  territory.  This  steady  pursuit  of  a 
far-reaching  policy  of  colonization  secured  to  Rome  what  she  won 
on  the  field  of  battle,  and  contrasts  strongly  with  the  unsteady 
violence  and  loose  grasp  of  the  Samnite  nation.  It  is  clear 
that  the  Samnites  must  have  been  alarmed  at  the  advance  of 
the  Romans,  but  with  the  exception  of  garrisoning  Teanum  they 
did  little  to  prevent  it.  The  Samnite  confederacy  allowed  the 
Roman  conquest  of  Campania  to  be  completed  before  they  in  earnest 
opposed  it ;  and  the  reason  for  their  doing  so  is  to  be  sought  partly 
in  the  contemporary  hostilities  between  the  Samnite  nation  and  the 
Italian  Hellenes,  but  principally  in  the  remiss  and  distracted  policy 
which  the  confederacy  pursued. 

While  Rome  had  been  securing  her  hold  in  the  center  of  Italy, 
the  Samnite  tribes  of  the  Lucanians  and  Bruttians  had  been  engaged 
in  constant  struggles  with  the  Italian  Greeks  in  the  south,  and  espe- 
cially with  Tarentum.  So  hard  pressed  was  the  latter  city  that 
she  called  in  the  aid  of  the  Spartan  king,  Archidamus,  who  was 
defeated  by  the  Lucanians  on  the  same  day  as  Philip  conquered 
at  Chaeronea,  in  338  B.C.  Alexander,  the  Molossian,  uncle  of 
Alexander  the  Great,  proved  far  more  successful  in  his  champion- 
ship of  the  Greek  cause  in  southern  Italy.  Not  only  did  he  cap- 
ture Consentia,  the  center  of  the  Lucanians  and  their  confederates, 
but  he  defeated  the  Samnites  who  brought  aid  to  the  Lucanians, 
and  subdued  the  Daunians  and  Messapians,  who  had  made  common 
cause  with  the  Sabellian  tribes  against  the  Greeks.  His  successes, 
however,  alarmed  the  Tarentines,  who  turned  against  their  com- 
mander; and  his  scheme  of  founding  a  new  Hellenic  empire  in 
the  West  was  cut  short  by  the  hand  of  an  assassin  in  332  B.C.  His 
death  left  the  Lucanians  and  other  Sabellian  tribes  again  paramount 
in  the  south  of  Italy,  and  destroyed  all  hopes  of  a  combined  re- 
sistance from  the  Greek  cities. 

We  have  already  shown  that  war  was  sooner  or  later  unavoid- 
able between  Rome  and  the  Samnites,  as  the  latter  were  the  only 


CONQUEST     OF     ITALY  69 

328-321    B.C. 

power  capable  of  disputing  with  Rome  the  supremacy  of  Italy. 
Had  the  Samnites  been  able  to  count  on  the  active  cooperation  of 
all  Sabellian  tribes,  of  the  Lucanians  and  Bruttians,  as  well  as  of 
the  smaller  cantons,  such  as  the  Vestini,  Frentani  and  Marrucini — 
had  they,  further,  been  able  to  persuade  the  Greeks  of  Campania 
and  of  southern  Italy  to  sink  minor  differences  in  the  face  of  a 
common  danger — had  they  been  able  to  rouse  at  once  the  Etruscans 
in  the  north,  and  the  still  chafing  and  indignant  Latins,  Volscians, 
and  Hernicans,  Rome  might  no  doubt  have  succumbed.  But  such 
combinations  belong  rather  to  the  imagination  of  the  historian  than 
to  the  facts  of  history.  The  immediate  cause  of  the  outbreak  of 
war  lay  in  the  two  independent  Greek  cities  of  Campania,  Palaeop- 
olis  and  Neapolis.  Rome  was  scheming  to  obtain  possession  of 
these  towns,  and  the  Samnites  combined  with  the  Tarentines  to 
prevent  them.  A  strong  garrison  was  placed  in  Palaeopolis  by 
the  Samnites.  The  Romans  laid  siege  to  the  town;  and  thus  war 
began,  nominally  against  the  people  of  Palaeopolis,  really  against 
the  Samnites,  in  327  b.c.  Palaeopolis,  weary  alike  of  the  foes 
without  and  the  Samnite  garrison  within,  got  rid  of  the  latter  by 
stratagem,  and  concluded  peace  with  Rome  on  the  most  favorable 
conditions  in  the  following  year.  The  Campanian  Greeks  generally 
followed  the  example  of  Palaeopolis,  and  held  to  the  Roman  side; 
and  Rome  still  further  attained  her  object  of  isolating  Samnium, 
by  detaching  the  Sabellian  towns  to  the  south  of  the  Volturnus — 
Nola,  Nuceria,  Herculaneum,  and  Pompeii — through  the  influence 
of  the  aristocratic  party  in  those  cities.  By  the  same  means  Rome 
secured  an  alliance  with  the  Lucanians,  who  were  the  natural  allies 
of  the  Samnites.  This  alliance  was  of  great  importance,  as  it  left 
Rome  free  to  turn  all  her  attention  to  Samnium,  while  the  Samnite 
ally,  Tarentum,  was  occupied  with  guarding  herself  against  Luca- 
nian  inroads. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  recount  in  detail  all  the  events  of  this 
war,  which  lasted  seven  and  thirty  years.  The  isolated  position  of 
the  Samnites,  the  disasters  that  befell  them  in  quick  succession,  the 
humble  request  they  made  for  peace  in  322  B.C.,  the  rejection  of 
the  same  by  the  Romans ;  the  desperate  resistance  and  brief  success 
of  Samnite  arms  at  the  Caudine  Pass,  under  the  brave  Gavius 
Pontius,  in  321  b.c.  ;  the  refusal  of  the  senate  to  recognize  the  agree- 
ment made  by  the  defeated  generals,  mark  the  first  period  of  the 
war.     When  it  was  renewed,  the  Samnites  occupied  Luceria  in 


70  ROME 

321-311    B.C. 

Apulia,  the  attempt  to  relieve  which  town  had  caused  the  Romans 
the  disaster  in  the  pass  of  Caudium ;  and  they  captured  Fregellae, 
and  gained  over  the  Satricans.  Lucius  Papirius  Cursor  now  was 
placed  in  command  of  the  Roman  forces,  and  took  Luceria  in  319 
B.C.,  having  received  no  small  assistance  from  the  people  of  Arpi 
and  other  Apulians.  Roman  successes  followed  this  important  cap- 
ture, and  Satricum  was  recovered  and  severely  punished.  For  a 
moment,  indeed,  fortune  deluded  the  Samnites  with  hopes  of  vic- 
tory. The  frontier  towns  of  Nuceria  and  Nola  sided  with  them. 
Sora,  on  the  upper  Liris,  expelled  the  Roman  garrison.  The  Auso- 
nians  on  the  coast  and  at  the  mouth  of  the  Liris  threatened  to  rise, 
and  the  Samnite  party  in  Capua  began  to  bestir  itself.  But  the 
recapture  of  Sora  in  314  B.C.,  the  cruel  suppression  of  the  Ausonian 
revolt,  the  execution  or  voluntary  death  of  the  leaders  of  the  Sam- 
nite party  in  Capua,  the  defeat  of  the  Samnite  army  before  the  walls 
of  that  city,  the  treaty  with  Nola  which  detached  that  city  forever 
from  the  Samnites  in  313  B.C.,  and  the  fall  of  Fregellae  in  the  same 
year,  turned  the  tide  of  war  once  more  in  Rome's  favor,  and  placed 
Apulia  and  Campania  in  her  hands.  Her  position  was  secured  by 
the  usual  process  of  founding  new  fortresses;  e.g.,  Luceria  in 
Apulia,  Saticula  on  the  frontier  of  Campania  and  Samnium,  In- 
teramna,  and  Suessa  Aurunca  on  the  road  from  Rome  to  Capua. 
Appius  Claudius,  the  censor,  completed  in  313  B.C.  the  great  military 
road  from  Rome  to  Capua,  across  the  Pomptine  marshes.  Thus 
by  roads  and  fortresses  Samnium  was  now  cut  off,  and  the  ultimate 
object  of  the  subjugation  of  Italy  was  within  Rome's  grasp. 

The  close  of  the  second  period  of  the  war  exhibits  an  attempt 
at  coalition — which  at  the  outset  might  have  rescued  Italy. 
Tarentum,  indeed,  practically  continued  an  inactive  spectator  of 
the  contest;  with  childish  arrogance  its  rulers  had,  in  320  B.C., 
ordered  the  Roman  and  Samnite  armies  in  Apulia  to  lay  down  their 
arms;  but,  when  Rome  refused,  Tarentum  lacked  the  courage  and 
sense  of  honor  to  declare  war.  Towards  the  close  of  the  war  she 
once  more  invoked  Greek  aid  against  the  Lucanians,  and  the  Spar- 
tan prince  Cleonymus  succeeded  in  compelling  the  latter  to  make 
peace  with  Tarentum;  but  he  did  not  dare  to  enter  on  the  more 
perilous  course  of  actively  siding  with  the  Samnites  against  Rome. 
But  in  the  north  and  center  of  Italy  the  ignoble  example  of  Taren- 
tum found  no  imitators.  The  Etruscans  in  311  B.C.  made  one  more 
fiery  effort  for  freedom,  and  for  two  years  the  Roman  frontier- 


CONQUEST     OF     ITALY  71 

311-299    B.C. 

fortress  of  Sutrium  was  hotly  besieged.  But  all  was  in  vain;  in 
310  B.C.  Quintus  Fabius  Rullianus  penetrated  for  the  first  time 
Etruria  proper,  marching  through  the  Ciminian  forest,  and  at  the 
Vadimonian  Lake  crushed  the  roused  Etruscans.  The  three  most 
powerful  towns,  Perusia,  Cortona,  and  Arretium,  made  peace  with 
Rome;  and  two  years  later,  after  another  defeat,  Tarquinii  fol- 
lowed their  example,  and  the  Etruscans  laid  down  their  arms. 
Meanwhile  the  Samnites  abated  not  their  exertions;  but  their 
hopes,  based  on  Etruscan  aid,  were  rudely  dashed  to  the  ground  by 
the  terrible  battle  in  309  B.C.,  in  which  the  very  flower  of  their  army 
— the  wearers  of  striped  tunics  and  golden  shields,  and  the  wearers 
of  white  tunics  and  silver  shields — was  extirpated  by  Lucius 
Papirius  Cursor.  Too  late  to  save  them  came  the  allied  forces  of 
the  Umbrians,  the  Marsi,  and  Paeligni,  and,  later,  the  Hernicans, 
who  all  rose  against  Rome — too  late,  for  the  Etruscans  had  already 
cowered  back  into  inaction.  The  first  three  peoples  were  soon  mas- 
tered by  Roman  arms ;  but  for  a  moment  the  rising  of  the  Herni- 
cans in  the  rear  of  the  Roman  army  threatened  destruction.  But 
Anagnia,  the  chief  Hernican  city,  fell;  and  two  consular  armies 
penetrated  the  fastnesses  of  Samnium,  and  took  the  Samnian  capital, 
Bovianum,  by  storm  in  305  B.C.  A  brief  peace,  on  moderate  terms, 
ensued,  not  only  with  Samnium,  but  with  all  the  Sabellian  tribes; 
and  about  the  same  time,  owing  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Spartan 
Cleonymus  to  Corcyra,  Tarentum,  whose  part  in  the  contest  we  have 
already  described,  came  to  formal  terms  with  Rome. 

Rome  lost  no  time  in  turning  her  victory  to  good  account.  In 
the  first  place,  she  dissolved  the  Hernican  league,  and  punished  those 
communities  which  had  revolted,  by  taking  away  their  autonomy 
and  giving  them  citizenship  without  voting  power.  Those  Hernican 
communities  which  had  not  joined  in  the  revolt  remained  with  their 
old  rights.  In  carrying  out  her  wise  policy  of  subjugating  central 
Italy,  Rome  severed  the  north  of  Italy  from  the  south,  and  pre- 
vented the  inhabitants  from  being  in  direct  touch  with  one  another. 
The  old  Volscian  land  was  completely  subdued  and  soon  Roman- 
ized, by  planting  a  legion  of  four  thousand  men  in  Sora  on  the 
upper  Liris,  by  making  Arpinum  subject,  and  taking  away  a  third 
of  its  territory  from  Frusino.  Two  military  roads  ran  through  the 
country  separating  Samnium  from  Etruria ;  the  northern  one  which 
was  afterwards  the  Flaminian,  covered  the  line  of  the  Tiber,  passing 
through  Ocriculum  to  Nequinum,  which  was  later  called  Narnia, 


72  ROME 

299-290   B.C. 

when  the  Romans  colonized  it  in  299  B.C.  The  southern  road, 
afterward  called  the  Valerian,  commanded  the  Marsian  and  Aequian 
land,  running  along  the  Fucine  Lake  by  way  of  Carsioli  and  Alba, 
in  both  of  which  towns  colonies  were  planted.  Thus,  when  we 
remember  the  roads  and  fortresses  which  already  commanded 
Apulia  and  Campania,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  Samnium  was  enclosed 
by  a  net  of  Roman  strongholds.  Such  a  peace  was  more  ruinous 
than  war,  and  the  proud  and  heroic  Samnites  viewed  it  in  that  light. 

We  have  now  reached  the  third  and  final  period  of  their  brave 
but  ill-fated  struggle.  This  time  the  Samnites,  taught  by  ex- 
perience, brought  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Lucanians,  and  secured 
their  alliance;  strong  hopes  were  entertained,  not  only  of  a  rising 
in  central  Italy,  but  of  active  aid  from  the  Etruscans  and  from 
mercenary  Gauls.  War  broke  out  afresh  in  298  B.C.,  and  the  first 
move  was  the  suppression  of  the  Lucanians  by  Roman  arms,  and 
two  Samnite  defeats  in  the  following  year.  The  superhuman  efforts 
of  the  Samnite  nation  put  three  fresh  armies  into  the  field,  and  their 
general,  Gellius  Egnatius,  who  led  an  army  into  Etruria,  caused  the 
Etruscans  to  rise  once  more  and  take  into  their  pay  numerous 
Celtic  bands.  The  Romans  strained  every  nerve  to  meet  the 
threatened  danger;  and,  by  sending  part  of  their  forces  into 
Etruria,  drew  off  a  portion  of  the  Etruscan  forces  which  were 
encamped  with  the  Samnites  and  Gauls  near  Sentinum,  in  Umbria, 
on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Apennines,  in  295  b.c.  It  was  here  that 
the  two  consuls  Publius  Decius  Mus  and  the  aged  Quintus  Fabius 
Rullianus  encountered  the  confederate  army;  and  it  was  here  that 
the  heroic  death  of  Publius  Decius  rallied  the  Roman  legions  when 
wavering  before  the  Gallic  hordes,  and  at  the  cost  of  nine  thousand 
Roman  lives  gained  a  victory,  which  broke  the  coalition  and  made 
Etruria  sue  for  peace.  The  Samnites,  however,  met  their  fate 
with  a  spirit  unbroken  by  disaster,  and  in  the  following  year  gained 
some  successes  over  the  Roman  consul,  Marcus  Atilius;  but  in 
293  b.c.  the  battle  of  Aquilonia  dealt  a  blow  to  the  Samnites  from 
which  they  never  recovered ;  and,  though  in  their  mountain  strong- 
holds they  continued  the  struggle  till  290  b.c,  deserted  by  all  to 
whom  they  looked  for  aid,  decimated  and  exhausted  by  a  war  which 
had  lasted  thirty-seven  years,  they  at  last  concluded  an  honorable 
peace. 

For  Rome,  their  great  antagonist,  was  too  wise  to  impose 
disgraceful  or  ruinous  conditions.     Her  object  was  to  secure  for- 


CONQUEST     OF     ITALY  78 

295-289   B.C. 

ever  what  she  had  already  subjugated.  With  this  end  in  view,  two 
fortresses,  Minturnae  and  Sinuessa,  were  established  on  the  Cam- 
panian  coast  in  295  b.c.  All  the  Sabines  were  forced  to  become 
subjects  in  290,  and  the  strong  fortress  of  Hatria  was  established 
in  the  Abruzzi,  not  far  from  the  coast,  in  289  b.c.  Still  more  im- 
portant was  the  colony  of  Venusia,  founded  with  twenty  thousand 
colonists  in  291  B.C.,  which,  standing  on  the  great  road  between 
Tarentum  and  Samnium,  at  the  borders  of  Samnium,  Apulia,  and 
Lucania,  kept  in  check  the  neighboring  tribes,  and  interrupted  the 
communications  between  Rome's  two  most  powerful  enemies  in 
southern  Italy.  Thus  the  compact  Roman  domain  at  the  close  of 
the  Samnite  wars  extended  on  the  north  to  the  Ciminian  forest, 
on  the  east  to  the  Abruzzi,  on  the  south  to  Capua,  while  the  two 
advanced  posts,  Luceria  and  Venusia,  established  towards  the  east 
and  south  on  the  lines  of  communication  of  their  opponents,  iso- 
lated them  on  every  side.  Rome  was  no  longer  merely  the  first, 
but  was  already  the  ruling  power  in  the  peninsula  when,  towards 
the  end  of  the  fifth  century  of  the  city,  those  nations  which  had 
been  raised  to  supremacy,  by  the  favor  of  the  gods  and  by  their  own 
capacity,  began  to  come  into  contact  in  council  and  on  the  battle- 
field; and  as  at  Olympia  the  preliminary  victors  girt  themselves  for 
a  second  and  more  serious  struggle,  so  on  the  larger  arena  of  the 
nations,  Carthage,  Macedonia,  and  Rome  now  prepared  for  tlie 
final  and  decisive  contest. 


Chapter   X 

WAR   WITH    PYRRHUS— UNION    WITH    ITALY 
280-268  B.C. 

THE  preceding  chapter  presented  the  chief  features  of  that 
career  of  conquest  which  left  Rome  without  a  rival  in 
Italy.  But  before  her  position  was  firmly  and  permanently 
established,  and  before  the  various  Italian  races  were  united  under 
her  rule,  one  more  step  remained,  and  one  more  struggle  had  to 
be  decided.  The  interest  of  this  final  phase  in  the  subjugation  of 
Italy  is  chiefly  due  to  the  romantic  charm  of  the  name  of  Pyrrhus. 
The  personal  qualities  and  adventurous  enterprises  of  Pyrrhus  him- 
self cannot  but  excite  our  imagination  and  kindle  our  sympathies. 
Of  still  greater  moment  is  the  fact  that  this  was  the  first  occasion 
on  which  Roman  and  Greek  influences  met  in  conflict;  that  from 
Pyrrhus  date  Rome's  direct  relations  with  Greece;  that  the  struggle 
between  phalanxes  and  cohorts,  between  a  mercenary  army  and  a 
militia,  between  military  monarchy  and  senatorial  government,  be- 
tween individual  talent  and  national  vigor,  was  first  fought  out  in 
the  battles  between  Pyrrhus  and  the  Roman  generals.  The  victory 
on  this  occasion,  as  on  all  others,  rested  with  Roman  arms,  but  the 
victory  was  of  a  different  character  from  that  over  Gauls  and 
Phoenicians ;  for  in  the  end  the  subtle  charm  of  Hellenic  ideas  and 
Hellenic  life  amply  avenged  the  physical  and  political  inferiority 
of  the  Greek  to  the  Roman. 

For  the  sake  of  chronological  sequence  it  will  be  well  to  reach 
the  causes  which  brought  Pyrrhus  to  Italy  before  we  narrate  his 
previous  career  or  estimate  his  position  in  history. 

The  peace  with  Samnium  had  scarce  been  concluded  when  the 
storm  broke  out  afresh,  and  this  time  from  a  new  quarter.  The 
Romans  had  granted  the  Lucanians,  in  consideration  of  their  serv- 
ices in  the  Samnite  war,  the  Greek  cities  in  their  territory.  In 
consequence  of  this,  Thurii,  among  other  cities,  was  attacked  by 
the  Lucanians  and  Bruttians,  and  reduced  to  great  extremities. 
Thurii  appealed  for  protection  to  Rome ;  and  Rome,  feeling  that  the 

74 


UNION     WITH     ITALY  75 

285-281   B.C. 

fortress  of  Venusia  enabled  her  to  dispense  with  the  Lucanian 
alliance,  granted  the  appeal.  The  Lucanians  and  Bruttians,  thus 
foiled  by  the  Romans,  proceeded  to  form  a  new  coalition  against 
their  old  allies,  and  at  the  same  time  opened  the  campaign  by  a 
fresh  attack  on  Thurii  about  285  b.c.  This  coalition  was  at  once 
joined  by  the  Etruscans,  Gauls,  Umbrians,  and  Samnites.  The 
last-named,  exhausted  and  hemmed  in  on  all  sides  as  they  were, 
could  render  but  little  assistance.  But  in  the  north,  under  the 
walls  of  Arretium,  the  Roman  army,  led  by  the  praetor  Lucius 
Caecilius,  was  annihilated  by  the  Celtic  Senones,  who  were  in  the 
pay  of  the  Etruscans. 

As  reprisals  a  terrible  revenge  was  executed  on  the  Senones 
in  283  b.c,  by  the  consul  Publius  Cornelius  Dolabella,  who  car- 
ried fire  and  sword  through  their  territory,  and  completely  ex- 
pelled the  whole  Celtic  tribe  from  Italy.  Their  Celtic  kinsmen 
and  neighbors,  the  Boii,  at  once  joined  the  Etruscans,  and  a  mighty 
combined  army  marched  to  wreak  vengeance  on  Rome;  but  two 
battles,  one  near  Lake  Vadimo  in  283  b.c,  and  another  near  Popu- 
lonia  in  the  following  year,  crushed  this  combination,  and  caused 
the  Boii  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  with  Rome.  The  Romans 
were  now  free  to  prosecute  with  vigor  the  war  in  southern  Italy. 
Thurii  was  relieved  and  the  Lucanians  utterly  defeated  in  282  B.C. ; 
the  most  important  places — Locri,  Croton,  Thurii,  and  Rhegium 
— were  garrisoned.  That  part  of  the  Adriatic  coast  which  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Senones  was  secured  by  a  colony  planted  in  the 
seaport  of  Sena,  the  former  Senonian  capital.  A  Roman  fleet  sailed 
from  the  Tyrrhene  Sea  to  take  up  its  station  in  the  Adriatic,  and, 
on  its  way,  anchored  in  the  harbor  of  Tarentum.  The  time  had  at 
last  arrived  for  the  supine  people  of  Tarentum  to  shake  off  their 
lethargy ;  but  their  awakening  came  too  late.  Old  treaties  had  for- 
bidden Roman  men-of-war  from  sailing  beyond  the  promontory 
of  Lacinium.  Fiery  appeals  by  mob-orators  excited  the  Tarentine 
multitude  to  such  a  degree  of  senseless  passion  that  it  rushed  down 
to  the  harbor,  fell  upon  the  unsuspecting  Romans,  and  seized  their 
ships  and  crews  after  a  sharp  struggle.  The  wanton  outrage  was 
followed  up  by  the  surprise  of  Thurii  and  the  severe  punish- 
ment of  its  inhabitants.  Notwithstanding  this  violent  breach  of 
all  civilized  law,  the  Romans  displayed  great  moderation  and  for- 
bearance in  the  terms  they  offered  Tarentum.  But  all  negotiations 
failed,  and  the  Roman  consul,  Lucius  Aemilius,  entered  Tarentine 


76  ROME 

320-287    B.C. 

territory  in  281  B.C.  It  was  clear  that  Tarentum  could  not  resist 
Rome  single-handed,  and  the  fear  of  the  demagogues  as  to  the 
vengeance  which  Rome  would  exact  drove  them  to  urge  the  com- 
pletion of  the  alliance  with  Pyrrhus  on  the  terms  proposed  by  the 
Epirot  king. 

At  this  point  we  must  revert  to  the  previous  history  of  the  man 
whose  name  has  cast  a  halo  of  romance  upon  this  war.  Born  in 
320  B.C.,  Pyrrhus,  when  but  six  years  old,  was  by  his  father's  down- 
fall deprived  of  his  hereditary  throne  among  the  Molossians  of 
Epirus,  and  subjected  to  the  many  vicissitudes  that  befell  all  those 
engaged  in  Macedonian  politics.  Trained  in  the  campaigns  of  the 
veteran  Antigonus,  one  of  Alexander's  chief  generals,  universally 
admired  by  the  Alexandrian  court  of  Ptolemy,  whither  the  battle 
of  Ipsus  brought  him  as  a  hostage,  he  was  restored  to  his  native 
land  and  kingdom  of  Epirus  in  296  B.C.,  through  the  influence  of 
Ptolemy,  who  wished  to  counteract  the  growing  power  of  the  Mace- 
donian ruler,  Demetrius  Poliorcetes.  Aided  by  the  brave  Epirots, 
whose  loyalty  and  enthusiasm  were  fired  by  their  young  ruler, 
"  the  eagle  of  Epirus,"  as  they  styled  him,  extended  his  dominions. 
When  Demetrius  was  driven  from  his  throne  in  287  B.C.,  Pyr- 
rhus was  summoned  to  wear  the  royal  diadem  of  Philip  and  of 
Alexander. 

No  worthier  successor  could  have  been  found.  But  Macedonian 
jealousy,  and  that  national  feeling  which  could  not  brook  a  foreign 
leader,  caused  him  to  resign  the  kingdom  after  a  short  reign  of 
seven  months.  The  colorless  life  of  an  Epirot  king  could  not 
satisfy  the  ambition  of  such  a  man  as  Pyrrhus.  Conscious  of  his 
great  powers  as  a  general,  fired  with  a  desire  to  imitate  the  great 
Alexander,  Pyrrhus  eagerly  embraced  the  opportunity  that  now 
offered  itself  of  founding  an  Hellenic  empire  in  the  West..  In  es- 
timating the  possibilities  of  success,  and  the  historical  position  of 
Pyrrhus  himself,  we  cannot  but  feel  that  the  attempt  to  draw  a 
comparison  befween  him  and  Alexander  completely  fails.  Alex- 
ander was  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  and  well-officered  Macedonian 
army;  he  was  the  foremost  general  and  most  gifted  statesman 
of  his  time ;  his  own  dominions  were  secured  by  the  powerful  army 
he  left  behind  him;  the  foes  he  went  to  encounter  were  such  as, 
long  inured  to  despotism,  knew  nothing  of  national  independence 
and  national  vigor,  and  regarded  with  indifference  a  change  of 
despots.    In  the  case  of  Pyrrhus  none  of  these  advantages  existed. 


UNION     WITH     ITALY  77 

281-280  B.C. 

Despite  his  noble  descent,  his  strategic  ability,  his  pure  and  chiv- 
alrous nature,  he  was  but  a  soldier  of  fortune,  a  king  of  mountain- 
tribes,  a  man  whose  chances  of  success  depended  on  mercenaries  and 
foreign  alliances,  and  on  his  ability  to  keep  together  a  coalition  of 
secondary  states.  Wide-reaching  as  was  his  scheme  of  founding 
a  great  Hellenic  empire  in  the  West,  it  was  the  unreal  dream  of  a 
romantic  adventurer,  not  the  possible  and  practicable  aim  of  a 
powerful  conqueror  and  statesman. 

When  once  Tarentum  had  signed  the  treaty  with  Pyrrhus,  the 
arrival  of  Cineas,  the  confidential  adviser  of  Pyrrhus,  and  of  his 
general,  Milo,  in  281  B.C.,  with  three  thousand  Epirots,  put  an  end 
to  all  further  vacillation.  Pyrrhus  himself  landed  early  in  the  fol- 
lowing year,  with  a  mixed  force  of  various  Greek  tribes,  amounting 
in  all  to  about  twenty  thousand  infantry,  two  thousand  archers,  five 
hundred  slingers,'  three  thousand  cavalry,  and  twenty  elephants. 
The  boasts  which  the  Tarentine  envoys  had  made,  of  the  huge  con- 
federate army  ready  to  take  the  field  in  Italy,  were  soon  proved  to 
be  utterly  fallacious.  In  the  north,  the  Etruscans  alone  were  still 
in  arms,  but  misfortune  attended  every  effort  they  made.  The 
Tarentines,  who  had  hoped  that  Pyrrhus  would  take  all  the  blows 
while  they  shared  the  spoil,  found  their  master  in  the  eagle  of 
Epirus.  They  were  called  upon  to  serve;  and  the  foreign  soldiers 
were  quartered  in  their  houses,  and  foreign  guards  set  over  their 
gates.  The  strictest  military  government  everywhere  prevailed; 
and  all  the  clubs,  theaters,  and  amusements  of  the  pleasure-loving 
Tarentines  were  ruthlessly  suspended. 

Special  exertions  were  made  by  Rome  to  meet  the  new  danger. 
In  280  B.C.,  on  the  banks  of  the  Siris,  near  Heraclea,  the  Roman 
consul,  Publius  Laevinus,  first  measured  swords  with  a  Greek  army 
under  the  greatest  general  of  the  day.  After  a  stubborn  contest, 
varied  by  many  vicissitudes  of  fortune,  the  elephants  of  Pyrrhus 
decided  the  issue.  The  losses  of  the  Romans,  estimated  from  fifteen 
to  twenty  thousand,  were  almost  equaled  by  those  of  Pyrrhus.  But 
the  value  of  winning  the  first  battle  was  at  once  shown  by  the  fact 
that  the  Lucanians,  Bruttians,  Samnites,  and  all  the  Greek  cities 
joined  Pyrrhus.  The  Latins,  however,  remained  firm,  and  the  fron- 
tier fortress,  Venusia,  although  completely  hemmed  in  by  enemies, 
refused  to  desert  Rome.  Pyrrhus  saw  that  his  hopes  lay  in  securing 
favorable  terms  from  the  Romans,  while  the  impressions  of  the 
battle  of  Heraclea  were  still  vivid.    He  commissioned  Cineas,  whose 


78  ROME 

312-279    B.C. 

rhetorical  powers  were  famous,  to  go  to  Rome  and  demand  the 
freedom  of  all  Greek  towns,  and  the  restitution  of  the  territory 
taken  from  the  Samnites,  Daunians,  Lucanians,  and  Bruttians.  The 
leniency  and  respect  shown  by  Pyrrhus  towards  his  Roman  prison- 
ers, and  the  persuasive  arts  of  Cineas,  made  the  senate  waver,  but 
the  undaunted  energy  of  the  blind  and  aged  Appius  Claudius,  who 
had  been  censor  in  312,  and  consul  in  307  and  296  B.C.,  and  who 
had  caused  himself  to  be  carried  into  the  senate-house  at  this  critical 
moment,  revived  the  true  Roman  spirit  in  the  hearts  of  his  audience. 
The  proud  answer  was  given  that  Rome  could  not  negotiate  with 
foreign  troops  as  long  as  they  were  on  Italian  soil.  This  answer, 
then  heard  for  the  first  time,  passed  thenceforth  into  a  maxim  of 
state. 

Pyrrhus  now  marched  upon  Rome,  hoping  by  this  step  to  shake 
the  allegiance  of  her  allies  and  to  terrify  the  capital.  Roman  cour- 
age, however,  was  proof  alike  against  the  flatteries  of  Cineas  and 
the  armed  threats  of  Pyrrhus.  No  Latin  ally,  no  Campanian  Greek 
state  joined  him;  moreover,  the  Etruscans  at  this  time  concluded 
peace  with  Rome,  and  thus  set  free  the  army  of  the  consul  Tiberius 
Coruncanius.  Three  armies,  one  in  his  rear  under  Laevinus,  and 
two  in  the  vicinity  of  the  capital,  barred  his  progress.  After  sur- 
prising Fregellae  and  reaching  Anagnia,  the  king  was  forced  to 
retrace  his  steps  without  striking  a  decisive  blow.  At  the  approach 
of  winter  he  returned  to  his  old  quarters  in  Tarentum.  In  the 
spring  of  279  B.C.  Pyrrhus  resumed  the  offensive,  and  met  the 
Roman  army  in  Apulia  near  Ausculum.  The  allied  forces  of 
Pyrrhus  amounted  to  about  seventy  thousand  infantry,  eight  thou- 
sand cavalry,  and  nineteen  elephants.  The  Romans  with  their  con- 
federates were  not  inferior  in  number;  and  as  a  protection  against 
the  elephants  they  had  invented  a  sort  of  war-chariot,  armed  with 
projecting  iron  poles  and  movable  masts,  capable  of  being  lowered, 
and  fitted  with  an  iron  spike.  Pyrrhus  also  had  copied  the  Roman 
system  of  maniples,  and  placed  companies  on  the  wings  of  the 
phalanx,  with  spaces  between  them,  in  imitation  of  the  cohorts. 
For  two  days  the  battle  raged ;  at  last  the  elephants,  as  at  Heraclea, 
forced  back  the  Roman  line,  and  Pyrrhus  remained  in  possession  of 
the  field. 

This  defeat  cost  the  Roman  forces  some  six  thousand  lives; 
but  Pyrrhus  himself  was  wounded.  Nor  was  the  victory  de- 
cisive enough  to  break  up  the  Roman  confederacy,  and  thus  fur- 


UNION     WITH    ITALY  79 

289-277   B.C. 

ther  the  political  designs  of  the  Epirot  king.  Forced  by  his  wound 
to  renounce  the  campaign  and  remain  inactive  in  Tarentum,  Pyrrhus 
soon  perceived  that  the  losses  he  had  sustained  and  the  petty  quar- 
rels and  hatred  of  discipline  which  characterized  his  allies,  rendered 
all  chances  of  ultimate  success  with  his  present  resources  out  of  the 
question.  The  condition  of  the  Sicilian  Greeks  gave  him  an  oppor- 
tunity of  leaving  Italy,  and  of  this  he  gladly  availed  himself. 

After  the  death  of  Agathocles  of  Syracuse,  in  289  B.C.,  Carthage 
had  made  great  strides  in  the  subjugation  of  Sicily.  No  re- 
sistance could  be  offered  by  the  smaller  Greek  cities,  whose  govern- 
ment, whether  under  demagogues  or  despots,  was  always  equally 
incapable.  Agrigentum  had  fallen,  and  Syracuse  was  now  hard 
pressed  by  the  victorious  Carthaginians.  In  the  hour  of  her  peril 
Syracuse  acted  as  Tarentum  had  done;  she  offered  the  supreme 
power  to  Pyrrhus.  Thus  fortune,  by  placing  in  his  hands  at  the 
same  moment  Tarentum  and  Syracuse,  seemed  to  give  to  Pyrrhus 
a  great  opportunity  of  realizing  his  mighty  schemes.  One  effect 
of  this  union  of  Italian  and  Sicilian  Greeks  under  one  head  was  to 
bring  into  closer  relations  Carthage  and  Rome.  An  offensive  and 
defensive  treaty  was  concluded  between  them,  in  279  B.C.,  against 
Pyrrhus,  binding  each  party  to  assist  the  other  in  case  of  attack,  and 
binding  both  states  not  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  with  Pyrrhus. 
Messana,  which  had  previously  been  seized  by  the  Mamertines,  who 
were  the  Campanian  mercenaries  of  Agathacles,  in  fear  of  the 
vengeance  of  Pyrrhus  joined  the  Romans  and  Carthaginians,  and 
thus  secured  for  them  the  Sicilian  side  of  the  straits.  A  strong 
Carthaginian  fleet  proceeded  to  blockade  Syracuse,  while  at  the 
same  time  a  land  army  laid  siege  to  it,  in  278  B.C.  Pyrrhus  was  there- 
fore forced  to  desert  the  Lucanians  and  Samnites,  and  content  him- 
self with  occupying  Tarentum  by  a  garrison  under  Milo,  and  Locri 
with  a  force  under  his  son  Alexander.  He  himself  set  sail  with  the 
rest  of  his  troops  for  Syracuse  in  the  spring  of  278  B.C.  During 
his  absence  from  Italy  the  Romans,  exhausted  by  their  previous 
struggles,  allowed  the  war  to  drag  on,  without  being  able  to  com- 
pletely expel  the  troops  left  behind  by  Pyrrhus.  Heraclea,  indeed, 
made, peace  with  Rome  in  278,  and  Locri  slaughtered  its  Epirot 
garrison  in  277  B.C. ;  but  Milo  retained  his  hold  of  Tarentum,  and 
made  successful  sorties  against  the  Romans.  Ignorance  of  the  art 
of  besieging  towns,  and  the  want  of  a  fleet,  made  the  capture  of 
Tarentum  almost  impossible;  and  the  Carthaginians,  owing  to  their 


80  ROME 

276-272    B.C. 

disasters  in  Sicily,  were  unable  to  render  any  real  assistance. 
Pyrrhus,  on  landing  at  Syracuse,  met  with  complete  success.  At 
the  head  of  the  Greek  cities  he  wrested  from  the  Carthaginians 
almost  all  that  they  had  won.  To  cope  with  their  powerful  fleet 
and  capture  the  all-important  position  of  Lilybaeum,  Pyrrhus  built 
himself  a  fleet,  and  in  2j6  B.C.  seemed  to  have  within  his  grasp  the 
realization  of  his  aims.  But  his  methods  of  governing  Sicily  were 
those  which  he  had  seen  Ptolemy  practice  in  Egypt :  personal  favor- 
ites, not  native  Greeks,  exercised  absolute  authority  as  magistrates 
and  judges  in  the  various  cities;  his  own  troops  acted  as  garri- 
sons, and  his  own  acts  were  arbitrary  and  despotic  to  the  last 
degree. 

His  reign  thus  became  more  detested  than  even  the  threatened 
Carthaginian  yoke  had  been,  and  negotiations  were  entered  into  by 
the  principal  Greek  cities  with  the  Carthaginians.  To  this  error 
Pyrrhus  added  a  second.  Instead  of  securing  his  rule  in  Sicily, 
expelling  the  Carthaginians  and  capturing  Lilybaeum,  he  turned 
his  thoughts  once  more  to  Italy.  Possibly  a  sense  of  honor  and  the 
cry  of  his  old  allies,  the  Lucanians  and  Samnites,  moved  him  to 
do  so ;  but  the  folly  of  the  step  was  at  once  apparent.  When  once 
it  was  known  that  he  had  set  sail  for  Italy,  towards  the  close  of 
276  B.C.,  all  the  Sicilian  cities  revolted,  and  refused  to  grant  him 
money  or  troops ;  and  thus  the  enterprise  of  Pyrrhus  was  wrecked, 
and  the  plan  of  his  life  irretrievably  ruined ;  he  was  thenceforth  an 
adventurer  who  felt  that  he  had  been  great,  and  was  so  no  longer. 
Foiled  in  an  attack  on  Rhegium,  he  surprised  Locri,  and  avenged 
himself  on  the  treacherous  inhabitants.  In  the  spring  of  275  B.C. 
he  marched  to  the  aid  of  the  hard-pressed  Samnites,  and  near 
Beneventum,  on  the  Campus  Arusinus,  he  fought  his  final  battle  on 
Italian  soil.  The  very  elephants  which  had  won  his  previous  vic- 
tories proved  the  cause  of  his  defeat  by  attacking  their  own  side. 
Unable  any  longer  to  keep  the  field,  or  to  get  reinforcements  from 
abroad,  Pyrrhus  left  Italy,  and  once  more  took  part  in  Greek  poli- 
tics. He  even  succeeded  in  recovering  the  whole  of  his  former 
kingdom,  and  in  paving  the  way  for  a  return  to  the  throne  of 
Macedonia.  But  his  successes  bore  no  lasting  fruit,  and  he  perished 
ingloriously  in  a  street  fight  at  Argos,  in  2J2  b.c. 

With  the  battle  of  Beneventum  and  the  departure  of  Pyrrhus 
the  war  in  Italy  came  to  an  end.  Milo,  who  had  been  left  behind 
in  Tarentum,  made  over  that  city  to  the  Roman  consul  Lucius 


UNION     WITH    ITALY  81 

350-264  B.C. 

Papirius  in  272  B.C.,  on  hearing  of  his  master's  death.  He  thus 
prevented  the  citizens  from  surrendering  the  town  to  the  Cartha- 
ginians, who  had  entered  the  harbor  with  a  fleet,  and  secured  for 
himself  and  his  troops  a  free  departure.  The  Carthaginians,  thus 
frustrated  in  their  attempt  to  gain  a  foothold  in  Italy,  pretended 
that  their  presence  was  merely  due  to  their  wish  to  help  the  Romans. 
The  gain  to  Rome  from  the  act  of  Milo  can  scarcely  be  overesti- 
mated. In  the  same  year  the  Samnites,  Lucanians,  and  Bruttians 
laid  down  their  arms.  Rome  was  now  mistress  of  all  Italy.  New 
colonies  and  new  roads  held  in  a  firm  grip  the  conquered  territories. 
Paestum  and  Cosa  in  Lucania,  Beneventum  and  Aesernia  to  com- 
mand Samnium,  Ariminum,  Firmum  in  Picenum,  and  Castrum 
Novum  to  hold  in  check  the  Gauls,  were  all  established  in  the  ten 
years  from  273-264  B.C.  Preparations  were  made  to  continue  the 
southern  highway  to  the  seaports  of  Tarentum  and  Brundisium,  to 
colonize  the  latter  seaport  and  make  it  the  rival  of  Tarentum.  Wars 
with  small  tribes  whose  territory  was  encroached  upon  were  caused 
by  the  construction  of  these  fortresses  and  roads,  and  Rome's  do- 
minion was  thus  extended  from  the  Apennines  to  the  Ionian  Sea. 
Nor  did  she  solely  confine  her  attention  to  the  development  of  her 
power  by  land. 

At  this  time  Carthage  was  practically  paramount  in  the 
western  water  of  the  Mediterranean.  Even  Syracuse  gradually 
ceased  to  compete  with  her;  Tarentum,  owing  to  the  Roman 
occupation,  was  no  longer  formidable;  the  naval  power  of  Etruria 
had  long  been  broken,  and  the  Etruscan  island  of  Corsica  lay  open 
to  the  ships  of  Carthage.  The  constant  struggles  by  land  had  caused 
the  Roman  fleet  to  dwindle  in  neglect,  until  about  350  B.C.  it  reached 
its  lowest  point  of  inefficiency.  A  treaty  with  Carthage  in  348  B.C. 
bound  Roman  ships  not  to  sail  beyond  the  Fair  Promontory  (Cape 
Bon)  on  the  Libyan  coast;  a  like  stipulation  with  Tarentum  ex- 
cluded Roman  ships  from  the  eastern  basin  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. 

As  soon  as  able,  Rome  made  efforts  to  free  herself  from  this 
humiliating  position.  The  chief  towns  along  the  Tyrrhene  and 
Adriatic  Seas  were  colonized,  and  thus  protected  the  coasts  from 
invasion  and  pillage.  The  Roman  navy  was  in  part  revived,  and 
the  war-ships  taken  from  Antium  in  338  B.C.  served  as  a  nucleus 
for  this  purpose.  Such  Greek  cities  as  were  admitted  into  a  state 
of  dependence  on  Rome  furnished  a  certain  number  of  vessels  as 


82  ROME 

280-268    B.C. 

a  war  contribution.  In  311  B.C.  two  masters  of  the  fleet  were  cre- 
ated by  a  special  resolution  of  the  burgesses,  and  the  Roman  fleet 
lent  assistance  in  the  Samnite  war  at  the  siege  of  Nuceria.  But 
the  renewal  of  the  treaty  with  Carthage  in  306  b.c.  shows  how  little 
Rome  really  accomplished.  Although  continuing  to  improve  the 
state  of  her  navy,  she  was  allowed  to  trade  only  with  Sicily  and 
Carthage,  and  was  thus  restricted  to  the  narrow  space  of  the  west- 
ern Mediterranean. 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  political  effect  of  the  mighty 
changes  consequent  upon  the  establishment  of  Roman  supremacy 
in  Italy.  We  do  not  know  with  exactness  what  privileges  Rome 
reserved  for  herself  as  sovereign  state.  It  is  certain  that  she  alone 
could  make  war,  conclude  treaties,  and  coin  money;  and  that, 
further,  any  war  or  treaty  resolved  upon  by  the  Roman  people  was 
legally  binding  on  all  Italian  communities,  and  that  the  silver  money 
of  Rome  was  current  everywhere  in  Italy. 

The  relations  of  the  Italians  to  Rome  cannot  in  all  cases  be 
precisely  defined,  but  the  main  features  are  as  follows.  In  the  first 
place,  the  full  Roman  franchise  was  extended  as  far  as  was  com- 
patible with  the  preservation  of  the  urban  character  of  the  Roman 
community.  Those  who  received  this  franchise  may  be  divided  into 
three  classes.  First,  all  the  occupants  of  the  various  allotments 
of  state  lands,  now  embracing  a  considerable  portion  of  Etruria  and 
Campania,  were  included.  Second,  all  the  communities  which,  after 
the  method  first  adopted  in  the  case  of  Tusculum,  were  incorporated 
and  completely  merged  in  the  Roman  state.  As  we  have  seen 
this  course  had  been  followed  in  the  case  of  many  of  the  original 
members  of  the  Latin  league;  it  was  now,  in  268  B.C.,  pursued  with 
regard  to  all  the  Sabine  communities  and  many  of  the  Volscian. 
Finally,  full  Roman  citizenship  was  possessed  by  the  maritime  or 
burgess  colonies  which  had  been  instituted  for  the  protection  of  the 
coast.  In  these  towns  the  young  men  were  exempted  from  service 
in  the  legions,  and  devoted  all  their  attention  to  guarding  the 
coasts. 

Thus  the  title  of  Roman  citizen  in  its  fullest  sense  was  possessed 
by  men  dwelling  as  far  north  as  Lake  Sabatinus,  as  far  east  as  the 
Apennines,  and  as  far  south  as  Formiae.  But  within  those  limits 
isolated  communities,  such  as  Tibur,  Praeneste,  Signia,  and  Norba, 
were  without  the  Roman  franchise ;  while  beyond  them  other  com- 
munities, such  as  Sena,  possessed  it. 


UNION     WITH     ITALY  83 

280-268   B.C. 

In  the  next  place,  we  must  distinguish  the  various  grades  of 
subjection  which  marked  all  the  communities  not  honored  with  the 
full  Roman  franchise.  As  in  the  case  of  the  recipients  of  full  citizen- 
ship, so  here  we  may  make  a  threefold  division.  To  the  first  divi- 
sion belong  the  Latin  towns:  these  retained  their  Latin  rights; 
that  is,  they  were  self-governing  and  stood  on  an  equal  footing  with 
Roman  citizens  as  regards  the  right  of  trading  and  inheritance. 
But  it  is  important  to  observe  that  the  Latins  of  the  later  times  of 
the  Republic  were  no  longer  for  the  most  part  members  of  the 
old  Latin  towns,  which  had  participated  in  the  Alban  festival,  but 
were  colonists  planted  in  Latium  by  Rome,  who  honored  Rome  as 
their  capital  and  parent  city,  and  formed  the  main  supports  of 
Roman  rule  in  Latium.  Indeed,  the  old  Latin  communities,  with 
the  exception  of  Tibur  and  Praeneste,  had  sunk  into  insignificance. 
It  was  but  natural  that  the  Latin  colonies,  issuing  as  they  did  from 
the  burgess-body  of  Rome,  should  not  rest  content  with  mere  Latin 
rights,  but  should  aim  at  the  full  rights  of  Roman  citizens.  Rome, 
on  the  other  hand,  now  that  Italy  was  subjugated,  no  longer  felt 
her  former  need  of  these  colonies;  nor  did  she  deem  it  prudent 
to  extend  the  full  franchise  with  the  same  freedom  as  she  hitherto 
had  done.  A  line  was  now  strictly  drawn,  and  all  members  of 
autonomous  communities  founded  after  268  b.c.  could  no  longer 
by  settling  in  Rome  become  municipes  or  passive  burgesses  with 
the  power  of  voting  in  the  comitia  tributa.  Men  of  eminence,  e.g., 
public  magistrates,  in  such  communities  were  alone  in  future  eligible 
to  the  Roman  franchise.  By  these  means  the  old  power  of  migration 
to  Rome  was  somewhat  restricted,  and  a  jealous  guard  was  set 
upon  the  privilege  of  becoming  a  full  Roman  citizen. 

To  the  second  division  belong  those  towns  whose  inhabitants 
were  passive  citizens  of  Rome  (cives  sine  suffragio).  They  were 
liable  to  service  in  the  Roman  legions,  and  to  taxation,  and  were  in- 
cluded in  the  Roman  census.  A  deputy  or  prefect  appointed  an- 
nually by  the  Roman  pretor  administered  justice  according  to  laws 
which  were  subjected  to  Roman  revision.  In  other  respects  they 
retained  their  old  form  of  government  and  appointed  their  own 
magistrates.  Caere  was  the  first  town  to  be  placed  on  this  footing; 
afterwards  Capua  and  other  more  remote  towns  were  treated  in  the 
same  way. 

In  the  third  and  last  division  we  may  include  all  allied  com- 
munities which  were  not  Latin  states ;  the  relation  of  these  towns  to 


84  ROME 

280-268    B.C. 

Rome  was  defined  by  separate  treaties,  and  therefore  varied  in 
accordance  with  the  terms  imposed  by  such  agreements. 

No  doubt  all  national  leagues,  such  as  the  Samnite  and  Lu- 
canian,  shared  the  fate  which  had  earlier  befallen  the  Latin  and 
Hernican  confederations;  and  any  movements  which  might  tend 
to  bind  one  community  with  another,  whether  by  rights  of  inter- 
marriage or  of  acquisition  of  property  or  by  common  council-cham- 
bers, were  doubtless  suppressed  by  the  vigilance  of  Rome.  Further, 
all  the  Italian  communities  were  obliged  to  equip  and  furnish  at 
their  own  expense  contingents  in  time  of  war.  Those  Latin  towns 
classified  above  in  the  first  division  furnished  a  definitely  fixed  num- 
ber of  infantry  and  cavalry  which  acted  on  the  wings  of  the  Roman 
legion  and  were  therefore  named  "  wings  "  and  "  winged  cohorts.'' 
The  same  duty  was  imposed  on  most  of  the  allied  communities 
classified  in  the  third  division,  such  as  Apulians,  Sabellians,  and 
Etruscans. 

Further,  the  passive  citizens  defined  in  the  second  divi- 
sion were,  as  above  stated,  bound  to  serve  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Roman  legions,  while  the  duty  of  supplying  ships  of  war  fell 
almost  entirely  on  the  Greek  cities.  Such  were  the  leading  features 
of  the  Roman  government  of  Italy,  the  details  of  which  can  no 
longer  be  ascertained.  In  addition  to  breaking  up  all  existing  con- 
federacies, and  thus  splitting  up  the  subject  states  into  a  number 
of  smaller  communities,  Rome  fostered  schisms  and  factions  among 
them.  In  pursuance  of  the  same  object  the  government  of  all  de- 
pendent communities  was  now  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  wealthy 
and  leading  families,  whose  interests  were  naturally  opposed  to  those 
of  the  multitude,  and  who  were  inclined  to  favor  Roman  views. 
Capua,  whose  nobles  had  sided  with  Rome  throughout  the  war 
against  the  revolted  Latins  and  Campanians,  furnished  a  notorious 
instance  of  this  policy.  Special  privileges  and  pensions  were  granted 
by  Rome  to  the  Campanian  aristocracy.  But  the  great  wisdom  and 
moderation  of  Rome  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  she  either  extended 
to  these  dependent  states  the  Roman  franchise,  or  allowed  them  to 
retain  a  certain  amount  of  self-government,  and  gave  them  a  share 
in  the  successes  of  Rome.  Thus  in  Italy,  at  least,  no  community 
of  Helots  existed,  nor,  which  was  equally  important,  was  there  any 
tributary  state ;  for  Rome  with  a  wise  magnanimity  never  assumed 
that  most  dangerous  of  rights,  the  right  of  taxing  any  of  her 
Italian  subjects.     Rome  exercised  control  and  supervision  over  the 


UNION     WITH     ITALY  85 

280-268  B.C. 

various  Italian  communities  by  means  of  the  four  quaestors  of  the 
fleet,  who  had  a  district  and  residence  outside  Rome  assigned 
them  by  law.  In  addition,  the  chief  magistrate  of  every  community 
had  to  take  a  census  of  his  state  every  fourth  or  fifth  year ;  by  this 
means  the  Roman  senate  was  kept  informed  of  the  resources  in 
men  and  money  of  the  whole  of  Italy. 

Politically  united  under  the  leadership  of  Rome,  the  various 
tribes  inhabiting  Italy  now  began  to  realize  more  completely  and 
feel  more  intensely  their  unity  as  a  nation.  This  feeling  must  have 
first  sprung  into  existence  from  the  contrast  presented  by  the 
Greeks,  and  must  have  been  heightened  by  the  danger  with  which 
the  Celts  threatened  all  Italians  equally.  It  found  expression  in 
two  names,  which  now  began  to  be  applied  to  all  the  peoples  in- 
habiting Italy.  The  name  of  Italians,  which  was  originally  a  Greek 
term,  became  current  everywhere,  and  Italia,  originally  limited  to 
the  modern  Calabria,  was  now  used  of  the  whole  land.  The  name 
of  Togati,  or  "  men  of  the  toga,"  was  now  for  the  first  time  used  to 
designate  all  the  Italians,  and  thus  sharply  contrasted  them  with  the 
Celtic  "men  of  the  hose"  (Braccati).  This  common  use  by  all  of 
the  Latin  toga — the  right  to  wear  which  was  an  exclusive  privilege 
of  the  Roman  citizen — seemed  to  point  to  the  day  when  the  Latin 
language  would  be  regarded  as  the  mother-tongue  of  every  Italian : 
the  germs  of  the  Latinization  of  the  whole  peninsula  were  already 
planted;   time  alone  was  needed  for  their  development. 

It  had  taken  Rome  120  years  to  complete  the  union  of  the 
Italian  peninsula,  broken  up  as  it  was  by  mountain  ranges  and 
naturally  favoring  the  formation  and  preservation  of  various  iso- 
lated states.  But  a  union  it  was,  rather  than  a  subjugation,  and 
each  nation  was  left  to  the  practical  management  of  its  own  affairs. 
Content  with  self-government,  the  various  communities,  for  the 
most  part,  easily  bore  the  yoke  of  Roman  supremacy.  Eventually 
all  the  municipal  towns  received  the  full  Roman  franchise  (90 
b.c),  and  thus  established  the  municipal  principle  of  government 
which  endures  to  the  present  day. 

The  recognition  of  Rome's  new  position  as  one  of  the  great 
powers  in  the  political  world  was  first  marked  by  an  embassy  sent 
from  Alexandria  to  Rome  in  273  B.C.,  primarily  with  a  view  to 
settling  commercial  relations.  Egypt  was  at  that  time  at  variance 
with  Carthage  touching  Cyrene,  and  with  Macedonia  touching  her 
predominating  influence  in  Greece;  the  complications  that  were 


ROME 


280-268  B.C. 


eventually  to  arise  between  Rome  and  Carthage  for  the  possession 
of  Sicily,  and  between  Rome  and  Macedonia  for  the  sovereignty  of 
the  Adriatic  coasts,  were  doubtless  foreshadowed  even  then,  and 


may  well  have  suggested  an  alliance  with  Egypt.  The  new  strug- 
gles which  were  preparing  on  all  sides  could  not  but  influence 
each  other;  and  Rome,  as  mistress  of  Italy,  could  not  fail  to  be 
drawn  into  the  wide  arena,  which  the  victories  and  projects  of 
Alexander  the  Great  had  marked  out  as  the  field  of  conflict  to  his 
successors. 


PART  II 

CONQUEST  OF  THE   MEDITERRANEAN 
STATES.    264-133  B.C. 


Chapter    XI 

CARTHAGE.     500264  B.C. 

WE  now  turn  our  eyes  to  a  race  of  people  widely  differing 
from  any  in  Italy  in  nature  and  origin,  viz.,  the  Cartha- 
ginians. Belonging  to  the  great  Semitic  race,  which 
has  ever,  as  though  from  some  instinctive  sense  of  its  wide  di- 
versity, kept  itself  severed  from  the  European  nations,  Carthage 
was  one  of  the  numerous  settlements  of  the  enterprising  Phoe- 
nicians. This  particular  branch  of  the  Semitic  stock  issued  forth 
from  its  native  land  of  Canaan  or  "  the  plain,"  and  spread  further 
west  than  any  other  people  of  the  same  race.  Utilizing  to  the  full 
the  excellent  harbors,  and  the  bountiful  supply  of  timber  and  metals 
of  their  own  country,  the  Phoenicians  early  attained  an  unrivaled 
position  in  the  ancient  world  as  the  pioneers  of  commerce,  naviga- 
tion, manufacture,  and  colonization.  In  the  most  remote  times  we 
find  them  in  Cyprus  and  Egypt,  Greece  and  Sicily,  Africa  and 
Spain,  and  even  on  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  the  North  Sea.  The 
field  of  their  commerce  reached  from  Sierra  Leone  and  Cornwall 
in  the  west,  eastward  to  the  coast  of  Malabar. 

But  the  one-sided  character  that  marks  the  development  of 
the  great  nations  of  antiquity  is  especially  visible  in  the  case  of  the 
Phoenicians.  We  cannot  ascribe  to  them  the  credit  of  having 
originated  any  of  the  intellectual  or  scientific  discoveries  which 
have  been  the  glory  of  other  members  of  the  Semitic  family.  Their 
religious  conceptions  were  gross  and  barbarous;  their  art  was  not 
comparable  to  that  of  Italy,  still  less  to  that  of  Greece;  their 
knowledge  of  astronomy  and  chronology,  of  the  alphabet,  of 
weights  and  measures,  was  derived  from  Babylon.  No  doubt,  in 
their  commercial  dealings,  the  Phoenicians  spread  valuable  germs 
of  civilization,  but  rather  as  a  bird  dropping  grain  than  a  husband- 
man sowing  seed.  They  never  civilized  and  assimilated  to  them- 
selves the  nations  with  which  they  came  into  contact. 

Moreover,  politically,  the  Phoenicians  were,  like  the  rest  of 

89 


90  ROME 

537-474    B.C 

their  race,  without  the  ennobling  idea  of  self-governed  freedom. 
A  policy  of  conquest  was  never  in  their  eyes  to  be  compared  with  a 
policy  of  commerce.  Their  colonies  were  factories.  The  power  to 
trade  with  natives  was  bought  too  dear  if  it  entailed  constant  war 
and  the  interruption  of  peaceful  barter.  Thus  they  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  supplanted  in  Egypt,  Greece,  Italy,  and  the  east  of 
Sicily,  almost  without  resistance;  and  in  the  great  naval  battles  at 
Alalia  in  537  B.C.,  and  at  Cumae  in  474  B.C.,  for  the  supremacy  of 
the  western  Mediterranean,  the  brunt  of  the  struggle  with  the 
Greeks  fell  upon  the  Etruscans,  and  not  on  the  Phoenicians.  In 
the  great  Sicilian  expedition,  which  ended  in  their  defeat  at  Himera 
by  Gelo  of  Syracuse  in  480  B.C.,  the  African  Phoenicians  only  took 
the  field  as  subjects  of  the  Great  King,  and  to  avoid  being  obliged 
to  aid  him  in  the  East  instead  of  the  West.  This  was  not  from 
want  of  courage  or  national  spirit;  indeed,  the  tenacity  and  ob- 
stinacy with  which  the  race  has  ever  held  to  its  feelings  and  preju- 
dices as  a  nation  far  exceeds  the  pertinacity  of  any  European 
people:  it  was  rather  due  to  their  want  of  political  instinct  and  of 
the  love  of  liberty.  No  Phoenician  settlements  attained  a  more 
rapid  and  secure  prosperity  than  those  established  by  the  cities  of 
Tyre  and  Sidon  on  the  south  coast  of  Spain  and  the  north  coast  of 
Africa.  Here  they  were  out  of  the  reach  of  the  Great  King  and  of 
Greek  rivals,  and  held  the  same  relation  to  the  natives  as  the 
Europeans  held  to  the  American  Indians.  Although  not  the  ear- 
liest settlement,  by  far  the  most  prominent  was  Karthada,  "  the 
new  town,"  or  Carthage.  Situated  near  the  mouth  of  the  river 
Bagradas,  which  flows  through  the  richest  corn  district  in  North 
Africa,  on  rising  ground  which  slopes  gently  towards  the  plain  and 
ends  in  a  seagirt  promontory,  commanding  the  great  roadstead  of 
North  Africa,  the  Gulf  of  Tunis,  Carthage  owed  its  sudden  rise  to 
preeminence  even  more  to  the  natural  advantages  of  its  situation 
than  to  the  character  of  its  inhabitants.  Even  when  restored, 
Carthage  at  once  became  the  third  city  in  the  Roman  empire;  and 
in  our  day,  on  a  far  worse  site,  and  under  far  less  favorable  condi- 
tions, a  city  exists  in  that  district,  whose  inhabitants  number  one 
hundred  thousand.  We  need  no  explanation,  then,  of  the  com- 
mercial prosperity  of  ancient  Carthage;  but  we  must  answer  the 
question  raised  by  its  development  of  political  power,  a  develop- 
ment never  attained  by  any  other  Phoenician  city. 

At  the  outset  Carthage  pursued  the  usual  passive  policy  of 


CARTHAGE  91 

500-450   B.C. 

Phoenician  cities.  She  paid  a  ground-rent  for  the  space  occupied 
by  the  city  to  the  native  Berbers,  the  tribe  of  Maxitani  or  Maxyes ; 
and  she  recognized  the  nominal  supremacy  of  the  Great  King  by 
paying  tribute  to  him  on  different  occasions.  It  gradually,  how- 
ever, became  clear  to  the  Carthaginians  that,  unless  they  undertook 
the  task  of  repelling  Greek  influences  and  Greek  migrations,  the 
Phoenicians  would  be  supplanted  in  Africa,  as  they  had  already 
been  in  Greece,  Italy,  and  Sicily.  The  colony  of  Cyrene  threatened 
their  very  stronghold  and  imperiled  their  existence.  The  Cartha- 
ginians, therefore,  undertook  the  task ;  and  by  about  500  B.C.,  after 
a  long  and  obstinate  struggle,  they  had  to  a  great  extent  effected 
their  purpose,  and  set  bounds  to  Greek  invasion.  These  successes 
changed  the  character  of  the  city  itself ;  it  no  longer  aimed  at  being 
merely  preeminent  in  commerce,  but  at  establishing  an  empire  as 
mistress  of  Libya  and  of  part  of  the  Mediterranean. 

About  the  year  450  B.C.  the  Carthaginians  refused  any  longer 
to  pay  rent  for  the  soil  they  occupied  to  the  natives,  and  were  thus 
enabled  to  prosecute  agriculture  on  a  greatly  extended  scale.  Capi- 
tal thus  found  a  new  outlet,  and  the  rich  soil  of  Libya  was  culti- 
vated on  a  system  similar  to  that  employed  by  modern  planters. 
Single  landowners  appear  to  have  employed  on  their  estates  no 
fewer  than  twenty  thousand  slaves.  Moreover,  the  native  Libyan 
farmers  were  subdued,  and  reduced  to  the  position  of  fellahs,  who 
paid  a  fourth  of  the  produce  of  their  soil  as  tribute  to  their  new 
masters,  and  served  as  a  recruiting  ground  for  the  Carthaginian 
armies.  The  Nomads,  or  roving  pastoral  tribes,  were  driven  back 
into  the  deserts  and  mountains,  or  were  compelled  to  pay  tribute 
and  supply  soldiers.  Finally,  the  Carthaginian  rule  embraced  the 
other  Phoenician  settlements  in  Africa,  or  the  so-called  Liby- 
Phoenicians.  These  states,  with  the  exception  of  Utica,  the  ancient 
protectress  of  Carthage,  lost  their  independence,  and  had  to  pull 
down  their  walls  and  to  contribute  a  fixed  sum  of  money  and  a 
definite  number  of  soldiers.  But  they  did  not  pay  a  land-tax,  nor 
were  they  subject  to  the  recruiting  system  like  the  subject  Libyans ; 
and  they  enjoyed  equal  legal  privileges  and  right  of  intermarriage 
with  the  Carthaginians. 

Thus  Carthage  became  the  capital  of  a  great  North  African 
empire,  extending  from  the  desert  of  Tripoli  to  the  Atlantic 
Ocean;  on  the  west  in  Morocco  and  Algiers,  indeed,  she  merely 
held  a  belt  along  the  coast,  but  on  the  east  in  the  region  of  Tunis 


92 


ROME 


Circa  500  B.C. 

she  extended  her  sway  far  into  the  interior.  In  the  words  of  an 
ancient  writer,  the  Carthaginians  were  changed  from  Tyrians  into 
Libyans.  The  Phoenician  tongue  and  civilization  were,  at  any 
rate  among  the  more  advanced  natives,  adopted  in  Libya.  The 
rise  of  Carthage  was  synchronous  with  a  decline  of  the  great  cities 
in  the  mother-country,  Tyre  and  Sidon;  and  from  the  first-named 
most  of  the  powerful  families  emigrated  to  their  prosperous  daugh- 
ter city. 

In  addition  to  the  empire  in  Libya  we  must  bear  in  mind  the 
parallel  growth  of  the  maritime  and  colonial  dominion  of  Carthage. 
The   early   Tyrian   settlement  at   Gades    (Cadiz)    was   the   chief 


Phoenician  colony  in  Spain.  By  a  chain  of  factories  on  the  west 
and  east  of  Gades,  and  by  the  possession  of  the  silver  mines  in  the 
interior,  the  Phoenicians  occupied  nearly  all  the  modern  Andalusia 
and  Granada.  Although  not  strictly  under  the  rule  of  Carthage, 
no  doubt  Gades  and  the  other  stations  in  Spain  fell  under  her 
hegemony.  The  island  of  Ivizo  and  the  Baleares  were  early  oc- 
cupied by  the  Carthaginians,  partly  as  fishing-stations,  partly  as 
outposts  against  the  Greek  colony  of  Massilia,  with  which  Carthage 
was  ever  at  war.  Moreover,  about  500  B.C.,  the  Carthaginians 
established  themselves  in  Sardinia,  the  natives  of  which  island 
retired  before  them  into  the  mountainous  interior,  just  as  the 
Numidians  withdrew  to  the  borders  of  the  African  desert.  The 
fertile  districts  of  the  Sardinian  coast  were  cultivated  by  imported 
Libyans,  and  colonies  were  planted  at  Caralis  (Cagliari)  and  other 
points.     They  also  held  the  west  and  northwest  coast  of  Sicily,  to- 


CARTHAGE  93 

415-306    B.C. 

gether  with  the  smaller  adjacent  islands  of  the  Aegates,  Melita, 
Gaulos,  Cossyra ;  the  station  at  Motya,  and  later  at  Lilybaeum,  pre- 
served their  communicatjon  with  Africa,  as  those  at  Panormus  and 
Soluntum  did  with  Sardinia.  For  a  long  period,  down  to  the 
Athenian  expedition  to  Sicily  (415-413  b.c.),  the  Greeks  and 
Carthaginians  seem  to  have  agreed  to  tolerate  one  another  in 
Sicily. 

All  these  possessions  served  not  only  as  commercial  cen- 
ters, but  as  pillars  of  the  Carthaginian  supremacy  by  sea.  The 
western  straits  of  the  Mediterranean  were  practically  closed  to 
other  nations,  and  in  the  Tyrrhene  and  Gallic  seas  alone  the  Phoe- 
nicians had  to  endure  the  rivalry  of  foreign  fleets.  As  long,  indeed, 
as  the  Etruscan  power  counterbalanced  the  Greek  in  those  waters, 
Carthage  could  afford  to  remain  passive;  but  on  the  fall  of  the 
Etruscans  and  the  rise  of  the  naval  power  of  Syracuse,  a  great 
contest  ensued  between  Dionysius  of  Syracuse  (406-367  B.C.)  and 
Carthage,  in  the  course  of  which  all  the  smaller  Greek  cities  in 
Sicily  were  either  totally  destroyed,  e.  g.,  Selinus,  Himera,  Agri- 
gentum,  Gela,  and  Messana,  or  reduced  to  a  state  of  utter  prostra- 
tion. The  island  was  partitioned  between  the  Syracusans  and 
Carthaginians,  and  on  several  occasions  each  side  in  turn  was  on 
the  point  of  completely  expelling  its  rival  from  the  island.  But 
gradually  the  balance  inclined  in  favor  of  the  Carthaginians,  and, 
after  the  failure  of  the  attempt  of  Pyrrhus  to  restore  the  Syracusan 
fleet,  the  Carthaginians  commanded  without  a  rival  the  whole  west- 
ern Mediterranean ;  and  their  efforts  to  occupy  Syracuse,  Rhegium, 
and  Tarentum  show  the  extent  of  their  power,  and  the  objects  they 
had  in  view.  They  shrank  from  no  violence  in  their  attempt  to 
monopolize  the  whole  trade  of  the  West;  any  foreigner  sailing 
towards  Sardinia  and  Gades,  if  apprehended,  was  thrown  into  the 
sea,  and  the  treaty  of  306  B.C.  closed  every  Phoenician  port  except 
that  of  Carthage  against  Roman  vessels,  which  forty-two  years 
before  had  been  allowed  to  trade  with  the  ports  in  Spain,  Sardinia, 
and  Libya. 

The  constitution  of  Carthage  was  described  by  Aristotle  as 
having  changed  from  a  monarchy  to  an  aristocracy,  or  as  a 
democracy  inclining  toward  oligarchy.  The  conduct  of  affairs 
was  directly  vested  in  the  hands  of  a  council  of  elders,  which  con- 
sisted, like  the  Spartan  gerusia,  of  two  kings,  annually  nominated 
by  the  citizens,  and  of  twenty-eight  elders,  also  annually  chosen  by 


94  ROME 

500-264    B.C. 

the  same  body.  All  the  chief  business  of  state  was  transacted  by 
this  council,  and  the  general  and  his  chief  officers,  who  were  always 
"  elders,"  were  appointed  by  it.  The  kings  seem  to  have  had  com- 
paratively little  power,  and  acted  as  supreme  judges.  The  general 
was  much  more  of  an  autocrat,  and  is  described  by  Roman  writers 
as  a  dictator;  the  term  of  his  office  was  not  fixed,  but  the  gerusiasts 
attached  to  him  as  sub-commanders  must  have  restricted  his  power, 
and  on  laying  down  his  office  he  had  to  give  an  official  account  of 
his  actions. 

But  over  the  gerusia  and  the  magistrates  was  the  body  of  the 
Hundred  and  Four,  or  the  judges,  the  bulwark  of  the  Carthaginian 
oligarchy.  Although  there  is  considerable  obscurity  as  to  the 
mode  of  their  election  and  the  length  of  their  tenure  of  office,  we 
may  infer  from  the  name  of  senators,  given  them  by  the  Greeks 
and  Romans,  that  they  practically  held  office  for  life,  and  that 
they  were  elected  by  some  method  of  cooptation.  At  first  intended 
to  act  as  political  jurymen  and  hear  the  accounts  of,  and,  if  neces- 
sary, punish  the  general,  or  any  of  the  gerusiasts,  the  judges  grad- 
ually came  to  interfere  in  all  legislation  and  thus  usurp  the  func- 
tions of  those  gerusiasts  whom  they  controlled.  We  can  thus  easily 
understand  how  the  generals  and  statesmen  of  Carthage  were 
perpetually  hampered  in  council  and  action  by  the  fear  of  this 
control. 

The  body  of  citizens  seems  to  have  exercised  very  little  in- 
fluence in  Carthage.  Although  the  people  were  consulted  in  the 
election  of  a  general,  their  opinion  was  only  taken  after  the  general 
had  been  nominated  by  the  gerusia.  On  other  questions  the  people 
were  only  consulted  if  the  gerusia  thought  fit,  so  that,  viewing  the 
Carthaginian  constitution  as  a  whole,  we  may  conclude  that  the 
government  was  one  of  capitalists,  such  as  would  arise  in  a  city 
where  there  was  no  rich  middle  class,  but  merely  a  city  rabble  on 
the  one  hand  and  a  class  of  great  merchants,  planters,  and  noble 
governors  on  the  other. 

Regarded  from  a  financial  point  of  view,  Carthage  stands  pre- 
eminent among  the  states  of  antiquity.  Polybius  calls  it  the  wealth- 
iest city  in  the  world,  and  indeed  it  rivaled  the  London  of  our  own 
times.  The  high  pitch  reached  by  the  Carthaginians  in  the  art  of 
husbandry  is  attested  by  the  agricultural  treatise  of  Mago,  the  text- 
book not  only  of  Carthage,  but  of  Rome,  which  was  translated  into 
Greek  and  edited  in  Latin  by  the  express  order  of  the  Roman  senate, 


CARTHAGE  95 

508-264    B.C. 

for  the  benefit  of  Italian  landholders.  The  close  connection  be- 
tween agriculture  and  the  management  of  capital  was  a  special 
feature  of  their  enlightened  system ;  no  one  held  more  land  than  he 
could  thoroughly  manage.  Thus  enriched  at  home  by  the  well- 
nigh  inexhaustible  resources  of  fertile  Libya,  whose  horses,  oxen, 
sheep,  and  goats  excelled  those  of  all  other  lands,  and  drawing  a 
huge  rental  from  her  subjects,  while  abroad  she  held  in  her  hands 
the  trade  and  manufactures  of  the  interior  as  well  as  of  the  coasts 
of  the  western  Mediterranean,  Carthage  occupied  a  commercial 
position  up  to  that  time  unrivaled  in  the  ancient  world;  and  the 
whole  carrying  trade  between  East  and  West  became  more  and 
more  concentrated  in  her  single  harbor.  For  science  and  art  Car- 
thage was  chiefly  indebted  to  Hellenic  influences,  and  rich  treasures 
were  carried  off  to  Carthage  from  Sicilian  temples.  Native  intel- 
lect was  subservient  to  the  interests  of  capital :  and  therefore  her 
literature  bore  chiefly  upon  agriculture  and  geography,  and  such 
subjects  as  advanced  commerce.  The  same  utilitarian  view  of 
education  caused  the  Carthaginians  to  pay  special  attention  to  the 
knowledge  of  foreign  languages.  In  consequence  of  the  huge 
accumulation  of  wealth  in  the  city  no  direct  taxation  was  found 
necessary;  and  after  the  second  Punic  war,  when  the  power  of 
Carthage  was  broken,  it  was  found  possible,  by  a  stricter  adminis- 
tration of  the  finances,  to  meet  the  current  expenses  and  pay  the 
yearly  installment  of  $240,000  to  Rome  without  levying  any  tax. 
Carthage  anticipated  the  economic  principles  of  a  later  epoch  in 
her  financial  management  of  loans  and  currency.  In  fact,  if  gov- 
ernment had  resolved  itself  into  a  mere  mercantile  speculation, 
never  would  any  state  have  solved  the  problem  more  brilliantly 
than  Carthage. 

Some  comparison  between  the  resources  of  Rome  and  Car- 
thage will  be  a  fitting  close  to  this  chapter.  Both  cities  were  purely 
agricultural  and  mercantile,  art  and  science  in  both  playing  a 
subordinate  and  wholly  practical  part.  In  Rome  the  landed  inter- 
est still  preponderated  over  the  moneyed;  in  Carthage  the  reverse 
was  the  case.  In  the  former  the  great  mass  of  citizens  tilled  their 
own  fields;  in  the  latter  the  agricultural  interest  was  centered  in 
the  hands  of  large  landholders  and  slave-owners.  Thus  at  Rome, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  most  of  the  citizens  held  property,  the  tone 
was  conservative;  in  Carthage  the  majority  held  no  property,  and 
were  therefore  moved  alike  by  the  bribes  of  the  rich  and  the  reform- 


96  ROME 

500-264    B.C. 

cries  of  the  democrats.  Rome  still  prescribed  pristine  frugal  sim- 
plicity in  her  mode  of  life ;  Carthage  was  the  victim  of  opulence  and 
luxury. 

Politically,  the  constitution  of  both  was  aristocratic.  The 
judges  of  Carthage  and  the  senate  of  Rome  governed  on  the  same 
system  of  police-control.  In  both  cities  the  individual  magistrate 
was  subject  to  the  control  of  the  governing  board,  but  the  cruel 
severity  and  absurd  restrictions  visible  in  the  Carthaginian  system 
contrast  very  unfavorably  with  the  milder  and  more  reasonable 
powers  of  the  Roman  council.  Moreover,  the  Roman  senate  was 
open  to  and  filled  by  men  of  eminent  ability,  representatives  of  the 
nation  in  the  truest  and  best  sense,  while  the  Carthaginian  senate 
exercised  a  jealous  control  on  the  executive,  and  represented  only  a 
few  leading  families,  and  was  inspired  by  a  sense  of  mistrust  of  all 
above  and  below  it.  Hence  the  steady  unwavering  policy  of  Rome, 
and  the  confidence  and  good  understanding  generally  existing  be- 
tween the  senate  and  its  magistrates ;  while  at  Carthage  a  wavering 
half-hearted  policy  was  pursued,  and  the  best  officers  were  generally 
at  feud  with  the  governing  body  at  home,  and  were  thus  forced  to 
join  the  reform  or  opposition  party.  Again,  as  to  their  treatment 
of  subject  states,  Rome  threw  open  her  citizenship  to  one  district 
after  another,  and  made  it  even  legally  attainable  by  the  Latin  com- 
munities; Carthage  never  allowed  such  a  hope  to  be  entertained, 
still  less  to  be  realized.  Rome  granted  a  share  in  the  fruits  of 
victory,  and  sought  to  create  a  party  in  each  state  favorable  to  her 
own  interests ;  Carthage  reserved  to  herself  all  the  spoils  of  victory, 
and  took  away  from  all  cities  the  freedom  of  trade.  Rome  allowed 
a  shadow  of  independence  even  to  the  lowest  grade  of  her  subject 
states,  and  imposed  a  fixed  tribute  on  none;  Carthage  enforced  a 
heavy  tribute  on  even  the  old  Phoenician  cities,  with  the  exception 
of  Utica,  and  treated  subject  tribes  as  state  slaves.  Thus  every 
African  community,  with  the  above  exception,  would  have  profited 
by  the  fall  of  Carthage,  whereas  every  state  in  Italy  would  have 
lost  rather  than  gained  by  a  rebellion  against  Rome.  The  strength 
of  the  Roman  alliance  was  shown  in  the  war  against  Pyrrhus ;  the 
landing  of  Agathocles  and  Regulus  in  Africa,  and  the  mercenary 
war,  proved  the  hollow  and  rotten  nature  of  the  Carthaginian  con- 
federacy. In  Sicily  alone  Carthage  pursued  a  wiser  and  milder 
policy,  owing  to  her  inability  to  take  Syracuse,  and  thus  there  was 
always  a  party  there  favorable  to  her  interests. 


CARTHAGE  97 

500-264    B.C. 

The  state  revenues  of  Carthage  were  far  superior  to  those  of 
Rome,  but  the  sources  of  that  revenue — tribute  and  customs — were 
exhausted  far  sooner  than  those  of  Rome,  and  the  Carthaginian 
mode  of  conducting  war  was  far  costlier  than  the  Roman. 

Though  very  different,  the  military  resources  of  the  two  rivals 
were  not  unequally  balanced.  Carthage,  at  the  time  of  her  con- 
quest, still  numbered  700,000  citizens,  and  at  the  close  of  the  fifth 
century  she  could  put  into  the  field  an  army  of  40,000  hoplites. 
Rome's  advantage  lay  not  so  much  in  the  superiority  of  numbers, 
as  in  the  superior  physique  and  character  of  the  Roman  husband- 
man. Neither  the  Carthaginians  nor  the  Liby-Phoenicians  were 
naturally  soldiers;  the  flower  of  the  Carthaginian  armies  consisted 
of  the  Libyans,  who  made  good  infantry,  and  were  unsurpassed  as 
light  cavalry.  Aided  by  the  forces  of  the  dependent  tribes  of 
Libya  and  Spain,  and  by  the  famous  slingers  of  the  Baleares,  as  well 
as  by  mercenary  foreigners,  the  Carthaginians  could  raise  their 
armies  to  almost  any  strength;  but  a  long  and  dangerous  interval 
must  elapse  before  such  hosts  could  be  collected,  and,  when  assem- 
bled, they  lacked  that  unity  of  interests  and  those  ties  of  fatherland 
which  made  the  Roman  army  so  formidable.  Moreover,  the  relations 
between  the  Carthaginian  officers  and  the  mercenary  and  Libyan 
troops  were  marked  by  a  callous  indifference  on  the  one  hand  and 
a  dangerous  and  mutinous  dissatisfaction  on  the  other.  Officers 
broke  their  word  to  the  troops,  and  even  betrayed  them, — wrongs 
which  were  bitterly  avenged  by  Libyan  insurrections.  Great  efforts 
were  always  made  by  the  Carthaginian  government  to  remedy  the 
defects  of  their  military  system.  Not  only  were  the  army  chests 
and  magazines  kept  fully  stored,  but  special  attention  was  paid  to 
all  machines  of  war,  and  to  the  use  of  elephants.  As  the  Cartha- 
ginians did  not  dare  to  fortify  their  dependent  cities,  owing  to 
their  fear  of  their  subject  states,  they  spared  no  pains  in  making 
Carthage  impregnable.  Rome,  on  the  other  hand,  allowed  most 
of  the  subject  towns  to  retain  their  walls,  and  secured  her  power 
by  a  chain  of  frontier  fortresses  throughout  Italy.  The  great 
strength  of  Carthage  lay  in  her  war-marine,  composed  of  ships  and 
sailors  unrivaled  in  the  world.  Ships  with  more  than  three  banks 
of  oars  were  first  built  at  Carthage,  and  her  quinqueremes  were 
better  sailors  than  the  Greek  ships  of  war.  In  this  point  Rome 
was  no  match,  and  could  not  at  this  period  venture  into  the  open 
sea  against  her  rivals. 


98  ROME 

500-264  B.C. 

To  sum  up,  the  resources  of  the  two  great  powers  were  at  the 
outset  very  equally  matched;  but  the  danger  of  Carthage  lay  in 
the  want  of  a  land  army  of  her  own,  and  of  a  confederacy  of  states 
resting  on  a  secure  and  self-supporting  basis.  It  was  plain  that 
neither  Rome  nor  Carthage  could  be  seriously  attacked  except  in 
the  home  of  her  power;  but,  in  the  one  case,  almost  insuperable 
obstacles  met  the  invader;  while,  in  the  other,  half  his  task  was 
accomplished  as  soon  as  he  had  set  foot  on  African  soil. 


Chapter  XII 

THE   FIRST   PUNIC   WAR.    264-241   B.C 

AS  was  but  natural,  the  first  conflict  between  Rome  and 
L\  Carthage  had  its  origin  in  the  island  which  lay  between 
JL  JL  Italy  and  Africa.  After  Pyrrhus  had  been  driven  from 
Sicily  and  Italy  in  275  B.C.,  the  Carthaginians  were  left  masters  of 
more  than  half  the  island,  and  were  in  possession  of  the  important 
town  of  Agrigentum.  Syracuse  retained  nothing  but  Tauromenium 
and  the  southeast  of  the  island.  We  have  above  alluded  to  the  roving 
and  mercenary  character  of  the  Campanian  youth,  who,  feeling  no 
strong  attachment  to  their  native  land,  had  ever  been  willing  to 
join  the  forces  of  Greek  adventurers.  On  the  death  of  Agathocles 
a  band  of  these  mercenaries  had,  by  an  act  of  odious  treachery, 
seized  Messana,  and  in  a  short  time  these  Mamertines,  or  men  of 
Mars,  as  they  styled  themselves,  became  the  third  power  in  Sicily. 
Their  increasing  strength  was  not  unwelcome  to  the  Carthaginians, 
who  gladly  saw  a  new  and  hostile  power  established  close  to  Syra- 
cuse. Hiero,  the  new  ruler  and  able  general  of  Syracuse,  made 
great  efforts  to  restore  the  city  to  its  former  eminence,  and  to  unite 
the  Sicilian  Greeks.  Being  at  peace  for  the  time  with  the  Cartha- 
ginians, he  turned  his  arms  against  Messana,  at  the  very  time  that 
Rome  was  taking  vigorous  measures  against  the  Campanian 
kinsmen  of  the  Mamertines,  who  had  established  themselves  in 
Rhegium. 

Hiero  succeeded  in  shutting  up  the  Mamertines  in  their 
city,  and  was  on  the  point  of  successfully  terminating  a  siege  which 
had  lasted  some  years,  when  the  Mamertines  in  their  dire  strait 
turned  for  help  to  Rome,  and  offered  to  deliver  their  city  into  her 
hands.  It  was  a  moment  of  the  deepest  significance  in  the  history 
of  the  world  when  the  envoys  of  the  Mamertines  appeared  in  the 
Roman  senate.  If  the  Romans  acceded  to  their  request,  they 
would  not  only  do  violence  to  their  own  feelings  of  right  and 
wrong,  by  receiving  into  alliance  a  band  of  adventurers  stained  with 
the  worst  crimes,  whose  very  kinsmen  in  Rhegium  they  had  just 

99 


100  ROME 

265-262    B.C. 

punished  for  the  same  offense,  but  they  would  throw  aside  their 
views  of  establishing  a  mere  sovereignty  in  Italy  for  the  wider  and 
more  dangerous  policy  of  interference  with  the  outside  world — a 
policy  which  could  not  fail  to  bring  them  into  complicated  relations 
with  powers  strictly  outside  their  own  land.  A  war  with  Carthage, 
serious  as  it  might  prove,  was  not  the  only  result  that  might  follow 
such  a  step;  no  one  could  calculate  the  consequences  of  so  bold  a 
leap  in  the  dark.  After  long  deliberation  the  senate  referred  the 
matter  to  the  citizens;  and  they,  fired  by  a  consciousness  of  what 
they  had  already  achieved,  and  by  a  belief  in  their  future  destiny, 
authorized  the  senate  in  265  B.C.  to  receive  the  Mamertines  into  the 
Italian  confederacy,  and  to  send  them  aid  at  once. 

When  the  Roman  force  dispatched  to  carry  out  this  policy 
reached  Rhegium  it  was  learned  that  Carthage  had  been  called  in  to 
mediate  between  Syracuse  and  Messana,  and  that  the  town  was  now 
in  possession  of  a  Carthaginian  garrison.  It  was  the  fear  of  just 
such  a  result  that  had  first  induced  the  Romans  to  interfere  in  the 
affair  of  the  Mamertines.  Without  delay,  therefore,  the  expedi- 
tion crossed  the  strait  and  took  forcible  possession  of  Messana. 

Carthage  declared  war  264  B.C.,  and  a  strong  fleet  under 
Hanno,  the  son  of  Hannibal,  blockaded  Messana.  At  the  same 
time  a  Carthaginian  land  army  laid  siege  to  the  town  on  the  north 
side,  and  Hiero  undertook  the  attack  on  the  south  side  of  the  city. 
But  the  Roman  consul,  Appius  Claudius  Caudex,  crossed  over  from 
Rhegium,  and,  uniting  his  forces  with  those  of  Claudius,  surprised 
the  enemy,  and  succeeded  in  raising  the  siege.  In  the  following 
year  Marcus  Valerius  Maximus  defeated  the  allied  armies  of 
Carthage  and  Syracuse.  Upon  this  Hiero  went  over  to  the  Roman 
side,  and  continued  to  be  the  most  important  and  the  firmest  ally 
the  Romans  had  in  the  island.  The  desertion  of  Hiero  and  the 
success  of  Roman  arms  forced  the  Carthaginians  to  take  refuge  in 
their  fortresses;  and  the  succeeding  year,  262  B.C.,  practically  saw 
the  close,  for  the  time  being,  of  the  war  in  Sicily. 

The  whole  island  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  with 
the  exception  of  the  maritime  fortresses,  held  by  the  firm  grip  of 
Hamilcar,  and  the  coast  towns,  which  wrere  awed  into  obedience 
by  the  all-powerful  Carthaginian  fleet.  The  real  difficulties  of  the 
war  were  at  last  beginning  to  be  realized  by  the  Romans,  and  the 
necessity  of  a  fleet  was  clearly  recognized.  Not  only  was  it  im- 
possible for  them  completely  to  subdue  Sicily  while  Carthage  ruled 


FIRST     PUNIC     WAR  101 

260-256    B.C. 

the  sea,  but  their  own  coast  was  continually  ravaged  by  Cartha- 
ginian privateers,  and  their  commerce  was  well-nigh  ruined. 
Therefore  they  resolved  to  build  a  fleet  of  one  hundred  quin- 
queremes  and  twenty  triremes.  A  stranded  Carthaginian  man-of- 
war  served  as  a  model  to  the  Roman  shipbuilders,  and  in  the  spring 
of  260  b.  c.  the  great  task  was  accomplished,  and  the  fleet  launched. 
It  has  been  seen  in  what  poor  estimation  the  Romans  held  naval 
matters,  and  even  now,  not  only  the  sailors,  but  also  the  naval  offi- 
cers, were  almost  exclusively  drawn  from  their  Italian  allies.  To 
compensate  for  their  ignorance  of  nautical  tactics  and  maneuvers, 
the  Romans  made  great  use  of  soldiers;  and  by  lowering  flying- 
bridges  on  to  the  Carthaginian  ships,  and  fastening  them  with 
grappling-irons,  they  reduced  the  fight  to  a  land  conflict,  making  it 
possible  to  board  and  capture  the  enemy's  ships  by  assault.  The 
first  great  trial  of  strength  took  place  at  Mylae,  a  promontory  to 
the  northwest  of  Messana,  where  the  Roman  fleet  under  Gaius 
Duilius  encountered  the  Carthaginian  fleet  under  the  command  of 
Hannibal.  The  Carthaginians,  despising  their  awkward-looking 
opponents,  fell  upon  them  in  irregular  order;  but  the  boarding- 
bridges  gave  the  Romans  a  complete  victory,  the  moral  effect  of 
which  was  far  greater  than  the  victory  itself.  In  spite  of  this  suc- 
cess, however,  the  war  dragged  on  without  any  decisive  action, 
Hamilcar  maintaining  himself  in  Sicily  with  great  skill.  At  last, 
weary  of  this  unsatisfactory  state  of  things,  the  Romans  de- 
termined to  strike  at  Carthage  in  her  native  land.  In  the  spring  of 
256  B.C.  a  powerful  fleet  of  330  ships  set  sail  for  Africa;  on  the 
way  it  received  on  board  at  Himera,  on  the  south  coast  of  Sicily, 
four  legions  under  the  command  of  the  two  consuls,  Marcus  Atilius 
Regulus  and  Lucius  Manlius  Volso.  The  Carthaginian  fleet,  con- 
sisting of  some  350  ships,  had  taken  up  its  station  at  Ecnomus  to 
protect  its  native  shores;  thus,  when  the  two  fleets  met,  each  side 
must  have  numbered  little  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men.  After  an  obstinate  struggle,  in  which  both  sides  suffered 
heavily,  the  Romans  gained  the  day;  and  the  consuls,  having  de- 
ceived the  Carthaginians  as  to  their  place  of  landing,  disembarked, 
without  any  hindrance  from  the  enemy,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
gulf  of  Carthage,  at  the  bay  of  Clupea.  An  entrenched  camp  was 
formed  on  a  hill  above  the  harbor,  and  so  confident  were  the  Romans 
rendered  by  the  success  of  their  plan  that  half  the  army  and  most 
of  the  fleet  were  recalled  home  by  the  senate.     Regulus  remained 


102  ROME 

256-255    B.C. 

in  Africa  with  40  ships,  15,000  infantry,  and  500  cavalry.  The 
terror-stricken  Carthaginians  did  not  dare  to  face  the  Romans  in 
the  field;  the  towns  everywhere  surrendered,  and  the  Numidians 
rose  in  revolt  against  Carthage.  Cowed  by  this  accumulation  of 
disasters,  the  proud  Phoenician  city  sued  for  peace,  but  the  exor- 
bitant terms  proposed  by  Regulus  were  little  calculated  to  render 
such  a  solution  possible.  Under  the  spur  of  dire  necessity,  Carthage 
evinced  that  energy  and  enthusiasm  which  on  such  occasions  often 
marks  Oriental  nations.  Hamilcar,  the  hero  of  the  guerrilla  war  in 
Sicily,  appeared  on  the  scene  with  the  flower  of  his  Sicilian  troops ; 
gold  purchased  the  support  both  of  Numidian  cavalry  and  of 
Greek  mercenaries,  among  whom  was  the  Spartan  Xanthippus, 
famous  for  his  knowledge  and  skill  in  the  art  of  war.  Dur- 
ing the  energetic  preparations  of  Carthage,  Regulus  remained 
idle  at  Tunis;  he  still  pretended  to  besiege  Carthage,  and  did 
not  even  take  measures  to  secure  his  retreat  to  the  naval  camp 
at  Clupea. 

His  folly  cost  him  dear.  In  the  spring  of  255  B.C.  the  Cartha- 
ginians were  in  a  position  to  take  the  field;  and  Regulus  accepted 
battle  without  waiting  for  reinforcements.  Roman  courage  availed 
not  against  the  superior  tactics  of  Xanthippus.  Outflanked  and  sur- 
rounded by  the  Numidian  horse,  crushed  and  completely  broken  up 
by  the  elephants,  the  Romans  were  almost  annihilated.  The  consul 
was  one  of  the  few  prisoners ;  about  two  thousand  fugitives  reached 
Clupea  in  safety.  On  the  news  of  this  disaster  reaching  Rome,  a 
large  fleet  at  once  started  to  save  the  remnant  shut  up  in  Clupea. 
After  defeating  the  Carthaginians  off  the  Hermaean  promontory, 
the  Roman  ships  arrived  at  Clupea,  and  carried  off  what  remained 
of  the  army  of  Regulus.  Content  with  accomplishing  this,  they 
sailed  homeward,  and  thus  evacuated  a  most  important  position, 
and  left  their  African  allies  to  Carthaginian  vengeance.  To  crown 
the  misfortunes  of  Rome,  a  terrible  storm  destroyed  three-fourths 
of  their  fleet,  and  only  eighty  ships  reached  home  in  safety. 

Carthage  took  a  stern  vengeance  on  the  revolted  Numidians, 
and  filled  her  exhausted  treasury  with  the  heavy  fines  in  money  and 
cattle  which  she  exacted  from  her  rebellious  subjects.  Able  now 
to  assume  the  offensive,  she  dispatched  Hasdrubal,  son  of  Hanno, 
to  Sicily,  with  a  force  especially  strong  in  elephants.  He  landed  at 
Lilybaeum,  and  Sicily  once  more  became  the  theater  of  the  war. 
A  new  Roman  fleet  of  three  hundred  ships  was  dispatched  thither 


FIRST     PUNIC     WAR  103 

254-249    B.C. 

in  the  incredibly  short  space  of  three  months ;  and  the  Carthaginian 
stronghold  of  Panormus,  with  many  other  places  of  minor  im- 
portance, fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans.  But  by  land  no 
progress  was  made,  and  the  Romans  did  not  dare  to  risk  a  battle 
in  the  face  of  the  overwhelming  numbers  of  Carthaginian  elephants. 
The  year  254  B.C.  passed  by;  and  the  next  year,  while  returning 
from  a  plundering  expedition  to  the  coast  of  Africa,  the  Romans 
lost  150  vessels  in  another  storm,  owing  to  their  obstinate  refusal 
to  allow  the  pilots  to  take  their  own  course.  The  senate,  utterly 
downcast  by  this  disaster,  reduced  their  fleet  to  sixty  sail,  and 
limited  themselves  to  the  defense  of  the  coast  and  the  convoy  of 
transports.  The  land  war  in  Sicily  was  more  successful.  In  252 
B.C.,  Thermae,  the  last  Carthaginian  position  on  the  north  coast, 
and  the  island  of  Lipara,  yielded  to  Roman  arms;  and  in  the  fol- 
lowing year  the  consul  Gaius  Caecilius  Metellus  gained  a  great 
victory  over  the  Carthaginian  army  under  the  walls  of  Panormus, 
owing  to  the  disorder  of  the  elephants,  which  charged  their  own 
side.  The  Carthaginians  could  no  longer  take  the  field,  and  in  a 
short  time  they  only  retained  their  hold  on  Drepana  and  Lilybaeum. 
The  Romans  refused  the  Carthaginian  proposals  for  peace  in  249 
b.cv  and  concentrated  all  their  efforts  on  the  capture  of  Lilybaeum. 
This  was  the  first  great  siege  undertaken  by  Rome ;  but  the  greater 
adroitness  of  the  Carthaginian  sailors  and  the  ability  of  Himilco, 
the  commander  of  Lilybaeum,  parried  all  the  efforts  of  the  Romans 
both  by  sea  and  land.  Foiled  in  their  efforts  to  take  the  city  by 
assault,  they  were  forced  to  attempt  to  reduce  it  by  blockade ;  but 
they  were  unable  to  completely  prevent  Carthaginian  ships  from 
running  into  the  harbor  with  supplies  from  Drepana,  while  the 
light  Numidian  cavalry  made  all  foraging  both  difficult  and  danger- 
ous on  land.  In  addition,  disease,  arising  from  the  malaria  of  the 
district,  thinned  the  ranks  of  the  Roman  land  army.  Weary  of  the 
tedious  blockade,  the  new  consul,  Publius  Claudius,  attempted  to 
surprise  the  Carthaginian  fleet  as  it  lay  at  anchor  before  Drepana. 
Completely  outmaneuvered  by  the  Phoenician  admiral,  Atarbas, 
the  Roman  consul  fell  into  the  trap  set  for  him,  and  only  escaped 
by  prompt  flight  himself.  Ninety-three  Roman  vessels,  with  the 
legions  on  board,  were  captured,  and  the  Carthaginians  won  their 
first  and  only  great  naval  victory  over  the  Romans.  Lilybaeum  was 
thus  set  free  from  the  blockade  by  sea ;  in  fact,  the  remains  of  the 
Roman  fleet  were  in  their  turn   blockaded   by   the   Carthaginian 


104  ROME 

252-243     B.C. 

vice-admiral,  Carthalo.  The  latter  also  took  advantage  of  the  folly 
of  the  second  consul,  Lucius  Junius  Pullus,  who  was  in  charge  of  a 
second  Roman  fleet,  intended  to  convey  supplies  to  the  army  at 
Lilybaeum.  Carthalo  met  this  fleet  off  the  south  coast,  sailing  in 
two  squadrons  at  some  distance  from  each  other;  interposing 
his  own  ships  between  the  squadrons,  he  forced  both  to  run  on 
shore.  A  violent  storm  completed  the  work  begun  by  Cartha- 
ginian assaults,  and  both  squadrons  were  completely  wrecked, 
while  the  Carthaginians  easily  weathered  the  storm  out  on  the 
open  sea. 

Now,  if  ever,  was  the  time  for  Carthage  to  humble  her  great 
antagonist.  During  a  war  of  fifteen  years  the  Romans  had  lost 
four  fleets,  three  with  armies  on  board ;  and  one  land  army  had  been 
destroyed  in  Libya.  This,  added  to  the  many  minor  losses  by 
disease,  guerrilla  warfare,  battles  by  sea  and  land,  had  reduced  the 
burgess-roll,  from  the  years  252-247  B.C.  alone,  by  about  forty 
thousand  men,  without  reckoning  the  losses  of  the  allies,  who  bore 
the  whole  brunt  of  the  war  by  sea.  The  loss  of  ships  and  war- 
material,  and  the  utter  paralysis  of  trade,  had  inflicted  incalculable 
damage.  Moreover,  every  method  and  every  plan  had  been  tried, 
and  Rome  was  no  nearer  the  end  than  she  was  at  the  outset  of  the 
war.  In  utter  despondency  the  senate  no  longer  felt  equal  to  the 
task  of  subduing  Sicily;  the  fleet  was  discarded,  and  the  state  ships 
were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  privateer  captains,  whose  unaided 
valor  might  perhaps  compensate  in  some  degree  for  the  feebleness 
of  the  senate.  The  miserable  indolence  and  weakness  of  the  Car- 
thaginian government  alone  saved  Rome:  relieved  of  the  necessity 
of  self-defense,  the  Carthaginians  imitated  the  example  of  their 
enemy,  and  confined  their  operations  by  land  and  sea  to  the  petty 
warfare  in  and  around  Sicily. 

The  next  six  years  of  uneventful  warfare,  from  248-243  b.  c, 
reflect  little  credit  on  Carthage,  and  still  less  on  Rome.  Hamilcar, 
named  Barak  or  Barca  (t.  e.,  lightning),  the  Carthaginian  com- 
mander in  Sicily,  alone  showed  proper  energy  and  spirit.  Aware 
that  the  infantry  of  Carthage  were  no  match  for  the  Roman 
legions,  and  aware  that  his  mercenaries  cared  as  little  for  Carthage 
as  for  Rome,  he  proved  that  personal  attachment  to  a  general  could 
compensate  in  the  minds  of  his  soldiers  for  the  want  of  ties  of 
nation  and  country.  He  established  himself  on  Mount  Ercte,  and 
later  captured  the  town  of  Eryx,  and  from  these  strong  positions 


FIRST     PUNIC     WAR  105 

243-241    B.C. 

he  carried  on  a  plundering  warfare,  and  levied  contributions  from 
the  plains,  while  Phoenician  privateers  ravaged  the  Italian  coast. 
The  Romans  were  unable  to  dislodge  him  from  either  of  his  posi- 
tions, and  every  day  threatened  to  bring  fresh  defeat  and  disgrace 
to  the  Roman  arms.  This  gloomy  aspect  of  affairs  was  completely 
changed,  not  by  the  energy  of  the  Roman  government,  but  by  the 
noble  patriotism  of  individuals.  By  private  subscription  a  fleet  of 
two  hundred  ships,  manned  by  sixty  thousand  sailors,  and  fitted 
out  with  the  greatest  care,  was  raised  and  presented  to  the  state. 
This  fleet,  under  the  consul  Gaius  Lutatius  Catulus,  had  no  diffi- 
culty in  occupying  the  harbors  of  Drepana  and  Lilybaeum,  and 
prosecuted  the  siege  of  both  places  with  great  vigor.  Carthage, 
taken  by  surprise,  dispatched  a  weak  fleet  with  supplies  to  the  be- 
leaguered towns,  and  hoped  to  effect  a  landing  without  interference 
from  the  Romans.  They  were,  however,  intercepted  and  forced  to 
accept  battle  off  the  small  island  of  Aegusa,  in  the  spring  of  241 
B.C.  The  result  was  never  doubtful,  and  the  Romans  gained  a 
complete  and  decisive  victory.  The  last  effort  of  the  Roman 
patriots  had  borne  fruit;  it  brought  victory,  and  with  victory 
peace. 

Peace  was  concluded  at  last  on  terms  not  wholly  unfavorable 
to  Carthage.  Sicily,  however,  had  to  be  abandoned,  and  Hamilcar 
was  forced  by  the  incapacity  of  others  to  descend  from  the  positions 
he  had  occupied  for  seven  years  with  such  conspicuous  success.  In 
addition  to  Sicily,  Carthage  ceded  all  the  islands  between  Sicily  and 
Italy.  She  was  also  condemned  to  pay  a  war  indemnity  of  about 
four  million  dollars,  a  third  of  which  was  to  be  paid  down  at  once, 
and  the  remainder  in  ten  annual  instalments.  But  Hamilcar  re- 
fused to  accede  to  certain  demands  of  the  Roman  consul,  and  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  Carthaginian  state  and  territory 
was  expressly  guaranteed.  Both  Rome  and  Carthage  bound  them- 
selves not  to  enter  into  a  separate  alliance  with  any  dependency  of 
the  other,  nor  in  any  way  to  encroach  on  the  rights  which  each 
exercised  in  her  own  dominions.  The  dissatisfaction  of  the 
patriotic  party  at  Rome  was  so  great  that  at  first  the  public  assem- 
bly refused  to  sanction  the  proposed  terms  of  peace.  But  a  commis- 
sion was  appointed  to  settle  the  question  on  the  spot  in  Sicily,  and 
practically  the  proposals  of  Catulus  were  adopted,  and  Hamilcar, 
the  unconquered  general  of  a  vanquished  nation,  delivered  up  to 
the  new  masters  of  Sicily  the  fortresses  which  had  been    in    the 


106  ROME 

241-238    B.C. 

possession  of  the  Phoenicians  for  at  least  four  hundred  years ;  and 
in  241  B.C.  the  West  had  peace. 

The  severe  struggle,  which  thus  ended  in  the  extension  of 
Roman  dominion  beyond  Italy,  throws  a  strong  and  by  no  means 
favorable  light  on  the  Roman  military  and  political  system.  Not- 
withstanding the  noble  patriotism  and  heroic  energy  often  exhibited 
by  the  citizens,  we  cannot  fail  to  mark  the  miserable  vacillation 
shown  by  Rome  in  the  conduct  of  this  war.  The  fact  is  that  the 
organization  of  the  Roman  senate  and  of  the  military  system  were 
only  adapted  for  a  purely  Italian  policy,  and  a  purely  continental 
war.  The  wide  area  of  the  battlefield,  the  necessity  of  a  fleet,  the 
siege  of  maritime  fortresses,  were  all  hitherto  unknown  to  the  Ro- 
mans. For  the  solution  of  such  problems  the  senate,  from  its  com- 
position and  ignorance,  was  quite  unfitted:  moreover,  the  system 
of  choosing  a  new  commander  every  year,  often  to  reverse  the 
plans  of  his  predecessor,  was  manifestly  absurd.  The  noble  cre- 
ation of  this  war — a  Roman  fleet — was  never  truly  Roman ;  Italian 
Greeks  commanded,  and  subjects,  nay  even  slaves  and  outcasts, 
composed  the  crews ;  naval  service  was  always  held  in  slight  esteem 
when  compared  with  the  honor  of  the  legionary.  The  general, 
again,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  Regulus,  could  not  change  his 
tactics  to  suit  the  exigencies  of  the  moment.  The  old  idea  that 
any  citizen  was  fit  to  be  a  general  was  true  only  in  rustic  warfare, 
while  the  notion  that  the  chief  command  of  the  fleet  should  be  re- 
garded as  a  mere  adjunct  of  the  chief  command  of  the  land  army 
excites  our  wonder  and  ridicule.  To  the  energy  of  her  citizens,  and 
still  more  to  the  terrible  blunders  of  her  adversaries,  Rome  owed 
her  victorious  issue  from  the  first  Punic  war. 

In  the  years  that  followed  this  peace  Rome  gradually  extended 
her  dominion  to  what  we  may  term  the  natural  boundaries  of  Italy, 
to  the  Alps  in  the  north  and  to  Sicily  in  the  south.  On  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  Phoenicians,  Rome  contented  herself  with  allowing 
her  steadfast  ally,  Hiero,  to  retain  his  independence  as  ruler  of 
Syracuse,  and  of  the  neighboring  districts  of  Elorus,  Neetum, 
Acrae,  Leontini,  Megara,  and  Tauromenium ;  the  rest  of  Sicily  she 
permanently  appropriated.  Meanwhile  Carthage,  in  consequence  of 
her  cowardly  and  miserly  attempt  to  dock  the  pay  of  the  merce- 
naries of  Hamilcar,  was  engaged  in  a  deadly  conflict  with  her 
revolted  soldiers  and  her  Libyan  dependencies,  among  whom  the 
revolution  spread  far  and  wide.     The  city  of  Carthage  itself  was 


FIRST    PUNIC    WAR  107 

238-237   B.C. 

besieged,  and  not  only  in  Libya,  but  even  in  Sardinia,  the  insurgents 
looked  to  Rome  for  aid.  Rome,  although  she  refused  to  succor 
the  revolted  Libyans,  availed  herself  of  the  treachery  of  the 
Sardinian  garrisons,  and  seized  possession  of  that  island  in  238 
b.c.  ;  shortly  afterwards  she  added  Corsica  to  her  new  possessions. 
Carthage,  restored  by  the  genius  of  Hamilcar  to  her  full 
sovereignty  in  Africa,  demanded  in  237  b.c.  the  restitution  of 
Sardinia ;  but  she  did  not  dare  to  take  up  the  gage  of  battle  which 
was  promptly  thrown  down  by  Rome;  and  therefore  she  had  to 
submit  to  the  cession  of  Sardinia,  and  in  addition,  to  pay  1200 
talents  ($1,460,000). 

The  acquisition  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia  caused  an  important 
change  in  the  Roman  method  of  administration,  and  one  which 
marked  the  difference  between  Italy  and  the  provinces,  between 
the  conquests  of  Rome  in  her  own  proper  land  of  Italy  and  those 
she  made  across  the  sea.  The  necessity  of  some  special  magistrate 
for  these  transmarine  regions  caused  the  appointment  of  two 
provincial  pretors,  one  for  Sicily,  and  one  for  Sardinia  and 
Corsica ;  the  coasts  of  these  latter  islands  alone  were  occupied,  and 
with  the  natives  of  the  wild  interior  perpetual  war  was  waged. 
The  two  pretors  exercised  powers  very  similar  to  those  of  the 
consuls  in  early  times;  the  pretor  was  commander-in-chief,  chief 
magistrate,  and  supreme  judge,  One  or  more  questors  were  as- 
signed to  each  pretor,  to  look  after  the  finance-administration. 
With  the  exception  of  this  difference  in  the  chief  power,  the  same 
principles  were  adhered  to  as  those  which  Rome  had  observed  in 
organizing  her  dependencies  in  Italy.  All  independence  in  external 
relations  was  taken  away  from  the  provincial  communities;  every 
provincial  was  restricted,  as  regards  the  acquisition  of  property, 
and  perhaps  the  right  of  marriage,  to  his  own  community.  But  in 
Sicily,  at  least,  the  cities  retained  their  old  federal  organization,  and 
their  harmless  federal  diets :  the  power  of  coining  money  was  prob- 
ably withdrawn.  The  land,  however,  was  left  untouched,  and  each 
Sardinian  and  Sicilian  community  retained  self-administration  and 
some  sort  of  autonomy.  A  general  valuation  corresponding  to  the 
Roman  census  was  instituted  every  fifth  year,  and  all  democratic 
constitutions  were  set  aside  in  favor  of  aristocratic  councils. 

Another  de  facto  distinction,  of  great  importance,  between  the 
Italian  and  transmarine  communities,  was  that  the  latter  furnished 
no  fixed  contingent  to  the  army  or  fleet  of  Rome ;  they  lost  the  right 


108  ROME 

244-229    B.C. 

of  bearing  arms,  and  could  only  use  them  in  self-defense  when 
called  upon  by  the  pretor.  In  lieu  of  a  contingent  they  paid  a  tithe 
of  their  produce  and  a  tax  of  five  per  cent,  on  all  articles  of  com- 
merce exported  or  imported;  these  taxes  were  not  new  to  the 
Sicilian  Greeks,  who  had  paid  them  to  the  ruling  power,  whether 
the  Persian  king,  Carthage,  or  Syracuse.  Certain  communities 
were  no  doubt  exempted  from  these  imposts;  Messana,  for  in- 
stance, was  enrolled  in  the  Roman  alliance,  and  furnished  its  con- 
tingent of  ships;  other  towns,  such  as  Segesta  and  Halicyae, 
Centuripa  and  Alaesa,  and  Panormus,  the  future  capital  of  Roman 
Sicily,  though  not  admitted  as  confederates  of  Rome,  were  ex- 
empted from  taxation.  But  on  the  whole  the  position  of  Sicilian 
and  Sardinian  communities  was  one  of  tributary  subjection,  not  of 
dependent  alliance. 

By  the  possession  of  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Corsica,  Rome 
might  now  call  the  Tyrrhene  Sea  her  own.  On  the  east  coast  the 
founding  of  Brundisium  in  244  B.C.  had  from  the  first  established 
Roman  supremacy;  the  quarrels  of  the  Greek  states  prevented  any 
rival  power  arising  in  Greece  itself.  But  the  Adriatic  Sea  was  a 
prey  to  Illyrian  pirates,  and  hordes  of  these  tribes,  in  their  dreaded 
Liburnian  galleys,  defied  all  authority  and  ravaged  every  coast. 
They  established  themselves  in  Phoenice,  the  most  flourishing  town 
in  Epirus,  and  at  length  took  possession  of  the  rich  island  of 
Corcyra.  Urgent  appeals  from  hard-pressed  Greek  settlements  on 
the  Adriatic  coast,  and  constant  complaints  from  Italian  mariners, 
at  last  caused  Rome  to  interfere,  and  to  send  an  embassy  to  Agron, 
king  of  Scodra  and  Illyria,  with  demands  that  he  should  put  the 
evil  down.  His  refusal  was  met  with  an  insulting  threat  from  one 
of  the  Roman  envoys,  for  which  all  the  ambassadors  paid  with 
their  lives.  A  Roman  fleet,  with  an  army  on  board,  appeared  to 
succor  the  hard-pressed  town  of  Apollonia  in  229  B.C.,  and  the 
corsairs  were  completely  vanquished  and  their  strongholds  razed 
to  the  ground.  The  territory  of  the  sovereigns  of  Scodra  was 
greatly  restricted  by  the  terms  imposed  by  Rome,  and  much  of  the 
Illyrian  and  Dalmatian  coasts,  together  with  several  Greek  cities 
in  that  quarter,  was  practically  reduced  under  Roman  sway,  or  at- 
tached to  Rome  under  forms  of  alliance.  The  Greeks  submitted 
with  a  good  grace  to  the  humility  of  seeing  their  countrymen  de- 
livered from  the  scourge  of  piracy  by  barbarians  from  across  the 
sea,  and  admitted  the  Romans   to    the  Isthmian  games  and  the 


FIRST     PUNIC     WAR  109 

241-222    B.C. 

Eleusinian  mysteries.    Macedonia  was  too  weak  to  protest  by  aught 
but  words,  and  that  part  she  disdained  to  play. 

With  the  exception  of  a  six-days'  war  with  Falerii  in  241  B.C., 
nothing  broke  the  peace  of  Italy  proper.  But  matters  were  not  so 
settled  in  the  northern  district  between  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines, 
where  strong  Celtic  races  still  held  their  ground.  It  was  but  natural 
that  Rome  should  now  wrest  the  gates  of  the  Alps  from  the  grasp 
of  these  barbarians,  and  make  herself  mistress,  not  only  of  the 
mighty  river,  navigable  for  230  miles,  but  of  the  largest  and  most 
fertile  plain  in  the  then  civilized  Europe.  The  Celts,  indeed,  had 
begun  to  stir  in  238  B.C.,  and  two  years  later  the  army  of  the  Boii, 
united  with  the  Transalpine  Gauls,  encamped  before  the  walls  of 
Ariminum.  Fortunately  for  Rome,  exhausted  as  she  then  was  by 
her  struggle  with  Carthage,  the  two  Celtic  hosts  turned  on  one 
another,  and  thus  freed  Rome  from  the  threatened  danger.  In 
232  B.C.  the  Celts,  weary  of  waiting  for  the  outbreak  of  that  con- 
test for  Lombardy,  which  they  perceived  was  inevitable,  resolved 
to  strike  the  first  blow.  All  the  Italian  Celts,  except  the  Cenomani 
and  Veneti,  took  part  in  the  war  against  Rome;  advancing  to  the 
Apennines  in  225  B.C..,  from  which  quarter  the  Romans  did  not 
expect  an  attack,  they  ravaged  Etruria  up  to  the  walls  of  Clusium, 
and  by  a  clever  strategy  almost  succeeded  in  cutting  off  one  Roman 
army  before  the  other  could  relieve  it.  Failing  in  this  attempt,  the 
Celts  retreated,  but  were  intercepted  at  Telamon  by  some  legions 
which  had  crossed  from  Sardinia  and  landed  at  Pisae.  The  consul 
Gaius  Atilius  Regulus  commanded  this  force,  and  at  once  made  a 
flank  attack  with  his  cavalry;  he  fell  in  the  engagement,  but  his 
colleague,  Papus,  at  the  head  of  the  Italian  army,  now  came  into 
action.  Despite  their  desperate  resistance  against  the  double  at- 
tack, the  Celts  were  utterly  defeated,  and  all  the  tribes  south  of 
the  Po  submitted  in  224  B.C.  The  next  year  saw  the  struggle  re- 
newed on  the  northern  side  of  the  river.  The  valor  of  the  Roman 
soldiers  redeemed  the  blunder  of  their  general,  Gaius  Flaminius, 
and  turned  what  nearly  proved  a  defeat  into  a  glorious  victory  over 
the  Insubres.  Many  conflicts  took  place  in  222  B.C.,  but  the  cap- 
ture of  the  Insubrian  capital,  Milan,  by  Gnaeus  Scipio,  put  an  end 
to  their  resistance.  Thus  the  Celts  of  Italy  were  completely 
vanquished,  and  though  in  the  most  northern  and  remote  districts 
Celtic  cantons  were  allowed  to  remain,  in  all  the  country  south  of 
the  Po  the  Celtic  race  gradually  disappeared.     By   extensive   as- 


110 


ROME 


201-194  B.C. 


signations  of  land  in  the  country  between  Picenum  and  Ariminum ; 
by  carrying  the  great  northern  highway,  or  "  Flaminian  Road,"  on 
from  Narnia  across  the  Apennines  to  Ariminum  on  the  Adriatic 


coast ;  by  planting  fortresses  and  Roman  townships,  e.  g.,  Placentia 
and  Cremona  on  the  Po  itself,  in  the  newly  acquired  territory,  the 
Romans  showed  their  determination  to  reap  the  fruits  of  their  late 
conquests;  but  a  sudden  event  checked  them  while  in  the  full  tide 
of  their  prosperity. 


Chapter   XIII 

THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.     218-202  B.C. 

THE  most  shallow-minded  Carthaginian  can  scarcely  have 
regarded  the  peace  with  Rome  in  241  B.C.  as  likely  to 
prove  lasting.  Carthage  had,  no  doubt,  long  been  divided 
into  two  parties,  the  one  eager  for  political  reform,  the  other 
striving  to  retain  the  close  oligarchical  constitution.  These  two 
parties  were  now  further  rent  asunder  by  the  cry  for  war  and  the 
demand  for  peace.  To  the  latter,  or  peace-party,  belonged  the 
gerusia  and  Council  of  a  Hundred,  under  the  leadership  of  Hanno ; 
to  this  party  the  timorous  and  indolent,  the  worshipers  of  money 
and  place,  naturally  attached  themselves.  The  war-party  found  its 
chief  support  in  the  democratic  leaders  and  military  officers,  among 
whom  Hasdrubal  and  Hamilcar  were  preeminent ;  the  wisest,  most 
far-seeing,  and  most  patriotic  Carthaginians  lent  their  aid  to  this 
section  of  the  state.  The  successful  conclusion  of  the  war  against 
the  revolted  Numidians,  while  it  made  clear  to  all  the  genius  of 
Hamilcar  Barca,  brought  out  in  odious  contrast  the  miserable  in- 
capacity of  Hanno,  and  the  utterly  corrupt  and  pernicious  charac- 
ter of  the  ruling  oligarchy.  Great  prominence  was  thus  given  to 
the  patriotic  party,  and,  although  political  reform  was  impractica- 
ble, while  Rome  was  all-powerful  and  gave  her  countenance  to  the 
treacherous  oligarchs,  important  changes  were  effected  in  the  mili- 
tary system  of  Carthage.  Hanno  was  deposed  from  his  command, 
and  Hamilcar  was  nominated  commander-in-chief  of  all  Africa  for 
an  indefinite  period.  He  could  only  be  recalled  by  the  vote  of  the 
popular  assembly,  and  the  choice  of  a  successor  was  made  to  de- 
pend, not  on  the  magisterial  board  at  home,  but  on  the  decision  of 
the  officers  serving  in  the  army.  Apparently  Hamilcar  was  in- 
vested with  these  dictatorial  powers  for  the  purpose  of  superin- 
tending the  border-warfare  with  the  Numidians;  but  we  shall  see 
what  a  different  view  he  took  of  the  charge  committed  to  him. 

The  task  set  Hamilcar  of  saving  the  state  by  means  of  the 
army  was  calculated  to  try  to  the  uttermost  the  abilities   of  that 

111 


112  ROME 

238-226   B.C. 

great  man.  Not  only  had  he  to  construct  an  army  out  of  poor 
material,  and  to  pay  his  mercenaries  out  of  an  ill-supplied  chest, 
but  he  had  also,  as  leader  of  a  party,  to  please  and  delude  in  turn 
the  venal  multitude  at  home,  whose  fickle  devotion  he  knew  but  too 
well  how  to  appraise.  Although  still  a  young  man,  Hamilcar  pos- 
sibly foreboded  his  premature  fate,  and,  ere  he  left  Carthage,  he 
bound  his  son  Hannibal,  then  nine  years  of  age,  by  the  most  solemn 
oath  to  swear  eternal  enmity  to  Rome,  and  thus  transmitted  to  his 
children  his  schemes,  his  genius,  and  his  hatred.  At  the  head  of 
a  strong  army,  and  accompanied  by  a  fleet  under  his  son-in-law, 
Hasdrubal,  Hamilcar  marched  westwards,  apparently  against  the 
Libyans  in  that  quarter;  suddenly,  without  any  authority  from  the 
government,  he  crossed  over  into  Spain,  and  there  laid  the  founda- 
tions of  the  Spanish  kingdom  of  the  Barcides.  Of  his  personal 
achievements  we  have  no  details,  save  that  Cato  the  Elder,  on  seeing 
the  still  fresh  traces  of  his  work,  exclaimed  that  no  king  was  worthy 
to  be  named  by  the  side  of  Hamilcar  Barca.  After  nine  years  of 
constant  war  with  the  Spanish  native  tribes,  when  he  was  begin- 
ning to  see  the  result  of  all  his  labors,  he  fell  fighting,  in  228  B.C. 

For  the  next  eight  years  his  son-in-law,  Hasdrubal,  carried  on 
his  plans  in  the  same  spirit.  The  adroit  statesmanship  of  Hasdru- 
bal consolidated  the  Carthaginian  kingdom  in  Spain  which  the 
generalship  of  Hamilcar  had  founded.  The  fairest  regions  of 
Spain,  the  southern  and  eastern  coasts,  became  Carthaginian 
provinces;  towns  were  founded,  chief  of  which  was  Cartagena,  on 
the  only  good  harbor  on  the  south  coast,  whose  silver  mines,  then 
first  discovered,  a  century  later  produced  a  yearly  yield  of  more 
than  $1,800,000.  The  revenues  of  the  province  not  only  paid  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  army,  but  enabled  Hasdrubal  to  remit  a 
large  sum  to  Carthage  every  year.  The  revival  of  commerce,  which 
thus  recouped  in  Spain  what  it  had  lost  in  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  was 
in  itself  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  non-interference  of  the  home 
government  with  the  plans  of  Hamilcar  and  Hasdrubal. 

We  must  ascribe  the  inaction  of  Rome  during  such  a  long 
period  of  brilliant  Carthaginian  successes  to  the  ignorance  of  the 
Romans,  who  knew  very  little  of  so  remote  a  country  as  Spain, 
and  who,  no  doubt,  at  first  regarded  with  contempt  the  reports 
furnished  them  by  their  spies  in  Carthage.  In  226  B.C.,  however, 
the  senate  warned  Hasdrubal  not  to  pass  the  Ebro,  and  received 
into  alliance  the  two  Greek  towns    on   the    east  coast  of  Spain, 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  113 

226-219  B.C. 

Saguntum  and  Emporiae ;  by  fixing  this  limit  to  the  Carthaginian 
advance  the  Romans  intended  to  secure  a  basis  of  operations  in  the 
country  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,  should  occasion  arise 
for  their  active  interference  in  Spain.  The  delay  of  the  Romans 
in  beginning  the  second  Punic  war  was  due  to  many  causes,  but 
chiefly  to  their  inability  to  form  a  true  conception  of  the  great 
scheme  which  the  family  of  Barca  was  pursuing  with  such  success. 
The  policy  of  the  Romans  was  always  more  remarkable  for 
tenacity,  cunning,  and  consistency  than  for  grandeur  of  conception 
or  power  of  rapid  organization. 

So  far  fortune  had  smiled  on  the  Carthaginians.  It  was  not 
fated  that  Hasdrubal  should  attempt  to  realize  the  dream  of  his 
great  predecessor.  In  220  B.C.  he  fell  by  an  assassin's  hand,  and 
his  place  was  filled  by  Hannibal,  the  eldest  son  of  Hamilcar,  then 
in  his  twenty-ninth  year.  Despite  his  youth,  the  man  thus  chosen 
by  his  comrades-in-arms  was  fully  worthy  of  their  confidence. 
Nature  had  bestowed  upon  him  gifts  both  mental  and  physical, 
which  were  no  mean  qualifications  for  his  mighty  task;  education 
and  association  had  completed  nature's  work.  Brought  up  from  his 
infancy  to  cherish  thoughts  of  vengeance  on  Rome,  trained  as  a 
soldier  in  early  youth  under  his  father's  eye,  already  highly  dis- 
tinguished, as  the  commander  of  the  Spanish  cavalry,  alike  for 
personal  bravery  and  for  the  higher  qualities  of  a  leader,  Hannibal 
was  specially  fitted  to  carry  out  the  great  projects  of  his  father. 
Anger,  envy,  and  meanness  have  written  his  history,  but  have  not 
been  able  to  mar  the  pure  and  noble  image  which  it  presents.  Com- 
bining in  rare  perfection  discretion  and  enthusiasm,  caution  and 
energy,  Hannibal  was  marked  in  a  peculiar  degree  by  the 
Phoenician  characteristic  of  inventive  craftiness.  Every  page  of 
the  history  of  the  period  attests  his  genius  as  a  general,  and  his 
gifts  as  a  statesman  were,  after  the  peace  with  Rome,  no  less  con- 
spicuously displayed  in  the  reform  of  the  Carthaginian  constitution, 
and  in  the  unparalleled  influence  which,  as  a  foreign  exile,  he  ex- 
ercised in  the  cabinets  of  the  Eastern  potentates.  The  power  which 
he  wielded  over  men  is  shown  by  his  incomparable  control  over  an 
army  of  various  nations  and  many  tongues — an  army  which  never, 
in  the  worst  times,  mutinied  against  him.  He  was  a  great  man; 
wherever  he  went  he  riveted  the  eyes  of  all. 

Hannibal  resolved  at  once  to  begin  the  war,  while  the  Celts  in 
Italy  were  still  unsubdued,  and  while  a  war  between  Rome  and 


114  ROME 

219-218    B.C. 

Antigonus  Doson,  the  far-seeing  ruler  of  Macedonia,  seemed  im- 
minent. Unfortunately  the  death  of  the  latter  reduced  Macedonia 
to  silence;  while  the  death  of  Hasdrubal  had  again  brought  the 
peace-party  in  Carthage  to  the  helm  of  the  state.  But  Hannibal 
was  not  to  be  deterred  by  the  opposition  of  the  miserable  politicians 
at  home.  Having  in  vain  tried  to  provoke  the  people  of  Saguntum 
to  break  the  peace,  he  attacked  the  town  in  219  B.C.  on  the  pretext 
that  the  Saguntines  were  oppressing  a  native  tribe  subject  to 
Carthage.  The  authorities  at  home,  whose  sanction  Hannibal  had 
purposely  refused  to  wait  for,  did  not  dare  to  oppose  the  war  thus 
begun.  Owing  to  the  supineness  of  the  Romans,  who  were  en- 
gaged in  war  with  the  Illyrian  brigands,  Saguntum  fell  after  a 
siege  of  eight  months,  and  the  rich  spoils  sent  home  to  Carthage 
roused  the  people  to  such  a  pitch  of  enthusiasm  that  they  accepted 
the  challenge  of  war  from  the  Roman  envoys,  who  had  been  sent 
to  demand  the  surrender  of  Hannibal,  in  the  spring  of  218  B.C. 

Hannibal  intrusted  the  safety  of  Spain  to  his  younger  brother, 
Hasdrubal,  and  sent  home  about  20,000  men  to  defend  Africa.  The 
fleet  remained  in  Spain  to  secure  the  communications  between  that 
country  and  Africa.  Two  smaller  fleets  were  dispatched,  the  one 
to  ravage  the  coast  of  Italy,  the  other  to  attempt  to  surprise  Lily- 
baeum,  and  to  renew  the  war  in  Sicily.  Hannibal  himself,  relying 
on  the  enmity  of  the  Celts  and  Ligurians  to  Rome,  determined  to 
make  northern  Italy  the  meeting-place,  where  all  foes  of  Rome 
might  unite  and  aid  him  in  the  achievement  of  his  great  enterprise. 
It  is  not  clear  why  he  chose  the  land-route,  the  old  pathway  of 
Celtic  hordes,  in  preference  to  that  by  sea ;  for  neither  the  maritime 
supremacy  of  the  Romans  nor  their  league  with  Massilia,  could 
have  prevented  a  landing  at  Genoa. 

In  the  spring  of  218  B.C.,  with  a  force  of  90,000  infantry, 
12,000  cavalry,  and  37  elephants,  he  set  out  from  Cartagena  to 
cross  the  Ebro,  and  he  inspired  all  his  soldiers  with  enthusiasm  by 
pointing  out  the  main  plan  and  object  of  his  undertaking.  Dis- 
tracted by  the  unexpected  nature  of  the  danger  which  threatened 
them,  the  Romans  seem  to  have  been  but  little  prepared  with  a 
settled  plan  of  war,  and  to  have  fatally  delayed  both  in  aiding 
Saguntum  and  in  meeting  Hannibal  on  the  Ebro;  the  losses  in- 
flicted on  Hannibal  by  the  native  tribes,  when  he  forced  the  passage 
of  that  river,  show  clearly  where  the  Romans  ought  to  have  first 
opposed  him.    Part  of  his  troops  he  left  behind  to  secure  the  newly 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  115 

218  B.C 

won  country  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,  part  he  sent  home 
on  reaching  that  chain  of  mountains ;  with  the  rest,  amounting  to 
50,000  infantry  and  9000  cavalry,  all  veterans,  he  crossed  the 
Pyrenees,  nor  did  he  meet  with  any  serious  resistance  until  he 
reached  the  Rhone,  opposite  Avignon;  there  he  was  met  by  a  levy 
of  the  Celts,  but,  outwitting  them,  he  crossed  the  river  before  the 
arrival  of  the  consul,  Publius  Cornelius  Scipio,  who  had  delayed 
at  Massilia,  and  reached  the  Alps  in  safety.  He  had  the  choice  of 
three  routes  in  crossing  this  mighty  barrier.  The  coast-route  was, 
however,  out  of  the  question,  as  it  was  not  only  barred  by  the  Ro- 
mans, but  would  also  have  taken  him  away  from  his  destination. 
The  remaining  two  routes  at  that  time  consisted  of  the  pass  of  the 
Cottian  Alps  (Mont  Genevre),  which,  though  shorter,  passes 
through  a  difficult  and  poor  mountain  country,  and  of  the  pass 
of  the  Graian  Alps  (the  little  St.  Bernard).  This,  though  longer, 
is  far  the  easiest  to  traverse;  and  the  route  by  this  pass  leads 
through  the  broadest  and  most  fertile  of  the  Alpine  valleys ;  more- 
over, the  Celts  favorable  to  Hannibal  inhabited  the  country  on  the 
Italian  side  of  the  little  St.  Bernard,  while  the  Cottian  pass  led  di- 
rectly into  the  territory  of  the  Taurini,  a  Celtic  tribe  at  feud  with 
the  Insubres,  who  were  Hannibal's  allies.  Thus  every  circumstance 
tended  to  make  Hannibal  choose  the  pass  of  the  Graian  Alps.  * 

The  march  along  the  Rhone  toward  the  valley  of  the  upper 
Isere,  through  the  rich  country  of  the  Allobroges,  brought  the 
Carthaginian  army,  after  sixteen  uneventful  days,  to  the  foot  of 
the  Alps,  and  there  the  first  dangers  were  encountered  from  some 
cantons  of  the  Allobroges,  who  made  constant  assaults  on  the  army 
during  its  ascent  of  the  first  Alpine  chain,  and  during  the  descent 
of  the  precipitous  path  that  trends  sheer  down  to  the  lake  of 
Bourget.  A  welcome  rest  in  the  fertile  valley  of  Chambery  gave 
Hannibal  time  to  repair  his  losses  in  beasts  of  burden  and  horses. 
Marching  up  the  Isere,  the  army  now  entered  the  territory  of  the 
Ceutrones,  whose  courteous  hospitality  did  but  mask  their  coming 
treachery.  On  reaching  the  narrow  track  that  led  to  the  summit  of 
the  St.  Bernard,  Hannibal  found  the  pass  occupied  on  both  sides, 
and  in  the  rear,  by  the  perfidious  Ceutrones.     His  forethought  in 

1  Various  geographical  questions  connected  with  Hannibal's  campaigns,  such 
as  the  route  followed  through  the  Alps  and  later  on  through  the  Apennines,  the 
details  of  the  battles  of  Trebia,  Trasimene,  Cannae,  etc.,  are  still  unsettled  and 
matters  of  much  dispute. 


116  ROME 

218   B.C. 

sending  forward  the  baggage  and  cavalry  saved  him  from  the  in- 
tended robbery  of  his  supplies ;  but  all  along  the  line  of  his  ascent 
constant  conflicts  caused  not  only  loss  of  men  and  beasts,  but  con- 
fusion and  utter  despondency  in  his  soldiers'  hearts.  At  last,  how- 
ever, the  summit  was  reached,  and  after  a  brief  rest  the  perilous 
descent  began;  here  the  late  season,  with  its  fresh  mantle  of 
September  snows,  proved  more  terrible  than  the  treacherous  attacks 
of  barbarians.  But  all  difficulties  gave  way  before  the  iron  will  and 
unshaken  confidence  of  the  great  general,  and  at  last  the  shattered 
army  enjoyed  a  nobly  earned  repose  in  the  plain  of  Ivrea,  quartered 
in  the  villages  of  the  friendly  Salassi,  clients  of  the  Insubres. 
Fortunately  for  Hannibal,  no  Roman  troops  were  stationed  so  far 
north  to  await  his  arrival.  The  Alps  were  crossed,  and  Hannibal 
had  attained  his  object ;  but  to  this  end  he  had  sacrificed  more  than 
half  his  infantry  and  three  thousand  cavalry.  The  military  value 
of  this  wonderful  achievement  may  well  be  called  in  question,  but 
the  courage,  skill,  and  masterly  execution  of  the  plan  by  Hannibal 
himself  admit  of  no  doubt.  The  grand  idea  of  Hamilcar,  that  of 
taking  up  the  conflk :  with  Rome  in  Italy,  was  now  realized.  It 
was  his  genius  that  projected  this  expedition,  and  the  unerring  tact 
of  historical  tradition  has  always  dwelt  on  the  last  link  in  the  great 
chain  of  preparatory  steps,  the  passage  of  the  Alps,  with  a  greater 
admiration  than  on  the  battles  of  the  Trasimene  lake  and  of  the 
plain  of  Cannae. 

Hannibal's  arrival  in  Italy  disconcerted  the  Roman  plans.  The 
army  of  Publius  Scipio  had  already  landed  in  Spain,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Gnaeus,  the  brother  of  Publius.  The  latter,  on  being 
foiled  by  Hannibal  at  the  passage  of  the  Rhone,  had  himself  re- 
turned to  Pisae  with  a  few  troops,  and  was  now  in  command  of  the 
Roman  force  in  the  valley  of  the  Po.  The  army  of  the  other  con- 
sul, Tiberius  Sempronius,  had  been  fortunately  delayed  in  its  in- 
tended attack  on  the  African  coast  by  the  descent  of  the 
Carthaginian  fleet  on  Sicily,  and  was  now  recalled  to  northern 
Italy,  but  the  surprise  of  the  Romans  enabled  Hannibal  to  rest  his 
troops  after  the  passage  of  the  Alps  and  to  cement  his  alliance  with 
the  Celts  and  Ligurians  before  encountering  the  famous  legions  of 
the  Republic. 

The  two  armies  met  in  the  plain  between  the  Ticinus  and  the 
Sesia,  not  far  from  Vercellae,  and  Scipio  was  decisively  beaten, 
owing  to  the  overpowering  force  of  the  light  Numidian  cavalry. 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  117 

218-217  B.C. 

Scipio  himself  was  severely  wounded,  and  only  saved  by  the 
spirited  devotion  of  his  son,  then  a  youth  of  seventeen.  He  at  once 
wisely  recrossed  the  Po,  and,  followed  by  Hannibal,  took  up  a 
strong  position  on  the  hills  behind  the  Trebia.  Here  he  was  joined 
by  the  second  army  under  Sempronius,  and  thus  strengthened  and 
occupying  a  highly  advantageous  position,  the  Romans  might 
await  with  confidence  the  next  move  of  Hannibal.  Fortunately  for 
the  latter,  Scipio's  wound  caused  the  sole  command  to  devolve  on 
Tiberius  Sempronius,  who  was  fired  with  impatience  to  avenge  the 
previous  defeat  on  the  Ticinus  and  the  desolation  of  the  villages 
of  such  Celts  as  still  remained  loyal  to  Rome.  Drawn  on  by  the 
simulated  flight  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  the  Romans  crossed  the 
Trebia  in  hot  pursuit,  and  suddenly  found  themselves  face  to  face 
with  the  whole  army  of  Hannibal  drawn  up  for  battle.  The  Roman 
cavalry  proved  no  match  for  their  opponents;  but  the  stubborn 
courage  of  the  infantry  resisted  every  attack  both  of  foot  and 
horse,  until  a  picked  force  of  two  thousand  Carthaginians  under 
Mago  by  an  attack  in  the  rear  decided  the  day.  Even  then  the  first 
division  of  the  Roman  infantry,  ten  thousand  strong,  cut  their  way 
through  the  midst  of  the  enemy  and  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
fortress  of  Placentia.  The  losses  of  Hannibal  in  battle  fell  chiefly 
on  the  Celts,  but  many  of  his  veterans  and  all  his  elephants,  except 
one,  perished  afterwards  of  fatal  diseases  caused  by  the  cold  and  wet 
of  that  bitter  December  day.  The  victory  made  Hannibal  master 
of  northern  Italy,  and  the  Celtic  insurrection  spread  far  and  wide 
without  let  or  hindrance  from  Roman  arms.  Hannibal  bivouacked 
for  the  winter  where  he  was,  and  organized  the  Celtic  accessions 
to  his  army,  which  are  said  to  have  numbered  more  than  sixty 
thousand  infantry  and  four  thousand  cavalry. 

Despite  this  brilliant  success  Hannibal  was  probably  well 
aware  of  his  true  position  in  Italy.  He  knew  that  his  chance  of 
ultimate  victory  depended  rather  on  political  than  military  achieve- 
ments, upon  the  gradual  loosening  and  breaking  up  of  the  Italian 
confederation:  as  long  as  that  confederation  remained  united,  and 
confronted  him  with  its  vastly  superior  resources,  he  no  doubt  felt 
that  with  his  inferior  infantry,  with  his  precarious  and  irregular 
support  from  home,  with  the  capricious  aid  of  the  fickle  Celts,  he 
had  no  hope  of  humbling  to  the  dust  his  proud  antagonist.  Owing 
to  this  conviction,  Hannibal's  conduct  of  the  war  in  Italy  is  marked 
by  a  constant  change  both  of  the  theater  of  war  and  of  the  plan  of 


118  ROME 

217    B.C. 

operations,  and  also  by  an  earnest  endeavor  to  turn  every  success 
to  good  account  by  posing  as  the  liberator  of  Italian  cities  from 
the  tyranny  of  Rome.  With  this  object  in  view  he  released  all  the 
Italian  prisoners  without  a  ransom,  and  charged  them  to  report 
that  he  waged  war  against  Rome,  not  Italy,  whose  saviour  and  re- 
storer of  ancient  powers  and  independence  he  professed  himself. 
The  Roman  prisoners,  on  the  other  hand,  he  loaded  with  chains 
as  slaves. 

In  the  early  spring  of  217  b.c.  Hannibal  set  out  from  the  Po; 
and  at  a  point  as  far  west  as  possible  he  crossed  the  Apennines, 
while  the  new  consul,  Gaius  Flaminius,  lay  idle  at  Arretium.  His 
army  suffered  terrible  hardships  on  the  other  side  of  the  mountains 
when  struggling  through  the  low-lying  and  flooded  country  ex- 
tending between  the  Serchio  and  Arno,  and  Hannibal  himself  lost 
the  sight  of  one  eye  from  ophthalmia.  However,  at  last  he  reached 
the  rich  land  at  Faesulae,  where  he  encamped,  having  thus  com- 
pletely baffled  the  consul  Flaminius. 

The  latter,  raised  by  the  popular  party  at  Rome  to  a  second 
consulship,  did  not  wait  for  his  colleague,  Graeus  Servilius,  to 
leave  his  useless  post  at  Ariminum,  and  join  him.  Fired  by  his 
ambition  to  justify  the  good  opinion  of  the  democrats,  and  stung 
by  the  sight  of  the  devastation  which  marked  far  and  wide  the  line 
of  Hannibal's  march  through  Etruria,  Flaminius  hastily  followed, 
and  overtook  Hannibal  in  the  district  of  Cortona.  Here  Hannibal 
had  chosen  his  field  of  battle — a  narrow  defile  between  two  steep 
mountains,  closed  at  its  outlet  by  a  high  hill,  and  at  its  entrance  by 
the  lake  Trasimene.  Here  he  prepared  an  ambush  for  the  enemy, 
into  which  the  Roman  army  in  the  heavy  mist  of  an  early  morning 
marched  unsuspectingly  and  was  almost  entirely  annihilated. 
Fifteen  thousand  Romans  fell,  and  among  them  the  con- 
sul; and  as  many  more  were  captured:  while  Hannibal's 
loss  was  but  fifteen  hundred.  The  vanguard  of  the  Romans, 
six  thousand  strong,  proved  once  more  the  irresistible  might  of  the 
legion,  and  cut  its  way  through  the  opposing  infantry;  but  they 
were  next  day  surrounded  and  made  prisoners  of  war  by  Maharbal, 
at  the  head  of  a  squadron  of  cavalry.  About  the  same  time  the 
cavalry  of  the  army  of  Servilius,  which  had  been  sent  forward  to 
support  Flaminius,  fell  in  with  the  enemy  and  was  cut  to  pieces. 
All  Etruria  was  lost ;  and  the  Romans  broke  down  the  bridges  over 
the  Tiber,  and  nominated  Quintus  Fabius  Maximus  dictator,  to 


SECOND     PUNIC    WAR  119 

217  B.C. 

make  all  preparations  for  the  defense  of  the  city,  upon  which  it  was 
supposed  Hannibal  would  at  once  march. 

Hannibal,  however,  knew  better;  suddenly  marching  through 
Umbria,  he  carried  fire  and  sword  through  the  territory  of 
Picenum,  and  then  gave  a  much-needed  rest  to  his  army  on  the 
shores  of  the  Adriatic.  More  than  this,  he  here  adopted  the 
marvelously  bold  experiment  of  reorganizing  his  Libyan  infantry, 
after  the  Roman  fashion,  and  of  equipping  them  with  the  arms 
taken  from  the  Roman  spoils.  From  here,  too,  he  sent  messages 
of  his  victory  by  sea  to  Carthage.  After  a  sufficient  rest  and  prac- 
tice of  the  new  method  of  warfare,  he  marched  slowly  along  the 
coast  into  southern  Italy.  His  hope  that  the  Italian  confederacy 
would  now  break  up  was  not  fulfilled:  not  a  single  community 
entered  into  alliance  with  the  Carthaginians. 

A  new  general  of  very  different  tactics  now  confronted  Han- 
nibal, in  the  person  of  the  dictator  Quintus  Fabius.  Elected  to 
counteract  the  demagogic  spirit  which  had  given  the  consulship  to 
Flaminius,  he  was  as  opposed  in  strategy  as  in  policy  to  his  pred- 
ecessor. Determined  to  avoid  a  pitched  battle  and  to  wear  out 
Hannibal  by  small  conflicts  and  deprivation  of  provisions,  Fabius 
followed  Hannibal  as  he  marched  over  the  Apennines  into  the 
heart  of  Italy  and  made  a  futile  attempt  on  the  loyalty  of  Capua. 
Bitter  indeed  must  have  been  the  feelings  of  the  Roman  soldier  as 
from  the  heights  along  which  Fabius  marched  was  visible  the 
flaming  track  of  ruin  and  desolation  throughout  Samnium  and 
Campania,  beneath  the  devastating  blight  of  the  Numidian  horse- 
men. At  last,  however,  the  patient  policy  of  Fabius  seemed  to 
grasp  its  reward.  When  Hannibal,  foiled  in  his  attempt  on  Capua, 
began  to  retreat,  Fabius  intercepted  his  route  near  Casilinum  by 
strongly  garrisoning  that  town  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Volturnus, 
and  occupying  the  heights  commanding  the  right  bank  with  his 
main  army,  while  a  division  blockaded  the  road  along  that  river. 
All  his  efforts  were,  however,  baffled  by  the  famous  ruse  of  Han- 
nibal, who  caused  his  light-armed  troops  to  climb  the  heights  im- 
mediately above  the  road,  and  drive  before  them  a  number  of  oxen 
with  lighted  faggots  on  their  horns.  The  Romans,  thinking  that 
they  saw  the  whole  Carthaginian  army  marching  off  during  the 
night  by  torchlight,  abandoned  their  blockade  of  the  road,  and 
made  for  the  heights.  Hannibal  thus  gained  a  free  passage  for  his 
main  army,  and  on  the  morrow  easily  disengaged  his  light  troops; 


120  ROME 

217-216  B.C. 

then  marching  northeast,  and  laying  all  the  country  under  contribu- 
tion as  he  marched,  he  proceeded  to  entrench  himself  for  the  winter 
in  the  plains  of  Apulia  at  Gerunium.  Huge  stores  of  grain  and 
supplies  were  daily  amassed  by  detachments  sent  out  for  that 
purpose. 

Marcus  Minucius,  the  master  of  the  horse,  in  the  absence  of 
the  dictator,  formed  a  camp  not  far*  off,  in  the  territory  of  the 
Larinates;  and  by  some  successful  engagements  with  Carthaginian 
detachments  he  caused  the  storm,  which  had  long  been  brewing  at 
Rome,  to  break  out  against  Fabius  and  his  policy.  The  Roman 
legions  felt  that  they  had  borne  long  enough  the  passive  attitude  of 
vigilant  observation,  and  had  too  long  acquiesced  in  the  sight  of 
all  Italy  spoiled  by  the  invader  without  striking  a  blow  in  her 
defense.  Indeed,  the  policy  of  Fabius  not  only  did  not  save  Rome, 
but  never  really  hindered  Hannibal  from  carrying  into  execution 
any  single  operation  he  had  planned.  The  outcry  at  Rome  gave 
rise  to  the  absurd  resolution  of  the  people,  by  which  Minucius  was 
appointed  co-dictator  with  the  same  powers  as  Fabius,  but  with  a 
diametrically  opposite  policy.  Minucius,  in  his  eagerness  to  give 
effect  to  his  spirited  policy,  was  soon  lured  into  a  foolish  attack, 
and  only  escaped  annihilation  by  the  timely  rescue  of  Fabius. 
Rome,  now  thoroughly  aroused,  haughtily  declined  the  offers  of 
money  from  Hiero  of  Syracuse,  and  from  the  Greek  cities  in  Italy, 
and  determined  to  send  out  such  a  force  as  had  never  before  been 
seen :  consisting  of  eight  legions,  each  raised  a  fifth  above  the  nor- 
mal strength,  with  a  corresponding  number  of  allies.  Weary  of 
the  dictatorship,  and  bitterly  distrusting  the  senate,  the  people 
in  216  B.C.  elected  Marcus  Terentius  Varro  as  consul,  whose  sole 
recommendation  was  his  low  origin  and  hot-headed  zeal  for  the 
popular  cause.  His  colleague  was  the  able  Lucius  Aemilius  Paulus, 
whose  candidature  was  supported,  and  with  great  difficulty  carried, 
by  the  senatorial  party. 

Hannibal  had  already  resumed  the  offensive  in  Apulia,  and, 
marching  south  from  Gerunium,  took  the  citadel  of  Cannae,  which 
commanded  the  plain  of  Canusium.  Hither  came  the  two  new  con- 
suls with  a  united  army  of  eighty  thousand  infantry  and  six 
thousand  cavalry,  as  compared  with  the  forty  thousand  infantry 
and  ten  thousand  cavalry  of  Hannibal.  Paulus  saw  that  the  wide, 
open  plain  was  very  favorable  to  the  superior  horse  of  his  enemy, 
and  therefore  constructed  two  camps  higher    up    the    river,  the 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  121 

216    B.C. 

larger  on  the  right  bank,  the  smaller  on  the  left  of  the  Aufidus, 
hoping  thus  to  compel  Hannibal  to  retire  from  his  position.  But 
the  soldiers  and  his  hot-headed  colleague  were  impatient  of  camp- 
work,  and  longed  to  measure  swords  with  the  hated  foe.  At  early 
dawn,  on  one  of  the  days  on  which  Varro  held  the  supreme  com- 
mand, the  Romans  crossed  over  the  river,  then  almost  dry,  and 
took  up  position  near  their  smaller  camp  in  the  wide  plain  that 
stretches  westward  from  Cannae.  The  Carthaginians  followed 
them,  and  Hannibal  formed  his  infantry  in  crescent  shape,  with  the 
Celtic  and  Iberian  troops  in  the  center  to  meet  the  first  shock  of  the 
serried  ranks  of  the  enemy;  the  light  Numidian  horse  occupied 
the  open  space  in  the  plain  facing  the  Italian  cavalry  under  Varro ; 
the  heavy  cavalry  under  Hasdrubal  occupied  the  ground  near  the 
river  on  the  right,  and  faced  the  less  numerous  Roman  horse  under 
Paulus.  The  Roman  legions  easily  overthrew  the  Celts  and 
Iberians,  and  pressed  on  into  the  center  to  complete  their  success. 
On  the  left  wing  the  cavalry  action  was  undecided,  but  on  the  right 
Hasdrubal  completely  scattered  and  cut  down  the  Roman  horse. 
Meanwhile  the  Roman  infantry  had  become  wedged  in  by  their 
eager  efforts  to  follow  up  their  first  success,  and  were  unable  to 
deploy  their  ranks  so  as  to  meet  the  attacks  of  the  Libyan  infantry, 
who  closed  in  upon  all  sides.  At  this  crisis,  Hasdrubal,  who  had 
previously  completely  routed  the  horse  under  Varro  and  left  their 
pursuit  to  the  light  Numidian  horse,  made  a  third  and  final  charge 
on  the  confused  ranks  of  the  Roman  infantry.  All  was  lost,  and 
the  Romans  merely  stood  to  be  butchered.  The  army  was  an- 
nihilated: seventy  thousand  Romans  lay  on  the  field,  while  Han- 
nibal lost  but  six  thousand,  two-thirds  of  whom  were  Celts. 
Paulus  was  among  the  slain,  as  also  the  pro-consul  Gnaeus 
Servilius,  who  had  led  the  infantry,  and  eighty  men  of  senatorial 
rank.  Varro  was  not  ashamed  to  survive  the  disaster,  and,  saved 
by  his  swift  steed,  reached  Venusia ;  and  the  senators,  with  a  noble, 
if  to  us  ironical,  generosity,  met  him  at  the  gates  of  Rome,  and 
thanked  him  for  not  having  despaired  of  the  safety  of  the  state.  In 
addition  to  those  slain  on  the  field  of  battle,  most  of  the  division 
guarding  the  Roman  camp  were  made  prisoners;  and,  as  if  to 
crown  the  disasters  of  Rome,  a  little  later  a  legion  sent  to  Gaul  fell 
into  an  ambush,  and  was  completely  destroyed,  together  with  its 
general,  Lucius  Postumius,  the  consul-designate  for  the  coming 
year. 


122  ROME 

217-216  B.C. 

Now  at  last  there  seemed  good  hope  of  realizing  that  great 
political  combination  for  the  sake  of  which  Hannibal  had  invaded 
Italy;  his  army  had  nobly  performed  its  task,  and  opened  the  way 
for  the  union  of  the  eastern  and  western  foes  of  the  proud  city. 
In  one  essential  quarter,  indeed,  all  chance  of  succor  had  been  for 
the  time  destroyed.  Gnaeus  Scipio  had  met  with  great  success  in 
Spain,  and  was  not  only  master  of  the  country  north  of  the  Ebro, 
but  with  the  aid  of  his  brother  Publius,  had  in  217  B.C.  crossed  that 
river,  after  inflicting  a  severe  defeat  on  the  Carthaginian  fleet  at  its 
mouth,  and  advanced  as  far  as  Saguntum.  Further,  in  the  follow- 
ing year,  almost  at  the  same  time  as  the  great  victory  of  Cannae, 
the  two  Scipios  totally  defeated  Hasdrubal,  when  attempting  to 
cross  the  Ebro  and  bring  a  fresh  army  across  the  Pyrenees  to  his 
brother's  aid.  As  far  as  Africa  was  concerned,  Hannibal  had  re- 
ceived all  the  assistance  he  could  hope  for  from  home,  though  he 
was  continually  pinched  for  want  of  money  wherewith  to  pay  his 
soldiers.  The  news  of  the  victory  of  Cannae  made  Carthage  resolve 
to  send  him  reinforcements  of  money  and  men,  and  to  prosecute  the 
war  with  energy  both  in  Italy  and  Spain.  Now,,  too,  Philip  of 
Macedon  formed  his  long-deferred  alliance  with  Carthage,  and 
undertook  to  land  an  army  on  the  east  coast  of  Italy,  in  return  for 
the  restoration  of  the  lands  in  Epirus,  which  had  been  wrested  from 
Macedonia  by  the  Romans.  Moreover,  Hieronymus,  the  young 
and  incapable  successor  of  the  shrewd  Hiero,  joined  the  side  of  the 
Carthaginians;  and  the  united  fleet  of  Syracuse  and  Carthage  at 
once  rendered  the  position  of  the  Romans  at  Lilybaeum  most  criti- 
cal. But,  above  all,  signs  were  at  last  visible  that  the  Italian  con- 
federacy was  losing  its  cohesion,  and  throwing  off  its  allegiance  to 
Rome.  Most  of  the  Italian  towns  of  southern  Italy  passed  over  to 
the  side  of  Hannibal.  The  aristocratic  party  in  all  these  places  ve- 
hemently opposed  the  change  of  sides,  and  their  bitter  opposition, 
especially  in  Capua,  produced  internal  conflicts,  which  greatly  les- 
sened the  advantage  derived  by  Hannibal  from  these  secessions. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  south  Italian  and  Campanian  Greeks  re- 
mained firmly  loyal  to  Rome,  despite  their  perilous  position  and 
the  attacks  of  Hannibal ;  naturally,  too,  all  the  Latin  colonies  in 
southern  and  central  Italy  presented  an  unyielding  front  to  the 
enemy. 

Such  were  the  direct  consequences  of  the  day  of  Cannae,  a 
cruel  but  just  punishment  for  the  grave  political  errors  of  the 


SECOND    PUNIC     WAR  123 

216-215   B.C. 

Roman  people.  The  war  with  Hannibal  had  revealed,  with  fatal 
clearness,  the  absurdity  of  the  method  of  electing  generals,  and  the 
still  greater  danger  of  such  a  method  when,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
two  consuls  Flaminius  and  Varro,  it  became  the  tool  of  party  and 
the  two-edged  instrument  of  demagogism.  It  was  clear  that  politi- 
cal struggles  must  cease  to  dictate  the  policy  of  the  war,  and  that  all 
elements  must  unite  to  preserve  the  state.  The  noble  and  patriotic 
manner  in  which  the  senate  performed  its  task,  and  healed  the  party 
quarrels  by  abstaining  from  all  recriminations,  constitutes  its  glor- 
ious and  imperishable  honor.  Quintus  Fabius  took  the  lead  in  all 
the  defensive  measures,  and  the  praetor,  Marcus  Claudius  Mar- 
cellus,  whose  destination  previous  to  the  battle  of  Cannae  had  been 
Sicily,  was  appointed  to  the  chief  command  of  the  hastily  collected 
army.  Every  nerve  was  strained  to  gather  troops  and  supply 
arms.  All  those  above  boyhood  were  called  out,  debtor-serfs  and 
criminals  were  armed,  and  even  eight  thousand  slaves  were  incor- 
porated in  the  army.  All  proposals  from  Hannibal  touching  a 
ransom  of  captives  were  contemptuously  rejected;  no  word,  no 
action,  was  suffered  to  have  even  the  semblance  of  a  thought  of 
peace,  while  Hannibal  was  still  in  Italy  and  Cannae  unavenged. 

From  this  point  on  the  war  in  Italy  flagged,  and,  in  spite  of 
various  military  successes,  Hannibal's  power  began  to  decline.  He 
had  gained  all  that  he  could  hope  for  by  mere  force  of  arms,  but 
the  Roman  confederation  in  central  Italy  still  presented  an  un- 
broken front  to  his  invincible  army.  The  great  difficulty  of  taking 
fortified  towns  prevented  a  single  battle  from  being  so  decisive  as 
it  is  in  our  own  days.  Further,  Rome  had  grown  wiser,  and  the 
selection  of  Marcus  Claudius  Marcellus  as  commander  of  the  forces 
in  Italy  contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  Rome's  preservation. 
Hannibal  could  no  longer  count  either  on  the  inaction  of  the 
Roman  armies  or  on  the  fatal  mistakes  of  ignorant  generals.  In 
215  B.C.  the  Romans  took  the  field  with  three  armies  in  Campania. 
A  fourth,  meanwhile,  under  the  pretor  Marcus  Valerius,  had  taken 
up  its  position  at  Luceria,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  force  under 
Marcellus  caused  great  annoyance  to  Hannibal's  allies  in  Apulia 
and  Lucania.  To  relieve  these,  Hannibal  attacked  Marcellus  and 
suffered  defeat  beneath  the  walls  of  Nola.  These  misfortunes 
obliged  Hannibal  to  evacuate  Campania  and  march  to  Arpi,  where 
he  might  in  person  put  a  stop  to  the  further  progress  of  the  Romans 
in  Apulia.     One  of  the  Roman  armies  followed  him,  leaving  the 


124.  ROME 

215-212    B.C. 

other  two  to  arrange  for  the  attack  on  Capua  in  the  coming 
spring. 

It  was  clear  to  Hannibal  that  the  offensive  was  no  longer  pos- 
sible, and  that  each  day  the  defensive  became  more  difficult.  The 
accomplishment  of  his  purpose  depended  on  the  strenuous  co- 
operation of  the  government  at  Carthage,  on  the  success  of  the 
Carthaginian  generals  in  Spain,  and  on  the  long-promised  aid  of 
Philip  of  Macedon.  But  the  peace  party  in  Carthage,  after  the 
first  impressions  of  the  victory  of  Cannae  had  died  away,  regained 
the  ascendency,  and,  with  the  exception  of  a  small  force  of  four 
thousand  Africans,  no  adequate  reinforcements  reached  Hannibal 
from  Carthage.  Had  he  been  able  to  bring  into  play  the  united 
forces  of  Carthage,  Spain,  Sicily,  and  Macedonia,  the  overthrow  of 
Rome  would  have  been  well-nigh  certain;  but  in  no  quarter  did 
matters  go  well  for  him.  The  activity  and  success  of  the  two 
Scipios  in  Spain  held  Hasdrubal  in  check.  The  assassination  of 
Hieronymus  at  the  close  of  the  same  year  left  the  state  of  Syracuse 
in  great  confusion,  though  the  city  still  held  true  to  the  Carthaginian 
alliance.  Marcellus  himself  was  sent  over  to  finish  the  war  in 
Sicily  in  214  B.C.  Owing  to  the  dread  of  Roman  vengeance  and 
the  passionate  enthusiasm  for  liberty  which  Hannibal's  emissaries 
had  excited  in  the  Syracusan  multitude,  Marcellus  was  obliged 
to  lay  siege  to  the  city,  and  after  eight  months  to  convert  the 
siege  into  a  blockade.  The  defense  of  Syracuse  was  notable 
alike  for  the  famous  ingenuity  of  the  great  engineer,  Archi- 
medes, and  for  the  efforts  made  by  Carthage  in  its  behalf,  but 
neither  availed  against  Roman  pertinacity.  In  212  B.C.  Syracuse 
surrendered  and  was  completely  sacked  by  the  soldiers  of  Marcellus, 
Archimedes  being  among  the, slain.  The  city  was  deprived  of  its 
freedom  and  was  classed  among  the  communities  that  paid  tribute 
to  Rome. 

All  Sicily  seemed  lost  to  the  Carthaginians,  whose  force  at 
Agrigentum,  under  Hanno  and  Epicydes,  dared  not  make  a  move 
against  the  triumphant  Romans.  But  Hannibal's  influence,  and  the 
ability  of  one  of  his  Libyan  cavalry  officers,  Mutines,  whom  Hanni- 
bal sent  from  Italy,  carried  on  a  guerrilla  warfare  throughout  the 
island  with  great  success.  Mutines,  at  the  head  of  the  Numidian 
cavalry,  even  succeeded  in  worsting  Marcellus  himself.  Jealousy, 
however,  arose  between  him  and  Hanno,  and  the  latter  deposed 
him  from  the  command  of  the  cavalry,  placing  his  own  son  in  the 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  125 

217-205  B.C. 

position.  Mutines  in  disgust  delivered  up  Agrigentum  to  the 
Romans  and  thus  put  an  end  to  the  war  in  Sicily,  which  henceforth 
remained  entirely  under  Roman  rule. 

Hannibal  might  with  good  reason  have  looked  for  more 
substantial  aid  from  Macedonia.  In  Greece  generally  there  was  a 
strong  outburst  of  national  patriotism;  internal  discord  had  been 
healed  and  peace  established  in  217  b.c.  between  Philip  and  the 
Aetolian  league.  But  in  Greece,  as  in  Carthage,  a  national  leader 
was  wanting  to  give  effect  to  the  national  ardor  of  the  moment. 
After  a  futile  attempt  to  take  Apollonia  in  216  b.c,  and  after  con- 
stantly threatening  but  never  daring  to  carry  out  his  promised 
descent  on  the  east  coast  of  Italy,  Philip  made  a  useless  attack  on 
the  Roman  possessions  in  Epirus  in  214  b.c.  The  energetic  action 
of  the  Romans,  who  crossed  over  from  Brundisium  and  stormed  his 
camp,  cowed  him  back  into  inaction.  Nor  was  he  roused  out  of  this 
inertness  until  a  coalition,  headed  by  the  Aetolians,  and  joined  by 
the  old  Greek  enemies  of  Macedonia,  and  supported  by  Rome, 
forced  him  to  bestir  himself.  In  the  long  and  dreary  war  that 
followed  he  repelled  the  attacks  of  his  foes  with  vigor  and  success, 
but  Hannibal  soon  ceased  to  look  eastward  for  aid.  Worn  out  by 
useless  conflicts,  at  last  Philip  made  peace  with  the  Aetolians  in 
205  b.cv  and  then  with  Rome:  a  peace  favorable,  indeed,  to 
Philip,  in  so  far  as  it  left  matters  in  much  the  same  position  as  they 
were  at  the  beginning  of  the  war ;  but  disastrous  to  him  and  to  the 
Greek  nation  as  a  whole,  since  by  it  the  grand  and  just  combination 
which  Hannibal  had  projected,  and  all  Greece  had  for  a  moment 
joined,  was  shattered  irretrievably. 

In  Spain  the  struggle  was  sharpest,  and  was  marked  by  the 
vicissitudes  incidental  to  the  character  of  the  country  and  habits 
of  the  people.  Neither  Rome  nor  Carthage  had  brought  into  Spain 
a  force  sufficiently  powerful  to  terminate  the  contest ;  therefore  both 
sides  had  to  have  recourse  to  native  help ;  but  the  natives  regarded 
neither  side  with  ardent  partisanship,  and  they  were  never  to  be 
depended  upon  for  persistent  and  united  action.  For  a  time,  in- 
deed, the  two  Roman  generals,  Publius  and  Gnaeus  Scipio,  were 
brilliantly  successful;  but  in  211  B.C.  Hasdrubal,  brother  of  Hanni- 
bal, after  suppressing  the  revolt  of  Syphax  in  Africa,  which  had 
been  stimulated  by  the  Romans,  crossed  back  into  Spain  and  an- 
nihilated the  army  of  the  two  Scipios,  who  lost  their  lives  in  the 
fatal  battle. 


126  ROME 

211-209    B.C. 

In  the  following  year  Rome  was  enabled,  by  the  fall  of  Capua, 
to  dispatch  a  force  of  12,000  men,  under  the  pro-pretor  Gaius  Clau- 
dius Nero,  to  check  the  Carthaginian  advance  in  Spain.  Nero  was 
not  unsuccessful  on  the  field,  but  his  strategic  ability  was  more 
than  counterbalanced  by  his  harshness  and  inability  to  deal  with  the 
natives.  The  senate,  aware  of  the  great  exertions  which  were 
being  made  in  Carthage  to  send  Hasdrubal  and  his  brilliant  African 
ally,  Massinissa,  with  a  powerful  army  across  the  Pyrenees  to  Italy, 
resolved  to  send  an  extraordinary  general  with  a  numerous  force 
to  Spain.  His  nomination,  if  we  may  credit  the  story,  was  left 
to  the  people.  At  first  no  one  in  Rome  offered  himself  as  a  candi- 
date ;  but  at  last  Publius  Scipio,  son  of  the  Publius  Scipio  who  had 
fallen  in  Spain,  although  not  properly  qualified  for  the  office,  came 
forward.  The  youth,  personal  beauty,  enthusiasm,  military  dis- 
tinction gained  on  the  fields  of  Trebia  and  Cannae,  and  political 
eminence  of  Publius  Scipio  were  of  themselves  calculated  to 
deeply  impress  the  people  of  Rome;  the  thought  that  a  youth 
of  twenty-seven,  who  had  merely  held  the  offices  of  edile  and 
military  tribune,  was  thus  suddenly  raised  to  the  highest  and 
proudest  office  in  the  state  at  a  time  of  great  peril,  and  was  going 
forth  to  avenge  a  father's  death,  rendered  that  impression  indeli- 
ble, and  has  colored  the  story  with  romantic  details.  Although 
lacking  the  energy,  iron  will,  and  statesmanlike  grasp  of  such 
men  as  Caesar  and  Alexander,  Publius  Scipio  was  eminently  cal- 
culated to  inspire  others  with  his  own  enthusiasm.  His  personal 
qualities,  both  of  appearance  and  manner;  his  graceful  oratory; 
his  happy  union  of  Hellenic  culture  and  Roman  patriotism;  above 
all,  his  intense  belief  in  himself  as  one  specially  favored  by  the 
gods,  served  to  cast  a  romantic  glamour  round  his  name,  and  to 
kindle  in  men's  hearts  a  fervent  belief  that  a  true  prophet  and 
divinely  inspired  saviour  had  arisen  to  give  victory  and  peace  to 
his  country. 

On  being  elected  general,  Scipio  proceeded  to  Spain  in  210  B.C., 
accompanied  the  pro-pretor  Marcus  Silanus,  and  by  his  friend 
Gaius  Laelius  as  admiral,  with  a  strong  force  and  well-filled  chest. 
He  at  once  successfully  executed  one  of  the  boldest  coups-de-main 
known  in  history.  All  the  three  Carthaginian  generals  were  at 
least  ten  days'  march  from  Nova  Carthago.  Suddenly,  early  in  the 
spring  of  209  B.C.,  Scipio  appeared  before  the  weakly  garrisoned 
town  with  his  whole  army  and  fleet.     By  engaging  the  attention  of 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  127 

209-206   B.C. 

the  garrison  with  an  attack  from  the  land  side,  Scipio  had  no 
difficulty  in  scaling  the  undefended  walls  from  the  harbor  side, 
where  at  ebb-tide  a  land  passage  was  left  open  to  his  troops.  The 
capture  of  the  Carthaginian  capital,  apart  from  the  immense  stores 
thus  thrown  into  the  conqueror's  hands,  completely  restored  Roman 
prestige  in  Spain.  Scipio's  command  was  indefinitely  prolonged, 
and  not  only  were  the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees,  and  all  the  country 
north  of  the  Ebro,  secured,  but  incursions  were  successfully*  made 
into  Andalusia.  Rendered  over-confident  by  success,  Scipio  ex- 
tended his  operations  over  too  large  an  area,  and,  when  in  Anda- 
lusia, he  encountered  Hasdrubal  Barca  at  Baecula,  in  208  B.C.,  on 
his  march  northward  to  his  brother's  aid.  Scipio  claimed  the  vic- 
tory, but  Hasdrubal  attained  his  object,  and  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Pyrenees,  and  taking  up  his  quarters  in  Gaul  for  the  winter. 
The  two  following  years  fresh  armies  were  sent  from  Carthage,  but 
Scipio  defeated  them,  and  in  206  B.C.  Spain  became  a  Roman  prov- 
ince. Scipio  resigned  his  command  in  that  year  and  returned  to 
Rome,  while  fyTago  the  Carthaginian  commander,  collecting  what 
ships  and  troops  he  could,  set  sail  for  northern  Italy. 

Meanwhile  the  great  conflict  in  Italy  had  been  continued  with- 
out interruption,  but  it  would  be  tedious  to  follow  in  detail  the 
course  of  military  events  from  the  battle  of  Cannae  to  that  of  the 
Metaurus.  At  no  time  did  the  genius  of  Hannibal  display  itself 
to  greater  advantage  than  in  this  period  when,  deprived  of  all  out- 
side help,  he  supported  himself  in  Italy  against  the  whole  power  of 
Rome.  Little  by  little,  however,  he  was  driven  into  the  southern 
portion  of  the  peninsula;  Capua  was  taken  by  the  Romans  and 
cruelly  punished  for  its  defection,  and,  though  some  of  the  Greek 
cities  opened  their  gates,  Hannibal  could  only  play  a  waiting  game 
and  expect  the  promised  succor  from  his  brother  in  Spain. 

The  material  distress  of  Rome  was  terrible:  the  exchequer 
was  utterly  impoverished,  the  lands  lay  fallow,  and  starvation  was 
only  averted  by  corn-supplies  from  Egypt ;  the  pay  of  the  soldiers 
was  greatly  in  arrear,  and  the  country  villages,  no  longer  smiling 
homes  of  farmers,  were  nests  of  beggars  and  brigands.  Still 
more  ominous  was  the  fact  that  the  allies  of  Rome  began  to  weary 
of  the  struggle,  and  even  Latium  to  waver  in  her  allegiance.  In 
209  b.c.  many  of  the  Latin  communities  announced  that  henceforth 
they  would  neither  send  contingents,  or  contributions,  and  that 
Rome  must  carry  on  the  struggle  single-handed.   Fortunately  the  col- 


128  ROME 

208-207   B.C. 

onies  in  Gaul,  Picenum,  and  southern  Italy,  with  Fregellae  at  their 
head,  refused  to  adopt  so  short-sighted  a  policy,  but  Arretium  gave 
dangerous  signs  that  the  Etruscans  were  preparing  to  rise  once 
more  in  aid  of  Hannibal. 

In  the  midst  of  all  these  difficulties  and  signs  of  coming 
trouble,  the  news  arrived  that  Hasdrubal  had  crossed  the  Pyrenees 
in  the  autumn  of  208  B.C.,  and  that  Rome  would  have  to  face,  next 
year,  both  sons  of  Hamilcar  in  Italy.  Thus,  at  last,  it  seemed  as  if 
Hannibal  was  destined  to  reap  the  reward  of  his  long  and  patient 
waiting.  Rome  once  more  called  out  twenty-three  legions.  Has- 
drubal, however,  was  too  quick  for  them,  and  ere  the  Romans 
could  occupy  the  outlets  of  the  Alpine  passes,  news  came  that  he 
had  reached  the  Po,  that  the  Gauls  were  flocking  to  his  standard, 
and  that  Placentia  was  invested.  Marcus  Livius  hastened  to  the 
northern  army :  while  his  colleague  Gaius  Nero,  with  the  aid  of  the 
force  at  Venusia  under  Gaius  Hostilius  Tubulus,  obstructed  the 
advance  of  Hannibal.  The  latter  marched  from  the  Bruttian  terri- 
tory and  fought  an  indecisive  engagement  with  Nero  at  Grumen- 
tum;  he  succeeded,  however,  in  his  object,  and  by  a  flank  march 
reached  Apulia,  and  encamped  at  Canusium.  Nero  followed,  and 
took  up  his  position  opposite  to  him. 

While  the  two  armies  remained  idly  facing  one  another,  Nero 
had  the  good  fortune  to  intercept  the  all-important  dispatch  from 
Hasdrubal,  acquainting  Hannibal  with  his  intention  to  meet  him 
at  Narnia.  Nero  thereupon  made  his  bold  and  famous  march  with 
a  picked  force  of  seven  thousand  men,  and  joined  Marcus  Livius 
in  the  north  at  Sena  Gallica:  he  left  behind  him  the  bulk  of  his 
army  strongly  entrenched  against  attack,  and,  what  was  more  im- 
portant, he  left  Hannibal  unconscious  of  his  departure  and  ignorant 
of  Hasdrubal's  intention.  The  two  consuls  at  once  marched 
against  Hasdrubal,  and  found  him  crossing  the  Metaurus.  Has- 
drubal tried  to  avoid  a  battle,  but,  being  deserted  by  his  guides, 
made  the  best  provision  for  the  inevitable.  A  flank  attack  by  Nero 
decided  the  hotly  contested  day.  Hasdrubal  scorned  to  survive  the 
disaster,  and  his  army  was  destroyed. 

The  defeat  and  death  of  Hasdrubal,  in  207  B.C.,  solved  the 
mighty  question  of  the  triumph  or  humiliation  of  Rome.  After 
fourteen  days'  absence  Nero  again  reached  his  old  station  at  Canu- 
sium, and  confronted  the  unconscious  Hannibal  in  Apulia.  With 
him,  in  ghastly  fashion,  he  brought  the  news  of  Hasdrubal's  defeat, 


H     o. 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  129 

205-204  R.C. 

and  the  overthrow  of  all  Hannibal's  plans  and  hopes.  Hannibal 
retired  to  the  Bruttian  territory;  while  Rome,  overjoyed  at  the 
relief  from  the  terrible  strain  of  past  years,  and  conscious  that  the 
peril  was  over,  resumed  business  and  even  pleasure  as  in  time  of 
peace,  and  made  no  great  effort  to  finish  the  war.  Thenceforth 
the  struggle  languished  in  Italy,  nor  could  all  the  superior  force  of 
his  opponents  compel  Hannibal  to  shut  himself  up  in  fortresses  or 
to  leave  Italian  soil. 

We  have  now  reached  the  final  scene  of  this  great  contest. 
Publius  Scipio,  who  had  returned  from  Spain  in  the  previous  year, 
was  chosen  consul  in  205  B.C.  His  popularity  with  the  multitude 
made  him  no  favorite  with  the  senate,  whose  members  viewed  with 
suspicion  his  Greek  refinement  and  modern  culture,  and  not  un- 
justly criticised  his  leniency  and  indulgence  towards  his  officers  and 
his  conduct  of  the  war  in  Spain.  Moreover,  the  senate  was  averse 
to  an  expedition  into  Africa  as  long  as  Hannibal  was  in  Italy, 
and  was  specially  disinclined  to  intrust  it  to  Scipio,  who  had  shown 
too  clearly  a  tendency  to  slight  the  constitutional  authority  of  the 
senate  and  to  rely  on  his  fame  and  popularity  with  the  masses.  At 
last,  however,  Scipio  was  intrusted  with  the  task  of  building  a  fleet 
in  Sicily,  and  raising  an  army,  of  which  the  two  legions  in  Sicily 
formed  the  nucleus.  The  fleet  was  ready  in  forty  days,  and  seven 
thousand  volunteers  responded  to  the  call  of  their  beloved  com- 
mander. 

In  the  spring  of  204  B.C.  Scipio  set  sail  with  30,000  men,  40 
ships  of  war,  and  400  transports,  and  landed  unopposed  at  the  Fair 
Promontory  near  Utica.  He  was  at  once  joined  by  his  old  foe 
Massinissa,  who  had  been  driven  from  his  kingdom  by  the  com- 
bined armies  of  Carthage  and  Syphax.  The  latter  had  embraced 
the  side  of  Carthage,  and,  as  a  reward,  had  caused  Carthage  to 
renounce  her  old  ally  Massinissa.  The  arrival  of  Syphax  with  a 
powerful  army,  and  his  junction  with  the  Carthaginian  force  sta- 
tioned to  oppose  Scipio,  caused  the  Roman  general  to  abandon  the 
siege  of  Utica,  and  to  entrench  himself  for  the  winter  on  a  promon- 
tory between  Utica  and  Carthage.  Fortune,  however,  never  failed  to 
smile  on  Scipio,  and,  under  cover  of  proposals  for  peace,  Scipio  suc- 
ceeded in  surprising  both  camps  on  the  same  night,  and  in  utterly 
routing  the  two  armies.  Reinforcements  at  this  moment  arrived, 
consisting  of  a  Macedonian  corps  under  Sopater,  and  of  Celtiberian 
mercenaries.      The  Carthaginians,  thus  strengthened,  resolved  to 


130  ROME 

204-202    B.C. 

venture  on  a  pitched  battle  in  the  "  Great  Plains,"  five  days'  march 
from  Utica.  Scipio  was  completely  successful,  and  Syphax  fell 
into  his  hands. 

The  peace  party  at  Carthage  now  tried  to  reverse  the  Barcid 
policy,  and  sued  for  peace.  The  terms  proposed  by  Scipio  were  so 
moderate  that  the  peace  faction  were  for  accepting  them  at  once. 
But  the  patriotic  party  had  not  lost  hope,  and  during  the  negotia- 
tions recalled  Hannibal  and  Mago  from  Italy.  The  latter,  however, 
after  striving  for  three  years  to  form  a  coalition  in  northern  Italy 
against  Rome,  had  just  been  defeated  near  Milan,  and  during  his 
voyage  home  died  of  a  wound  received  in  that  battle.  Hannibal 
at  once  embarked  at  Croton,  and,  after  an  absence  of  thirty-six 
years,  returned  once  more  to  his  native  land  in  203  B.C.  The 
Roman  citizens  breathed  freely  when  the  mighty  Libyan  lion, 
whose  departure  no  one  even  now  ventured  to  compel,  thus  volun- 
tarily turned  his  back  on  Italian  ground.  To  mark  the  occasion,  a 
grass  wreath,  the  highest  distinction  possible  in  the  Roman  state, 
was  presented  to  the  veteran  Quintus  Fabius,  then  nearly  ninety, — 
his  last  honor,  for  in  the  same  year  he  passed  away. 

Hannibal's  arrival  in  Africa  ignited  the  torch  of  war  once 
more.  The  people  of  Carthage  refused  to  ratify  the  peace  prac- 
tically concluded,  and  the  seizure  of  a  ship  of  war  with  Roman 
envoys  on  board  broke  the  armistice.  Scipio,  in  just  wrath, 
ravaged  the  valley  of  the  Bagradas,  and  penetrated  the  interior, 
when  his  course  was  arrested  by  Hannibal.  After  fruitless  nego- 
tiations both  armies  prepared  for  a  decisive  battle  at  Zama,  in  202 
b.c.  By  a  skillful  disposition  Scipio  managed  that  the  elephants 
of  the  enemy  should  pass  through  his  lines  without  breaking  them : 
fcfrcing  their  way  to  the  side,  these  unwieldly  creatures  threw  the 
cavalry  of  Hannibal  into  disorder,  and  the  far  more  numerous 
horse  of  Massinissa  easily  scattered  the  Carthaginian  squadrons. 
The  infantry  battle  was  most  bloody  and  severe:  nor  did  the 
veterans  of  Hannibal  ever  flinch  until  the  cavalry  of  Massinissa, 
returning  from  pursuit,  surrounded  them  on  all  sides.  The  Phoe- 
nician army  was  annihilated  and  Cannae  avenged.  Hannibal  with 
a  few  men  escaped  to  Hadrumetum. 

Peace  was  now  inevitable  if  Carthage  was  to  be  saved  from 
destruction.  The  terms  proposed  by  Scipio,  and  subsequently 
ratified  by  the  senate,  were :  the  cession  of  the  Spanish  possessions 
and  the  islands  of  the  Mediterranean ;  the  transference  of  the  king- 


SECOND     PUNIC     WAR  131 

202-201   B.C. 

dom  of  Syphax  to  Massinissa ;  the  surrender  of  all  ships  of  war 
except  twenty,  and  an  annual  contribution  of  two  hundred  talents 
($240,000)  for  the  next  fifty  years;  an  engagement  not  to  make 
war  against  Rome  or  her  allies,  and  not  to  wage  war  in  Africa 
beyond  the  Carthaginian  boundaries  without  the  permission  of 
Rome.  The  practical  effect  of  these  terms  was  to  render  Car- 
thage tributary  and  to  deprive  her  of  her  political  independence.  The 
terms  of  this  peace  have  often  been  considered  too  light,  and  they 
served  as  a  handle  to  the  charge  that  Scipio,  in  his  eagerness  to 
secure  for  himself  the  glory  of  finishing  the  war,  forgot  what  was 
due  to  Rome.  A  true  estimate  of  the  peace  and  of  its  effect  on  the 
future  position  of  Carthage  inclines  rather  to  the  view  that  these 
terms  were  the  outcome  of  the  nobleness  of  the  two  greatest  men  of 
the  age,  and  a  recognition  on  the  part  of  Scipio  of  the  crime  of 
blotting  out  one  of  the  main  props  of  civilization  merely  to  gratify 
the  petty  ferocity  of  his  fellow-countrymen.  The  noble-mindedness 
and  statesmanlike  gifts  of  the  great  antagonists  are  no  less  apparent 
in  the  magnanimous  submission  of  Hannibal  to  what  was  inevita- 
ble than  in  the  wise  abstinence  of  Scipio  from  an  extravagant  and 
insulting  use  of  victory. 

It  remains  for  us  to  sum  up  the  results  of  this  terrible  war, 
which  for  seventeen  years  had  devastated  the  lands  and  islands 
from  the  Hellespont  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules.  Rome  was  hence- 
forth compelled  by  the  force  of  circumstances  to  assume  a  position 
at  which  she  had  not  directly  aimed,  and  to  exercise  sovereignty 
over  all  the  lands  of  the  Mediterranean.  Outside  Italy  there  arose 
the  two  new  provinces  in  Spain,  where  the  natives  lived  in  a  state 
of  perpetual  insurrection;  the  kingdom  of  Syracuse  was  now  in- 
cluded in  the  Roman  province  of  Sicily:  a  Roman  instead  of  a 
Carthaginian  protectorate  was  now  established  over  the  most  im- 
portant Numidian  chiefs:  Carthage  was  changed  from  a  powerful 
commercial  state  into  a  defenseless  mercantile  town.  Thus  all  the 
western  Mediterranean  passed  under  the  supremacy  of  Rome.  In 
Italy  itself,  the  destruction  of  the  Celts  became  a  mere  question  of 
time:  the  ruling  Latin  people  had  been  exalted  by  the  struggle  to 
a  position  of  still  greater  eminence  over  the  heads  of  the  non-Latin 
or  Latinized  Italians,  such  as  the  Etruscans  and  Sabellians  in  lower 
Italy.  A  terrible  punishment  was  inflicted  on  the  allies  of  Hanni- 
bal. Capua  was  reduced  from  the  position  of  second  city  to  that 
of  first  village  in  Italy:   the  whole  soil,  with  a  few  exceptions,  was 


132  ROME 

218-202  B.C. 

declared  to  be  public  domain-land,  and  was  leased  out  to  small 
occupiers.  The  same  fate  befell  the  Picentes  on  the  Silarus.  The 
Bruttians  became  in  a  manner  bondsmen  to  the  Romans,  and  were 
forbidden  to  carry  arms.  All  the  Greek  cities  which  had  sup- 
ported Hannibal  were  treated  with  great  severity:  and  in  the  case 
of  a  number  of  Apulian,  Lucanian,  and  Samnite  communities  a 
loss  of  territory  was  inflicted,  and  new  colonies  were  planted. 
Throughout  Italy  the  non-Latin  allies  were  made  to  feel  their  utter 
subjection  to  Rome,  and  the  comedies  of  the  period  testify  to  the 
scorn  of  the  victorious  Romans. 

It  seems  probable  that  not  less  than  three  hundred  thousand 
Italians  perished  in  this  war,  the  brunt  of  which  loss  fell  chiefly  on 
Rome.  After  the  battle  of  Cannae  it  was  found  necessary  to  fill 
up  the  hideous  gap  in  the  senate  by  an  extraordinary  nomination 
of  177  senators:  the  ordinary  burgesses  suffered  hardly  less  se- 
verely. Further,  the  terrible  strain  on  the  resources  of  the  state 
had  shaken  the  national  economy  to  its  very  foundations.  Four 
hundred  flourishing  townships  had  been  utterly  ruined.  The  blows 
inflicted  on  the  simple  morality  of  the  citizens  and  farmers  by  a 
camp-life  worked  no  less  mischief.  Gangs  of  robbers  and  desper- 
adoes plundered  Italy  in  dangerous  numbers.  Home  agriculture 
saw  its  existence  endangered  by  the  proof,  first  given  in  this  war, 
that  the  Roman  people  could  be  supported  by  foreign  grain  from 
Sicily  and  Egypt.  Still,  at  the  close  and  happy  issue  of  so  terrible 
a  struggle,  Rome  might  justly  point  with  pride  to  the  past  and  with 
confidence  to  the  future.  In  spite  of  many  errors  she  had  sur- 
vived all  danger,  and  the  only  question  now  was  whether  she  would 
have  the  wisdom  to  make  a  right  use  of  her  victory,  to  bind  still 
more  closely  to  herself  the  Latin  people,  to  gradually  Latinize  all 
her  Italian  subjects,  and  to  rule  her  foreign  dependents  as  subjects, 
not  as  slaves, — 'whether  she  would  reform  her  constitution  and 
infuse  new  vigor  into  the  unsound  and  fast-decaying  portion  of 
her  state. 


Chapter    XIV 

A   REVIEW   OF   THE   WEST   AND   EAST.    201-194  B.C. 

THE  war  with  Hannibal  had  interrupted  Rome  in  the  ex- 
tension of  her  dominion  to  the  Alpine  boundary  of  Italy; 
that  task  was  now  resumed.  The  Celts,  aware  of  the 
coming  vengeance,  had  again  taken  up  arms  in  201  B.C.  The 
insurrection  spread  far  and  wide,  and  Celtic  and  Ligurian  bands 
sacked  Placentia  and  invested  Cremona  in  the  following  year.  A 
great  battle  before  the  latter  city  ended  in  their  overthrow, 
but  the  struggle  continued  until  193  B.C.  before  these  people 
were  finally  subdued.  The  Romans  intended  that  the  Transpa- 
dane  Celts  should  serve  as  a  bulwark  against  the  incursions  of 
northern  tribes.  It  seems  that  the  Celtic  nationality  in  these 
districts  rapidly  became  submerged  in  the  all-absorbing  spread  of 
Latin  influence.  The  terror  of  the  Roman  name  penetrated  even 
beyond  the  Alps,  and  by  the  founding  of  Aquileia,  about  183  B.C., 
the  Romans  showed  their  determination  to  close  the  gates  of  the 
Alps  forever  against  the  northern  nation.  New  means  of  commu- 
nication were  opened  up  by  the  extension  of  the  Flaminian  road, 
under  the  name  of  the  Aemilian,  from  Ariminum  to  Placentia,  and 
by  the  reconstruction  of  the  Cassian  Way  from  Rome  to  Arretium. 
The  result  was  that  the  Po,  and  not  the  Apennines,  now  divided 
Celtic  from  Italian  land,  and  that  south  of  the  Po  the  old  name  of 
Ager  Celticus,  applied  to  the  district  between  the  Po  and  the  Apen- 
nines, ceased  to  have  any  meaning. 

The  same  policy  was  pursued  with  the  Ligurian  tribes  occu- 
pying the  hills  and  valleys  in  the  northwestern  highlands  of  Italy. 
Some  were  extirpated,  others  transplanted,  and  the  mountainous 
country  between  the  valley  of  the  Po  and  the  Arno  was  practically 
cleared.  The  fortress  of  Luna  was  established  in  177  B.C.,  to  act  as 
a  bulwark  against  the  Ligurians,  and  as  a  port  for  ships  sailing  to 
Massilia  or  Spain.  With  the  more  western  Ligurian  tribes  in  the 
Genoese  Apennines  and  the  Maritime  Alps  conflicts  were  incessant, 
but  no  permanent  results  were  effected.      Wars,  too,  of  a  similar 

133 


13i  ROME 

201-194    B.C. 

character  were  waged  in  Corsica  and  Sardinia,  where  the  natives 
in  the  interior  were  continually  hunted  down  by  Roman  troops. 

With  regard  to  Carthage,  Rome's  great  aim  was  to  keep  sus- 
pended over  her  head  the  fear  of  a  declaration  of  war.  Massinissa 
was  established  close  at  her  doors  as  a  most  powerful  Numidian 
chief,  and  Carthaginian  territory  was  constantly  exposed  to  the 
spoliations  of  the  Libyan  and  Numidian  tribes,  who  exulted  in  thus 
retaliating  on  their  old  tormentors  for  their  former  sufferings. 
Carthage  bore  every  insult  with  true  Phoenician  patience.  Her 
embassies  and  complaints  to  Rome  had  no  effect,  save  that  of  mak- 
ing her  victor  more  resolved  in  this  short-sighted  policy  of  humilia- 
tion. One  man,  however,  still  remained  at  Carthage,  a  just  object 
of  dread  to  his  enemies.  Hannibal  had  already  overthrown  the 
rotten  oligarchy  and  instituted  the  most  beneficial  political  and 
financial  reforms.  By  checking  the  embezzlement  of  the  public 
moneys  it  was  soon  found  that  the  tribute  to  Rome  could  be  paid 
without  extraordinary  taxation.  Hannibal  was  doubtless  reorgan- 
izing Carthage  to  be  ready  for  the  complications  which  he  saw  must 
arise  for  Rome  in  the  East.  We  cannot  wonder  that  the  Romans 
at  last  insisted  on  the  surrender  of  Hannibal,  in  195  B.C.,  which 
demand  he  anticipated  by  a  speedy  flight  to  the  East,  and  thus  left 
to  his  ancestral  city  merely  the  lesser  disgrace  of  banishing  its  great- 
est citizen  forever  from  his  native  land,  of  confiscating  his  property, 
and  of  razing  his  house.  The  profound  saying,  that  those  are  the 
favorites  of  the  gods  on  whom  they  lavish  infinite  joys  and  infinite 
sorrows,  thus  verified  itself  in  full  measure  in  the  case  of  Hannibal. 
Even  after  his  withdrawal,  Rome,  still  not  content,  adopted  a  course 
of  perpetual  irritation  against  Carthage.  Jealous  of  her  financial 
prosperity,  which  remained  unshaken  by  the  loss  of  political  power, 
Rome  was  ever  the  credulous  receptacle  of  every  rumor  of  Cartha- 
ginian perfidy  and  intrigue. 

Unwilling  to  have  any  possessions  of  her  own  in  Africa,  Rome 
established  the  great  Berber  chief  Massinissa  in  his  new  Numidian 
kingdom.  This  remarkable  man  was  in  every  way  fitted  for  the 
post.  Thoroughly  conversant  with  Carthage,  in  which  city  he  had 
been  educated,  and  with  whose  armies  he  had  fought  both  as  friend 
and  foe,  fired  with  bitter  hatred  of  the  Carthaginian  oppressor,  both 
as  a  native  African  and  as  a  prince  personally  wronged,  gifted  with 
a  physique  which  knew  no  fatigue,  and  with  a  nature  that  recked 
not  of  scruple  or  honor,  Massinissa  became  the  soul  of  his  nation's 


WESTANDEAST  135 

201-194    B.C. 

revival ;  and,  during  ninety  years  of  unimpaired  life  and  sixty  years 
of  vigorous  reign,  was  completely  successful  in  consolidating  the 
vast  kingdom  of  which  he  was  the  founder.  By  the  addition  of 
the  kingdom  of  Syphax,  who  died  in  captivity  in  Rome,  and  by 
occupying  the  old  Sidonian  city  of  Great  Leptis  and  other  districts, 
Massinissa  held  rule  from  the  Mauretanian  to  the  Cyrenaean  fron- 
tier, and  enclosed  the  Carthaginian  territory  on  all  sides ;  indeed,  he 
fixed  his  eyes  on  Carthage  as  his  future  capital.  Under  his  ex- 
ample the  Berber  became  converted  from  a  nomad  shepherd  into  a 
farmer  and  settled  citizen;  the  Numidian  hordes  of  plunderers  be- 
came trained  soldiers,  worthy  to  fight  by  the  side  of  Roman  legions ; 
Cirta,  his  capital,  became  the  seat  of  Phoenician  civilization,  which 
the  king  carefully  fostered,  with  a  view,  perhaps,  to  the  future  ex- 
tension of  his  power  over  Carthage.  Thus  the  Libyan  language, 
nationality,  and  manners,  after  so  many  years  of  degradation,  re- 
asserted their  position,  and  made  themselves  felt  even  in  the  old 
Phoenician  cities. 

In  Spain  the  Greek  and  Phoenician  towns  along  the  coast  at 
once  submitted  to  the  Romans,  and  were  absorbed  in  their  civiliza- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  the  natives,  especially  in  the  west  and 
north  and  in  the  interior,  were  a  perpetual  thorn  in  the  side  of  the 
Romans,  nor  was  it  even  safe  for  a  Roman  governor  to  travel  with- 
out a  strong  escort.  Bound  together  by  all-powerful  laws  of 
chivalry,  proud  of  their  military  honor,  fired  with  a  love  of  war 
and  change,  the  barbaric  Spaniards  were  utterly  devoid  of  political 
instinct,  and  could  neither  submit  to  military  discipline  nor  political 
combination.  Thus  in  Spain  there  was  no  serious  war  nor  real 
peace. 

The  Romans  divided  the  peninsula  into  two  provinces,  and 
while  the  governor  of  Hither  Spain,  the  modern  Arragon  and  Cat- 
alonia, was  ever  occupied  with  quelling  Celtiberian  revolts,  his  col- 
league in  Further  Spain,  which  comprised  the  modern  Andalusia, 
Granada,  Murcia,  and  Valencia,  was  similarly  busy  in  attempts  to 
hold  in  check  the  Lusitanians.  Necessity  thus  compelled  the  Ro- 
mans to  adopt  a  new  policy — to  maintain  a  standing  army  of 
four  legions  in  the  country ;  hence  it  was  in  Spain  that  the  military 
occupation  of  the  land  on  a  large  scale  first  became  continuous,  and 
that  the  military  service  first  acquired  a  permanent  character.  The 
obvious  danger  of  withdrawing  or  even  changing  every  year  a  large 
portion  of  the  forces  in  so  remote  and  turbulent  a  country  forced  the 


136  ROME 

201-194  B.C. 

Romans  to  adopt  this  course.  Thus  service  in  Spain  became  very 
odious  to  the  Roman  people,  who  now  learned  that  dominion  over  a 
foreign  nation  is  a  burden  not  only  to  the  slave,  but  also  to  the 
master.  Reality  was  first  given  to  the  Roman  rule  in  the  penin- 
sula by  the  valor  of  Quintus  Fulvius  Flaccus  in  181  B.C.;  and 
two  years  later,  his  successor,  Tiberius  Gracchus,  achieved  results 
of  a  permanent  character,  not  merely  by  force  of  arms,  but  by  his 
adroit  comprehension  of  the  Spanish  character.  By  inducing 
Celtiberians  to  serve  in  the  Roman  army,  by  settling  free-booting 
tribes  in  towns,  by  wise  and  equitable  treaties,  Gracchus  made  the 
Roman  name  not  only  feared  but  liked,  and  his  own  memory  was 
ever  held  dear  by  the  natives. 

The  Spanish  provinces  were  governed  on  principles  similar  to 
those  which  were  observed  in  Sicily  and  Sardinia ;  but  the  Romans 
proceeded  with  great  caution,  and  often  conceded  considerable 
privileges  to  Spanish  towns,  such  as  the  right  of  coining  their  own 
money.  The  old  Carthaginian  imposts  of  fixed  money  payments 
and  other  contributions  were  retained,  instead  of  the  tithes  and 
customs  paid  by  Sicilian  and  Sardinian  communities.  The  grave 
fault  of  changing  the  pretors  every  year  was  still  committed, 
and  that  in  spite  of  the  Baebian  law,  which  in  192  B.C.  pro- 
longed the  command  of  Spanish  governors  for  two  years.  On  the 
whole,  Spain,  notwithstanding  its  mines  both  of  iron  and  silver, 
was  a  burden  rather  than  a  gain  to  the  Roman  state ;  but  probably 
the  chief  reason  for  its  retention  as  a  province  was  the  fear  that, 
if  left  unoccupied,  it  might  serve  another  foe  as  it  had  served 
Hannibal,  and  act  as  a  basis  of  operations  against  the  sovereignty 
of  Rome. 

We  must  now  turn  our  eyes  eastward,  and  see  how  those  com- 
plications arose  which  involved  Rome  in  the  Macedonian  and 
Asiatic  wars.  Macedonia,  alone  of  all  the  Greek  states,  had  pre- 
served that  national  vigor  which  made  the  Greek  race  so  famous  in 
earlier  days.  Philip  V.  ruled  not  only  over  Macedonia  proper,  but 
over  all  Thessaly,  Euboea,  Locris,  Phocis,  and  Doris,  and  held 
many  isolated  and  important  positions  in  Attica  and  the  Pelopon- 
nese,  of  which  the  chief  were  Demetrias  in  Magnesia,  Chalcis  in 
Euboea,  and  Corinth,  "  the  three  fetters  of  the  Hellenes."  His 
real  strength,  however,  lay  in  his  hereditary  kingdom  of  Macedonia 
proper.  It  is  true  that  this  land  was  very  sparsely  populated,  but 
the  national  character  of  its  loyal  and  courageous  people,  never 


WEST     AND     EAST  137 

320-194   B.C. 

shaken  in  their  fidelity  to  their  native  land  and  hereditary  form  of 
government,  places  the  Macedonians  almost  on  a  level  with  the 
Romans  themselves;  in  particular,  the  regeneration  of  the  state 
after  the  storm  of  Celtic  invasion  in  278  b.c.  was  as  honorable  as 
it  was  marvelous. 

The  huge  unwieldy  empire  of  Asia,  pretending  to  stretch  from 
the  Hellespont  to  the  Punjab,  was  in  reality  an  aggregate  of  states 
in  different  stages  of  dependence,  or  rather  a  conglomeration  of 
insubordinate  satrapies  and  half-free  Greek  cities.  Along  the 
coast  the  Great  King  vainly  endeavored  to  expel  the  Egyptians ;  on 
the  eastern  frontier  he  was  perpetually  harassed  by  Parthians  and 
Bactrians ;  while  in  Asia  Minor  the  Celtic  hordes  had  settled  on  the 
north  coast  and  the  eastern  interior,  and  on  the  west  the  Greek 
cities  were  constantly  trying  to  assert  and  make  good  their  inde- 
pendence. Indeed,  in  Asia  Minor  the  king's  authority  was  little 
more  than  nominal  except  in  Cilicia,  Phrygia,  and  Lydia,  for  the 
powerful  kingdom  of  Pergamus  embraced  a  large  portion  of  the 
west,  and  a  number  of  cities  and  native  princes  practically  owned 
no  lord.  Egypt,  on  the  other  hand,  presented  a  marked  contrast  to 
the  loose  organization  of  Asia.  Under  the  prudent  Lagidae,  Egypt . 
had  been  welded  into  a  firmly  united  and  compact  state,  incapable 
of  revolt  or  disruption  under  the  worst  misrule.  The  objects  of  the 
Ptolemies'  policy  were  not,  like  the  Macedonian  or  Persian,  vague 
dreams  of  universal  empire,  but  definite  and  capable  of  realiza- 
tion. The  whole  traffic  between  India  and  the  Mediterranean  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  rulers  of  Egypt,  and  owing  to  their  excellent 
geographical  position,  whether  for  defense  or  attack,  the  Egyptians 
established  themselves  not  only  in  Cyrene,  but  in  Cyprus  and  the 
Cyclades,  on  the  Phoenician  and  Syrian  coast,  on  the  whole  of  the 
south  and  west  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  and  even  in  the  Thracian  Cher- 
sonese. The  finances  of  Egypt  were  most  flourishing,  and  Alex- 
andria, the  seat  of  the  Ptolemies,  attracted  all  the  learning,  whether 
scientific  or  literary,  of  the  time.  The  mutual  relation  of  these 
three  great  Eastern  powers  was  naturally  one  of  antagonism  and 
rivalry;  but  Egypt,  as  a  maritime  power,  and  the  protectress  of  the 
Asiatic  Greek  towns  and  minor  states,  was  the  foe  of  both  Mace- 
donia and  Asia,  while  the  two  latter  powers,  though  rivals,  were 
ready  to  combine  against  Egypt,  their  common  enemy. 

In  addition  to  the  various  states  of  the  second  rank  in  Asia 
Minor,  such  as  Atropatene,  Armenia,   Cappadocia,   Pontus,   and 


138  ROME 

201-194    B.C. 

Bithynia,  there  were  three  powerful  Celtic  tribes  who  had  settled 
with  their  national  customs  and  constitution  in  the  interior.  From 
their  barbarous  strength  and  free-booting  habits  they  were  the  con- 
stant terror  of  the  more  degenerate  Asiatics.  It  was  due  to  his 
successful  opposition  to  these  hordes  that  Attalus  was  raised  from 
the  position  of  a  wealthy  citizen  to  that  of  king  of  Pergamus.  His 
court  was  a  miniature  Alexandria,  and,  as  the  patron  of  art  and 
science,  and  from  his  retention,  when  king,  of  his  simple  citizen 
character,  Attalus  may  not  inaptly  be  styled  the  Lorenzo  de'  Medici 
of  antiquity. 

In  Greece  proper  we  find  a  great  decay  of  national  energy. 
The  Aetolian  League,  whose  policy  was  alike  hostile  to  the  Achaean 
confederacy  and  to  Macedonia,  would  have  proved  of  far  more 
service  to  the  Greek  nation  had  not  its  members  pursued  a  system  of 
organized  robbery,  and  by  their  unfortunate  policy  prevented  any 
union  of  the  whole  Hellenic  race.  In  the  Peloponnese  the  Achaean 
League  had  knit  together  the  best  elements  of  Greece,  and  breathed 
new  life  and  true  patriotism  into  the  nobler  portion  of  the 
Hellenes.  But,  owing  to  the  selfish  diplomacy  of  Aratus  and  the 
foolish  invocation  of  Macedonian  interference  to  settle  its  disputes 
with  Sparta,  the  league  had  become  entirely  subject  to  Macedonian 
influence,  and  had  admitted  Macedonian  garrisons  into  its  chief 
fortresses.  Sparta  alone  of  the  other  Peloponnesian  states  showed 
any  vigor,  and  under  the  unscrupulous  Nabis  daily  increased  its 
strength.  The  commercial  prosperity  enjoyed  by  Byzantium,  the 
mistress  of  the  Bosporus,  and  by  Cyzicus,  on  the  Asiatic  side  of  the 
Propontis,  was  at  this  time  very  considerable;  but  they  were  both 
eclipsed  by  Rhodes,  which  had  secured  the  carrying  trade  of  all  the 
eastern  Mediterranean.  Aided  by  her  fleet  and  the  courageous 
temper  of  her  citizens,  Rhodes  was  the  champion  of  all  the  Greek 
maritime  cities,  and,  though  as  a  rule  pursuing  a  policy  of  neutrality 
and  of  friendly  relationship  with  the  neighboring  powers,  she  did 
not  shrink,  if  need  be,  from  adopting  sterner  measures.  The  Rho- 
dians  became  the  leaders  of  a  league  of  the  chief  Greek  cities  scat- 
tered along  the  coasts  and  islands  of  Asia  Minor  and  elsewhere, 
such  as  Sinope,  Lampsacus,  Halicarnassus,  Chios,  and  Smyrna. 
This  league  upheld  with  success  the  cause  of  freedom  against  the 
attacks  of  neighboring  tyrants,  and  securely  fostered  the  arts  of 
peace  and  the  old  Greek  spirit,  uncontaminated  by  the  tyranny  of  a 
dissolute  soldiery  or  the  corrupt  atmosphere  of  an  Eastern  court. 


WESTANDEAST  139 

215-201    B.C. 

Such,  then,  was  the  state  of  things  in  the  East  when  Philip 
of  Macedon  was  induced  to  break  down  the  wall  of  political  separa- 
tion, and  to  interfere  in  the  West.  The  miserable  incompetence  he 
had  shown  in  the  first  Macedonian  war,  215-205  B.C.,  and  the  con- 
temptible indolence  which  caused  him  to  utterly  disappoint  Hannibal 
at  a  critical  period,  have  been  already  pointed  out.  Now,  however, 
though  Philip  was  not  the  man  needed  at  this  juncture,  he  exhibited 
none  of  those  faults  which  had  marred  his  first  war  with  Rome. 
Philip  was  a  true  king  in  the  worst  and  best  sense  of  the  term.  In- 
flated with  arrogance  and  pride,  incapable  of  taking  advice  or 
brooking  opposition,  he  was  utterly  callous  to  the  lives  and  suffer- 
ings of  those  about  him ;  bound  by  no  sense  of  moral  tie  or  obliga- 
tion, the  slave  of  passion,  combining  in  singular  fashion  sagacity 
and  resolution  with  supineness  and  procrastination,  he  was  yet 
gifted  with  the  valor  of  a  soldier  and  the  eye  of  a  general;  jealous 
of  his  honor  as  a  Macedonian  king,  he  could  rise  to  a  spirited  and 
dignified  public  policy;  full  of  intelligence  and  wit,  he  won  the 
hearts  of  all  whom  he  wished  to  gain. 

At  the  present  moment  Philip  directed  his  attentions  to  Egypt. 
About  205  B.C.  he  had  formed  an  alliance  with  Antiochus  of  Asia 
to  break  up  the  Egyptian  state,  now  ruled  over  by  Ptolemy 
Epiphanes,  a  child  five  years  old,  and  to  divide  the  spoil.  In 
201  B.C.  Philip  had  begun  his  task  of  plunder,  and  crossing  to  Asia 
had  proceeded  to  make  war  upon  the  Greek  cities  on  the  coast. 
Chalcedon  saved  itself  by  submission,  but  Cius  and  Thasos  were 
stormed  and  sacked.  Rhodes,  at  the  head  of  her  league,  declared 
war  against  Philip;  she  was  joined  by  Byzantium  and  Attalus  of 
Pergamus.  Several  indecisive  battles  were  fought  at  sea;  towards 
the  close  of  the  year  Philip  withdrew  to  Macedonia,  where  his  pres- 
ence was  urgently  needed. 

At  this  point  the  Romans  thought  right  to  interfere.  They  could 
not  view  with  indifference  the  possible  extension  of  Philip's  power, 
the  conquest  of  Rhodes  and  Egypt,  the  fall  of  Cyrene,  and  the  future 
peril  of  all  the  Greek  cities,  whose  protectors  they  claimed  to  be, 
and  they  could  not  honorably  refuse  aid  to  Attalus  of  Pergamus, 
who  had  been  their  staunch  ally  since  the  first  Macedonian  war.  The 
policy  of  interference  in  the  East  was  not  actuated  by  greed  for 
further  conquest,  but  was  dictated  by  necessity;  it  redounds  to 
the  senate's  honor  that  it  resolved  to  prepare  for  war  with  Philip 
at  a  time  when  the  Roman  citizens  were  thoroughly  weary  of 


140  ROME 

200-197     B.C. 

and  exhausted  by  one  transmarine  war,  and  when  such  a  war  was 
sure  to  rouse  a  storm  of  popular  disapprobation. 

At  first,  indeed,  the  Romans  lacked  a  pretext  for  war.  Their 
ambassador,  sent  to  Abydus,  after  the  capture  of  that  city  by  Philip 
in  200  B.C.,  was  politely  reproved  by  the  Macedonian  king  for  at- 
tempting to  interfere  with  his  designs.  The  Athenians,  however, 
had  at  this  time  put  to  death  two  Acarnanians  who  strayed  into  their 
mysteries.  The  Acarnanians  at  once  invoked  Philip's  aid,  and  he 
proceeded  to  lay  waste  Attica.  Athens  applied  for  help  to  Rome, 
and  the  popular  assembly  was  at  length  induced  by  various  conces- 
sions to  ratify  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  senate,  in  200  B.C. 
These  concessions  were  chiefly  made  at  the  expense  of  the  allies, 
who  had  to  supply  the  garrison  service  in  Gaul,  Lower  Italy,  Sicily, 
and  Sardinia;  volunteers  alone,  as  was  alleged,  were  enrolled  for 
the  Macedonian  campaign.  Two  of  the  six  legions,  thus  called 
out,  embarked  at  Brundisium  under  the  leadership  of  the  consul 
Publius  Sulpicius  Galba. 

The  position  of  Philip  was  very  critical.  Antiochus  stood 
aloof;  Egypt,  despite  its  anxiety  to  keep  a  Roman  fleet  out  of 
Eastern  waters,  was  utterly  estranged  from  Philip  by  his  recent 
scheme  of  partition;  the  Rhodian  confederacy  of  Greek  cities  was 
also,  owing  to  recent  events,  a  pronounced  enemy ;  while  in  Greece 
itself  many  of  the  most  powerful  states  were  ready  to  welcome  the 
Romans  as  deliverers,  and  the  Acarnanians  and  Boeotians  alone 
remained  the  steadfast  allies  of  Macedonia.  The  Achaean  League, 
previously  estranged  by  the  murder  of  Aratus,  had,  under  the  able 
leadership  of  Philopoemen,  revived  its  military  power  and  freed 
itself  from  the  oppressive  influence  of  Macedonia.  Aware  of  the 
danger  to  Greece  of  invoking  Roman  aid,  this  league  attempted  in 
vain  to  mediate  between  Philip  and  Rhodes,  and  in  despair  remained 
neutral,  awaiting  the  coming  of  the  Roman  troops  with  undisguised 
but  inactive  dread.  Thus  Philip,  by  his  cruelty  and  arrogance,  had 
alienated  all  those  Eastern  powers  which  at  this  critical  hour  should 
have  proved  his  staunchest  allies  in  repelling  the  common  danger 
to  Greek  freedom  and  independence. 

The  Roman  army  under  Galba  effected  very  little,  and  the 
result  of  the  first  year  of  the  war  was  on  the  whole  favorable  to 
Philip.  A  second  campaign  conducted  by  a  far  abler  officer,  the 
Consul  Titus  Quintius  Flamininus,  was  more  successful,  and  the 
Achaean  League  went  over  to  the  Roman  side.  Finally,  in  197  B.C., 


WESTANDEAST  141 

197-195    B.C. 

Flamininus  succeeded  in  bringing  Philip  to  a  decisive  engagement 
in  the  district  of  Scotussa.  The  battle  takes  its  name  from  the  steep 
height  of  Cynoscephalae,  which,  lying  between  the  two  camps,  was 
the  scene  of  the  first  encounter  between  the  vanguards  of  both 
armies.  Owing  to  the  success  of  the  Macedonians  at  the  outset, 
Philip  was  encouraged  to  risk  a  battle  with  his  whole  force,  and, 
after  a  fierce  conflict,  in  which  the  phalanx  exhibited  its  ancient 
prowess,  Philip  was  utterly  defeated,  and  escaped  to  Larissa. 

At  this  defeat,  even  his  most  staunch  allies,  the  Acarnanians, 
submitted  to  Rome ;  resistance  was  no  longer  possible.  The  terms 
imposed  do  honor  to  the  Romans.  They  gave  no  ear  to  the  malig- 
nity of  the  Aetolians,  who  demanded  the  annihilation  of  the  Mace- 
donian kingdom;  for  they  clearly  saw  that  it  alone  could  serve  as 
a  bulwark  against  the  encroaching  Celts  and  Thracians.  A  com- 
mission of  ten  was  appointed,  at  the  head  of  which  was  Flamininus, 
to  settle  the  complicated  affairs  of  Greece.  The  result  of  their  de- 
liberations was  the  decision  that  Philip  should  give  up  all  his  pos- 
sessions in  Asia  Minor,  Thrace,  Greece,  and  the  islands  of  the 
Aegean;  that  he  should  pay  a  contribution  of  a  thousand  talents 
($1,220,000) ;  that  he  should  conclude  no  foreign  alliances  without 
Rome's  consent,  and  wage  no  foreign  wars;  that  he  should  enter 
into  the  Roman  alliance,  and  send  a  contingent  when  required; 
that  the  Macedonian  army  should  not  exceed  five  thousand  men, 
nor  its  fleet  five  decked  ships ;  that  the  territory  of  Macedonia  should 
remain  unimpaired,  with  the  exception  of  some  small  strips  and  of 
the  revolted  province  of  Orestis. 

With  regard  to  the  disposition  of  the  possessions  thus  ceded 
by  Philip,  Rome,  having  learned  by  experience  in  Spain  the  doubt- 
ful value  of  transmarine  provinces,  kept  none  of  the  spoil  for  her- 
self, and  decreed  freedom  to  the  Greek  states — a  freedom  rather  in 
name  than  deed,  when  we  consider  the  value  of  it  to  a  nation  devoid 
of  all  union  and  unity.  Athens  received  the  three  islands  of  Paros, 
Scyros,  and  Imbros,  as  a  reward  for  the  hardships  she  had  suffered 
and  for  the  many  courtesies  she  had  shown  to  Rome.  All  Philip's 
possessions  in  the  Peloponnese  and  on  the  Isthmus  were  ceded  to 
the  Achaean  League,  which  was  thus  practically  made  ruler  of  the 
Peloponnese:  but  scant  favor  was  accorded  to  the  boastful  and 
greedy  Aetolians,  who  incorporated  Phocis  and  Locris,  but  were 
not  suffered  to  extend  their  power  to  Acarnania  and  Thessaly. 

Nabis  of  Sparta  obstinately  refused  to  give  up  Argos  to  the 


142  ROME 

195-194   B.C. 

Achaean  League,  and  only  yielded  to  a  powerful  display  of  Roman 
arms;  and,  though  his  banditti  were  dispersed  and  Sparta  cap- 
tured, both  the  city  and  Nabis  himself  were  left  intact,  the  con- 
querors only  requiring  the  cession  of  his  foreign  possessions  and 
his  adherence  to  the  usual  stipulations  touching  the  right  of  waging 
war  and  of  forming  foreign  alliances. 

Peace  was  thus,  outwardly  at  any  rate,  established  among  the 
petty  Greek  states.  Flamininus  acted  with  great  fairness  and 
patience  throughout,  and  strove  as  far  as  possible  to  mete  out  jus- 
tice to  the  claims  of  each  Greek  state.  He  showed  an  especially 
wise  and  tolerant  moderation  in  his  punishment  of  the  rebellious 
Boeotians,  who,  in  their  eagerness  to  attach  themselves  again  to 
Macedonia,  did  not  refrain  from  putting  to  death  isolated  bands  of 
Roman  soldiers. 

In  194  b.c.  Flamininus,  after  holding  a  conference  of  all  the 
Greek  states  at  Corinth,  withdrew  his  troops  from  every  fortress 
and  departed  homeward,  thus  giving  the  lie  to  the  Aetolian  calumny 
that  Rome  had  inherited  from  Philip  "  the  fetters  "  of  Greece. 

We  cannot  doubt  the  nobleness  and  sincerity  of  the  Roman 
endeavor  to  set  Greece  free ;  the  reason  of  its  failure  was  the  com- 
plete demoralization  of  the  Greek  nation.  In  truth,  the  necessities 
of  the  case  demanded  the  permanent  presence  of  a  superior  power, 
not  the  pernicious  boon  of  a  fictitious  freedom;  the  feeble  policy 
of  sentiment,  with  all  its  apparent  humanity,  was  far  more  cruel 
than  the  sternest  occupation.  History  has  a  Nemesis  for  every  sin 
— for  an  impotent  craving  after  freedom,  as  well  as  for  an  injudi- 
cious generosity.  The  Nemesis  in  this  case  was  the  war  with 
Antiochus  of  Asia. 


Chapter    XV 

WAR  WITH   ANTIOCHUS  AND  THE   FINAL   CONQUEST 
OF   THE   EAST.     192-168  B.C. 

A  NTIOCHUS  had  long  fixed  his  eyes  upon  the  Syrian  coast, 
L\  which  had  been  wrested  from  Asia  by  the  Egyptians,  and 
X  JL  had  seized  the  occasion  of  Philopator's  death,  in  205  B.C., 
to  concert  measures  with  Philip  for  the  partition  of  the  kingdom 
of  the  Ptolemies.  But  he  lacked  the  foresight  to  make  common 
cause  with  Philip  in  repelling  Roman  interference,  and  had  taken 
advantage  of  the  second  Macedonian  war  to  secure  Egypt  for  him- 
self. At  first  he  attacked  the  Egyptian  possessions  in  Cilicia,  Syria, 
and  Palestine,  and  by  a  victory  gained  in  198  B.C.,  near  the  sources 
of  the  Jordan,  he  became  absolute  master  of  the  two  latter  countries. 
He  then  proceeded  with  a  strong  fleet  to  occupy  all  the  districts 
on  the  south  and  west  coasts  of  Asia  Minor,  which  had  formerly 
belonged  to  Egypt,  but  had  virtually  fallen  under  the  dominion  of 
Philip.  Rome  had,  however,  bidden  Philip  to  withdraw  from  these 
possessions,  and  to  leave  them  free  and  untouched,  and  now  An- 
tiochus  came  forward  to  take  Philip's  place  as  the  oppressor  of  the 
Greek  cities  and  free  kingdoms  in  those  lands. 

Already,  in  198  b.c,  Attalus  of  Pergamus  had  applied  to  Rome 
for  aid  against  Antiochus ;  and  in  the  following  year  the  Rhodians 
openly  protected  the  Carian  cities  of  Halicarnassus,  Caunus,  Myn- 
dus,  and  the  island  of  Samos  against  the  attacks  of  the  Great  King. 
Other  cities,  such  as  Smyrna  and  Lampsacus,  took  heart  to  resist 
Antiochus,  and  they,  one  and  all,  called  upon  Rome  to  give  effect 
to  her  promise  that  they  should  be  free,  and  to  prove  that  neither 
Macedonian  tyrant  nor  Asian  despot  should  be  suffered  to  endanger 
Greek  life  and  liberty.  Rome,  however,  was  slow  to  answer  such 
a  call ;  nor  did  she  resort  to  other  measures  than  those  of  diplomacy, 
when  Antiochus,  in  196  b.c,  landed  in  Europe  and  invaded  the 
Thracian  Chersonese,  and  took  active  measures  to  convert  Thrace 
into  a  dependent  satrapy  on  the  plea  that  he  was  merely  reassert- 
ing his  claim  to  the  land  conquered  by  his  ancestor  Seleucus. 

143 


144.  ROME 

192-190  B.C. 

The  delay  of  the  Romans  in  forcibly  opposing  Antiochus,  who 
plainly  showed  his  designs  not  only  on  Asia  Minor,  but  also  on 
Greece,  may  be  ascribed  partly  to  their  weariness  of  war,  but  chiefly 
to  the  vain  wish  of  Flamininus  to  pose  as  the  liberator  of  Greece 
and  the  extinguisher  of  the  war  in  the  East.  Flamininus  was  thus 
induced  to  withdraw  all  the  Roman  garrisons  from  Greece  in  194 
B.C.,  and  to  blind  the  Romans  to  the  fact  that  the  embers  of  war 
still  smoldered,  soon  to  be  rekindled  into  a  flame  by  his  own  vanity 
and  by  the  senate's  culpable  negligence. 

In  the  year  previous  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Roman  troops 
from  Greece,  Antiochus  had  accorded  an  honorable  reception  to  the 
exiled  Hannibal,  which  in  itself  was  tantamount  to  a  declaration 
of  war ;  but  Flamininus  refused  to  regard  it  as  such,  and  contented 
himself  with  addressing  mere  verbal  remonstrances  and  demands 
to  Antiochus.  The  latter  did  not  fail  to  profit  by  the  respite  unex- 
pectedly granted  him  by  the  Roman  evacuation  of  Greece.  He 
made  alliances  with  all  the  states  of  Asia  Minor  and  Greece  that 
would  listen  to  his  proposals,  and  events  soon  reached  such  a  pass 
that  a  rupture  between  the  two  nations  became  inevitable.  After 
some  fruitless  discussion  at  Ephesus  between  the  envoys  of  Rome 
and  the  Great  King,  war  was  declared  in  192  B.C. 

The  attitude  of  Philip  of  Macedon,  of  Eumenes,  of  the  Achaean 
League,  Rhodes,  and  Egypt,  who  all  sided  with  Rome,  showed  at 
once  how  futile  would  be  the  attempts  of  Antiochus  in  Europe. 
Notwithstanding  this  he  crossed  the  Aegean  and  anticipated  his 
enemies  by  occupying  Euboea  and  part  of  Thessaly.  On  the  ap- 
proach of  the  Roman  army  he  retired  to  Thermopylae,  but,  being 
defeated  there,  was  forced  to  withdraw  from  Europe  altogether. 
Some  time  was  now  occupied  by  the  Romans  in  a  naval  warfare 
for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the  Aegean  Sea  of  the  enemy's  ships 
and  opening  the  way  to  an  invasion  of  Asia.  The  conduct  of  the 
war  on  land  had  been  intrusted  to  Scipio  Africanus,  conqueror  of 
Zama.  In  190  B.C.  he  crossed  the  Hellespont  and  met  the  army  of 
the  Great  King  near  Magnesia,  at  the  foot  of  Mount  Sipylus,  not  far 
from  Smyrna.  The  cumbrous  masses  of  the  Asiatic  troops  proved 
their  own  destruction:  the  flower  of  their  army,  drawn  up  in 
Macedonian  phalanx,  was  foiled  in  its  efforts  to  reach  the  Roman 
legions  by  the  confusion  of  their  own  light  troops,  and  by  the 
absence  of  the  heavy  cavalry  under  Antiochus,  which  had  rushed 
off  in  pursuit  of  a  small  Roman  squadron.    At  last  the  phalanx  was 


PUBLICS  CORNELIUS   SCIPIO   AFRICANUS 

(Horn   234   b.  c.     Died    183   b.  c.) 

Bronze  bust  in   the  National  Museum  at  Wiples 


CONQUEST     OF     THE     EAST  145 

190-187  B.C. 

broken  up  by  its  own  elephants,  and  the  whole  army  scattered  in 
utter  rout. 

The  losses  of  Antiochus  have  been  estimated  at  fifty  thousand, 
those  of  the  Romans  at  three  hundred  foot  soldiers  and  twenty-four 
horsemen.  Peace  was  concluded  on  the  terms  proposed  by  Scipio 
before  the  battle,  by  which  Antiochus  was  condemned  to  pay  all 
the  costs  of  the  war  and  to  surrender  the  whole  of  Asia  Minor.  An- 
tiochus himself  was  soon  after,  in  187  B.C.,  slain,  while  plundering 
a  temple  of  Bel  in  Elymais,  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  With 
the  day  of  Magnesia,  Asia  was  erased  from  the  list  of  great  states ; 
and  never  perhaps  did  a  great  power  fall  so  rapidly,  so  thoroughly, 
and  so  ignominiously  as  the  kingdom  of  the  Seleucidae  under  this 
Antiochus  the  Great. 

The  final  settlement  of  Asia  was  determined  by  a  commission 
presided  over  by  Volso.  The  sum  to  be  paid  by  Antiochus  was 
fixed  at  fifteen  thousand  Euboic  talents  ($18,000,000)  ;  all  posses- 
sion in  Europe,  and  all  the  country  in  Asia  Minor  west  of  the  river 
Halys  and  the  mountain  chain  of  the  Taurus,  were  now  ceded  by 
the  Great  King;  lastly,  certain  restrictions  were  imposed  upon  his 
rights  of  waging  war  and  of  navigating  the  sea.  Even  beyond 
the  boundaries  of  the  Roman  protectorate,  Ariarathes,  king  of 
Cappadocia,  though  mulcted  in  a  light  fine  for  his  alliance  with 
Antiochus,  retained  his  kingdom  and  was  practically  independent 
of  Antiochus;  moreover,  the  two  satrapies  of  Armenia  now  rose 
under  Roman  influence  into  independent  kingdoms.  Prusias,  king 
of  Bithynia,  was  allowed  to  keep  his  possessions  intact;  nor  were 
the  Celts  ousted  from  their  territory,  though  bound  to  refrain  in 
the  future  from  sending  out  armed  bands  and  levying  blackmail 
from  the  Asiatic  Greeks.  The  Greek  cities,  which  were  free  and 
had  joined  the  Romans,  were  confirmed  in  their  ancient  freedom 
and  exempted  from  tribute  to  the  various  dynasts  of  Asia 
Minor;  this  exemption  was  not,  however,  extended  to  those 
which  paid  tribute  to  Eumenes.  Rhodes  obtained  Lycia  and  the 
greater  part  of  Caria  as  a  reward  for  her  zealous  assistance. 
But  the  largest  share  of  the  spoil  fell  to  the  king  of  Pergamus. 
Eumenes  received  the  Thracian  Chersonese  and  the  greater  part 
of  Asia  Minor  west  of  the  Halys,  the  protectorate  over  and  right 
of  receiving  tribute  from  such  Greek  cities  as  were  not  made  abso- 
lutely free,  and  a  contribution  of  nearly  five  hundred  talents  from 
Antiochus.    Thus  he  was  nobly  recompensed  for  his  sufferings  and 


146  ROME 

188-183   B.C. 

devotion  to  the  Roman  cause,  and  thus  the  kingdom  of  the  Attalids 
became  in  Asia  what  Numidia  was  in  Africa — a  powerful  state 
dependent  on  Rome,  capable  of  acting  as  a  check  upon  Macedonia 
and  Syria  without  needing  Roman  support.  Rome  thus  adhered 
strictly  to  its  policy  of  acquiring  no  transmarine  possessions,  and  in 
1 88  B.C.  the  fleet  and  land  army  evacuated  Asia. 

The  war  with  Antiochus  had  naturally  agitated  the  ever  quar- 
relsome and  excitable  states  in  European  Greece.  The  Aetolians, 
who  had  tried  to  rekindle  the  flame  of  war  by  attacks  on  Philip 
of  Macedon,  were  soon  compelled  to  utter  submission  by  the  com- 
bined arms  of  the  Roman  consul,  Marcus  Fulvius  Nobilior,  and  the 
Macedonians  and  Achaeans.  The  possessions  taken  from  the 
Aetolians  were  divided  among  the  allies  of  Rome,  who  reserved  for 
herself  nothing  but  the  two  islands  of  Cephallenia  and  Zacynthus. 
Neither  Philip  nor  the  Achaeans  were  satisfied  with  their  share  of 
the  spoil.  The  last-named  were  foolish  enough  to  attempt  to  display 
their  independence  of  Rome,  and  with  a  quasi-patriotic  zeal  to  de- 
sire an  extension  of  their  power;  though  indignant  at  the  advice 
of  Flamininus  to  content  themselves  with  the  Peloponnese,  and  at 
the  refusal  of  Rome  to  enlarge  the  territory  of  their  league,  they 
proved  their  incapacity  to  govern  what  they  already  possessed  by 
constant  quarrels  with  Sparta  and  Messene.  The  senate,  after  vain 
attempts  to  arbitrate,  at  last  grew  weary  of  these  petty  disputes, 
and  left  the  Achaeans  and  the  Greek  states  generally  to  settle  such 
trifles  among  themselves. 

After  the  defeat  of  Antiochus,  Hannibal  had  taken  refuge 
with  Prusias,  the  king  of  Bithynia,  and  had  successfully  aided  him 
in  his  wars  with  Eumenes.  Now  he,  the  only  being  on  earth  who 
was  still  a  source  of  terror  to  Rome,  was  hunted  down  by  his  old 
enemies  in  a  way  unworthy  of  so  great  a  nation,  and  compelled  to 
take  poison,  dying  in  183  B.C.,  at  the  age  of  sixty-seven. 

About  the  same  time  died  his  great  rival  and  lucky  victor, 
Publius  Scipio.  The  favorite  of  fortune,  he  had  added  to  the 
empire  of  Rome,  Spain,  Africa,  and  Asia;  and  yet  he,  too,  like 
Hannibal,  spent  his  last  years  in  bitter  trouble  and  disappointment, 
a  voluntary  exile  from  the  city  of  his  fathers,  for  which  he  had  spent 
his  life,  but  in  which  he  had  forbidden  his  own  remains  to  be  buried. 
We  do  not  exactly  know  what  drove  him  from  Rome.  The  charges 
of  peculation  brought  against  him  and  his  brother  Lucius  were  no 
doubt  empty  calumnies,  but  his  arrogance  and  proud  belief  that  he 


HANNIBAL 

(Born    247    b.  r.      Died    183    B.  C.) 
Nation, 1I  Museum,   Naples 


CONQUEST     OF     THE     EAST  147 

185-179    B.C. 

was  not  as  other  men  had  doubtless  raised  many  enemies,  while 
his  own  wish  to  sacrifice  everything  to  the  promotion  of  his  own 
family  caused  general  distrust  of  his  political  aims.  It  is,  more- 
over, the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  such  natures  as  that  of 
Scipio — strange  mixtures  of  genuine  gold  and  glittering  tinsel — 
that  they  need  the  good  fortune  and  the  brilliance  of  youth  in  order 
to  exercise  their  charm,  and,  when  this  charm  begins  to  fade,  it  is 
the  charmer  himself  that  is  most  painfully  conscious  of  the  change. 
Thus  ended  this  Asiatic  war.  A  significant  indication  of  the 
feeble  and  loose  organization  of  the  kingdom  of  the  Seleucidae  is 
the  fact  that  it,  alone  of  all  the  great  states  conquered  by  Rome, 
never  after  the  first  conquest  made  a  second  appeal  to  arms.  But 
Rome  had  not  yet  done  with  her  troubles  in  the  East ;  and  her  un- 
just treatment  of  Philip  of  Macedon  in  return  for  his  staunch  sup- 
port during  the  war  with  Antiochus  soon  caused  another  outbreak 
in  that  quarter.  All  the  states  in  Greece  now  seized  the  opportunity 
of  damaging  their  ancient  oppressor,  and  of  reviving  the  anti- 
Macedonian  feeling  by  constant  complaints  to  the  Roman  senate; 
but  the  irritation  and  annoyance  thus  caused  to  Philip  was  as  noth- 
ing compared  with  the  indignation  he  felt  at  the  extension  of 
the  kingdom  of  Eumenes.  The  Attalids  had  ever  been  the  bit- 
terest foes  of  Macedonia,  and,  now  that  their  power  was  revived 
and  increased  under  the  protecting  arm  of  Rome,  Philip's  thirst 
for  revenge  went  beyond  all  limits  of  prudence.  On  hearing  of 
some  fresh  invectives  which  had  been  launched  against  him  in  the 
Thessalian  assemblies  he  replied  with  the  line  of  Theocritus: 
"  What !  thinkest  thou  that  all  my  suns  are  set  ?  "  a  reply  which 
showed  that  he  had  determined  once  more  to  put  all  to  the  hazard. 
In  these  later  days,  however,  Philip  displayed  a  caution  and  an 
earnest  perseverance  in  his  preparations  which  at  an  earlier  date 
might  have  changed  the  world's  history.  He  even  curbed  his  proud 
temper  so  as  to  p:*.cend  complete  submission  to  Rome,  and  delayed 
the  breaking  out  of  war  by  the  agency  of  his  son  Demetrius,  who 
during  his  residence  as  a  hostage  at  Rome  had  won  great  popularity 
with  the  leading  Romans.  Perseus,  the  eldest  son,  fearing  that 
Philip  would  disinherit  him  in  favor  of  Demetrius,  persuaded  his 
father  to  put  the  latter  to  death,  on  the  false  charge  that  he  was 
intriguing  with  Rome  against  Macedonia.  Philip  learned  too  late 
the  plot  of  the  fratricide,  but  died  himself,  in  179  B.C.,  before  he 
could  punish  the  crime. 


148  ROME 

179-172    B.C. 

Thus  Perseus  succeeded  to  the  throne,  a  man  remarkable  for  his 
personal  prowess  and  steady  perseverance,  and  incapable  of  being 
turned  aside,  as  his  father  had  been,  by  the  vicious  allurements  of 
pleasure.  He  entered  on  all  his  father's  schemes  with  resolute  de- 
termination, and  to  the  outward  eye  of.his  countrymen  he  seemed  the 
man  needed  for  the  great  work  of  liberation  from  the  yoke  of  Rome. 
But  he  lacked  the  genius  and  elasticity  of  Philip.  He  could  devise 
plans  and  persevere  in  his  preparations  for  their  execution,  but 
when  the  time  came  for  action  he  was  frightened  at  his  own  handi- 
work. As  is  the  case  with  all  narrow  minds,  the  means  became  to 
him  the  end;  when  imminent  peril  demanded  the  use  of  the  treas- 
ures which  he  had  amassed  for  the  war  with  Rome,  Perseus  could 
not  find  the  heart  to  part  with  his  golden  pieces. 

The  wise  measures  of  Philip,  in  founding  towns,  encouraging 
marriage,  and  in  developing  the  finances  of  his  country  during 
twenty  years  of  peace,  had  rendered  the  power  of  Macedonia  at 
least  twice  as  strong  as  it  had  been  at  the  outbreak  of  the  second 
Macedonian  war.  Perseus  now  possessed  an  army  of  thirty  thou- 
sand troops,  independent  of  auxiliaries,  a  treasury  capable  of  pay- 
ing both  this  army  and  ten  thousand  mercenaries  for  ten  years,  and, 
above  all,  a  devoted  and  loyal  people.  The  attempts,  however,  to 
raise  a  coalition  against  Rome,  and  thus  carry  out  the  schemes  of 
Hannibal,  failed.  In  Greece  it  is  true  that  the  sentiments  of  every 
state  were  gradually  veering  round  to  the  side  of  Perseus,  whose 
name  was  not  stained,  as  that  of  his  father  had  been,  by  atrocious 
and  bloodthirsty  deeds.  Every  Greek  now  saw  the  true  meaning 
of  the  freedom  granted  by  Rome,  and  that  the  restoration  of  Hel- 
lenic nationality  by  a  foreign  power  involved  a  contradiction  in 
terms.  The  efforts  of  Eumenes,  who  tried  by  gifts  and  favors  to 
conciliate  the  Greeks  in  Asia  Minor,  and  to  reconcile  them  to  the 
arrangements  made  by  Rome,  were  received  with  every  sign  of 
scorn  and  contempt. 

But  the  support  from  the  Greek  cities  and  states,  whether  of 
Greece  proper  or  Asia  Minor,  was  but  a  broken  reed  whereon  to 
lean.  More  important  was  the  success  which  attended  the  efforts 
of  Perseus  to  stir  up  the  barbarian  tribes  living  near  the  Danube 
and  in  Illyria,  and  the  close  alliance  he  formed  with  the  brave 
Cotys,  ruler  of  the  Odrysians  and  of  all  eastern  Thrace.  By  public 
proclamation  he  gained  over  to  his  side  all  the  Greeks  who,  owing 
to  political  and  other  offenses,  and  still  more  owing  to  debt,  had 


EUMENES    II,    KING    OF    PERGAMOS,    APPEALING    To    THE 
FOR   HELP  AGAINST  THE  RISEN   GREEKS 
Painting    by    Christopher   Grieptinkerl 


human    SENATE 


CONQUEST     OF     THE     EAST  149 

172-168    B.C. 

been  exiled.  From  these  and  other  causes  the  whole  of  Greece  was 
once  more  in  a  state  of  ferment.  Rome  saw  that  she  could  delay- 
no  longer;  and  the  advent  of  Eumenes  in  person,  with  a  long  list 
of  grievances  and  a  true  account  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  Greece, 
caused  the  senate  to  resolve  on  war  in  the  autumn  of  172  b.c. 

Perseus,  instead  of  acting  at  once  and  occupying  Greece  by 
the  aid  of  the  Macedonian  party  in  each  state,  frittered  away  his 
time  in  discussions  with  Quintus  Marcius  Philippus,  whose  aim  was 
to  cause  Perseus  to  delay  active  operation  until  the  Roman  legions 
arrived.  This  foolish  delay  on  the  part  of  Perseus  ruined  his  chance 
of  support  from  the  Greek  states  and  confederacies.  The  Aetolian 
League  chose  Lyciscus  as  its  new  strategus,  a  thorough  partisan  of 
Rome ;  and  the  Boeotian  confederacy  suddenly  collapsed  completely 
on  the  complaint  of  a  Roman  envoy  touching  two  of  their  cities, 
Haliartus  and  Coronea,  which  had  entered  into  engagements  with 
Perseus. 

In  June,  171  B.C.,  the  Roman  legions  landed,  and  Perseus, 
owing  to  his  utter  remissness,  found  himself  alone.  Fortunately 
for  him,  the  Roman  consul,  Publius  Licinius  Crassus,  was  grossly 
incompetent,  and,  had  Perseus  followed  up  his  first  success,  gained 
near  Larissa,  by  assuming  the  offensive,  no  doubt  all  Greece  would 
have  at  once  followed  the  example  of  the  Epirots  and  revolted. 
Crassus  signalized  his  shameful  command  by  forcing  the  small 
Boeotian  town  of  Coronea  to  capitulate,  and  by  selling  its  inhabit- 
ants into  slavery.  His  successor,  Aulus  Hostilius,  was  equally  un- 
successful, and  was  twice  easily  repulsed  in  attempting  to  enter 
Macedonia ;  while  his  colleague,  Appius  Claudius,  commanding  the 
western  army,  met  with  nothing  but  reverses.  Moreover,  the 
Roman  name,  hitherto  distinguished  in  the  East  by  the  honorable 
probity  of  its  political  transactions,  was  now  stained  by  treacherous 
and  underhand  dealing  with  various  Greek  states.  Two  campaigns 
had  served  to  show  the  completely  demoralized  and  disorganized 
condition  of  the  Roman  army,  which  was  only  saved  from  destruc- 
tion by  the  inability  of  Perseus  to  change  his  plan  of  defensive  war- 
fare to  one  of  a  vigorous  offensive. 

A  third  campaign  was  scarcely  more  successful,  but  in  168 
b.c.  a  very  different  Roman  general  appeared  on  the  scene,  in  the 
person  of  Lucius  Aemilius  Paulus,  son  of  the  consul  who  fell  at 
Cannae — a  man  full  of  vigor  despite  his  sixty  years,  and  utterly 
incorruptible.    He  soon  turned  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  forced 


150  ROME 

168    B.C. 

them  to  retreat  to  Pydna.  Here  the  decisive  battle  was  fought, 
and  the  Macedonian  phalanx,  after  dispersing  the  Roman  vanguard 
and  endangering  the  whole  army,  lost  its  formation  on  the  uneven 
ground,  and  was  cut  down  to  a  man ;  twenty  thousand  Macedonians 
fell,  and  eleven  thousand  were  made  prisoners.  Perseus  fled  with 
his  cavalry  and  treasure  to  Samothrace,  and  soon  after  surrendered, 
weeping,  to  the  Romans ;  he  died  a  few  years  later,  at  Alba  on  the 
Fucine  Lake. 

Thus  perished  the  empire  of  Alexander  the  Great,  144  years 
after  his  death.  Macedonia  was  henceforth  abolished,  and  the  united 
kingdom  was  broken  up  into  four  republican  leagues,  which  paid 
to  Rome  half  the  former  land-tax;  right  of  intermarriage  between 
the  members  of  different  leagues  was  forbidden,  and  every  measure 
was  taken  to  prevent  a  revival  of  the  ancient  monarchy.  The  Ro- 
mans gained  their  object,  and  from  that  day  to  this  Macedonia  has 
possessed  no  history. 

Illyria,  whose  king  Genthius  was  taken  prisoner,  and  whose 
capital  Scodra  was  captured  by  the  pretor  Lucius  Anicius,  was 
treated  in  the  same  way  as  Macedonia  had  been.  It  was  split  up 
into  three  free  states ;  its  piratical  fleet  was  confiscated,  and  an  end 
was  thus  put  to  the  depredations  of  Illyrian  corsairs. 

In  the  treatment  of  the  rest  of  the  Greek  world,  Rome  now 
discarded  the  sentimental  policy  of  Flamininus,  and  determined  to 
reduce  all  Greek  states  to  the  same  humble  level  of  dependence.  It 
was  clear  that  with  the  abolition  of  Macedonia  the  kingdom  of 
Pergamus,  as  exercising  a  check  on  that  power,  ceased  to  be  a  neces- 
sity. The  Romans  therefore  proceeded  to  circulate  strange,  though 
utterly  unfounded,  reports  as  to  the  loyalty  of  Eumenes;  they  at- 
tempted to  set  his  brother  Attalus  against  him  by  granting  Attalus 
favors  and  inciting  him  to  establish  a  rival  throne;  they  declared 
Pamphylia  independent,  and,  when  the  Galatians  overran  Pergamus, 
they,  after  a  pretense  of  mediation,  declared  them  independent  also. 
Eumenes  set  sail  for  Italy  to  remonstrate ;  but  the  senate  suddenly 
decreed  that  no  kings  in  future  were  to  come  to  Rome,  and  sent 
a  questor  to  meet  Eumenes  at  Brundisium.  Eumenes,  taking  the 
hint,  declared  that  he  was  satisfied,  and  returned  home;  he  clearly 
saw  that  all  equality  of  alliance  was  at  an  end,  and  that  the  time  of 
impotent  subjection  to  Rome  had  now  come  for  himself  as  for  all 
other  free  states. 

The  high-spirited  Rhodians  were  the  next  to  suffer.  Deluded 
by  the  consul  Quintus  Marcius,  who  had  pretended  to  wish  for  their 


CONQUEST     OF     THE     EAST  151 

168  B.C. 

mediation  in  the  war  with  Perseus,  they  just  before  the  battle  of 
Pydna  sent  envoys  to  the  Roman  camp  and  the  Roman  senate, 
saying  that  the  Macedonian  war  was  injurious  to  their  commercial 
interests,  and  that  they  would  declare  war  against  the  side  which 
refused  at  once  to  make  peace.  This  miserable  republican  vanity 
soon  changed  to  humble  entreaty,  when  the  Romans,  after  the  battle 
of  Pydna,  threatened  the  Rhodians  with  war.  The  senate,  glad  of 
an  excuse  to  humiliate  the  haughty  merchant  city,  deprived  Rhodes 
of  all  her  possessions  on  the  mainland,  and,  by  the  erection  of  a  free 
port  at  Delos,  so  damaged  Rhodian  commerce  that  the  yearly  re- 
ceipts from  customs  sank  at  once  from  $205,000  to  $30,000. 

In  Greece  itself  severe  measures  were  taken.  Seventy  towns 
in  Epirus  were  plundered,  and  the  inhabitants,  to  the  number  of 
1 50,000,  were  sold  into  slavery.  Trials  for  high  treason  took  place 
in  all  parts  of  Greece,  owing  to  the  existence  of  a  Macedonian  party 
in  every  city.  A  very  large  number  of  suspects  from  Achaia, 
Aetolia,  Acarnania,  and  Lesbos  were  deported  to  Italy,  partly,  per- 
haps, to  escape  the  bloodthirsty  zeal  of  such  men  as  the  Aetolian 
strategus  Lyciscus. 

An  opportunity  had,  moreover,  been  given  Rome  to  interfere 
once  more  in  the  East.  During  the  third  Macedonian  war  Antio- 
chus  Epiphanes,  king  of  Asia,  or,  as  it  was  now  called,  Syria, 
seized  the  occasion  to  carry  out  the  traditional  policy  of  the  Seleu- 
cidae  and  to  conquer  Egypt.  When  he  was  on  the  eve  of  success, 
and  was  lying  encamped  before  Alexandria,  a  Roman  envoy  arrived 
shortly  after  the  battle  of  Pydna,  and  drawing  a  circle  round  the 
king,  warned  him  at  once  to  restore  all  that  he  had  conquered  and 
to  evacuate  Egypt.  With  this  warning  Antiochus  was  forced  to 
comply;  and  Egypt  at  once  submitted  to  the  Roman  protectorate. 

Every  state  in  the  world  now  did  homage  to  Rome,  and  the 
most  obsequious  flattery  met  the  ears  of  the  Roman  senate.  Nor 
was  the  moment  ill-chosen;  from  the  battle  of  Pydna  Polybius 
dates  the  full  establishment  of  Rome's  universal  empire.  All  subse- 
quent struggles  were  rebellions,  or  wars  with  nations  beyond  the 
pale  of  Graeco-Roman  civilization.  The  whole  civilized  world 
recognized  in  the  Roman  senate  the  supreme  tribunal  for  kings  and 
nations ;  to  acquire  its  language  and  manners  foreign  princes  and 
noble  youths  resided  in  Rome.  Only  once  was  a  real  attempt  made 
to  get  rid  of  Roman  dominion — by  Mithradates,  king  of  Pontus. 

The  battle  of  Pydna  marks  the  last  occasion  on  which  the  senate 
still  adhered  to  the  state  maxim  that  Rome  should,  if  possible,  hold 


152  ROME 

168    B.C. 

no  possessions  and  maintain  no  garrisons  beyond  the  Italian  seas, 
but  should  keep  in  check  the  numerous  dependent  states  by  a  mere 
political  supremacy.  The  treatment  of  Macedonia  and  other  states 
after  the  battle  of  Pydna  shows  that  Rome  had  at  last  recognized 
the  impracticable  nature  of  this  protectorate;  the  necessity  of  her 
constant  intervention  had  proved  to  Rome  that  the  effort  to  preserve 
vanquished  states,  even  at  the  cost  of  faithful  allies,  was  a  failure. 
Signs  were  now  forthcoming  that  by  gradual  steps  these  client- 
states  would  be  reduced  to  the  position  of  subjects.  When  we 
review  the  extension  of  Rome's  power  from  the  conquest  of  Sicily 
to  the  battle  of  Pydna,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  universal  empire 
of  Rome  was  a  result  forced  upon  the  Roman  government,  without, 
and  even  in  opposition  to  its  wish — certainly  it  was  not  a  gigantic 
plan  contrived  and  carried  out  by  a  thirst  for  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment. All  that  the  Roman  government  wished  for  was  the  sover- 
eignty of  Italy;  and  they  earnestly  opposed  the  extension  of  this 
sovereignty  to  Africa,  Greece,  and  Asia,  from  the  sound  view  that 
they  ought  not  to  suffer  the  kernel  of  their  empire  to  be  crushed 
by  the  shell.  Their  blind  hatred  of  Carthage  led  them  into  the  error 
of  retaining  Spain,  and  of  assuming  in  some  measure  the  guardian- 
ship of  Africa;  their  still  blinder  enthusiasm  for  Greek  freedom 
made  them  commit  the  equal  blunder  of  conferring  liberty  every- 
where on  the  Greeks. 

The  policy  of  Rome  was  not  projected  by  a  single  mighty 
intellect  and  bequeathed  by  tradition  from  generation  to  generation ; 
it  was  the  policy  of  a  very  able  but  somewhat  narrow-minded  de- 
liberative assembly,  which  had  far  too  little  power  of  grand  combina- 
tion, and  far  too  much  of  an  instinctive  desire  for  the  preservation 
of  its  own  commonwealth,  to  devise  projects  in  the  spirit  of  a  Caesar 
or  a  Napoleon.  The  universal  empire  of  Rome  was,  in  fact,  based 
on  the  political  development  of  antiquity  in  general.  In  the  ancient 
world  balance  of  power  was  unknown,  and  every  nation's  aim  was 
to  subdue  his  neighbor  or  to  render  him  harmless.  Though  we  may 
sentimentally  mourn  the  extinction  of  so  many  richly  gifted  and 
highly  developed  nations  by  the  supremacy  of  Rome,  we  must  bear 
in  mind  that  that  supremacy  was  not  due  to  a  mere  superiority  of 
arms,  but  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  international  relations 
of  antiquity  generally ;  and  therefore  the  issue  was  not  one  of  mere 
chance,  but  the  fulfillment  of  an  unchangeable  and  therefore  endur- 
able destiny. 


Chapter  XVI 

THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  GOVERNED 

AMID  the  din  of  arms  and  constant  succession  of  victories, 
L\  it  is  difficult  to  trace  the  secret  and  silent  growth  of  those 
JL  Jl  changes  which  were  fraught  with  such  momentous  con- 
sequences to  the  Roman  constitution.  The  new  aristocracy,  con- 
sisting of  the  old  patrician  families  and  of  those  plebeians  who  had 
become  united  with  the  old  patricians,  gradually  gathered  in  its 
grasp  the  reins  of  government.  The  leaders  of  the  plebeian  element 
of  the  aristocracy  were  most  zealous  in  maintaining  the  barrier 
of  caste,  and  in  assigning  a  political  significance  to  those  outward 
badges,  such  as  the  ius  imaginum,  the  laticlave,  the  gold  rings,  and 
the  bulla,  which  had  originally  merely  distinguished  the  higher 
from  the  lower  patrician  families.  The  senate  and  the  equestrian 
order  1  were  no  longer  organs  of  the  whole  state,  but  organs  of 
the  aristocracy.  In  each  case  this  change  was  due  to  the  power  of 
the  censorship.  Everyone  who  had  held  a  curule  magistracy2  had 
a  legal  claim  to  a  vote  and  seat  in  the  senate;  but  the  censor  had 
the  power  of  summoning  men  to  become  members  of  that  body,  and 
of  striking  off  the  names  of  such  as  were  unworthy  of  so  high  a 
position.  Inasmuch  as  the  election  to  a  curule  office  and  the  choice 
of  censor  really  lay  in  the  hands  of  the  senate,  it  was  but  natural 
that  curule  magistrates  and  censors  were  chosen  out  of  the  ranks 
of  the  nobility,  and  thus  practically  gave  a  strong  aristocratic  char- 
acter to  the  composition  of  the  senate.  So,  too,  the  censors  selected 
the  members  of  the  equestrian  centuries,  and  no  doubt,  as  a  rule, 
had  regard  to  the  birth  and  position  of  the  members  they  selected, 
rather  than  to  their  military  capacity.     Thus  the  equestrian  order 

1  The  equestrian  order  was  originally  made  up  of  those  citizens  who  served 
as  the  cavalry  contingent  of  the  legions.  As  this  service  presupposed  consider- 
able wealth,  and  as  in  the  comitia  centuriata  they  voted  by  themselves  in  the 
eighteen  equestrian  centuries  into  which  they  were  divided,  they  came  to  be 
looked  upon  as  a  wealthy,  privileged  class  of  nobles,  a  little  inferior  to  the  sena- 
tors, but  far  superior  in  rank  to  the  ordinary  plebeians. 

2  The  curule  officers  were  the  dictator  consuls,  pretors,   censors,    and   ediles. 

153 


154  ROME 

became  a  stronghold  of  the  aristocracy.  The  distinction  between 
classes  was  further  rendered  more  marked  by  the  unwise  change 
introduced  by  the  great  Scipio  in  194  B.C.  This  change  separated 
the  special  seats  assigned  to  the  senatorial  order  from  those  occupied 
by  the  mass  of  the  people  at  the  national  festivals. 

The  office  of  censor,  owing  to  these  changes,  became  invested 
with  a  peculiar  glory  of  its  own,  as  the  palladium  of  the  aristocratic 
order,  and  great  efforts  were  made  to  resist  attacks  on  the  censor- 
ship or  judicial  prosecution  of  unpopular  censors,  and  to  prevent 
opponents  of  the  aristocracy  from  holding  this  office.  An  important 
check,  moreover,  was  placed  upon  the  censor  himself  by  the  usage 
which  obliged  him  to  specify  the  grounds  on  which  he  erased  the 
name  of  senator  or  knight.  The  nobility,  in  order  to  keep  the  gov- 
ernment in  their  own  hands,  were  naturally  averse  to  appointing 
more  magistrates  than  the  growth  of  Roman  power  rendered  un- 
avoidable. The  appointment,  in  243  B.C.,  of  two  pretors  in  the 
place  of  one,  and  the  assignation  of  all  lawsuits  between  Roman 
citizens  to  the  city  pretor  (praetor  urbanus)  and  of  all  lawsuits 
between  men  who  were  not  Roman  citizens  to  his  colleague  (praetor 
peregrinus)  was  manifestly  inadequate  to  the  growing  needs  of  the 
state.  Further,  the  attempt  to  govern  the  four  transmarine  prov- 
inces by  the  appointment  of  four  pretors  in  197  b.c.  showed  a 
desire  to  limit  the  number  of  magistrates  who  were  outside  the 
immediate  control  of  the  senate,  rather  than  a  real  grasp  of  the  re- 
quirements of  the  new  empire.  A  more  serious  evil  was  the 
election  of  the  twenty-four  military  tribunes,  i.  e.,  of  the  whole 
military  staff,  by  the  comitia  tributa;  thus  the  choice  of  officers  be- 
came subject  to  the  evils  of  popular  election,  and  every  effort  was 
made  by  the  aristocracy  to  secure  the  position  for  members  of  their 
own  order,  and  to  make  the  military  tribunate  the  stepping-stone 
in  the  political  career  of  young  nobles.  In  serious  wars,  e.  g.,  in  171 
b.c,  it  was  found  necessary  to  suspend  this  system,  and  to  restore 
to  the  general  the  power  of  electing  his  own  staff. 

Owing  to  the  aristocratic  spirit  that  pervaded  every  section 
of  the  government,  the  chief  magisterial  offices  of  consul  and  censor 
not  only  centered  in  the  hands  of  a  limited  number  of  gentes,  but, 
what  was  worse,  in  the  hands  of  particular  families.  This  was 
markedly  the  case  in  the  policy  of  the  Scipios  and  the  Flaminini. 
Moreover,  a  serious  laxity  began  to  prevail  in  the  management  of 
the  public  money ;  and,  although  embezzlement  was  still  rare  among 


GOVERNMENT  155 

Roman  officials,  the  corruption  prevalent  in  the  provinces  could 
not  fail  to  react  with  pernicious  effect  on  the  pretors  and  their 
retinue.  The  relations  of  Rome  to  her  allies  and  dependents,  both 
within  and  outside  Italy,  gradually  underwent  a  change.  In  the 
first  place,  such  communities  as  had  been  passive  burgesses  of  Rome, 
and  had  sided  with  Hannibal,  c.  g.,  Capua,  lost  their  Roman  citizen- 
ship, while  other  communities  which  had  remained  true  to  Rome 
acquired  the  full  franchise;  thus,  except  in  isolated  cases,  the  posi- 
tion occupied  by  passive  burgesses  ceased  to  exist.  Admission  to 
the  Roman  franchise  became  more  and  more  difficult;  and  the 
tendency  arose  on  the  part  of  the  Roman  citizens  to  separate  them- 
selves, not  only  from  the  mass  of  Italians,  but  even  from  their  old 
Latin  allies,  whose  staunch  support  had  saved  the  state  in  the  war 
with  Hannibal.  The  chief  burdens  of  war,  of  garrison  duty,  and 
of  the  Spanish  service,  now  fell  upon  the  allies,  while  the  Roman 
citizens  appropriated  most  of  the  spoil  and  of  the  honors  and  ad- 
vantages that  accrued  from  the  successes  won  by  the  arms  of  their 
allies.  Indeed,  the  Latins,  though  of  course  far  removed  from  the 
servile  position  held  by  the  Bruttians  and  other  communities,  felt 
that  the  distinction  between  themselves  and  the  mass  of  the  Italian 
confederacy  was  being  abolished,  and  that  they  were  fast  becoming 
the  subjects,  instead  of  the  privileged  allies,  of  Rome. 

A  far  graver  error  was  the  retention  of  the  old  constitution, 
which  Carthage  had  established  in  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Spain :  by 
retaining  the  tribute  imposed  by  their  predecessors,  the  Romans 
renounced  their  old  policy  of  having  no  tributary  subjects ;  and  by 
applying  this  method  to  Hither  Spain,  Macedonia,  and  Illyria,  they 
clearly  adopted  the  dangerous  and  demoralizing  expedient  of  mak- 
ing money  out  of  their  new  possessions.  It  is  true  that  the  gov- 
ernors were  legally  bound  to  administer  their  office  with  honesty 
and  frugality,  and  it  is  equally  true  that  many,  like  Cato  in  Sar- 
dinia, scrupulously  observed  the  legal  injunction.  But  the  tempta- 
tion was  too  great;  the  control  exercised  by  the  senate  over  the 
governors  was  of  necessity  very  lax,  and  the  complaints  of  the 
governed,  unless  the  severity  and  rapacity  of  the  pretor  had  ex- 
ceeded all  ordinary  limits,  met  with  but  scant  attention.  Moreover, 
the  governor  could  not  be  called  to  account  during  his  term  of  office, 
and  the  charges  laid  against  him  were,  as  a  rule,  heard  by  a  jury 
consisting  of  men  of  his  own  order,  and  therefore  little  inclined  to 
visit  the  offender  with  severe  punishment.     We  can,  then,  scarcely 


156  ROME 

doubt  that,  owing  to  the  feeble  control  exercised  by  the  senate,  and 
the  absolute  nature  of  the  governor's  provincial  office,  and,  still 
more,  owing  to  the  corrupt  servility  of  those  whom  he  governed,  it 
was  a  rare  thing  for  governors  to  return  home  with  clean  hands. 

A  wholesome  corrective  to  the  abuse  of  the  senatorial  power, 
theoretically  at  least,  still  existed  in  the  assemblies  of  the  people. 
But  this  period  exhibits  to  us  the  growing  unimportance,  nay  im- 
potence, of  the  popular  comitia.  The  reason  is  plain.  With  the 
extension  of  the  Roman  suffrage,  not  only  throughout  Latium,  Sa- 
bina,  and  a  part  of  Campania,  but  to  the  new  colonies  founded  in 
Picenum  and  across  the  Apennines,  the  burgess-body  no  longer 
consisted  of  farmers  living  within  easy  distance  of  the  capital. 
Thus  the  decision  of  the  great  questions  of  foreign  policy  rested 
with  men  scattered  over  Italy,  who  met  together  in  the  capital 
by  mere  chance,  and  who  were  unable  by  previous  consultation  to 
arrive  at  some  joint  course  of  action  and  to  show  an  intelligent  grasp 
of  the  weighty  questions  submitted  to  their  judgment.  As  a  rule, 
then,  the  people  played  a  passive  part  on  such  occasions,  and  ratified 
without  discussion  the  proposals  made  to  them  by  the  senate. 

Again,  out  of  the  old  clients  of  powerful  houses  now  arose  a 
city  rabble,  whose  votes  in  the  comitia  were  becoming  of  even  more 
importance  than  those  of  the  scattered  burgesses,  and  were  employed 
by  the  aristocracy  to  counterbalance  the  independence  of  the  farm- 
ers. Systematic  corruption  began  to  be  practiced  upon  these 
clients  by  the  sale  of  grain  at  low  prices,  by  an  increase  of  festivals 
and  holidays,  and  by  gladiatorial  shows,  in  order  that  the  aristo- 
cratic candidate  might  secure  his  election  to  the  offices  of  state  at 
the  expense  of  his  poorer  rival.  The  spoils  of  war  were  even  em- 
ployed to  corrupt  the  soldiers,  and  the  stern  refusal  of  Lucius 
Paulus  to  turn  his  victory  at  Pydna  to  such  base  uses  almost  cost 
him  the  honor  of  a  triumph.  It  was  but  natural  that  such  corrup- 
tion should  work  the  decay  of  the  old  warlike  spirit,  and  that  cow- 
ardice should  stain  the  honor  of  the  Roman  officers  and  soldiers. 

Another  sign  of  the  universal  degeneration  was  the  miserable 
love  for  petty  distinctions :  triumphs  were  granted  to  the  victor  of 
Ligurian  or  Corsican  robbers;  statues  and  monuments  became  so 
common  that  it  was  said  to  be  a  distinction  to  have  none;  men 
received  permanent  surnames  from  the  victories  they  had  won ;  and 
among  the  lower  orders  equal  anxiety  was  manifested  to  mark  their 
social  grade  by  trifling  badges. 


GOVERNMENT  157 

The  party  of  opposition  in  the  state  was  composed  of  two 
elements  of  widely  different  character.  In  the  first  place,  there 
was  the  patriotic  party,  whose  cry  for  reform  arose  from  a  genuine 
distrust  and  hatred  of  the  prevailing  corruption.  The  moving 
spirit  and  typical  representative  of  this  party  was  Marcus  Porcius 
Cato  (234-149  B.C.).  This  rough  Sabine  farmer  had  been  induced 
to  enter  upon  a  political  career  by  a  noble  of  the  old  stamp,  Lucius 
Valerius  Flaccus.  He  saw  active  service  throughout  the  whole  of 
the  second  Punic  war,  and  in  all  countries  and  in  every  capacity  had 
won  equal  distinction.  He  was  the  same  in  the  Forum  as  in  the 
battlefield.  His  prompt  and  intrepid  address,  his  rough  but  pun- 
gent rustic  wit,  his  knowledge  of  Roman  law  and  Roman  affairs,  his 
incredible  activity  and  his  iron  frame,  first  brought  him  into  notice 
in  the  neighboring  towns ;  and  when  at  length  he  made  his  appear- 
ance on  the  greater  arena  of  the  Forum  and  the  senate-house  in  the 
capital,  constituted  him  the  most  influential  pleader  and  public 
orator  of  his  time.  Thoroughly  narrow  in  his  political  and  moral 
views,  and  having  the  ideal  of  the  good  old  times  always  before  his 
eyes  and  on  his  lips,  he  cherished  an  obstinate  contempt  for  every- 
thing new.  Deeming  himself  entitled,  by  virtue  of  his  own  austere 
life,  to  manifest  an  unrelenting  severity  and  harshness  towards 
everything  and  everybody;  upright  and  honorable,  but  without  a 
glimpse  of  any  duty  beyond  the  sphere  of  police  discipline  and  of 
mercantile  integrity ;  an  enemy  to  all  villainy  and  vulgarity  as  well 
as  to  all  genius  and  refinement ;  and,  above  all  things,  a  foe  to  those 
who  were  his  foes,  he  never  made  an  attempt  to  stop  evils  at  their 
source,  but  waged  war  throughout  life  against  mere  symptoms,  and 
especially  against  persons.  Not  only  did  he  attack  the  most  power- 
ful aristocrats,  such  as  the  Scipios  and  the  Flaminini,  but  he  never 
shrank  from  abusing  his  own  supporters  did  he  deem  they  deserved 
it.  Still,  so  staunch  were  the  farmers  in  their  support,  that  when 
Cato  and  his  friend  and  colleague,  Lucius  Flaccus,  stood  as  candi- 
dates for  the  censorship  in  184  B.C.,  all  the  exertions  of  the  aristo- 
crats were  powerless  to  prevent  their  return. 

The  reforms  introduced  by  Cato  and  his  party  were  aimed  at 
arresting  the  spread  of  decay  and  at  checking  the  preponderating 
influence  of  the  aristocracy  in  politics.  In  view  of  the  first  object, 
police  regulations  were  enacted  to  restrict  the  luxurious  style  of 
living,  and  to  introduce  a  frugal  economy  into  Roman  households. 
More  successful  and  more  practical  were  the  efforts  made  to  revive 


158  ROME 

the  farmer  class  by  founding  Latin  colonies  in  the  north,  and  by 
large  and  numerous  assignations  of  the  domain  land.  Although 
Cato  failed  to  carry  his  proposal  to  institute  four  hundred  new 
equestrian  stalls,  and  thus  remedy  the  decline  of  the  burgess  cavalry, 
the  necessities  of  war  had  long  before  compelled  the  government  to 
reduce  the  rating  which  allowed  a  man  to  serve  in  the  army  from 
$210  to  $30,  and  to  abolish  the  other  qualification  of  free  birth.  The 
admission  of  the  poor  and  of  freedmen  into  the  army  gave  them  a 
new  importance  in  the  state,  and  was  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the 
changes  introduced  into  the  comitia  centuriata.  These  changes,  ac- 
complished about  241  B.C.,  at  the  close  of  the  first  Punic  war,  placed 
all  five  classes  composing  the  comitia  on  an  equal  footing  as  regarded 
number  of  votes,  and  took  away  from  the  equites  their  old  priority 
in  voting,  and  gave  the  freedmen  the  same  power  as  the  free- 
born. 

This  reform  was  the  first  victory  won  by  the  new  democracy 
over  the  aristocracy,  but  its  effects  were  greatly  neutralized  by  the 
fact  that,  though  priority  of  voting  was  taken  away  from  the 
equites  or  aristocratic  voters,  it  was  still  confined  to  a  division 
chosen  by  lot  from  the  first  or  richest  class ;  and  further,  the  equali- 
zation of  the  freedmen  with  the  freeborn  was  set  aside  twenty  years 
later,  in  220  B.C.,  by  the  censor  Gaius  Flaminius,  and  the  freedmen 
were  excluded  from  the  centuries.  A  proof  that  the  reform  did  not 
at  any  rate  greatly  affect  the  power  of  the  aristocracy  is  furnished 
by  the  fact  that  the  second  consulship  and  second  censorship,  al- 
though in  law  open  to  both  patricians  and  plebeians,  were  almost 
invariably  filled  by  patricians;  the  second  consulship  was  held  by 
patricians  down  to  172  B.C.,  and  the  second  censorship  down  to 

131  B.C. 

Viewed  as  a  whole,  the  reforms  of  Cato  and  his  party,  dis- 
tinguished as  they  were  by  great  energy  and  a  noble  wish  to  coun- 
teract the  evident  evils  of  the  time,  were  unfortunately  marred  by  a 
want  of  clear  insight  into  the  source  of  those  evils,  and  by  the 
failure  to  devise,  in  a  large  and  statesmanlike  spirit,  some  compre- 
hensive plan  for  their  remedy. 

In  the  second  place,  the  party  of  opposition  contained  a  far 
less  reputable  element,  the  outcome  of  the  city  rabble.  The  spirit 
of  demagogism  was  abroad;  men,  cursed  with  a  love  of  empty 
speechmaking,  pretended  to  be  ardent  reformers,  but  in  their 
harangues  dwelt  only  on  the  excessive  powers  of  the  aristocratic 


GOVERNMENT  159 

government  and  on  the  rights  of  the  citizens,  not  on  the  urgent 
need  for  moral  reform  in  every  section  of  the  state.  The  evils 
which  arose  out  of  this  new  spirit  have  already  been  indicated  in  the 
history  of  the  war  with  Hannibal :  the  appointment  of  mere  party 
leaders,  such  as  Flaminius  and  Varro,  to  the  supreme  command; 
the  absurd  decree  which  made  Minucius  co-dictator  with  Fabius  in 
217  B.C.,  and  which  gave  the  deathblow  to  the  dictatorship;  the 
charge  of  embezzlement  laid  against  Marcellus  in  219  B.C., — these 
and  other  acts  all  proceeded  from  the  wanton  interference  of  the 
demagogues.  The  citizens  were  even  tempted  to  interfere  with  the 
administration  of  the  finances,  the  oldest  and  most  important  pre- 
rogative of  the  government;  and,  in  232  B.C.,  Gaius  Flaminius, 
owing  to  the  fatal  obstinacy  of  the  senate,  went  to  the  burgesses 
with  his  proposal  to  distribute  the  domain-lands  in  Picenum.  Nor 
was  this  new  system  of  politics  confined  to  its  author,  Gaius  Flamin- 
ius; aristocrats,  such  as  Scipio,  in  their  efforts  to  place  themselves 
and  their  families  in  a  position  superior  to  that  of  the  rest  of  the 
senate,  condescended  to  vie  with  demagogues  in  their  flattery  of 
the  city  rabble.  We  have  already  pointed  out  the  impotence  of  the 
comitia;  as  a  rule,  indeed,  the  burgesses  had  the  good  sense  and 
sufficient  patriotism  to  give  a  hearty  support  to  that  senate  which 
had  weathered  the  storm  of  Hannibal's  invasion.  But  appeals  to 
selfishness  and  avarice  could  not  fail  to  demoralize  the  best  citizens ; 
and  sudden  caprice  or  violent  outbursts  of  jealousy  or  hatred  from 
time  to  time  showed  that  the  old  foundations  of  the  Republic  were 
being  undermined.  To  the  later  generations,  who  survived  the 
storms  of  revolution,  the  period  after  the  Hannibalic  war  appeared 
the  golden  age  of  Rome,  and  Cato  seemed  the  model  of  the  Roman 
statesman.  It  was  in  reality  the  calm  before  the  storm,  and  the 
epoch  of  political  mediocrities.  The  seeming  outward  stability  of 
the  Roman  constitution,  during  the  years  266-146  b.c,  was  a  sign, 
not  of  health,  but  of  incipient  sickness  and  revolution. 

A  review  of  this  period  would  be  incomplete  unless  it  presented 
a  brief  notice  of  the  economic  troubles  produced  by  the  system  of 
farming  on  a  large  scale,  and  by  the  power  of  capital.  The  impor- 
tation of  corn  from  the  provinces,  and  the  sale  of  it  at  a  merely 
nominal  price  for  the  benefit  of  the  idle  proletariat  of  the  capital, 
naturally  ruined  the  market  for  the  growers  of  Italian  corn.  The 
evil  was  all  the  worse  and  all  the  more  inexcusable  in  a  country  like 
Italy,  where  there  were  hardly  any  manufactures,  and,  consequently, 


160  ROME 

no  large  industrial  population  whose  needs,  as  in  England,  could 
not  be  supplied  by  home-grown  grain.  On  the  contrary,  agricul- 
ture was  the  mainstay  of  the  Roman  state,  and  the  short-sighted 
policy  of  the  government  in  this  matter  sacrificed  the  soundest  to 
the  most  worthless  part  of  the  nation.  The  small  farmers  were 
gradually  ruined,  and  their  holdings  became  merged  in  the  large 
estates  of  the  landlords,  who,  by  cultivating  their  lands  by  means 
of  large  gangs  of  slaves,  were  able  to  produce  at  a  cheaper  rate 
than  the  farmer.  But  even  the  large  landlord  was  unable  to  com- 
pete with  foreign  grain,  and  devoted  himself  almost  entirely  to 
stock-raising  and  the  production  of  oil  and  wine;  and  thus  it  was 
that  arable  land  to  a  great  extent  was  converted  into  pasture,  while, 
owing  to  the  increased  use  of  slaves,  free  labor  became  almost  un- 
known. The  power  of  the  capitalist  was  alike  evinced  in  the 
speculative  management  of  land,  in  the  increase  of  money-lenders, 
and  in  the  enormous  extent  of  all  mercantile  transactions;  and,  as 
in  the  end  the  gains  from  commercial  enterprise  flowed  into  Rome, 
the  result  was  that  Rome,  compared  with  the  rest  of  the  world, 
stood  as  superior  in  point  of  wealth  as  in  political  and  military 
power.  In  fact,  the  whole  Roman  nation  became  possessed  with 
the  mercantile  spirit,  and,  while  money  served  to  create  a  new  social 
barrier  between  rich  and  poor,  that  deep-rooted  immorality, 
which  is  inherent  in  an  economy  of  pure  capital,  ate  into  the  heart 
of  society  and  of  the  commonwealth,  and  substituted  an  absolute 
selfishness  for  humanity  and  patriotism. 

Moreover,  the  very  population  of  Italy  began  to  decline,  and 
Cato  and  Polybius  agree  in  stating  that  at  the  end  of  the  sixth  cen- 
tury of  the  city  Italy  was  far  weaker  in  population  than  at  the  end 
of  the  fifth ;  and  although  it  was,  in  the  first  instance,  the  two  long 
wars  with  Carthage  that  decimated  and  ruined  both  the  burgesses 
and  the  allies,  the  Roman  capitalists  beyond  doubt  contributed  quite 
as  much  as  Hamilcar  and  Hannibal  to  the  decline  in  the  vigor  and 
the  numbers  of  the  Italian  people. 


Chapter     XVII 

THE  SUBJECT  COUNTRIES  DOWN  TO  THE  GRACCHAN 
EPOCH.     168-133  B.C. 

BEFORE  we  enter  upon  the  period  of  change  which  takes  its 
name  from  the  family  of  the  Gracchi,  it  is  necessary  to  pre- 
sent a  picture  of  the  state  of  things  in  the  subject  countries. 
Trivial  and  dreary  as  the  separate  conflicts  in  these  remote  lands 
between  weakness  and  power  may  seem,  yet  collectively  they  are  of 
great  historical  significance;  and  the  reaction  which  the  provinces 
exercised  on  the  mother  country  alone  renders  intelligible  the  con- 
dition of  Italy  at  this  period. 

At  first  the  only  two  recognized  provinces  of  Rome,  if  we 
except  what  may  be  regarded  as  the  natural  appendages  of  Italy, 
i.  e.,  Sicily,  Corsica,  and  Sardinia,  were  the  two  Spains;  and  they 
were  the  scene  of  many  wars  and  the  cause  of  much  trouble  to 
Rome.  In  154  B.C.  the  peaceful  state  of  the  Spanish  provinces, 
which  had  lasted  for  nearly  thirty  years,  was  broken  by  the  suc- 
cessful invasion  of  the  Lusitanians.  The  complete  defeat  of  the 
governor  of  Farther  Spain,  in  153  B.C.,  emboldened  the  Celti- 
berians  to  join  against  the  common  foe;  and  the  successes  achieved 
by  the  powerful  tribe  of  the  Arevacae  over  the  Consul  Quintus 
Fulvius  Nobilior  even  eclipsed  the  previous  victories  of  the 
Lusitanians.  But  the  advent  of  Marcus  Claudius  Marcellus,  who 
combined  skillful  generalship  with  humane  treatment,  terminated 
the  Celtiberian  war  in  151  B.C.  After  a  brief  interval  of  peace  an- 
other outbreak  occurred,  due  to  the  weakness  and  perfidy  of  the 
Roman  commanders.  The  withdrawal  of  the  regular  military 
forces  during  the  last  Macedonian  and  Punic  wars  in  149  B.C.,  and 
the  appearance  of  a  Spanish  national  leader  in  the  person  of  the 
famous  Viriathus,  gave  a  dangerous  character  to  the  revolt.  It 
seemed  as  if  at  last  Spain  had  found  a  champion  able  to  break  the 
fetters  of  Rome;  general  after  general,  army  after  army,  both  in 
northern  and  southern  Spain,  recoiled  in  utter  discomfiture  before 
the  ability  and  enthusiasm  of  the  Spanish  leader.     For  about  ten 

161 


162  ROME 

148-133    B.C. 

years  (148-139  B.C.)  Viriathus  was  the  acknowledged  king  of  the 
Lusitanians,  though  never  distinguished  by  any  badge  from  the 
meanest  soldier — a  true  hero,  remarkable  alike  for  his  physical 
and  mental  qualities.  In  the  end  his  brilliant  and  noble  career  was, 
as  often  happened  in  Spain,  cut  short  by  the  hand  of  the  assassin, 
three  of  his  intimate  friends  having  sold  the  life  of  their  lord  to 
the  Roman  consul,  Quintus  Servilius  Caepio,  in  return  for  their 
own  safety.  With  the  death  of  Viriathus  the  war  in  Lusitania 
came  to  an  end,  and  two  years  later  the  Celtiberians  in  the  north 
were  reduced  by  the  consul  Quintus  Caecilius  Metellus. 

The  struggle  with  the  town  of  Numantia  was  more  serious. 
The  incapable  consul,  Quintus  Pompeius,  after  several  severe  de- 
feats, agreed  to  come  to  terms  with  its  invincible  inhabitants ;  but  in 
fear  of  the  reckoning  that  awaited  him  at  home  for  thus  concluding 
peace,  he  at  the  last  moment  took  refuge  in  a  base  falsehood,  and 
denied  the  agreement  he  had  made.  The  matter  was  referred  to 
the  senate,  who  supported  their  guilty  consul,  and  ordered  his  suc- 
cessor, Marcus  Popilius  Laenas,  to  continue  the  war.  The  total 
incompetence  of  the  Roman  generals  and  the  demoralized  condition 
of  their  armies  caused  the  war  to  drag  on,  amid  disgrace  and  dis- 
aster, from  137-134  B.C.  In  the  latter  year  Scipio  Aemilianus,  the 
first  general  in  Rome,  was  sent  out,  and  after  reorganizing  the 
Roman  army  by  treatment  alike  severe  and  contemptuous,  he  set 
about  the  task  of  subduing  the  brave  Numantines.  After  a  heroic 
defense,  the  city,  utterly  exhausted  by  famine  and  pestilence,  fell 
in  the  autumn  of  133  B.C.,  and  its  fall  reestablished  the  supremacy 
of  Rome  in  Hither  Spain.  A  senatorial  commission  was  shortly 
after  sent  to  Spain,  and  the  provinces  were  reorganized.  Thanks  to 
the  efforts  of  Scipio  and  other  governors  the  country  gradually  be- 
came exceedingly  prosperous,  and  despite  the  guerrilla  warfare  ever 
waged  by  the  half-subdued  native  tribes,  it  was  the  most  flourishing 
and  best  organized  country  in  the  Roman  dominions. 

Far  more  insupportable  was  the  condition — -intermediate  be- 
tween formal  sovereignty  and  actual  subjection — of  the  African, 
Greek,  and  Asiatic  states.  These  had  neither  independence  nor 
peace.  In  Africa  there  was  constant  war  between  Carthage  and 
Numidia;  in  Egypt  the  rulers  of  that  country  and  Cyrene  were 
ever  disputing  for  the  possession  of  Cyprus;  in  Asia  almost  every 
petty  kingdom  was  torn  by  intestine  struggles,  and  several  were  at 
war  with  one  another.     The  interference  of  Rome,  constantly  in- 


THE     SUBJECT     COUNTRIES  163 

168-152  B.C. 

voked,  only  made  matters  worse.  Rome  neither  resigned  her  au- 
thority nor  displayed  sufficient  force  to  bring  the  ruled  into  subjec- 
tion. It  was  the  epoch  of  commissions.  Commissioners  went  to 
and  fro,  reporting  and  giving  orders,  to  which  the  Asiatic  states, 
feeling  secure  from  their  very  remoteness,  as  a  rule  paid  no  atten- 
tion. The  Roman  government  conferred  neither  the  blessings  of 
freedom  nor  of  order.  It  was  clear  that  this  state  of  things  must 
be  put  an  end  to,  and  that  the  only  way  to  do  so  was  by  the  con- 
version of  the  client  states  into  Roman  provinces.  The  only 
question  was  whether  the  Roman  senate  would  perceive  the  neces- 
sity of  the  task,  and  would  put  its  hand  to  the  work  with  the 
requisite  energy. 

In  Africa  we  have  to  record  the  last  act  of  the  terrible  Car- 
thaginian drama.  The  Romans  saw  with  ill-concealed  envy  the 
increasing  prosperity  of  their  old  rival,  though  hampered  in  every 
way  by  the  encroachments  of  Massinissa.  At  the  head  of  the  second 
commission,  sent  from  Rome  in  161  B.C.,  to  settle  points  of  dispute 
between  the  Numidian  king  and  Carthage,  was  the  aged  Cato, 
whose  inveterate  hatred  of  Carthage  was  aroused  afresh  by  the 
sight  of  her  great  commercial  prosperity.  Opposed  though  he  was 
by  the  larger-minded  Scipio  Nasica,  Cato  had  no  difficulty  in  find- 
ing men  at  home  ready  to  support  his  view  that  Rome  could  know 
no  security  until  Carthage  was  destroyed,  and  among  his  most 
ardent  supporters  were  the  bankers  and  rich  capitalists  of  Rome, 
who  saw  that  the  wealth  of  Carthage  must  revert  to  themselves. 

An  opportunity  for  putting  the  policy  of  Cato  into  effect  soon 
arose.  In  154  B.C.  Massinissa  appealed  to  Rome  to  act  once  more 
as  arbiter  between  him  and  Carthage,  and  pointed  out  that  the 
leaders  of  the  patriotic  party  in  Carthage,  Hasdrubal  and  Carthalo, 
were  amassing  stores  and  collecting  troops  in  violation  of  the  treaty 
with  Rome.  The  Carthaginians  were  ordered  to  destroy  their 
naval  stores  and  dismiss  their  troops;  but  the  spirit  of  the  people 
was  roused,  and  the  demand  was  rejected  and  preparations  made  to 
wage  war  against  Massinissa.  In  152  b.c.  hostilities  began,  and 
owing  to  the  miserable  incapacity  of  Hasdrubal,  Massinissa  gained 
a  complete  victory. 

The  Romans  now  conceived  that  the  hour  had  come  to  deal 
the  death  blow  to  their  old  antagonist.  By  making  war  upon  an 
ally  of  Rome,  Carthage  had  broken  one  of  the  stipulations  of  their 
treaty,  and  had  thus  given  Rome  a  plausible  pretext  for  war,  and 


164  ROME 

149-148   B.C, 

from  the  feeble  display  of  arms  she  had  made  against  Massinissa, 
Carthage  seemed  a  certain  and  easy  victim.  In  vain  the  Car- 
thaginians made  every  submission  to  avert  the  threatened  blow,  and 
war  was  declared  in  149  b.c.  After  dallying  with  the  wretched 
envoys  sent  from  Carthage,  the  Roman  consul,  Lucius  Marcius 
Censorinus,  who  had  landed  at  Utica,  at  last  revealed  the  dire  pur- 
pose of  the  senate,  and  bade  the  envoys  tell  the  gerusia  that  Car- 
thage must  be  evacuated  and  surrendered  to  destruction.  At  this 
the  frenzied  enthusiasm  of  the  Phoenician  race  once  more  blazed 
forth.  The  most  marvelous  efforts  were  made  to  secure  the  de- 
fenses of  the  city,  and  to  repair  the  blunder  which  had  surrendered 
all  the  arms  and  dismantled  the  battlements  in  obedience  to  the 
Roman  demands. 

Meanwhile,  the  Roman  consuls  were  deluded  by  pretended  em- 
bassies, and  though  but  a  few  miles  distant,  had  no  idea  what  was 
happening  in  the  Phoenician  capital.  The  precious  respite  was 
turned  to  good  account:  day  and  night  the  work  of  forging  arms 
and  catapults  never  flagged.  Young  and  old,  women  and  children, 
were  all  fired  with  the  same  zeal  and  the  same  hatred.  With  in- 
credible speed  the  work  was  finished,  and  the  city  and  its  inhabitants 
ready  for  the  struggle.  Art  had  rendered  the  naturally  strong  site 
of  Carthage  well-nigh  impregnable,  and  the  two  consuls,  Manius 
Manilius  and  Lucius  Censorinus,  on  realizing  their  blunder  and  at- 
tempting to  prosecute  the  siege,  soon  found  out  how  utterly  incom- 
petent they  were  for  the  task.  After  losses  by  assaults  and  disease 
the  Romans  were  compelled,  by  the  death  of  Massinissa  in  149  B.C., 
to  suspend  all  offensive  operations.  The  youthful  Scipio,  who  was 
serving  as  a  military  tribune,  alone  retrieved  the  honor  of  the  Ro- 
man name,  both  by  his  personal  bravery  and  his  politic  dealings 
with  the  native  Numidians. 

The  following  year  saw  two  new  commanders,  Lucius  Piso 
at  the  head  of  the  land  army,  and  Lucius  Mancinus  in  charge  of 
the  fleet :  they  achieved  even  less  than  their  predecessors  and  neg- 
lected the  siege  of  Carthage  for  attacks  on  smaller  towns,  which  as 
a  rule  were  unsuccessful.  A  Numidian  sheik  passed  over  to  the 
Carthaginian  side  with  eight  hundred  horse,  and  negotiations  were 
entered  into  with  the  kings  of  Numidia  and  Mauretania.  At  this 
juncture  the  Romans  adopted  the  extraordinary  measure  of  giving 
the  command  to  Scipio  Aemilianus,  and  thus  made  him  consul  with- 
out his  having  held  the  preliminary  office  of  edile.     His  arrival 


STOKMiNG    THE    BYRSA    OF    CARTHAGE    BY    THE    ROMANS     UNDER 
SCIPIO    AFKICANL'S 

Painting  by  G.  Conriidcr 


THE     SUBJECT     COUNTRIES  165 

147-146   B.C. 

in  147  b.c.  completely  changed  the  aspect  of  affairs.  Mancinus  was 
rescued  from  a  position  of  great  danger  on  an  isolated  cliff,  and  the 
siege  of  Carthage  was  once  more  begun  in  real  earnest.  Scipio 
first  constructed  a  large  camp  across  the  isthmus  which  connected 
Carthage  with  the  mainland,  and  then  blocked  up  the  entrance  to 
the  harbor  by  a  mole  of  stone  ninety-six  feet  in  breadth.  This 
latter  operation  the  Carthaginians  neutralized  by  cutting  a  new 
canal,  thus  gaining  a  new  outlet  into  the  harbor.  But  Scipio  at  last 
succeeded  in  his  object,  and  completely  blockaded  the  city  by  land 
and  sea,  leaving  famine  and  pestilence  to  complete  what  he  had 
begun. 

In  the  spring  of  146  B.C.  the  city  wall  was  scaled,  and  for  six 
days  the  famished  inhabitants  continued  a-  terrible  but  hopeless 
struggle  from  house  to  house  and  street  to  street.  Even  then  the 
steep  citadel-rock,  held  by  Hasdrubal  and  the  remnant  of  the  gar- 
rison, remained ;  to  clear  the  approaches,  Scipio  ordered  the  city  to 
be  set  on  fire  and  the  ruins  to  be  leveled.  The  garrison  at  last 
capitulated,  and  life  was  granted  to  the  survivors,  a  bare  tenth  part 
of  the  former  population.  Hasdrubal,  to  whose  gluttony  and  brag- 
ging incapacity  the  fall  of  Carthage  was  in  no  small  measure  due, 
gained  the  boon  of  life  for  which  he  prayed  Scipio  on  his  knees ;  but 
his  wife  scorned  to  survive  her  city's  destruction,  and  plunged  with 
her  children  into  the  flames  of  a  burning  temple.  Despite  the  pro- 
tests of  Scipio,  the  senate  ordered  the  consul  to  raze  Carthage  to 
the  ground,  to  pass  the  plow  over  its  site,  and  to  curse  the  ground 
forever.  Where  the  industrious  Phoenicians  had  bustled  and 
trafficked  for  five  hundred  years,  Roman  slaves  henceforth  pastured 
the  herds  of  their  distant  masters.  Scipio,  however,  whom  nature 
had  destined  for  a  nobler  part  than  that  of  an  executioner,  gazed 
with  horror  on  his  own  work,  and  instead  of  the  joy  of  victory,  the 
victor  himself  was  haunted  by  a  presentiment  of  the  retribution 
that  would  inevitably  follow  such  a  misdeed.  The  Carthaginian 
territory  as  possessed  by  the  city  in  its  last  days  became  a  Roman 
province  under  the  name  of  Africa,  and  the  boundaries  of  the  en- 
larged Numidian  kingdom  were  clearly  defined.  Utica  was  the 
capital  of  the  new  province,  and  thither  Roman  merchants  flocked 
to  turn  to  account  the  new  acquisition. 

About  the  same  time  Macedonia  also  experienced  the  common 
fate.  The  four  small  confederacies  into  which  Roman  wisdom  had 
parceled  out  the  ancient  kingdom  soon  showed  how  impracticable 


166 


ROME 


146-130  B.C. 

such  an  arrangement  was.  A  pretender,  calling  himself  Philip,  the 
son  of  Perseus,  was  accepted  as  king  by  the  Macedonian  nation,  but 
was  crushed  in  148  B.C.  Macedonia  was  now  converted  into  a  Ro- 
man province,  and  covered  much  the  same  area  as  had  formerly 
been  subject  to  Macedonian  sway. 

In  Greece  itself  all  Roman  efforts  at  conciliation  failed,  and  at 
last,  despite  the  warnings  of  the  Roman  envoys,  the  Achaean 
league  declared  war  against  Sparta  about  146  B.C.     This  action, 


combined  with  the  insulting  attitude  of  the  Greeks  towards  Rome, 
caused  the  senate  to  send  Lucius  Mummius  to  crush  the  pretensions 
of  Critolaus,  the  Achaean  strategus.  A  battle  at  Leucopetra  was 
utterly  disastrous  to  the  Achaeans,  and  was  followed  by  the  con- 
version of  Greece  into  the  province  of  Achaia.  On  the  whole, 
Mummius  seems  to  have  acted  with  justice  and  moderation  in  his 
administration  of  Greek  affairs;  but  the  Roman  senate  showed  a 
hideous  severity  in  the  destruction  of  Corinth,  the  first  commercial 
city  in  Greece,  and  the  last  precious  ornament  of  a  land  once  so  rich 
in  cities.  Doubtless  this  barbarous  act  was  due  to  the  political  in- 
fluence of  the  Roman  merchants,  who  gladly  seized  the  opportunity 
to  rid  themselves  of  a  commercial  rival. 

In  Asia  Minor  the  bequest  of  Pergamus  to  the  Romans  by  the 


THE     SUBJECT     COUNTRIES  167 

173-133  B.C. 

last  of  the  Attalids,  in  133  B.C.,  gave  Rome  a  new  province,  though 
she  had  to  vindicate  her  right  by  the  sword,  as  Aristonicus,  a  natural 
son  of  one  of  the  former  kings  of  Pergamus,  succeeded  for  a  time 
in  making  good  his  claim  to  the  throne.  Most  of  the  small  states 
and  cities  in  western  Asia  remained  unchanged,  but  both  Cappa- 
docia  and  Pontus  received  some  additional  territory  on  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Attalid  kingdom.  Roman  authority  in  Syria  and  Egypt 
became  weaker  and  weaker,  owing  to  the  negligent  and  spasmodic 
manner  in  which  the  senate  attempted  to  settle  the  various  disputes 
that  arose.  Many  causes  had  combined  to  destroy  the  once  huge 
empire  of  Asia:  the  battle  of  Magnesia  had  wrested  western  Asia 
from  the  Great  King;  the  two  Cappadocias  and  the  two  Armenias 
had  become  independent  kingdoms;  lastly,  Antiochus  Epiphanes 
(175-164  B.C.)  had  adopted  the  course,  equally  foolish  and  fatal, 
of  introducing  Roman  and  Greek  ideas  both  in  manners  and  re- 
ligion throughout  his  dominions.  This  step,  enforced  as  it  was  by 
religious  persecution  and  plundering  of  temples,  drove  the  Jews  to 
revolt  in  167  B.C.,  and  the  successful  issue  of  their  rebellion  was 
mainly  due  to  the  brave  and  prudent  conduct  of  the  house  of  the 
Maccabees. 

A  still  more  important  result  of  the  folly  of  Antiochus  was  the 
founding  of  the  Parthian  kingdom,  the  outcome  of  a  reaction  on 
the  part  of  the  native  religion  and  manners  against  Hellenism. 
Mithradates  I.  (175-133  B.C.)  laid  the  foundations  of  this  empire 
by  his  successes  over  the  Bactrian  kingdom,  and  in  all  the  countries 
west  of  the  great  desert.  Aided  by  the  internal  dissolution  of  the 
kingdom  of  the  Seleucidae,  from  which  Persia,  Babylonia,  and 
Media  were  forever  severed,  this  new  empire  reached  from  the 
Oxus  and  the  Hindu  Khush  to  the  Tigris  and  the  desert  of  Arabia. 
The  foundations  of  its  strength  rested  not  merely  on  the  revival  of 
the  wild  physical  forces  of  the  East,  on  the  bow  and  arrow  and  the 
whirlwind  rush  of  the  cavalry  of  the  desert,  but  far  more  on  the 
revival  of  the  national  customs  and  national  religion;  on  the  old 
Iranian  language,  the  order  of  the  Magi  and  the  worship  of  Mithra. 
From  the  founding  of  the  Parthian  empire  dates  the  ebb  of  that 
great  Hellenic  movement  which  had  reached  its  height  under  Alex- 
ander the  Great.  The  East  once  more  reasserted  itself,  and  re- 
entered the  world  of  politics:  the  world  had  again  two  masters. 
Thus  the  Roman  senate  sacrificed  the  first  essential  result  of  the 
policy  of  Alexander,  and  thereby  paved  the  way  for  that  retrograde 


168  ROME 

168-133  B.C. 

movement  whose  last  offshoots  ended  in  the  Alhambra  of  Granada 
and  in  the  great  Mosque  of  Constantinople. 

If  we  glance  at  the  maritime  relations  of  this  period,  we  find 
that  practically  no  naval  power  existed.  Rome  had  no  fleet,  and 
her  maritime  police,  once  so  effective,  ceased  to  control  the  piracy 
everywhere  prevalent.  A  check  no  doubt  was  kept  on  the  bucca- 
neers of  the  Adriatic  and  Tyrrhene  seas ;  but  Crete  and  Cilicia  be- 
came the  recognized  home  of  organized  bands  of  pirates.  The 
Roman  government  merely  looked  on,  and  the  Roman  merchants 
kept  up  a  friendly  traffic  with  the  pirate  captains,  who  furnished 
them  with  that  marketable  commodity — slaves. 

We  have  now  reviewed  Rome's  position  in  and  dealings  with 
the  outer  world.  The  problem  of  governing  this  new  empire  was 
not  wholly  misunderstood,  though  it  was  by  no  means  solved. 
Showing  themselves  often  stern  masters  where  leniency  was  needed, 
and  lenient  where  sternness  was  required,  the  Romans  governed 
from  one  day  to  another  with  feeble  and  selfish  hands,  merely  trans- 
acting the  current  business  of  the  hour.  Senators  had  learned  to 
despise  the  old  maxim  that  office  was  its  own  reward,  and  that  such 
office  was  a  burden  and  duty  rather  than  a  privilege  and  benefit,  and 
we  find  that  foreign  powers  constantly  bribed  influential  senators 
by  enormous  gifts.  The  Roman  fleet  was  allowed  to  go  to  ruin; 
the  decay  of  the  old  military  spirit  and  prestige  was  no  less  marked. 
The  better  classes  had  begun  to  disappear  from  the  army,  and  offi- 
cers for  the  Spanish  wars  were  found  with  great  difficulty.  In 
truth  the  Roman  senate  had  solved  the  problem  of  acquiring  the 
sovereignty  of  the  world,  but  had  broken  down  under  the  more 
difficult  task  of  its  government. 


PART  III 
THE   REVOLUTION    PERIOD.    133-78   B.C. 


Chapter  XVIII 

THE   REFORMS   OF  THE   GRACCHI.     133-121  B.C. 

WE  have  now  reached  the  epoch  in  Roman  history  forever 
rendered  famous  by  the  revolutionary  reforms  of 
Tiberius  and  Gaius  Gracchus.  It  is  our  duty  to  trace 
the  causes  which  called  for  those  reforms,  and  to  form  some  judg- 
ment both  of  the  measures  and  their  authors.  In  the  preceding 
chapter  we  have  sketched  the  evils  underlying  the  outward  calm 
which  pervaded  the  whole  Roman  empire  for  a  full  generation  after 
the  battle  of  Pydna.  Cato's  question  as  to  the  future  of  Rome, 
when  she  no  longer  had  a  state  of  fear,  had  a  profound  significance 
now.  The  younger  generation  of  aristocrats  thought  no  more  of 
foreign  foes,  but  of  maintaining  and,  if  possible,  of  increasing  the 
privileges  they  had  usurped.  The  various  measures  of  the  opposi- 
tion— the  institution  of  a  standing  senatorial  commission  to  try  the 
complaints  of  provincials  touching  the  extortion  of  Roman  gov- 
ernors ;  the  introduction  of  the  vote  by  ballot  in  the  burgess-assem- 
blies, the  exclusion,  a  little  later,  of  the  senators  from  the  equestrian 
centuries, — failed  entirely  to  emancipate  the  electors  from  aristo- 
cratic influence,  and  to  restore  to  the  comitia  the  power  and  inde- 
pendence they  had  once  possessed.  The  Romans  lacked  what  alone 
compensates  for  the  evils  of  party  life,  the  free  and  common  move- 
ment of  the  masses  to  some  definite  aim.  Politics  were,  as  a  rule, 
merely  partisanship  for  individuals,  not  for  great  principles,  and 
the  people  arrayed  itself  now  on  the  side  of  this  aristocratic  coterie, 
now  on  the  side  of  that.  Hence  sprang  that  despicable  canvassing 
of  the  mob  by  an  aspirant  for  public  office ;  hence,  too,  those  dema- 
gogic cries  for  reform  and  attacks  on  eminent  persons  to  catch  the 
popular  ear;  hence,  again,  arose  the  necessity  for  providing  costly 
popular  amusements,  the  long-recognized  duty  of  any  candidate  for 
the  consulship.  A  still  graver  evil  was  the  miserable  position  which 
the  government,  by  thus  cringing  for  the  favor  of  the  mob,  was 
forced  to  occupy  towards  the  governed.  The  burgesses  became  used 
to  the  dangerous  idea  that  they  were  exempt  from  all  direct  taxa- 

171 


172  ROME 

133-121  B.C. 

tion,  and  they  were  no  longer  forced  to  enter  the  hateful  military 
service  across  the  sea.  The  two  factions,  which  now  became  known 
by  the  names  of  Optimates  and  Populares,  fought  alike  for  shadows, 
being  completely  destitute  of  political  morality  and  political  ideas. 
It  would  have  been  better  for  Rome  had  the  Optimates  substituted 
hereditary  rotation  for  election  by  the  burgesses,  or  had  the  Popu- 
lares developed  a  real  democratic  government. 

The  crisis  with  which  the  Roman  revolution  opened  arose  from 
the  old  evil,  the  land  question.  The  warfare  which  had  for  cen- 
turies been  waged  between  the  small  farmer  and  the  capitalist  had 
at  last  produced  the  most  disastrous  results;  and  as  formerly  the 
farmer  had  been  ruined  by  the  chain  of  debt,  so  now  he  was  crushed 
by  the  competition  with  transmarine  and  slave-grown  corn.  The 
ultimate  result  was  in  both  cases  the  same:  Italian  farms  sank  in 
value;  small  holdings  became  merged  in  large  estates;  agriculture 
gave  place  to  stock-raising  and  the  growing  of  olives  and  vines; 
and,  finally,  free  labor  was  supplanted  in  Italy,  as  in  the  provinces, 
by  that  of  slaves.  The  new  and  huge  system  of  slavery  now  in- 
troduced owed  its  rise  to  the  all-powerful  capitalist.  In  earlier  days 
captives  taken  in  war  and  the  hereditary  transmission  of  slavery 
had  sufficed,  but  this  new  system  of  servitude  was,  just  like  that  of 
America,  based  on  the  methodically  pursued  hunting  of  man.  The 
"  negroland  "  of  that  period  was  western  Asia,  and  the  Cretan  and 
Cilician  corsairs,  the  professional  slave-hunters  and  slave-dealers, 
robbed  the  coasts  of  Syria  and  the  Greek  islands.  Their  example  was 
imitated  by  the  Roman  revenue-farmers,  who  instituted  similar  hu- 
man hunts  to  such  an  extent  that  they  well-nigh  depopulated  certain 
provinces.  At  the  great  slave-market  at  Delos  it  is  said  that  as 
many  as  ten  thousand  slaves  were  disembarked  in  the  morning  and 
sold  before  the  evening  of  the  same  day.  Every  financial  arrange- 
ment, every  speculation,  every  trade,  was  carried  on  by  means  of 
slaves.  Pastoral  husbandry,  now  so  common,  was  almost  entirely 
performed  by  armed  and  often  mounted  slaves.  But  far  worse  than 
any  previous  form  of  slavery  was  the  plantation  system  proper — the 
cultivation  of  fields  by  chained  gangs,  who  worked  under  overseers 
and  were  locked  up  together  at  night  in  the  common  laborers' 
prison.  This  system,  introduced  from  the  East  into  Carthage  and 
thence  into  Sicily,  was  developed  in  that  island  earlier  and  more 
fully  than  in  any  other  part  of  the  Roman  dominions.  In  fact,  for 
the  present,  Italy  was  still  substantially  free  from  this  worst  form 


THE     GRACCHI  173 

133-121    B.C. 

of  slave  husbandry,  though  the  Roman  government  was  soon 
aroused  to  the  danger  which  the  system  developed  elsewhere. 

It  requires  but  little  imagination  to  picture  the  hideous  suffer- 
ings of  the  slaves  themselves,  far  exceeding  the  sum  of  all  negro 
misery.  Slave  wars  and  slave  insurrections  now  became  frequent, 
not  only  in  the  provinces,  but  in  Italy  itself,  though,  as  was  natural, 
it  was  in  Sicily  that  the  evil  results  of  slavery  were  most  conspicu- 
ous. At  Enna  the  slaves  rose  en  masse,  murdered  their  masters, 
and  crowned  a  Syrian  juggler  as  king.  His  general  Achaeus,  a 
Greek  slave,  traversed  the  island,  and  united  under  his  standard 
both  slaves  and  free  laborers.  Agrigentum  was  seized  by  another 
band,  under  Cleon,  a  Cilician  slave;  and  the  united  forces  utterly 
defeated  the  pretor  Lucius  Hypsaeus,  and  reduced  the  whole  island 
under  their  sway.  It  was  not  until  three  successive  consuls  and 
armies  had  been  dispatched  from  Rome  (134-132  b.c.)  that  the 
servile  war  was  ended  by  the  capture  of  Tauromenium  and  Enna, 
the  latter  stronghold  being  reduced  by  famine  rather  than  by  Ro- 
man arms,  after  a  siege  of  two  years.  Such  results  were  due  partly 
to  the  lax  control  of  the  Roman  police  system  as  worked  by  the 
senate  and  its  officials  in  the  provinces,  partly  to  the  disinclination 
of  the  government  to  disoblige  Italian  planters,  to  whom  revolted 
slaves  were  often  surrendered  for  punishment. 

The  real  remedy  for  these  evils  doubtless  was  to  be  found,  not 
in  the  severe  repression  of  such  revolts,  but  in  the  elevation,  by  the 
government,  of  free  labor,  a  natural  consequence  of  which  would 
be  the  restriction  of  the  slave  proletariate.  But  the  difficulty  of 
this  measure  was  beyond  the  capacity  of  the  senate.  In  the  first 
social  crisis  the  landholder  had  been  forced  by  law  to  employ  a  num- 
ber of  free  laborers  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  his  slaves.  Now 
the  government  caused  a  Punic  treatise  on  agriculture  to  be  trans- 
lated for  the  use  of  Italian  speculators,  the  solitary  instance  of  a 
literary  undertaking  suggested  by  the  senate!  The  same  wisdom 
was  shown  in  the  matter  of  colonization.  It  was  quite  clear  that 
the  only  real  remedy  against  an  agricultural  proletariate  consisted 
in  a  comprehensive  and  regular  system  of  emigration.  Hitherto  the 
constant  assignations  of  land  and  the  establishment  of  new  farm 
allotments  had  proved  a  fairly  effective  remedy  for  the  evil.  But 
after  the  founding  of  Luna  in  177  B.C.,  no  further  assignations 
took  place  for  a  long  time,  for  the  simple  reason  that  no  new  terri- 
tory was  acquired  in  Italy,  with  the  exception  of  the  unattractive 


174  ROME 

159-131    B.C. 

Ligurian  valleys.  Therefore  there  was  no  other  land  for  distribu- 
tion except  the  leased  or  occupied  domain  land,  with  which  the 
aristocracy  was  as  loath  to  part  now  as  it  had  been  three  hundred 
years  before.  For  political  reasons  it  was  deemed  impossible  to 
distribute  the  land  in  the  provinces :  Italy  was  to  remain  the  ruling 
country,  and  the  wall  of  partition  between  the  Italian  masters  and 
the  provincial  servants  was  not  to  be  broken  down.  The  result  was 
inevitable — the  ruin  of  the  farmer-class  in  Italy.  Even  as  early  as 
134  B.C.  not  a  free  farmer  existed  in  Etruria,  where  the  old  native 
aristocracy  combined  with  the  Roman  capitalist;  and  in  the  very 
capital  one  could  hear  it  said  that  the  beasts  had  their  lairs  but 
the  burgesses  had  nothing  left  but  air  and  sunshine,  and  that  the 
so-called  masters  of  the  world  had  no  longer  a  clod  they  could  call 
their  own.  The  census  list  supplies  a  sufficient  commentary.  From 
the  close  of  the  war  with  Hannibal  down  to  159  b.c.  the  numbers 
of  the  burgesses  steadily  rose,  owing  to  the  distributions  of  the 
domain  land;  while  from  159  to  131  B.C.  they  declined  from 
324,000  to  319,000 — an  alarming  result  for  a  period  of  profound 
peace  at  home  and  abroad. 

The  urgent  need  of  reform  in  the  government  was  patent  to 
every  eye.  When  laying  down  the  censorship  in  142  b.c,  Scipio 
Aemilianus  called  on  the  gods  to  deign  to  preserve  the  state, 
whereas  all  his  predecessors  had  prayed  for  increased  glory 
to  Rome.  This  expressed  the  feeling  of  the  experienced  and  con- 
servative citizens  of  the  state.  But,  where  Scipio  despaired, 
Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus,  a  youth  unmarked  by  any  achieve- 
ment, dared  to  hope.  His  father  had  been  the  true  model  of  a  Ro- 
man aristocrat,  and  had  given  proof  of  his  noble  and  generous 
feelings  both  as  consul  and  censor,  but,  above  all,  had  by  his  strict 
integrity  and  humane  governorship  of  the  province  of  the  Ebro 
not  only  rendered  service  to  his  country,  but  also  endeared  himself 
to  the  subject  Spaniards.  His  famous  mother,  Cornelia,  was  the 
daughter  of  the  conqueror  of  Zama,  and  had  been  given  in  mar- 
riage to  Gracchus  in  return  for  his  generous  intervention  on  behalf 
of  his  political  opponent,  Scipio,  when  a  petty  and  miserable  charge 
had  been  got  up  against  the  Scipionic  house.  Thus  Tiberius,  who 
had  taken  part  in  the  storming  of  Carthage  under  his  cousin  and 
brother-in-law,  Scipio  Aemilianus,  had  been  brought  up  in  all  the 
political  ideas  and  social  and  intellectual  refinement  of  the  Scipionic 
circle.     Nor  were  he  and  his  brother  Gaius  the  only  members  of 


THE     GRACCHI  175 

143-134     B.C. 

that  circle  who  felt  that  far-reaching  reforms  must  be  instituted 
at  once.  Appius  Claudius,  consul  in  143  b.c.  and  censor  in  136 
B.C.,  the  father-in-law  of  Tiberius,  censured  the  Scipionic  circle  for 
their  desertion  of  the  state  with  bitter  vehemence;  the  pontifex 
maximus,  Publius  Crassus  Mucianus,  father-in-law  of  Gaius 
Gracchus,  the  revered  warrior  Quintus  Metellus,  and  other  men  of 
note  were  known  to  favor  the  cause  of  reform.  Tiberius  brooded 
over  the  lofty  ideals  of  statesmanship  which  he  had  imbibed  in  the 
atmosphere  around  him,  and  public  placards  often  summoned  the 
grandson  of  Africanus  to  think  of  the  poor  people  and  of  the  deliv- 
erance of  Italy.  He  was  elected  tribune  in  134  B.C.,  at  a  time  when 
one  of  the  consuls  had  met  with  disaster  in  his  attempt  to  quell  the 
rebellion  of  the  Sicilian  slaves,  and  when  a  small  Spanish  town  had 
defied  for  months  the  efforts  of  Scipio  Aemilianus.  Not  only  had 
Tiberius  the  support  and  counsel  of  his  father-in-law,  but  he  also 
hoped  for  the  influence  of  the  new  consul,  Publius  Mucius  Scaevola, 
the  founder  of  scientific  jurisprudence  in  Rome,  and  a  man  whose 
abstention  from  party  conflict  gave  his  opinion  the  greater  weight. 

At  the  outset  Tiberius  proposed  what  was  in  a  certain  sense 
but  the  renewal  of  the  Licinio-Sextian  law  of  367  b.c.  Under  it 
all  the  state  lands  held  and  enjoyed  without  remuneration  were  to 
be  resumed  on  behalf  of  the  state,  with  the  restriction  that  each  oc- 
cupier should  reserve  for  himself  three  hundred  acres  and  for  each 
son  one  hundred  and  fifty  acres  (so  as,  however,  not  to  exceed  a 
total  of  six  hundred  acres)  in  permanent  and  guaranteed  posses- 
sion; moreover,  compensation  was  to  be  given  to  an  ejected  occu- 
pier for  any  improvements  executed  by  him.  The  domain  land  thus 
resumed  was  to  be  broken  up  into  lots  of  eighteen  acres,  and  to  be 
distributed  among  burgesses  and  Italian  allies  on  permanent  lease 
at  a  moderate  rent,  and  the  new  holders  were  bound  to  use  the  land 
for  agriculture.  A  board  or  "  college  "  of  three  men,  regarded  as 
ordinary  state  magistrates  and  annually  elected  by  the  people,  was 
intrusted  with  the  work  of  confiscation  and  distribution ;  and  later 
the  same  board  had  the  difficult  and  important  task  of  determining 
what  was  domain  land  and  what  private  property. 

This  permanent  executive,  the  absence  of  which  had  chiefly 
caused  the  Licinian  rogations  to  remain  in  abeyance,  was  the  special 
point  of  difference  between  the  Sempronian  and  the  older  proposals. 
War  was  thus  declared  against  the  great  landholders,  whose  organ 
now,  as  three  centuries  ago,  was  the  senate.     The  old  plan  was 


176  ROME 

134-133   B.C. 

adopted  of  silencing  Tiberius.  His  colleague  Marcus  Octavius  in- 
terposed his  veto  when  the  measure  was  about  to  be  put  to  the  vote ; 
Gracchus  replied  by  suspending  all  public  business  and  administra- 
tion of  justice.  He  again  brought  his  law  to  the  vote,  and  Octavius 
again  vetoed  it.  Gracchus,  now  feeling  that  all  constitutional  means 
were  exhausted,  began  a  revolution  by  proposing  to  the  burgesses 
that  they  should  vote  whether  he  or  Octavius  should  retire  from 
office.  Such  deposition  was  impossible  according  to  the  Roman 
constitution,  but  Gracchus  persevered,  and  was,  of  course,  backed 
up  by  the  almost  unanimous  vote  of  the  assembled  multitude.  He 
then  had  his  opponent  removed  from  the  tribunes'  bench,  and  amid 
great  rejoicing  the  law  was  carried. 

The  first  three  commissioners  elected  were  Tiberius  Gracchus, 
his  brother,  and  his  father-in-law  Appius.  Such  a  family  selection 
only  irritated  the  aristocratic  party  still  more,  and  the  strife  was 
carried  into  every  district  where  the  commissioners'  task  lay. 
Gracchus'  very  life  was  in  danger,  and  he  appeared  in  public  with  a 
retinue  of  three  thousand  men — a  step  possibly  necessary,  but  the 
cause  of  bitter  words  from  senators  as  well  disposed  to  him  as 
Metellus.  He  clearly  saw  that  he  was  a  lost  man  unless  he  con- 
tinued indispensable  to  the  people,  and  that  his  only  course  lay  in 
forming  fresh  plans  and  introducing  still  wider  reforms.  So  he 
proposed  that  the  treasures  of  Pergamus,  which  had  just  been  be- 
queathed to  Rome,  should  be  divided  among  the  new  landholders 
for  the  purchase  of  the  necessary  farming  implements  and  stock. 
What  his  other  proposals  were  we  do  not  know,  but  it  is  certain 
that  he  was  well  aware  that  reelection  to  the  tribunate  could  alone 
secure  his  safety.  At  the  next  meeting  of  the  tribes  to  elect  tribunes, 
the  aristocratic  party  opposed  its  veto  with  the  effect  that  the  as- 
sembly broke  up  on  the  first  and  second  days  without  accomplishing 
its  object,  though  on  both  occasions  the  first  divisions  voted  for 
Gracchus.  To  attain  his  object  at  the  second  meeting  of  the  tribes 
Gracchus  had  resorted  to  every  art,  and  even  employed  force  to 
expel  his  opponents;  they,  in  their  turn,  spread  abroad  that  he  had 
deposed  all  the  other  tribunes  and  was  aiming  at  sole  power.  On 
the  assembling  of  the  senate  the  consul  Scaevola  refused  the  urgent 
request  for  the  death  of  Tiberius,  whereupon  Publius  Scipio  Nasica, 
at  the  head  of  an  aristocratic  following  armed  with  legs  of  benches 
and  clubs,  began  the  civil  bloodshed.  Tiberius  was  struck  down  on 
the  slope  of  the  capitol,  and  his  body,  with  the  corpses  of  three 


THE     GRACCHI  177 

133    B.C. 

hundred  adherents,  was  thrown  into  the  Tiber.  Such  a  day  had 
never  before  been  seen  in  Rome.  The  more  moderate  aristocrats 
had  not  only  to  acquiesce  in,  but  even  to  defend,  the  deed  of  blood, 
as  was  the  case  with  Publius  Scaevola  and  even  Scipio  Aemilianus, 
and  official  sanction  was  given  to  the  assertion  that  Gracchus  had 
aimed  at  the  crown. 

It  remains  for  us  to  form  some  judgment  touching  events  so 
momentous.  In  the  first  place,  the  appointment  of  an  official  com- 
mission, though  a  sign  of  the  unhealthy  state  of  things,  was  a 
judicious  and  necessary  step.  In  the  second  place  the  distribution 
of  the  domain  lands  was  not  in  itself  a  question  affecting  the  ex- 
isting constitution  or  the  government  of  the  aristocracy ;  nor,  seeing 
that  the  state  was  admitted  to  be  the  owner  of  the  occupied  land, 
was  it  a  violation  of  rights.  But,  inasmuch  as  many  of  these  lands 
had  been  in  private  hereditary  possession  for  as  long  as  three  cen- 
turies, the  state's  proprietorship  in  the  soil  had  virtually  lost  its 
character  of  private  right  and  become  extinct.  Therefore,  though 
legally  defensible,  the  resumption  of  these  lands  by  the  state  was 
regarded  as  an  ejection  of  the  great  landholders  for  the  benefit  of 
the  agricultural  proletariate.  Still,  strong  as  the  objections  to  such 
a  course  might  be,  the  fact  remains  that  no  other  plan  seemed 
capable  of  checking  the  extinction  of  the  farmer-class  in  Italy.  But, 
whatever  view  wise  men  took  of  the  aims  of  Tiberius  Gracchus, 
none  could  approve  of  his  method.  He  practically  began  a  revolu- 
tion with  regard  to  the  spirit  of  the  constitution  when  he  submitted 
his  agrarian  proposals  to  the  people,  and  it  was  a  revolution  with 
regard  to  the  letter,  when  he  destroyed  for  all  time  the  tribunician 
veto,  by  which  the  senate  rid  itself  of  interference  with  its  govern- 
ment, by  the  unconstitutional  deposition  of  his  colleague.  Yet  even 
this  was  not  the  moral  and  political  mistake  of  Gracchus;  for  a 
revolutionist  may  be  at  the  same  time  a  sagacious  and  praiseworthy 
statesman.  The  essential  defects  of  the  Gracchan  revolution  lay  in 
the  nature  of  the  burgess  assemblies  at  that  time.  The  sovereign 
assembly  of  Rome  was  what  it  would  be  in  England,  if,  instead  of 
sending  representatives,  the  electors  of  England  were  to  meet  to- 
gether in  Parliament.  Not  only  was  the  assembly  a  chance  con- 
glomeration of  men  assembled  in  the  capital,  incapable  of  intelligent 
action  and  agitated  by  every  interest  and  passion,  and,  therefore,  as 
a  rule,  ready  to  accept  and  ratify  the  decree  of  the  proposing  magis- 
trate, but   it   was  also,  in  no  small  degree,  under  the  influence  of 


178  ROME 

134-125  B.C. 

the  opinion  of  the  street.  Although  the  contiones,  or  meetings  of 
the  street  populace,  had  legally  no  power,  and  consisted  of  the  low- 
est rabble,  of  Egyptians,  Jews,  street  boys,  and  slaves,  yet  the 
opinion  of  the  masses,  evinced  by  the  loud  shouts  of  approval  or 
disapproval,  began  to  be  a  power  in  Rome.  It  was  bad  enough  that 
the  demoralized  and  disorganized  comitia  should  be  made  use  of 
for  the  elections  and  legislation;  but  when  they  were  allowed  to 
interfere  with  the  government,  and  when  the  senate  lost  the  in- 
strument to  prevent  such  interferences — when  they  could  decree 
themselves  lands,  and  when  a  single  person  by  his  influence  with 
the  proletariate  could  thus  play  the  part  of  ruler  and  dictate  to  the 
senate — then  Rome  had  reached  the  end  of  popular  freedom  and 
had  arrived,  not  at  democracy,  but  at  monarchy.  The  very  fact 
that  Tiberius  Gracchus  never  harbored  the  thought  of  deposing  the 
senate  and  making  himself  sole  ruler,  but  was  the  victim  of  events 
which  irresistibly  urged  him  into  the  career  of  demagogue  tyrant, 
was  only  a  fresh  ground  of  charge  against  him  rather  than  a  justifi- 
cation. The  infamous  butchery  which  slew  him  condemns  the 
aristocratic  party,  and  has  cast  a  halo  of  martyrdom  round  his 
name — a  glory  undeserved  both  in  the  opinion  of  his  mother  and 
of  Scipio  Aemilianus. 

Though  Tiberius  was  dead,  his  two  works,  the  land  distribu- 
tion and  the  revolution,  survived  their  author.  Indeed,  the  mod- 
erate party  in  the  senate,  headed  by  Metellus  and  Scaevola,  in 
combination  with  the  adherents  of  Scipio,  gained  the  upper  hand, 
and  the  land  commission,  composed  now  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  Marcus 
Flaccus,  and  Gaius  Carbo,  continued  its  work.  The  census  fur- 
nishes the  strongest  evidence  that  the  distribution  of  the  domain 
lands  went  on  very  vigorously,  an  increase  of  76,000  burgesses 
being  noted  in  six  years,  from  131-125  b.c.  But  the  commission- 
ers, in  their  ardor,  overreached  themselves.  They  attacked  that 
part  of  the  lands  which  had  been  assigned  by  decrees  to  Italian 
communities,  or  which  had  been  occupied  with  or  without  per- 
mission by  Latin  burgesses.  The  senate  could  not  disregard  the 
complaints  of  those  communities  who  were  already  smarting  under 
other  wrongs,  and  the  Latins  appealed  for  protection  to  the  most 
prominent  man  in  Rome,  Scipio  Aemilianus.  Through  his  influ- 
ence the  people  in  129  b.c.  decreed  that  the  commissioners'  juris- 
diction should  be  suspended,  and  that  the  consuls  should  decide 
what  were  domain  lands  and  what  private  property.     Thus  prac- 


THEGRACCHI  179 

129-123    B.C. 

tically  the  land  distribution  ceased,  and  the  reform  party  were  bit- 
terly indignant  at  Scipio's  intervention.  Shortly  afterwards  Scipio 
was  found  dead  in  his  bed,  murdered,  no  doubt,  by  some  assassin, 
at  the  instigation  of  the  Gracchan  party.  The  matter  was  hushed 
up  as  far  as  possible,  both  parties  in  the  state  being  glad  to  let  it 
rest;  but  all  men  of  moderate  views  were  horrified  at  so  atrocious 
a  crime. 

The  revolution  still  went  on  under  the  leadership  of  the  orator 
Carbo,  Flaccus,  and  Gaius  Gracchus.  The  chief  object  of  the  revo- 
lutionary party  was  to  revive  the  allotment  commission,  and  to  this 
end  they  proposed  to  confer  the  rights  of  citizenship  on  the  Italian 
allies.  Marcus  Pennus,  tribune  in  126  B.C.,  and  member  of  the 
aristocratic  party,  carried  his  proposal  that  all  non-burgesses  should 
leave  the  city.  Flaccus,  consul  in  125  b.cv  made  a  counter-proposal 
that  every  ally  should  take  the  vote  of  the  comitia  on  the  subject 
of  his  request  to  be  entitled  to  Roman  citizenship.  But  Carbo  had  de- 
serted the  popular  party  and  joined  the  aristocrats,  and  Gaius 
Gracchus  was  away  as  questor  in  Sardinia;  so  Flaccus's  proposal 
found  no  support,  and  he  left  Rome  to  take  command  against  the 
Celts.  Still,  his  action  bore  fruit  in  the  revolt  of  Fregellae,  at  that 
time  the  second  city  in  Italy  and  the  mouthpiece  of  the  Latin  colo- 
nies. This  was  the  first  instance,  for  one  hundred  and  fifty  years, 
of  a  serious  insurrection  in  Italy  against  Rome,  without  the  insti- 
gation of  foreign  powers.  But  before  it  spread  Fregellae  was  sur- 
prised and  seriously  punished  by  the  loss  of  its  walls  and  all  its 
privileges,  in  124  B.C.  The  democratic  party  was  regarded  as  im- 
plicated in  the  revolt  of  Fregellae,  and  Gaius  Gracchus,  who  had 
returned  from  Sardinia,  was  tried,  but  acquitted.  He  now  threw 
down  the  gauntlet,  and  by  being  elected  tribune  in  123  B.C. 
declared  open  war  upon  the  aristocracy. 

Gaius  resembled  his  brother  only  in  his  dislike  for  vulgar 
pleasures  and  pursuits,  in  his  culture  and  personal  bravery.  He  was 
decidedly  his  superior  in  talent,  character,  and  passion.  His  ability 
as  a  statesman  was  evinced  in  his  clearness  and  self-possession,  in 
his  grasp  of  details  and  practical  powers.  His  lovable  nature  was 
proved  by  the  devotion  of  his  intimate  friends.  Disciplined  by 
suffering,  he  masked  the  terrible  energy  of  his  nature  and  the  bitter 
indignation  he  felt  against  the  aristocracy  by  a  compulsory  reserve. 
At  times,  indeed,  his  passion  mastered  him,  and  caused  his  brilliant 
oratory  to  become  confused  and  faltering;  but  he  was  one  of  the 


180  ROME 

123   B.C. 

greatest  speakers  Rome  ever  saw.  He  had  none  of  the  sentimental 
good-nature  of  his  brother ;  fully  and  firmly  resolved,  he  entered  on 
the  career  of  revolution  with  vengeance  as  his  goal  and  aim.  To 
attain  this  end  he  counted  not  too  great  the  price  of  his  own  fall 
and  the  ruin  of  the  state.  His  mother's  creed,  that  the  country 
should  at  all  cost  be  saved,  was  nobler,  but  posterity  has  been  right 
in  rather  lamenting  than  blaming  the  course  taken  by  her  son. 

The  proposals  now  made  by  Gracchus  were  nothing  less  than 
a  new  constitution,  the  foundation-stone  of  which  rested  upon  the 
legal  right  of  the  same  man  to  be  elected  tribune  for  two  or  more 
years  in  succession.  This  having  been  carried,  the  next  object  was 
to  attach  the  multitude  of  the  capital  to  the  holder  of  the  tribunate. 
This  was  first  of  all  effected  by  distributions  of  corn.  Gaius  enacted 
that  every  burgess,  on  personal  application,  should  receive  a 
monthly  allowance  of  i^  bushels  at  the  extremely  low  rate  of  24 
cents  a  bushel.  This  measure  would  both  attract  into  the  capital 
the  whole  mass  of  the  burgess  proletariate,  and  would  make  them 
dependent  on  the  tribune,  and  supply  him  with  a  bodyguard  and  a 
firm  majority  in  the  comitia.  Though  thus  securing  his  position  in 
Rome,  he  did  not  neglect  to  legislate  for  the  existing  social  evils. 
His  agrarian  law  only  revived  that  of  his  brother,  and  he  did  not 
proceed  any  further  in  the  distribution  of  domain  land.  But  by 
establishing  colonies  at  Tarentum  and  Capua,  he  rendered  that 
land,  which  had  been  let  on  lease  by  the  state  and  had  been  exempt 
from  distribution,  liable  to  be  divided;  and  no  doubt  he  intended 
these  colonies  to  aid  in  defending  the  revolution  to  which  they  owed 
their  existence.  He  also  opened  a  new  outlet  for  the  Italian  pro- 
letariate by  sending  six  thousand  colonists  chosen  from  Italian  allies 
as  well  as  from  Roman  citizens — to  the  site  of  Carthage.  Fur- 
ther, Gracchus  attempted  to  restrict  capital  punishment  as  far  as 
possible,  by  withdrawing  the  cognizance  of  such  crimes  as  poisoning 
and  murder  from  the  popular  assemblies  and  intrusting  it  to  perma- 
nent judicial  commissions.  These  tribunals  could  only  sentence  a 
man  to  exile,  and  their  sentence  could  not  be  appealed  from,  nor 
could  they,  like  the  tribunals  of  the  people,  be  broken  up  by  the 
intercession  of  a  tribune. 

In  order  to  work  the  ruin  of  the  aristocracy,  Gracchus  took 
advantage  of  the  already  existing  elements  favorable  to  a  rupture 
in  that  body.  The  aristocracy  of  the  rich  consisted  of  two  classes, 
the  governing  senatorial  families  whose  capital    was   invested    in 


THEGRACCHI  181 

123  B.C. 

land,  and  the  wealthy  merchants  and  speculators,  who  conducted  all 
the  money  transactions  of  the  empire,  and  who  had  gradually  risen 
to  take  their  place  by  the  side  of  the  older  aristocracy.  At  the 
present  time  the  latter  class  was  generally  known  as  the  equestrian 
order,  which  title  had  gradually  come  to  be  used  of  all  who  pos- 
sessed an  estate  of  at  least  twenty  thousand  dollars,  and  as  such 
were  liable  to  cavalry  service.  Already  senators  had  been  marked 
off  from  this  body  by  a  law  passed  in  129  B.C.,  but  many  members 
of  senatorial  families,  not  yet  members  of  the  senate,  were  included 
in  the  equites.  The  natural  antipathy  between  the  aristocrats  of 
blood  and  those  of  wealth  was  adroitly  increased  by  Gracchus,  until 
the  equestrian  order  ranged  itself  on  his  side.  Partly  by  conferring 
on  them  various  insignia,  but  still  more  by  offering  them  the  reve- 
nues of  Asia  and  the  jury  courts,  Gracchus  won  over  the  class  of 
material  interests.  Hitherto  the  direct  taxes  of  each  province  had 
been  farmed  by  the  provincials  themselves,  and  thus  the  Roman 
publicani  had  been  kept  at  a  distance.  Gracchus  now  enacted  that 
Asia  should  be  burdened  with  the  heaviest  taxes,  both  direct  and 
indirect,  and  that  these  taxes  should  be  put  up  for  auction  in  Rome ; 
he  thus  excluded  the  provincials  from  participation,  and  gave  the 
capitalists  an  opening  for  the  farming  of  these  various  taxes,  of 
which  they  did  not  fail  to  avail  themselves. 

Having  thus  opened  up  a  gold  mine  for  the  merchant  princes, 
Gracchus  gave  them  a  sphere  for  public  action  in  the  jury  courts. 
Most  processes,  alike  civil  and  criminal,  were  up  to  this  time  de- 
cided by  single  jurymen  or  by  commissioners,  whether  permanent 
or  extraordinary,  and  in  both  cases  the  members  had  been  ex- 
clusively taken  from  the  senate.  Gracchus  now  transferred  the 
functions  of  jurymen,  both  in  strictly  civil  processes  and  in  the 
various  commissions,  to  the  equestrian  order,  and  directed  a  new 
list  of  judices  to  be  made  out  annually  from  all  persons  of  equestrian 
rating.  The  result  of  these  measures  was  that  not  only  was  the 
moneyed  class  united  into  a  compact  and  privileged  order  on  the  solid 
basis  of  material  interests,  but  that  also,  as  a  judicial  and  controlling 
power,  it  was  almost  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  ruling 
aristocracy.  All  the  old  antipathies  found  expression  in  the 
sentences  of  the  new  jurymen,  and  the  senator,  on  his  return  from 
governing  a  province,  had  no  longer  to  pass  the  scrutiny  of  his 
brother  peers,  but  of  merchants  and  bankers. 

For  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  senate,  Gracchus  not  only 


182  ROME 

123-122    B.C. 

had  to  deprive  it  of  the  substance  of  its  powers  by  legislative 
changes,  but  also  to  ruin  the  existing  aristocracy  by  more  personal 
and  less  permanent  measures.  He  did  both.  For  not  only  did  he 
deprive  the  senate  of  administrative  power  by  settling  questions  by 
comitial  laws,  dictated  as  a  rule  by  the  tribune,  but  also  by  taking 
the  business  of  the  state  into  his  own  hands.  He  had  meddled  with 
the  state  finances  by  his  distributions  of  corn ;  with  the  domain  lands 
by  sending  out  colonies,  not  at  the  decree  of  the  senate,  but  of  the 
people;  with  the  provincial  administration  by  overturning  the 
provincial  constitution  of  Asia  and  substituting  his  own  for  that 
of  the  senate.  The  marvelous  activity  Gracchus  showed  in  all  his 
new  functions  quite  threw  into  the  shade  the  lax  administration  of 
the  senate,  and  began  to  make  it  clear  to  the  people  that  one  vigor- 
ous man  could  control  the  business  of  the  state  better  than  a  college 
of  effete  aristocrats.  Still  more  vigorous  was  his  interference  with 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  senate.  He  forbade  their  appointing  any 
extraordinary  commission  of  high  treason,  such  as  had  tried  his 
brother's  adherents,  and  he  even  planned  to  reinforce  the  senate  by 
three  hundred  new  members,  to  be  elected  by  the  comitia  from  the 
equestrian  order. 

Such  was  the  political  constitution  projected  and  carried  by 
Gaius  Gracchus,  as  tribune,  in  123  and  122  B.C.,  without  any  seri- 
ous resistance  or  recourse  to  force.  It  is  clear  that  he  did  not  wish 
to  place  the  Roman  Republic  on  a  new  democratic  basis,  but  that  he 
wished  to  abolish  it  and  introduce  in  its  stead  an  absolute  despotism, 
in  the  form  of  an  unlimited  tribuneship  for  life.  Nor  can  he  be 
blamed  for  it;  as,  though  an  absolute  monarchy  is  a  great  mis- 
fortune for  a  nation,  it  is  a  less  misfortune  than  an  absolute 
oligarchy.  Besides  this,  he  was  fired  with  the  passion  for  a  speedy 
vengeance,  and  was  in  fact  a  political  incendiary, — the  author  not 
only  of  the  one  hundred  years'  revolution,  which  dates  from  him, 
but  the  founder  of  that  terrible  urban  proletariate  which,  utterly 
demoralized  by  corn  largesses  and  the  flattery  of  the  classes  above 
it,  and  at  the  same  time  conscious  of  its  power,  lay  like  an  incubus 
for  five  hundred  years  on  the  Roman  commonwealth,  and  only 
perished  with  it. 

Many  of  the  fundamental  maxims  of  Roman  monarchy  may 
be  traced  to  Gracchus.  He  first  laid  down  that  all  the  land  of  sub- 
ject communities  was  to  be  regarded  as  the  private  property  of  the 
state — a  maxim  first  applied  to  vindicate  the  right  of  the  state  to 


THEGRACCHI  183 

122  B.C. 

tax  the  land  and  then  to  send  out  colonies  to  it,  which  later 
became  a  fundamental  principle  of  law  under  the  empire.  He  in- 
vented the  tactics  by  which  his  successors  broke  down  the  govern- 
ing aristocracy,  and  substituted  strict  and  judicious  administration 
for  the  previous  misgovernment.  He  first  opened  the  way  to  a 
reconciliation  between  Rome  and  the  provinces,  and  his  attempt  to 
rebuild  Carthage  and  to  give  an  opportunity  for  Italian  emigration 
to  the  provinces  was  the  first  link  in  the  chain  of  that  beneficial 
course  of  action.  Right  and  wrong,  fortune  and  misfortune,  were 
so  inextricably  blended  in  this  singular  man  and  in  this  marvelous 
political  constellation,  that  it  may  well  beseem  history  in  this  case — 
though  it  beseems  her  but  seldom — to  reserve  her  judgment. 

Having  thus  established  his  new  constitution,  Gracchus  turned 
to  the  task  of  enfranchising  the  Italian  allies,  which  had  been  pro- 
posed and  rejected  in  125  B.C.  But  a  considerable  section  of  the 
mob,  thinking  that  their  own  interests  would  be  seriously  injured 
by  a  new  influx  of  men  to  share  the  profits  they  were  enjoying, 
combined  with  the  senate  in  rejecting  the  proposal,  made  by 
Gracchus  in  122  b.  c,  that  the  Latins  should  receive  the  full  fran- 
chise. This  encouraged  the  senate  to  work  his  ruin.  Another 
tribune,  Marcus  Livius  Drusus,  was  put  forward  to  outbid  him  for 
the  popular  favor  by  offering  the  proletariate  more  than  he  had 
done.  Those  who  had  received  land  under  the  Gracchan  laws  were 
to  be  freed  from  their  rent,  and  twelve  new  Italian  colonies  were 
to  be  founded.  Gracchus  was  away  at  the  time  in  Africa,  founding 
the  Carthaginian  colony,  and  the  incapacity  of  his  lieutenant,  Mar- 
cus Flaccus,  made  all  easy  for  his  opponents.  The  people  ratified 
the  Livian  laws  as  readily  as  they  had  the  Sempronian,  and  then 
declined  to  reelect  Gracchus,  when  he  stood  for  the  third  time  for 
office.  On  December  10,  122  B.C.,  therefore,  he  ceased  to  be  tribune 
and  so  lay  exposed  to  the  vengeance  of  the  enemies  he  had  made. 

The  first  attack  was  directed  against  the  most  unpopular  meas- 
ure of  Gracchus,  the  restoration  of  Carthage.  National  supersti- 
tion was  invoked,  and  the  senate  proposed  a  law  to  prevent  the 
planting  of  the  colony.  Gracchus,  attended  by  an  armed  crowd  of 
partisans,  appeared  on  the  day  of  voting  at  the  Capitol,  to  procure 
the  rejection  of  the  law.  The  sight  of  his  armed  adherents,  and 
the  intense  excitement  which  prevailed,  could  hardly  have  failed  to 
result  in  a  collision  between  the  two  sides.  A  tumult  broke  out,  in 
which  a  lictor  attending  the  consul  was  killed,  but  a  heavy  rain  dis- 


184  ROME 

121    B.C. 

persed  the  people  for  the  time.  Next  day  the  consul,  Lucius 
Opimius,  a  personal  enemy  of  Gracchus,  took  vigorous  measures 
to  put  down  the  insurrection,  and  the  Gracchan  party,  under  the 
command  of  Flaccus,  took  refuge  on  the  Aventine,  where  they  en- 
trenched themselves.  Gracchus  was  averse  to  resistance,  but 
Flaccus  hoped  to  come  to  a  compromise  with  his  foes.  The  aristo- 
crats rejected  all  his  proposals,  and  ordered  an  attack  on  the 
Aventine.  The  defenders  of  the  mount  were  speedily  dispersed, 
and  Flaccus  was  killed  after  vainly  seeking  concealment.  Gracchus 
was  persuaded  to  fly,  but  sprained  his  foot  in  the  attempt.  The 
devotion  of  two  of  his  attendants,  who  sacrificed  their  lives  to  give 
him  time  to  escape,  enabled  him  and  his  slave  to  cross  the  Tiber. 
Here,  in  a  grove,  both  he  and  his  slave  were  found  dead.  The  Grac- 
chan party  was  hunted  down  by  prosecutions,  and  three  thousand 
are  said  to  have  been  strangled  in  prison.  The  memory  of  the 
Gracchi  was  officially  proscribed,  and  Cornelia  was  forbidden  to  put 
on  mourning  for  the  death  of  her  son ;  but,  despite  the  precautions 
of  the  police,  the  common  people  continued  to  pay  a  religious  ven- 
eration to  the  spots  where  the  two  leaders  of  the  revolution  had 
perished. 


Chapter    XIX 

THE   RULE   OF  THE   RESTORATION.     121-101    B.C. 

GRACCHUS  had  fallen,  and  with  him  the  structure  he  had 
■  reared ;  nor  was  there  anyone  left  fit  to  take  the  lead  of  the 
Gracchan  party.  But,  though  the  aristocracy  once  more 
ruled,  it  was  the  rule  of  a  restoration,  which  is  always  in  itself  a 
revolution ;  and  in  this  case  it  was  not  so  much  the  old  government 
as  the  old  governor  that  was  restored.  The  senate  practically  con- 
tinued to  govern  with  the  constitution  of  the  Gracchi,  though  no 
doubt  resolved  to  purge  it  in  due  time  from  the  elements  hostile  to 
its  own  order.  The  distributions  of  grain,  the  taxation  of  Asia, 
and  the  new  arrangements  as  to  jurymen  and  tribunals  remained  as 
before ;  nay,  the  senate  exceeded  Gracchus  in  the  homage  it  paid  to 
the  mercantile  class,  and,  more  especially,  to  the  proletariate.  But 
the  noble  scheme  of  Gracchus  to  introduce  legal  equality,  first  be- 
tween the  Roman  burgesses  and  Italy,  and  then  between  Italy  and 
the  provinces,  and  also  his  attempt  to  solve  the  social  question  by  a 
comprehensive  system  of  emigration,  were  alike  disregarded  by  the 
aristocrats.  They  still  held  fast  to  the  principle  that  Italy  ought  to 
remain  the  ruling  land,  and  Rome  the  ruling  city  in  Italy.  The 
colony  of  Narbo,  founded  in  118  B.C.,  was  the  sole  exception  to  the 
success  of  the  government  in  preventing  assignations  of  land  out- 
side Italy.  So  also  the  Italian  colonies  of  Gracchus  were  can- 
celed, and,  where  already  planted,  were  again  broken  up;  those 
who  had  received  domain  lands,  not  by  virtue  of  being  members  of 
a  colony,  retained  their  possessions.  With  regard  to  those  domain 
lands,  which  were  still  held  by  the  right  of  occupation,  and  from 
which  to  a  great  extent  the  thirty-six  thousand  new  allotments 
promised  by  Drusus  were  to  have  been  formed,  it  was  resolved  to 
maintain  the  rights  of  the  present  occupiers,  so  as  to  preclude  the 
possibility  of  future  distribution. 

The  allotment  commission  was  abolished  in  119  B.C.,  and  a 
fixed  rent  imposed  on  the  occupants  of  the  domain  land,  the  pro- 
ceeds of  which  went  to  benefit  the  populace  of  the  capital. 

185 


186  ROME 

111-102   B.C. 

The  final  step  was  taken  in  1 1 1  B.C.,  when  the  occupied  domain 
land  was  converted  into  the  rent-free  private  property  of  the  former 
occupants.  It  was  added  that  in  future  domain  land  was  not  to  be 
occupied  at  all,  but  was  either  to  be  leased  or  lie  open  as  public  pas- 
ture; thus  too  late  the  injurious  character  of  the  occupation  system 
was  officially  recognized,  when  the  state  had  lost  almost  all  its  do- 
main lands.  The  aristocracy  thus  converted  all  the  occupied  lands 
they  still  held  into  private  property,  and  pacified  the  Italian  allies 
by  preserving  their  rights  with  regard  to  the  Latin  domain  land, 
though  they  did  not  actually  confer  it  upon  them. 

But  practically  the  restored  government  was  powerless  in  the 
presence  of  the  dread  forces  evoked  by  Gracchus.  The  proletariate 
of  the  capital  continued  to  have  a  recognized  claim  to  being  kept  by 
largesses  of  corn ;  and  the  attempt  by  the  consul  Quintus  Caepio  in 
106  B.C.,  to  transfer  the  courts  back  again  to  the  senatorial  order, 
resulted  in  failure.  The  miserable  condition  of  the  senate  at  this 
period  is  only  too  apparent:  its  rule  rested  on  the  same  basis  as 
that  of  Gracchus,  and  its  strength  lay  only  in  its  league  with  the 
city  rabble  or  with  the  mercantile  order;  confronted  with  either, 
it  was  powerless.  It  sat  on  the  vacated  throne  with  an  evil  con- 
science and  divided  hopes,  indignant  at  the  institutions  of  the  state 
which  it  ruled,  and  yet  incapable  of  even  systematically  assailing 
them,  vacillating  in  all  its  conduct  except  where  its  own  material 
advantage  prompted  decision,  a  picture  of  faithlessness  towards  its 
own  as  well  as  the  opposite  party,  of  inward  inconsistency,  of  the 
most  pitiful  impotence,  of  the  meanest  selfishness — an  unsurpassed 
ideal  of  misrule.  Moral  and  intellectual  decay  had  fallen  upon  the 
whole  nation,  and  especially  on  the  upper  classes.  The  aristocracy 
returned  to  power  with  the  curse  of  restoration  upon  it,  and  it  re- 
turned neither  wiser  nor  better.  Incompetency  marked  alike  its 
leaders  in  the  world  of  politics  and  on  the  field  of  battle.  Social 
ruin  spread  apace;  small  farm-holders  quickly  disappeared;  and  in 
i oo  B.C.  it  was  said  that  among  the  whole  burgesses  there  were 
scarce  two  thousand  wealthy  families.  Slave  insurrections  became 
almost  annual  in  Italy,  the  most  serious  of  which  was  in  the  terri- 
tory of  Thurii,  headed  by  a  Roman  knight  named  Titus  Vettius, 
whom  his  debts  had  driven  to  take  this  step  in  104  B.C.  Piracy  was 
practiced  in  the  Mediterranean  by  the  magisterial  and  mercantile 
classes  of  Rome  as  well  as  by  professional  freebooters.  At  last  the 
government  was  forced  to  dispatch  a  fleet,  in  102  B.C.,  and  occupy 


THE     RESTORATION  187 

104-101   B.C. 

stations  on  the  eoast  of  Cilicia,  the  main  seat  of  the  pirates,  and  this 
was  the  first  step  to  the  establishment  of  the  province  of  Cilicia ;  but 
piracy  flourished  in  spite  of  these  precautions. 

Throughout  the  provinces  slaves  constantly  rose  in  insurrec- 
tion; and  the  most  terrible  tumults  occurred,  as  usual,  in  Sicily, 
which  swarmed  with  slaves  brought  from  Asia  Minor  to  work  on 
the  plantations.  Practically,  too,  the  free  natives  were  little  better 
than  slaves,  and  many  had  become  enrolled  as  such.  Publius 
Nerva,  the  governor  of  Sicily,  in  104  b.c.  was  ordered  by  the  senate 
to  hold  a  court  at  Syracuse,  and  to  investigate  the  cases  of  those 
who  applied  for  freedom.  Numbers  were  declared  free,  and,  in 
alarm,  the  planters  succeeded  in  causing  Nerva  to  suspend  the  court 
and  to  order  the  rest  of  the  applicants  to  return  to  their  former 
masters.  This  set  ablaze  the  smoldering  embers  of  revolt.  A  band 
of  slaves  defeated  part  of  the  garrison  at  Enna,  and  thus  supplied 
themselves  with  arms;  they  placed  a  slave  at  their  head  with  the 
title  of  King  Tryphon.  The  open  country  between  Enna  and 
Leontini  was  overrun  by  their  forces,  and  they  defeated  a  hastily- 
collected  force  of  militia  under  the  Roman  governor  with  ridicu- 
lous ease. 

On  the  west  coast  a  still  more  serious  revolt  arose  under  the 
leadership  of  Athenion,  who  had  been  a  robber  captain  in  Cilicia, 
and  was  alike  versed  in  military  tactics  and  in  the  superstitious  arts 
so  necessary  for  gaining  a  hold  on  vulgar  minds.  He  avoided 
jealous  quarrels  by  submitting  to  King  Tryphon,  and  the  two  ruled 
all  the  flat  country  in  Sicily  and  laid  siege  to  many  towns,  Messana 
itself  being  all  but  captured  by  Athenion.  Rome  was  at  that  time 
engaged  with  the  war  against  the  Cimbri,  but  in  103  B.C.  it  sent  a 
large  force  under  Lucullus,  who  gained  a  victory,  but  did  not  follow 
it  up.  Nor  was  his  successor  Servilius  any  more  fortunate ;  and,  on 
the  death  of  Tryphon,  Athenion,  in  102  B.C.,  stood  sole  ruler  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  island.  In  101  B.C.  Manius  Aquillius,  who  had 
gained  distinction  in  the  war  with  the  Teutones,  arrived,  and,  after 
two  years  of  hard  struggles,  quelled  the  revolt  and  killed  Athenion, 
thus  terminating  the  war  after  five  years. 

A  clear  proof  of  the  gross  incompetency  of  the  senate  is  fur- 
nished by  the  origin  and  conduct  of  this  second  Sicilian  slave  war.  If 
we  turn  our  eyes  to  Africa,  this  is  still  more  clearly  proved  by  the 
fourteen  years'  insurrection  and  usurpation  successfully  achieved 
by  Jugurtha.     Numidia  included  the  greatest  portion  of  the  terri- 


188  ROME 

121-112    B.C. 

tory  held  by  Carthage  in  its  days  of  prosperity,  as  well  as  several 
old  Phoenician  cities,  and  thus  embraced  the  largest  and  the  best 
part  of  the  rich  seaboard  of  northern  Africa.  This  kingdom  was 
now  ruled  over  by  Adherbal,  grandson  of  Massinissa,  and  his  ille- 
gitimate cousin,  Jugurtha,  who  had  secured  the  assassination  of 
another  heir,  and  was  constantly  intriguing  against  Adherbal. 
Civil  war  arose  between  the  two  in  118  B.C.,  in  which  all  Numidia 
took  part.  Jugurtha  was  victorious,  and  seized  the  whole  king- 
dom, while  Adherbal  escaped  and  made  his  complaints  in  person  at 
Rome.  Jugurtha's  envoys,  however,  bribed  the  senators,  and,  not- 
withstanding the  disgust  of  the  leading  men  in  Rome,  the  senate 
divided  the  kingdom  equally  between  the  two,  and  sent  Lucius 
Opimius  to  arrange  the  division.  An  unfair  distribution  gave 
Jugurtha  far  the  best  half  of  the  kingdom.  But,  not  content,  he 
tried  to  provoke  Adherbal  to  war,  and,  finding  this  impossible, 
made  war  upon  him,  and  laid  siege  to  Cirta,  which  was  defended 
more  vigorously  by  the  resident  Italians  than  by  Adherbal's  troops. 
In  answer  to  the  latter's  complaints,  the  senate  sent  a  commission  of 
inexperienced  youths,  whose  demands  Jugurtha  contemptuously 
rejected.  At  last,  when  matters  were  getting  desperate  at  Cirta, 
Rome  sent  another  commission,  headed  by  the  chief  man  of  the 
aristocracy,  Marcus  Aemilius  Scaurus;  but  the  conference  at  Utica 
ended  without  any  result.  In  the  end,  Cirta  capitulated,  and  Jugur- 
tha put  all  the  males,  whether  Italian  or  African,  to  the  sword,  in 
112  B.C.  This  was  too  much  for  the  people  in  Italy;  a  storm  broke 
out  against  the  government,  headed  by  Gaius  Memmius,  tribune 
designate  for  the  next  year,  and  war  was  declared  against  Jugurtha. 
A  Roman  army  was  sent  to  Africa,  and  Bocchus,  the  father-in-law 
of  Jugurtha  and  king  of  Mauretania,  took  the  Roman  side,  but  he 
neglected  to  bribe  the  Roman  commanders,  and  so  his  alliance  fell 
through.  Jugurtha,  on  the  other  hand,  more  wisely  made  free  use 
of  the  treasures  left  by  Massinissa,  and  gained  a  peace  on  most 
favorable  terms,  being  merely  condemned  to  pay  a  moderate  fine 
and  give  up  his  war  elephants.  On  this  the  storm  again  broke  out 
in  Rome;  all  men  now  knew  that  even  Scaurus,  who  was  serving 
in  Africa,  was  amenable  to  bribes,  and  Gaius  Memmius  pressed  for 
the  appearance  of  Jugurtha  to  answer  the  charges  made  against 
him.  The  senate  yielded,  and  granted  a  safe  conduct  to  Jugurtha ; 
but  his  gold  was  as  powerful  as  ever,  and  the  colleague  of  Mem- 
mius interposed  his  veto,  when  the  latter  addressed  his  first  question 


THE     RESTORATION  189 

110-107  B.C. 

to  the  king.  Endless  discussions  took  place  in  the  senate  as  to  the 
validity  of  the  peace,  and  Massiva,  a  grandson  of  Massinissa,  living 
in  Rome,  was  induced  to  claim  the  throne  of  Numidia.  He  was 
at  once  assassinated  by  Bomilcar,  one  of  Jugurtha's  confidants. 
This  new  outrage  caused  the  senate  to  cancel  the  peace  and  dismiss 
Jugurtha  from  the  city,  at  the  beginning  of  no  B.C.  War  was 
resumed  under  the  command  of  the  consul  Spurius  Albinus;  but, 
owing  to  the  utterly  demoralized  state  of  the  African  army,  and, 
possibly,  to  the  gold  of  Jugurtha,  Albinus  could  effect  nothing. 
His  brother,  however,  in  109  B.C.,  rashly  conceived  the  plan  of 
storming  the  town  of  Suthul,  where  Jugurtha  kept  his  treasures. 
The  attack  failed,  and  the  Roman  general  pursued  the  troops  of 
Jugurtha,  who  purposely  decoyed  him  into  the  desert.  In  a  night 
attack  the  Roman  army  was  utterly  routed,  and  the  terms  dictated 
by  Jugurtha  were  accepted,  which  involved  the  passing  of  the 
Romans  under  the  yoke,  the  evacuation  of  Numidia,  and  the  renewal 
of  the  canceled  peace. 

On  news  of  this  peace  the  fury  of  the  popular  party,  allied  for 
the  time  with  the  mercantile  classes  at  Rome,  swept  away  by 
public  prosecutions  many  of  the  highest  aristocrats.  The  second 
treaty  of  peace  was  canceled,  and  Quintus  Metellus,  an  aristocrat 
inaccessible  to  bribes  and  experienced  in  war,  had  the  conduct  of 
the  campaign  in  Africa.  Gaius  Marius  accompanied  him  as  one  of 
his  lieutenants. 

Metellus  speedly  reorganized  the  army  in  Africa,  and  in  108 
B.C.  led  it  over  the  Numidian  frontier.  He  returned  an  evasive  an- 
swer to  Jugurtha's  proposals  for  peace,  and  tried  to  end  the  war  by 
having  Jugurtha  assassinated.  Failing  in  this,  he  destroyed  the  Nu- 
midian army  in  battle  and  occupied  most  of  the  country,  but  his 
object  was  not  gained,  and  the  Roman  army  had  to  retire  into  win- 
ter quarters.  The  capture  of  Jugurtha  was  all-important  to  the 
speedy  conclusion  of  the  war.  Vaga,  one  of  the  Numidian  cities 
occupied  by  the  Romans,  revolted  early  in  107  B.C.,  and  put  to  death 
the  whole  Roman  garrison;  and,  although  Metellus  surprised  the 
town  and  gave  it  over  to  martial  law,  such  a  revolt  sufficiently 
indicated  the  difficulty  of  the  Roman  enterprise. 

In  107  B.C.  the  war  in  the  desert  went  on,  but  Jugurtha  nowhere 
withstood  the  Romans;  now  here,  now  there,  he  was  perpetually 
appearing  and  then  vanishing  from  the  scene.  Metellus  took  Thala, 
a  city  situated  on  the  edge  of  the  great  desert  and  only  to  be  reached 


190  ROME 

106-104    B.C. 

with  great  difficulty,  where  Jugurtha  had  placed  his  treasures,  chil- 
dren, and  the  flower  of  his  troops.  But  Jugurtha  escaped  with  his 
chest,  and,  though  Numidia  was  virtually  in  the  hands  of  the 
Romans,  the  war  only  seemed  to  extend  over  a  wider  area. 

Metellus  had  now  to  resign  the  command  to  his  lieutenant,  Marius. 
The  latter  had  gained  his  consulship,  in  spite  of  the  sneers  of 
Metellus  and  the  whole  aristocratic  party,  by  appealing  to  the 
credulity  of  the  Roman  mob  and  by  misleading  them  with  the  most 
unfair  and  absurd  misrepresentations  of  the  conduct  by  Metellus  of 
the  African  war.  He  succeeded  to  the  command  in  106  B.C.  In 
spite  of  his  boast  that  he  would  deliver  Jugurtha  bound  hand  and 
foot,  he  seemed  to  abandon  all  hope  of  his  capture,  and  turned  his 
attention  to  storming  towns  and  strongholds,  though  without  accom- 
plishing many  results.  Most  of  the  glory  of  the  war  fell  to  his 
lieutenant,  Sulla,  who  manifested  his  bravery  and  adroitness  con- 
spicuously in  the  negotiations  between  Marius  and  Bocchus,  and  at 
last  induced  the  latter,  with  whom  Jugurtha  had  taken  refuge,  to 
surrender  his  son-in-law  to  the  Romans.  By  an  act  of  treachery 
Jugurtha  was  given  up  to  Sulla,  and  thus  the  war  which  had  lasted 
for  seven  years  came  to  an  end.  Jugurtha  was  brought  to  Rome  on 
January  I,  104  B.C.,  and  perished  in  the  old  tullianum  in  the 
Capitol,  which  the  Numidian  king  grimly  termed  the  bath  of  ice. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Marius  cuts  but  a  sorry  figure,  when 
contrasted  with  either  his  predecessor,  Metellus,  or  his  still  more 
brilliant  officer,  Sulla.  The  fatal  consequences  produced  by  the 
praise  lavished  on  both  these  men  at  the  expense  of  Marius  bore  bit- 
ter fruit  in  succeeding  history. 

Contrary  to  the  usual  policy,  Numidia  was  not  converted  into  a 
province,  probably  because  a  standing  army  would  have  been  neces- 
sary to  protect  its  frontier.  The  most  westerly  district  was  annexed 
to  the  kingdom  of  Bocchus,  and  the  kingdom  of  Numidia  was 
handed  over  to  the  last  surviving  grandson  of  Massinissa,  a  man 
feeble  alike  in  mind  and  body.  But  politically  the  results  of  the 
Jugurthine  war  were  more  important.  It  had  made  clear  to  all, 
not  only  the  utter  baseness  and  venality  of  the  restored  senatorial 
government,  but  also  the  complete  nullity  of  the  opposition. 

It  was  not  possible  to  govern  worse  than  the  restoration  gov- 
erned from  1 17  to  109  B.C. ;  it  was  not  possible  to  be  more  defenseless 
and  forlorn  than  was  the  senate  in  109  B.C.;  had  there  been  in  Rome 
a  real  opposition,  that  is  to  say,  a  party  which  wished  and  urged  a 


THE     RESTORATION  191 

117-104  B.C. 

fundamental  alteration  of  the  constitution,  it  must  at  least  have 
made  an  attempt  to  overturn  the  restored  senate ;  but  no  such  attempt 
took  place.  The  so-called  popular  party,  as  such,  neither  could  nor 
would  govern,  and  the  only  two  possible  forms  of  government  were 
a  despotism  or  an  oligarchy.  The  appearance  of  Marius  on  the 
scene  indicated  clearly  the  danger  which  threatened  the  oligarchy. 
Probably  he  was  unaware  of  the  real  significance  of  his  action  when 
he  canvassed  the  people  for  the  supreme  command  in  Africa;  but 
there  was  evidently  an  end  of  the  restored  aristocratic  government 
when  the  comitia  began  to  make  generals,  or  when  every  popular 
officer  could  legally  nominate  himself  as  general.  As  might  be 
expected,  the  new  element  introduced  into  politics  was  the  part 
played  by  military  men.  It  could  now  be  foreseen  that  the  new  des- 
pot would  not  be  a  statesman  like  Gaius  Gracchus,  but  a  soldier  like 
Gaius  Marius.  The  contemporary  reorganization  of  the  military 
system — which  Marius  introduced  when,  in  forming  his  army 
destined  for  Africa,  he  disregarded  the  property  qualification  and 
allowed  even  the  poorest  burgess  to  enter  the  legion  as  a  volunteer 
— may  have  been  projected  by  its  author  on  purely  military  grounds ; 
but  it  was  none  the  less  a  momentous  political  event,  that  the  army 
was  no  longer,  as  formerly,  composed  of  those  who  had  much,  no 
longer  even,  as  in  the  most  recent  times,  composed  of  those  who  had 
something,  to  lose,  but  became  gradually  converted  into  a  host  of 
people  who  had  nothing  but  their  arms  and  what  the  generals 
bestowed  on  them.  The  aristocracy  ruled  in  104  B.C.  as  absolutely 
as  in  134  B.C. ;  but  the  signs  of  the  impending  catastrophe  had  multi- 
plied, and  on  the  political  horizon  the  sword  had  begun  to  appear 
by  the  side  of  the  crown. 

Let  us  now  for  awhile  turn  our  attention  outside  Rome  and 
its  political  crisis,  and  consider  what  was  taking  place  to  the  north  of 
Italy.  Behind  the  mighty  mountain  screen  nations  were  moving 
uneasily  to  and  fro,  and  reminding  the  Graeco-Roman  world  that 
it  was  not  the  sole  possessor  of  the  earth.  In  the  country  between 
the  Alps  and  Pyrenees  Rome  found  her  chief  mainstay  in  the  power- 
ful city  of  Massilia,  whose  mercantile  and  political  connections 
extended  in  all  directions.  In  that  region  the  Romans  now  pro- 
ceeded to  attack  the  various  Ligurian  and  Celtic  tribes,  and  after  a 
series  of  campaigns  succeeded  in  bringing  them  into  subjection. 
The  result  of  these  wars  was  the  creation  of  the  province  of  Narbo, 
between  the  Alps  and  the  Pyrenees,  Narbo  being  the  seat  of  the 


192  ROME 

155-110  B.C. 

governor  of  this  province,  in  which  several  Roman  settlements  were 
formed  at  Aquae  Sextiae  and  elsewhere.  The  policy  which  gave 
rise  to  this  new  field  for  colonization  was  checked  by  the  death  of 
Gaius  Gracchus,  but  the  mercantile  class  at  Rome  proved  strong 
enough  to  protect  the  colony  of  Narbo  from  the  narrower  policy 
of  the  restored  optimates. 

A  similar  problem  had  to  be  solved  in  the  northeast  of  Italy, 
but  there  Rome  contented  herself  with  taking  the  strong  town  of 
Delmium,  and  subduing  the  Dalmatians,  in  155  B.C.  The  conver- 
sion of  Macedonia  into  a  province  in  146  B.C.,  and  the  acquisition 
of  the  Thracian  Chersonese  in  133  B.C.,  brought  Rome  into  close 
relations  with  the  various  tribes  of  the  northeast,  but  also  gave  her 
the  double  basis  of  the  Po  valley  and  the  province  of  Macedonia, 
from  which  she  could  now  advance  in  earnest  towards  the  Rhine 
and  Danube.  Of  the  various  Celtic  tribes  in  these  regions,  the 
Helvetii,  who  occupied  both  banks  of  the  Upper  Rhine,  were  the 
most  powerful;  near  them  were  the  Boii,  settled  in  Bavaria  and 
Bohemia.  To  the  southeast  came  the  Taurisci,  next  to  whom  were 
the  Iapydes,  partly  Ulyrian,  partly  Celtic;  while  in  the  interior  the 
powerful  and  cruel  Celtic  tribe  of  the  Scordisci  roamed  hither  and 
thither,  leaving  a  path  marked  by  crime  and  bloodshed. 

Although  Roman  expeditions  against  Alpine  tribes  were  fre- 
quent, no  adequate  scheme  of  conquest  was  attempted,  so  as  to 
create  a  barrier  strong  enough  to  ward  off  the  constant  inroads  of 
barbarism.  Marcus  Aemilius  Scaurus  was  the  first  to  cross  the 
eastern  Alps,  in  115  B.C.,  and  to  compel  the  Taurisci  to  a  friendly 
alliance  with  Rome;  the  first  Roman  general  to  reach  the  Danube 
was  Marcus  Livius  Drusus,  in  112  b.c.  ;  and,  two  years  later,  Mar- 
cus Minucius  utterly  defeated  the  Scordisci  and  reduced  them  to 
harmless  insignificance. 

But  these  victories  only  brought  upon  the  scene  a  still  more 
terrible  foe  in  the  Cimbri,  or  "  champions."  Whence  this  people 
really  came  and  the  causes  of  their  migration  are  matters  of  which 
we  cannot  be  certain.  That  they  were  in  the  main  of  German  race, 
as  were  their  brothers-in-arms,  the  Teutones,  is  shown  by  the  exist- 
ence of  two  small  tribes  of  the  same  name,  left  behind,  probably,  in 
their  primitive  seats — the  Cimbri  in  Denmark  and  the  Teutones  in 
the  northeast  of  Germany,  near  the  Baltic ;  and  by  the  judgment  of 
Caesar,  who  first  showed  the  difference  between  Celts  and  Germans, 
and  who  includes  the  Cimbri  among  the  Germans.     This  classifica- 


&5    ft, 

S    O 


2  I 


THE     RESTORATION  193 

113-105    B.C. 

tion  is  further  borne  out  by  their  names  and  the  account  given  of 
their  physical  appearance  and  habits. 

No  doubt  a  number  of  Celts  joined  these  hordes,  and  thus  men 
of  Celtic  name  directed  their  armies,  and  the  Celtic  tongue  was 
spoken  among  them.  The  invasion  was  not  one  of  mere  plunder, 
but  that  of  a  whole  nation  seeking  a  new  home,  with  their  wives 
and  children  drawn  along  in  wagons,  which  served  as  houses  and 
means  of  locomotion.  Their  army  was  accompanied  by  priestesses 
— a  truly  Germanic  custom.  They  came  like  lightning,  like  light- 
ning they  vanished;  and  in  that  dull  age  no  observer  traced  this 
marvelous  meteor.  Thus  the  first  Germanic  movement  that  came 
in  contact  with  civilization  passed  away  unnoticed  till  it  was  too  late 
to  have  any  accurate  knowledge  of  it.  Owing  to  Roman  attacks  on 
the  Danubian  Celts,  the  Cimbri  broke  through  the  barrier  which  had 
prevented  their  advance,  and  reached  the  passes  of  the  Carnian  Alps 
in  113  B.C.,  where  the  consul  Gnaeus  Papirius  Carbo  was  posted  to 
meet  them,  not  far  from  Aquileia.  He  ordered  them  to  evacuate 
the  territory  of  the  Taurisci,  and  they  complied  and  followed  his 
guides  into  an  ambush.  But  the  betrayed  utterly  worsted  the 
betrayer,  and  then  they  turned  westward  and  reached  the  west 
bank  of  the  Rhine  and  passed  over  the  Jura.  There,  some  years 
after  the  defeat  of  Carbo,  they  again  threatened  Roman  territory. 
In  109  B.C.  Marcus  Junius  Silanus  appeared  with  an  army  in 
southern  Gaul,  and  replied  to  the  Cimbrian  request  for  land  to 
settle  in  by  an  attack ;  he  was  completely  defeated. 

The  Cimbri  now  occupied  themselves  with  subduing  the  neigh- 
boring Celtic  cantons,  and  for  a  time  left  the  Romans  unmolested. 
But,  fired  by  the  example  of  the  Cimbri,  the  Helvetii  rose,  under 
their  leader  Divico,  and  sought  new  and  more  fertile  settlements 
in  western  Gaul.  The  consul  Longinus,  with  most  of  his  army,  was 
decoyed  by  the  Helvetii  into  an  ambush,  and  fell  fighting,  in  107 
B.C.  Then  for  a  time  all  was  quiet,  but  in  105  B.C.,  under  their 
king  Boiorix,  the  Cimbri  again  moved  onward,  this  time  with  the 
serious  purpose  of  invading  Italy. 

Their  first  assault  fell  on  Marcus  Aurelius  Scaurus,  whose 
corps  was  easily  overthrown.  Then,  owing  to  the  foolish  discord 
between  the  two  Roman  commanders,  Gnaeus  Maximus  and  the 
proconsul  Caepio,  and  through  the  rash  haste  of  the  latter,  the 
battle  of  Arausio  (Orange),  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhone,  took 
place.     Both    Roman   armies   were   utterly   annihilated.     Such   a 


194  ROME 

104-102  B.C. 

calamity  materially  and  morally  far  surpassed  the  day  of  Cannae. 
Allia  and  the  burning  of  Rome  recurred  to  men's  minds,  and  every 
Italian  capable  of  bearing  arms  was  bound  by  oath  not  to  leave  Italy. 
But,  happily  for  Rome,  the  Cimbri  turned  upon  the  Arverni,  and  then 
set  out  to  the  Pyrenees. 

As  after  the  African  defeats,  so  now,  the  storm  of  popular 
indignation  at  Rome  fell  upon  individuals,  not  on  the  rotten 
system  of  senatorial  government.  Quintus  Caepio  barely  escaped 
with  his  life.  Gaius  Marius  was  now,  in  defiance  of  the  law,  nom- 
inated as  consul,  and  given  the  chief  command  not  merely  for  one 
year,  but  was  reinvested  with  the  consulship  for  five  years  in  succes- 
sion, from  104  to  100  B.C.  The  traces  of  this  unconstitutional  step 
remained  visible  for  all  time. 

Owing  to  the  disappearance  of  the  Cimbri  from  the  stage, 
Marius  had  time  to  reduce  revolted  tribes  and  to  reassure  the  waver- 
ing. At  last  the  wave  of  invasion,  having  broken  itself  on  the 
resistance  of  the  brave  Celtiberians,  flowed  back  over  the  Pyrenees. 
Near  Rouen  the  Cimbri  received  reinforcements  from  the  Helvetii, 
and  were  also  joined  by  their  kinsmen,  the  Teutones,  and  now 
resolved  to  invade  Italy.  But  for  some  reason  they  broke  up  again 
into  two  hosts,  one  of  which,  the  Cimbri,  was  to  recross  the  Rhine 
and  invade  Italy  by  way  of  the  Rhaetian  Alps,  while  the  other,  the 
Teutones,  together  with  some  of  the  bravest  Cimbrian  troops,  was 
to  descend  into  Italy  by  way  of  Roman  Gaul  and  the  western  passes 
of  the  Alps. 

In  102  b.c.  the  latter  host  attacked  the  camp  of  Marius  at  the 
confluence  of  the  Isere  and  Rhone,  for  three  days,  but  in  vain ;  they 
then  marched  onward  to  Italy,  occupying  six  days  in  defiling  past  the 
Roman  camp.  Marius  followed  them  to  the  district  of  Aquae 
Sextiae,  and  defeated  the  rear  guard.  On  the  third  day  after  this 
success  Marius  drew  up  his  army  on  a  hill;  the  barbarians  rushed 
up  with  hot  impatience.  For  a  long  while  the  struggle  was  terrible, 
but,  owing  to  the  heat  of  the  sun  and  a  false  alarm  raised  in  the  rear 
by  Roman  camp  boys,  the  barbarian  ranks  broke  and  were  utterly 
cut  to  pieces. 

The  Cimbri,  meanwhile,  owing  to  a  panic  which  seized  the 
army  of  the  consul  Quintus  Lutatius  Catulus,  had  passed  the  Alps 
and  reached  the  plain  between  the  Po  and  the  Alps  in  the  summer  of 
102  b.c.,  when  their  brethren  were  annihilated  at  Aquae  Sextiae. 
Fortunately  for  Rome,  they  remained  in  this  rich  land  for  the 


THE     RESTORATION  195 

102-101    B.C. 

winter,  and  thus  gave  the  Romans  time  to  prepare  for  the  coming 
struggle.  Marius,  having  refused  a  triumph  for  his  first  victory, 
returned  in  the  spring  and  crossed  the  Po  with  his  army.  On  the 
invitation  of  the  Cimbri  he  named  the  Raudine  plain  as  the  place 
for  battle.  There,  in  a  dense  morning  mist,  the  Celtic  cavalry  of 
the  barbarians  was  driven  back  on  to  the  infantry ;  and  thus  taken 
by  surprise  and  thrown  into  disorder,  the  whole  Cimbrian  host  fell 
an  easy  victim.  Thus  the  battle  of  Vercellae,  in  101  B.C.,  ended  the 
dreaded  invasion  of  these  Germanic  peoples.  Marius  was  justly 
regarded  as  the  conqueror  of  the  Cimbri,  although  Catulus,  a 
polished  art-critic  and  member  of  the  aristocracy,  had  overthrown 
the  center  of  the  Cimbrian  hosts  and  captured  thirty-one  standards, 
while  Marius  took  but  two.  But  the  victory  of  Vercellae  was  only 
rendered  possible  by  that  of  Aquae  Sextiae.  With  the  victories 
of  Marius  were  associated  hopes  of  the  overthrow  of  the  detested 
government.  Could  it  be  that  the  rough  farmer  of  Arpinum  was 
destined  to  be  the  avenger  of  Gracchus,  and  to  continue  the  revolu- 
tion which  he  had  begun  ? 


Chapter  XX 

MARIUS  AS  REVOLUTIONIST  AND  DRUSUS  AS 
REFORMER.     100-91  B.  C. 

SUCH  were  the  fears  and  hopes  that  moved  the  people  in  the 
capital  on  the  news  of  the  final  overthrow  of  the  Germanic 
invaders.  These  hopes  were  raised  afresh  when  the  saviour 
of  Rome  himself  returned,  late  in  101  B.C.,  by  far  the  first  man  in 
Rome,  and  yet  a  mere  tyro  in  politics.  Born  in  155  b.  c,  Gaius 
Marius  had,  as  a  poor  day-laborer's  son,  schooled  his  frame  to  bear 
hunger  and  thirst,  cold  and  heat.  His  early  training  had  fitted  him 
to  rise  rapidly  from  the  ranks  and  to  gain  distinction,  first  as  a 
mere  soldier,  and  then  as  governor  of  Further  Spain.  His  subse- 
quent military  career  in  Africa  and  Gaul  has  been  already  described. 
Success  in  speculation  had  given  him  wealth,  and  a  union  with  a 
daughter  of  the  ancient  Julian  gens  had  given  him  powerful  connec- 
tions. But  he  never  rid  himself  of  the  taint  of  his  plebeian  origin. 
No  one  was  ever  so  popular  with  the  masses,  either  before  or  after, 
both  on  account  of  his  thorough  honesty  and  disinterestedness,  and 
of  his  boorish  uncouthness. 

The  time  had  now  come  to  test  the  power  of  the  rustic  soldier 
to  realize  the  expectations  of  the  people,  and  to  justify  the  extrava- 
gant joy  manifested  at  his  return.  The  newly  organized  army 
might  prove  a  formidable  weapon  in  his  hand,  though  the  day  was 
hardly  yet  come  for  the  sword  to  achieve  what  it  afterwards  did 
in  the  world  of  politics.  His  military  revolution  was  as  follows: 
Before  his  time  the  old  Servian  constitution  had  undergone  consid- 
erable relaxation;  and  the  minimum  census,  which  bound  a  man 
to  serve  in  the  army,  had  been  lowered  from  $215  to  $85.  The 
cavalry  was  still  drawn  from  the  wealthiest  and  the  light-armed 
troops  from  the  poorest  citizens,  but  the  arrangement  of  the  infantry 
of  the  line  in  the  three  divisions  of  hastati,  principes,  and  triarii 
was  no  longer  determined  by  property,  but  by  duration  of  service. 
Moreover,  the  Italian  allies  had  long  taken  part  in  the  military 
service.     Still,  the  primitive  organization  was  in  the  main  the  basis 

196 


MARIUS     AND     DRUSUS  197 

107-105    B.C. 

of  the  Roman  military  system,  and  it  was  no  longer  suited  to  the 
altered  circumstances  of  the  state.  The  better  classes  held  aloof  more 
and  more  from  service,  and  the  middle  class  of  both  Romans  and 
Italians  was  fast  disappearing;  while  the  allies  and  subjects  outside 
Italy,  as  well  as  the  Italian  proletariate,  were  available  to  fill  up  the 
gaps  thus  caused.  The  cavalry  formed  of  the  wealthiest  burgesses 
had  acted  as  a  guard  of  honor  in  the  Jugurthine  war,  and  thence- 
forth it  ceases  to  appear.  In  ordinary  circumstances  it  was  a  very 
difficult  task  to  fill  up  the  legions  with  properly  qualified  persons ; 
in  times  of  emergency,  as  after  the  battle  of  Arausio,  it  was  impossi- 
ble. Already  the  cavalry,  as  a  rule,  came  from  Thrace  and  Africa, 
while  the  light  Ligurian  infantry  and  Balearic  slingers  were  em- 
ployed in  daily  increasing  numbers.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  dearth 
of  properly  qualified  citizens,  non-qualified  and  poorer  men  pressed 
into  the  service,  nor  could  it  be  hard  to  find  plenty  of  volunteers 
for  so  lucrative  a  profession.  Thus  it  was  a  necessary  result  of  the 
social  and  political  changes  that  the  old  system  of  the  burgess  levy 
should  give  place  to  that  of  contingents  and  enlistments,  that  the  cav- 
alry and  light  troops  should  mainly  consist  of  subject  contingents, 
and  that  every  free-born  citizen  should  be  admitted  to  the  line 
service,  as  was,  in  fact,  first  allowed  by  Marius  in  107  B.C. 

Marius  also  abolished  all  the  old  aristocratic  distinctions, 
whether  of  definite  rank  and  place  or  of  standards  and  equipments, 
which  had  hitherto  obtained  among  the  four  divisions  of  the  army. 
All  were  uniformly  trained  under  the  new  method  of  drill  devised 
by  Publius  Rufus,  consul  in  105  B.C.,  and  borrowed  from  the 
gladiatorial  schools ;  and  thus  the  infantry  of  the  line  were  reduced 
to  a  common  level.  The  thirty  maniples,  or  companies,  of  the 
legion  were  now  replaced  by  ten  cohorts,  each  cohort  having  its 
own  standard  and  being  formed  of  six  or  five  sections  of  one  hundred 
men  apiece.  The  light  infantry  were  suppressed,  but  the  numbers 
of  the  legion  were  raised  from  4200  to  6000  men.  Although  the 
custom  of  fighting  in  three  divisions  was  retained,  yet  the  general 
could  distribute  his  cohorts  in  the  three  lines  as  he  thought  fit.  The 
old  four  standards  of  the  wolf,  the  ox  with  a  man's  head,  the  horse, 
the  boar,  gave  place  to  the  new  standard  of  the  silver  eagle,  given 
by  Marius  to  the  legion  as  a  whole.  Thus  all  the  old  civic  and 
aristocratic  distinctions  were  abolished,  and  all  future  distinctions 
were  purely  military.  The  pretorian  cohort,  or  bodyguard  of  the 
general,  owed  its  existence  to  a  pure  accident.     In  the  Numantine 


198  ROME 

107-105    B.C. 

war  Scipio  Aemilianus  had  been  obliged,  owing  to  the  insufficiency 
and  unruly  nature  of  the  soldiers  with  which  he  was  supplied,  to 
form  out  of  volunteers  a  band  of  five  hundred  men,  into  which  he 
afterwards  admitted  his  ablest  soldiers.  This  cohort  had  the  duty 
of  serving  at  the  pretorium,  or  headquarters,  and  was  exempt  from 
encamping  and  entrenching  service,  and  enjoyed  higher  pay  and 
greater  prestige. 

This  revolution  in  the  military  system  probably  saved  the  state, 
in  a  military  point  of  view,  from  destruction,  but  it  involved  a  com- 
plete political  revolution,  the  effects  of  which  time  alone  could 
develop.  The  republican  constitution  was  essentially  based  on  the 
view  that  the  citizen  was  also  a  soldier,  and  that  the  soldier  was, 
above  all,  a  citizen ;  it  was  at  an  end  so  soon  as  a  soldier  class  was 
formed.  Under  the  new  system  of  drill,  the  military  service  became 
gradually  a  profession.  The  admission,  though  at  first  restricted, 
of  the  proletariate  to  the  service  speedily  took  effect,  the  more  so  as 
the  general  had  a  right  to  reward  the  successful  soldier  and  give 
him  a  share  in  the  spoil.  To  the  burgess  in  old  times  the  service 
had  always  been  a  burden  and  duty,  but  little  alleviated  by  the 
rewards  it  might  give  him.  To  the  proletarian  this  was  far  from 
the  case.  All  his  hopes,  both  of  pay,  rewards,  and  citizenship,  lay 
in  his  success  in  war  and  in  his  general ;  thus  the  camp  became  his 
only  home  and  hope.  Marius  defended  his  action  in  giving  Roman 
citizenship  to  two  Italian  cohorts  on  the  Raudine  plain,  by  saying 
that  amid  the  din  of  battle  he  could  not  distinguish  the  voice  of  the 
laws.  So,  if  once  the  interest  of  the  general  and  army  concurred 
in  producing  unconstitutional  demands,  it  was  unlikely  that  any  law 
would  be  of  much  avail  amid  the  clashing  of  arms. 

They  had  now  the  standing  army,  the  soldier  class,  the  body- 
guard; as  in  the  civil  constitution,  so  also  in  the  military,  all  the 
pillars  of  the  future  monarchy  were  already  in  existence ;  the  mon- 
arch alone  was  wanting.  When  the  twelve  eagles  circled  round  the 
Palatine  hill,  they  ushered  in  the  kings ;  the  new  eagle  which  Gaius 
Marius  bestowed  on  the  legions  proclaimed  the  advent  of  the 
emperors. 

Marius,  in  the  eyes  of  the  populace,  who  still  mourned  the 
death  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  was  the  one  man  capable  alike  from  his 
military  and  political  position  of  averting  the  ruin  of  the  state, 
and  of  substituting  in  the  place  of  the  effete  oligarchy  a  new  and 
vigorous  administration.     It  remains  for  us  to  see  how  he  realized 


MARIUS     AND     DRUSUS  199 

105-100    B.C. 

the  expectations  so  confidently  formed  of  him.  Two  methods  of 
operation  were  apparently  open  to  him:  one,  to  overthrow  the 
oligarchy  by  means  of  the  army;  the  other,  to  follow  the  example 
of  Gracchus  and  effect  his  object  in  a  constitutional  manner.  The 
first  plan,  perhaps,  he  never  entertained,  relying  on  his  immense 
popularity  and  on  the  support  of  his  discharged  soldiers,  but  still 
more  on  the  weakness  of  his  opponents,  whose  downfall  he  probably 
thought  could  be  more  easily  compassed  than  proved  to  be  the  case. 
Moreover,  the  army  was  still  in  a  state  of  transition,  and  as  yet 
ill  adapted  for  effecting  a  coup  d'etat,  and  at  the  beginning  of  this 
crisis  the  use  of  such  an  instrument  might  well  have  recoiled  upon 
the  user.  Having  therefore  discharged  his  army,  Marius  depended 
for  further  action  upon  the  leaders  of  the  popular  party,  which  now 
once  more  sprang  into  active  existence.  This  party  had  much 
deteriorated  during  the  interval  between  Gaius  Gracchus  and  Mar- 
ius; much  of  the  enthusiasm,  faith,  and  purity  of  aim  had  been 
rubbed  off  in  the  years  of  confusion  and  turmoil ;  and  the  popular 
leaders  were,  for  the  most  part,  either  political  novices,  or  men  who 
had  nothing  to  lose  in  respect  of  property,  influence,  or  even  honor, 
and  who,  from  personal  motives  of  malice  or  a  wish  to  attract 
notice,  busied  themselves  with  inflicting  annoyance  and  damage  on 
the  government.  To  the  first  class  belonged  Gaius  Memmius  and 
the  noted  orator,  Lucius  Crassus ;  to  the  second,  and  these  were  the 
most  notable  leaders,  belonged  Gaius  Glaucia,  the  Roman  Hyperbo- 
lus,  as  Cicero  called  him,  and  his  better  and  abler  colleague,  Lucius 
Appuleius  Saturninus.  The  latter,  owing  to  a  personal  slight  at  the 
senate's  hands,  had  joined  the  ranks  of  the  opposition.  As  tribune 
of  the  people  in  103  B.C.  he  excited  a  popular  indignation  by  his 
public  speeches  touching  the  briberies  practiced  in  Rome  by  the 
envoys  of  Mithradates,  and  also  by  his  invectives  against  Quintus 
Metellus,  when  he  was  a  candidate  for  the  censorship  in  102  b.c. 
Moreover,  he  had  carried  the  election  of  Marius  as  consul  for  102 
B.C.  in  the  teeth  of  a  fierce  opposition.  His  violence  and  unscrupu- 
lousness  marred  his  very  considerable  powers  both  as  a  politician 
and  orator,  but  he  was  the  most  prominent  and  dreaded  enemy  of 
the  senate.  He  and  Glaucia  now  entered  into  partnership  with 
Marius,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  latter  should  become  a  candidate 
for  his  sixth  consulship,  Saturninus  for  a  second  tribunate,  and 
Glaucia  for  the  pretorship,  for  the  year  100  b.c,  in  order  to  carry 
out  the  intended  revolution. 


200  ROME 

100    B.C. 

Despite  all  the  opposition  of  the  senate,  they  succeeded  in 
effecting  their  object — partly  by  craft,  partly  by  violence.  The 
laws  of  Saturninus,  known  as  the  Appuleian,  revived  the  chief 
objects  of  Gaius  Gracchus.  Marius  was  called  upon  to  conduct 
the  assignations  of  land  which  had  been  promised  his  soldiers,  firstly 
in  Africa,  and  then  in  all  provincial  land,  and  even  in  that  beyond 
the  Alps,  which  was  still  occupied  by  independent  Celtic  tribes. 
As  the  Italian  allies  were  to  receive  these  assignations  together  with 
Roman  burgesses,  this  was  practically  a  first  step  to  placing  them 
on  an  equality  with  Romans;  and  thus  not  only  the  extensive 
schemes  of  transalpine  and  transmarine  colonization,  as  sketched 
by  Gaius  Gracchus,  were  revived,  but  also  his  project  of  gradually 
giving  first  the  Italians  and  then  all  Roman  subjects  the  same 
political  privileges.  For  this  work  of  land  distribution  it  was, 
doubtless,  necessary  that  Marius  should  have  his  consulship  annually 
renewed,  and  thus  practically  be  king  of  Rome.  The  main  differ- 
ence between  his  case  and  that  of  Gracchus  was  that  he  occupied  a 
military  as  well  as  civil  position.  Following  the  example  of 
Gracchus,  Marius  and  his  confederates  made  advances  to  the 
equites  and  the  proletariate.  They  extended  the  powers  of  the 
former  as  jurymen,  and  gave  them  greater  control  over  the  extor- 
tions of  provincial  magistrates ;  while  to  the  latter  they  now  sold 
grain  at  the  merely  nominal  price  of  three  cents  instead  of  twenty- 
four  cents  a  bushel.  Still  their  real  power  lay  in  the  discharged 
Marian  soldiers,  and  this  fact  lent  a  strong  military  color  to  their 
attempt  at  a  revolution. 

In  spite  of  the  vehement  opposition  of  the  aristocrats  by  means 
of  tribunician  veto,  the  invocation  of  portents,  and  the  armed  inter- 
ference of  the  urban  questor  Quintus  Caepio,  the  Appuleian  laws 
were  ratified.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  firmness  of  Saturninus, 
and  still  more  to  the  appearance  of  the  dreaded  soldiers  of  Marius. 
Quintus  Metellus,  rather  than  take  the  oath  which  bound  every 
senator  to  observe  the  new  laws,  went  into  exile,  but  that  was  only  a 
gain  to  his  opponents.  When,  however,  the  plans  came  to  be  exe- 
cuted, it  was  soon  clear  that  a  politically  incapable  general,  and  a 
violent  street  demagogue  could  not  long  be  allies.  In  the  first  place, 
Marius,  from  his  utter  incapacity  as  a  statesman,  was  unable  either 
to  keep  his  own  party  in  check  or  to  gain  over  his  opponents.  The 
wealthy  classes  had  no  liking  for  Saturninus  and  his  street  riots; 
nay,  the  equites  had  skirmishes  with  his  armed  bands,  and  he  was 


MARIUS     AND     DRUSUS  201 

100  B.C. 

only  with  difficulty  elected  tribune  in  ioo  B.C.  Thus  this  powerful 
body  began  to  side  with  the  aristocracy  when  they  saw  that  Marius 
was  practically  the  tool  of  his  more  violent  associates. 

But  the  attitude  of  Marius  not  only  alienated  those  who  should 
have  been  his  most  powerful  supporters,  but,  what  was  more  impor- 
tant, caused  Saturninus  and  Glaucia  to  lose  all  trust  in  him.  His 
refusal  to  go  the  lengths  that  they  went,  his  negotiations  with  his 
own  party  and  the  senate  at  one  and  the  same  time,  his  reservation 
when  he  swore  as  a  senator  to  observe  the  Appuleian  laws,  "  so  far 
as  they  were  really  valid,"  soon  caused  a  total  rupture  between 
himself  and  the  most  violent  democrats.  But  Saturninus  and 
Glaucia  had  gone  too  far  to  recede ;  they  now  resolved  to  grasp  the 
sovereignty  for  themselves.  They  arranged  that  the  former  should 
again  seek  the  tribuneship,  the  latter  the  consulship,  for  which  he 
was  not  legally  eligible  till  two  years  had  elapsed.  For  the  latter 
office  Gaius  Memmius  was  the  government  candidate;  he  was  sud- 
denly murdered.  Hereupon  the  senate  called  upon  the  consul  Mar- 
ius to  interfere;  he  complied,  and  a  hasty  levy  of  young  men  was 
drawn  up  in  array,  while  the  senators  appeared  armed  in  the  Forum, 
led  by  Marcus  Scaurus.  The  democrats  saw  their  danger,  and  set 
free  all  the  slaves  in  prison;  and  on  December  10,  ioo  B.C.,  a 
great  battle  took  place  in  the  market-place,  the  first  ever  fought 
within  the  walls  of  the  capital.  It  ended  in  the  utter  overthrow  of 
the  popular  party.  Saturninus  and  Glaucia  were  put  to  death  with 
many  others,  so  that  there  perished  on  one  day  four  Roman  magis- 
trates, a  pretor,  questor,  and  two  tribunes,  together  with  a  number 
of  other  notable  men,  in  some  cases  of  good  family.  The  victory  of 
the  government  was  complete.  Not  only  were  its  noisiest  opponents 
dead,  but  the  one  man  who  might  have  proved  really  dangerous  had 
publicly  and  completely  effaced  himself;  and,  what  was  perhaps  still 
more  important,  the  two  chief  elements  of  the  opposition — the  cap- 
italists and  the  proletariate — emerged  from  the  struggle  bitter 
enemies. 

Thus  the  force  of  circumstances,  and,  still  more,  the  incapacity 
of  Marius,  had  completely  destroyed  the  fabric  reared  by  Gaius 
Gracchus.  Pitiful,  indeed,  was  the  position  of  the  great  general ; 
he  retired  to  the  East  so  as  not  to  witness  the  return  of  his  rival 
Metellus.  When  he  came  back  to  Rome  his  counsel  was  not  sought, 
and  the  continuance  of  profound  peace  rendered  vain  his  hopes 
that  the  time  would  come  when  his  strong  arm  would  be  needed. 


202  ROME 

98-93  B.C. 

But  his  superstitious  soul  ever  kept  in  mind  the  oracular  promise  of 
seven  consulships,  and,  though  in  the  eyes  of  all  insignificant  and 
harmless,  he  brooded  over  his  schemes  of  vengeance,  and  in  moody 
sullenness  bided  his  time.  In  addition  to  this,  the  current  of  popular 
feeling  now  set  in  strongly  against  the  remnants  of  the  party  left 
behind  by  Saturninus.  The  tribunals  of  the  equites  condemned 
with  the  utmost  severity  everyone  who  professed  the  views  of  the 
Populares;  nay,  they  even  assailed  men  on  the  ground  of  injuries 
years  old  against  the  aristocrats.  Moreover,  abroad  the  Roman 
arms  were  everywhere  successful.  In  Spain  a  serious  rising  was 
quelled  by  the  consuls,  in  the  years  98-93  B.C.  In  the  East,  too, 
much  greater  energy  was  displayed  than  had  been  shown  for  many 
years.  At  home  the  government  was  more  popular  and  secure 
than  it  had  ever  been  since  the  restoration.  The  laws  of  Saturninus 
were,  of  course,  canceled,  and  the  transmarine  colonies  of  Marius 
dwindled  down  to  a  small  settlement  in  Corsica. 

In  98  B.C.  the  two  consuls  passed  a  law  which  made  an  interval 
of  seven  days  between  the  introduction  and  passing  of  a  bill  obliga- 
tory, and  forbade  the  combination  in  a  single  proposal  of  several 
enactments  differing  in  their  nature.  Thus  the  government  was 
protected  from  being  taken  by  surprise  by  new  laws,  and  some 
restriction  was  placed  on  the  initiative  power  in  legislation. 

It  was  clear  that  the  Gracchan  constitution,  which  had  rested 
on  the  union  of  the  multitude  and  the  moneyed  aristocracy,  was 
on  the  eve  of  perishing,  and  that  the  hour  had  come  to  reestablish 
the  governing  oligarchy  in  undisputed  possession  of  political  power. 
All  depended  on  the  recovery  by  the  senate  of  the  nomination  of 
jurymen ;  for  of  late  the  governors  had  administered  the  provinces, 
not  for  the  senate,  but  for  the  order  of  capitalists  and  merchants. 
The  latter  fiercely  resisted  all  attempts  to  wrest  their  power  from 
them ;  and  even  Quintus  Mucius  Scaevola,  one  of  the  most  eminent 
jurists  and  most  noble-minded  men  of  the  time,  was  rewarded 
for  his  stern  repression  of  all  crime,  and  for  his  scrupulous  justice 
in  administering  the  province  of  Asia,  by  seeing  his  legate,  Publius 
Rufus,  brought  to  trial  before  the  equites  on  the  most  absurd  charge 
of  maladministration.  Rufus  refused  to  submit  to  the  moneyed 
lords,  and  was  condemned  and  had  his  property  confiscated.  He 
retired  to  the  province  which  he  was  accused  of  plundering,  and 
was  there  welcomed  with  every  honor  by  all  men,  and  there  spent  the 
rest  of  his  life.     Soon  after,  Marcus  Scaurus,  seventy  years  of  age, 


MARIUS     AND     DRUSUS  203 

93-91  B.C. 

and  for  twenty  years  the  chief  of  the  senate,  was  tried  for  unjust 
extortions;  and  it  was  evident  that  neither  nobility  of  descent, 
blamelessness  of  life,  nor  age  itself  were  any  screen  against  the 
wildest  charges  preferred  by  men  who  made  a  regular  profession 
of  reckless  accusation.  The  very  commission  touching  exactions 
became  the  scourge  instead  of  the  shield  of  the  provincials;  the 
vilest  scoundrel,  provided  that  he  satisfied  the  claims  of  his  fellow- 
robbers,  went  unpunished;  while  those  who  trusted  to  their  inno- 
cence, and  attempted  to  do  their  duty  by  the  provinces  they  gov- 
erned, were  found  guilty  by  the  juries  whom  they  neglected  to 
bribe. 

Marcus  Livius  Drusus,  tribune  in  91  B.C.,  son  of  the  over- 
thrower  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  a  conservative  of  the  conservatives,  the 
proudest  and  noblest  of  the  aristocrats,  vehemently  earnest,  pure  of 
life,  and  an  object  of  respect  to  the  humblest  citizen,  felt  that  the 
time  had  come  to  attack  the  equestrian  jury  courts.  He  was  aided 
by  Marcus  Scaurus  and  Lucius  Crassus,  the  famous  orator;  but 
against  him  were  not  only  the  consul  Lucius  Philippus  and  the  reck- 
less Quintus  Scaepio,  but  also  the  more  corrupt  and  cowardly  mass 
of  the  aristocracy,  who,  sooner  than  lose  all  chance  of  plunder, 
were  quite  content  to  share  the  spoils  of  the  provinces  with  the 
equites.  Drusus  proposed  to  take  away  the  functions  of  jurymen 
from  the  equestrian  order,  and  to  restore  them  to  the  senate,  and  to 
add  three  hundred  new  members  to  the  senate,  in  order  to  enable 
it  to  meet  its  increased  obligations.  Moreover,  a  special  criminal 
commission  was  to  be  appointed  to  try  all  jurymen  who  had  been 
or  should  be  guilty  of  taking  bribes.  But  he  also  had  a  wide  and 
well-considered  scheme  of  reform.  He  proposed  to  increase  the 
largesses  of  corn  and  to  cover  the  increased  expense  by  the  perma- 
nent issue  of  copper-plated  by  the  side  of  the  silvered  denarii ;  to  re- 
serve all  the  still  undistributed  arable  land  of  Italy,  and  the  best 
part  of  Sicily,  for  the  settlement  of  burgess  colonists;  lastly,  he 
bound  himself  to  give  the  Italian  allies  the  Roman  franchise. 

There  is  a  marked  similarity  of  means  and  aims  in  the  cases 
of  Drusus  and  Gaius  Gracchus ;  both  relied  on  the  proletariate,  and 
both  had  practically  the  same  measures  of  reform  in  view.  The 
great  difference  was  as  to  who  should  be  the  governing  power  in 
the  state;  in  all  other  points  the  best  men  of  both  political  parties 
had  much  in  common,  widely  different  as  often  were  the  processes 
of  reasoning  by  which  they  arrived  at  such  views. 


204  ROME 

93-91    B.C. 

In  order  to  carry  his  laws,  Drusus  wisely  kept  in  the  back- 
ground his  proposal  touching  the  Italian  franchise,  and  embodied 
all  his  other  measures  in  one  law ;  thus  he  caused  those  interested  in 
largesses  of  corn  and  distributions  of  land  to  also  carry  the  proposal 
touching  the  transference  of  the  jury  courts.  He  was  stoutly 
opposed,  especially  by  the  consul  Philippus,  whom  he  caused  to  be 
imprisoned.  Though  the  Livian  laws  were  carried,  the  consul  sum- 
moned the  senate  to  reject  them.  On  its  refusal,  Philippus  declared 
he  would  seek  another  state  council,  and  seemed  to  meditate  a  coup 
d'etat.  Many  of  the  senate  now  began  to  waver,  and  their  fears 
were  still  further  aroused  by  the  sudden  death  of  Lucius  Crassus 
in  September,  91  B.C.  Gradually  the  connections  of  Drusus  with 
the  Italians  became  known,  and  a  furious  cry  of  high  treason  was 
raised.  The  opposition  grew  more  powerful,  and  the  senate  at  last 
issued  a  decree  canceling  the  Livian  laws  on  the  ground  of  infor- 
mality. Drusus  refused  to  interpose  his  veto,  and  thus  the  senate 
once  more  became  subject  to  the  yoke  of  the  capitalists. 

Shortly  after  Drusus  perished  by  the  hand  of  an  assassin,  who 
escaped  undetected;  nor  was  the  crime  investigated.  Thus  the 
same  end  which  swept  away  the  democratic  reformers  was  the  fate 
of  the  Gracchus  of  the  aristocracy.  The  weakness  of  the  aristocracy 
frustrated  reform,  even  when  the  attempt  came  from  their  own 
ranks. 


Chapter    XXI 

THE  REVOLT  OF  ALL  ITALY.    91-87  B.C. 

JUST  as  the  failure  of  the  previous  attempt  of  Flaccus,  in  125 
B.C.,  to  confer  the  citizenship  on  the  Italians  was  followed  by 
the  revolt  of  Fregellae,  so  the  despair  of  the  subjects  of  Rome 
after  the  death  of  Drusus  broke  forth  in  a  revolt  of  all  Italy. 

The  Italian  allies  had  two  inducements  to  revolt;  they  wished 
to  obtain  the  enjoyment  of  certain  privileges;  they  wished  also  to 
free  themselves  from  many  disabilities  and  wrongs.  The  voting 
power  was  perhaps  the  chief,  but  by  no  means  the  only,  privilege 
which  they  sought.  There  were  others,  such  as  immunity  from 
taxation  and  flogging.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were  subject  to 
vexation  and  oppression  in  many  forms  from  which  Roman  citizens 
were  exempt.  The  rigor  of  martial  law,  largely  modified  for  the 
burgess  soldiers,  remained  unsoftened  for  them.  Italian  officers 
of  any  rank  might  be  condemned  and  executed  by  sentence  of  court- 
martial,  while  the  meanest  burgess-soldier  could  appeal  to  the  civil 
courts  at  Rome.  The  contingent  furnished  by  the  allies  to  the 
army  was  disproportionate  to  their  number,  and  the  disproportion 
was  increasing.  In  civil  matters  the  general  superintendence  of 
the  Roman  government  over  the  dependent  communities  was 
extended  till  the  allies  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  caprice  of  any 
Roman  magistrate.  At  Teanum  Sidicinum  the  chief  magistrate  had 
been  scourged  by  order  of  the  Roman  consul  for  supposed  remissness 
in  gratifying  a  whim  of  the  consul's  wife.  In  the  Latin  colony  of 
Venusia  a  free  peasant  was  whipped  to  death  for  a  laugh  at  the 
passing  litter  of  a  young  Roman  holding  no  office.  Incidents  like 
these  must  have  been  frequent ;  and  all  non-citizens,  from  Latins 
downward,  became  united  by  the  bond  of  a  common  oppression. 
Since  the  completion  of  the  Roman  conquests  the  Roman  citizenship 
had  become  the  one  thing  worth  having;  it  alone  would  give  protec- 
tion from  tyranny  and  a  status  in  the  world ;  for  the  Roman  empire 
by  this  time  embraced  all  civilization,  and  to  be  outside  the  Roman 
state  was  to  be  outside  the  world. 

305 


206  ROME 

126-91    B.C. 

The  privilege  was  thus  more  valuable  than  it  had  ever  been 
before ;  but  it  was  also  becoming  more  and  more  difficult  to  acquire. 
The  tendency  of  the  body  of  Roman  citizens  was  to  close  their  ranks. 
The  practice  of  bestowing  the  franchise  on  whole  communities  had 
ceased;  the  right  of  individuals  to  acquire  it  by  residence  at  Rome 
was  curtailed;  and  in  126  b.c.  all  non-burgesses  were  expelled  from 
the  city  by  decree  of  the  senate. 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  the  senate  and  the  conservative 
party  objected,  not  to  the  demands  of  the  Italians,  but  to  the  revolu- 
tionary schemes  of  those  by  whom  these  demands  were  supported; 
but  in  95  b.c.  the  deliberate  policy  of  the  oligarchy  was  made  clear 
by  a  consular  law  which  prohibited  under  penalties  any  non-burgess 
from  laying  claim  to  the  franchise.  With  Drusus  hope  arose  once 
more  for  the  Italians;  Drusus  accomplished  nothing  but  his  own 
destruction,  and  now  no  resource  was  left  but  an  appeal  to  arms. 

The  chief  difficulty  with  which  rebellions  always  have  to  con- 
tend is  want  of  organization.  They  have  to  contend  against  an 
established  government  completely  equipped  and  organized,  and  to 
create  their  own  organization  during  the  course  of  the  struggle. 
The  Italian  peoples  were  not  entirely  unprepared  in  this  respect.  In 
the  first  place,  a  secret  league  had  been  formed  in  connection  with  the 
attempt  of  Drusus,  with  members  of  all  the  most  important  Italian 
towns,  bound  by  oath  to  be  faithful  to  each  other  and  to  the  common 
cause.  Again,  each  allied  town  furnished  a  contingent  to  the  Roman 
army,  and  these  trained  troops  formed  a  valuable  nucleus  for  the 
allied  army.  Thirdly,  there  were  the  old  Roman  confederacies  of 
the  various  Italian  peoples — of  the  Marsians,  Paelignians,  and 
others, — which  had  of  course  lost  all  political  significance  after  the 
conquest  by  Rome,  but  which  still  existed  for  purposes  of  common 
sacrifice. 

The  revolt  broke  out  prematurely  at  Asculum  in  Picenum, 
where  all  the  resident  Romans  were  massacred.  The  flame  spread 
rapidly  through  all  central  and  southern  Italy.  The  Marsians  were 
the  first  to  declare  war,  and  round  them  gathered  the  Paeligni,  the 
Marrucini,  the  Frentani,  and  the  Vestini,  while  the  Samnites  were 
the  center  of  the  southern  group  of  peoples,  from  the  Liris  to 
Apulia  and  Calabria. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Romans  had  many  adherents  where  the 
richer  classes  were  influential.  Thus  the  whole  of  Umbria  and 
Etruria,  where  the  middle  class  had  entirely  disappeared,  remained 


REVOLT     OF     ITALY  207 

91-90  B.C. 

faithful;  so  also  many  isolated  communities  in  insurgent  districts, 
such  as  Pinna  in  the  Vestini.  Lastly,  many  of  the  most  favored  of 
the  allied  communities,  such  as  Nola,  Nuceria,  and  Neapolis  in 
Campania,  and  Rhegium;  and  Latin  colonies,  such  as  Alba  and 
Aesernia,  refused  to  rise.  The  strength  of  the  revolt  was  in  the 
middle  classes  and  the  small  farmers ;  the  moneyed  and  aristocratic 
classes  held  with  Rome. 

After  the  first  blood  had  been  shed  at  Asculum  the  insurgents 
still  made  an  attempt  at  negotiation:  they  offered  even  now  to  lay 
down  their  arms  if  Rome  would  grant  them  the  citizenship.  Instead 
of  complying,  the  Roman  government  instituted  a  commission,  on 
the  proposal  of  the  tribune  Varius,  to  investigate  the  conspiracy  set 
on  foot  in  connection  with  the  agitation  of  Drusus.  The  result  was 
the  banishment  of  many  members  of  the  moderate  senatorial  party 
who  were  favorable  to  compromise.  Great  preparations  were  made 
for  the  struggle.  Officers  of  all  parties,  including  both  Sulla  and 
Marius,  offered  themselves  to  the  government.  The  largesses  of 
corn  were  curtailed  in  order  to  husband  supplies;  and  all  business, 
except  military  preparations,  was  at  a  standstill. 

The  Italians  on  their  side  were  preparing  not  merely  to  secede 
from  Rome,  but  to  crush  her  and  form  a  new  state.  Corfinium,  a 
town  on  the  Paeligni,  was  to  be  the  head  of  the  new  government, 
under  the  new  name  of  Italica.  All  burgesses  of  insurgent  com- 
munities were  declared  citizens  of  Italica.  A  new  forum  and  senate- 
house  were  made,  a  senate,  consuls,  and  pretors  appointed.  The 
Latin  and  Samnite  languages  were  placed  on  an  equality  as  the 
official  tongues;  and  the  imitation  of  the  Roman  constitution  was 
carried  out  in  the  minutest  details.  The  most  important  feature 
of  the  new  organization  is  this — that  Italica,  like  Rome,  was  to 
remain  merely  a  governing  city-state.  The  Italians,  like  Rome 
itself,  were  unable  to  rise  above  the  conception  of  the  Greek  iz6Xts, 
or  city-state.  No  idea  occurred  to  them  of  any  means,  such  as 
modern  representative  institutions,  by  which  a  vast  population  could 
be  welded  into  a  united  nation. 

Their  plan  of  campaign  was  settled  for  the  Romans  by  the 
character  and  extent  of  the  revolt.  They  had  to  relieve  the  many 
fortresses  which  held  out  for  them  in  various  parts  of  the  insurgent 
districts,  and  they  had  to  combat  a  numerous  enemy  at  widely  dis- 
tant points.  Accordingly,  two  consular  armies  were  formed  to 
meet  the  forces  of  the  two  Italian  consuls,  the  one  acting  in  the 


208  ROME 

90-89    B.C. 

northern  group  of  insurgent  states,  the  other  in  the  southern.  The 
operations  of  the  first  year  of  the  war,  90  B.C.,  were  distinctly 
unfavorable  to  Rome,  especially  in  the  south,  where  several  impor- 
tant towns  were  lost,  the  Roman  armies  defeated,  and  most  of  the 
country  occupied  by  the  Italians.  In  central  Italy  the  course  of 
events  was  less  disastrous,  but  many  communities  in  Umbria  and 
Etruria  soon  declared  for  the  allies. 

The  change  in  popular  feeling  at  Rome  due  to  these  reverses 
was  shown  by  the  repeal  of  the  Varian  commission  which  had  sent 
into  exile  many  prominent  men  of  the  party  favorable  to  concession. 
About  the  same  time  a  policy  of  compromise  was  adopted.  The 
Lex  Julia  of  the  consul  Lucius  Julius  Caesar  at  the  end  of  90  B.C. 
granted  the  citizenship  to  all  Italian  communities  which  had  not 
declared  against  Rome.  The  Lex  Plautia  Papiria  a  short  time 
later  granted  the  citizenship  to  all  allies  who  presented  themselves 
before  a  Roman  magistrate  within  sixty  days. 

At  the  same  time  the  effect  of  these  concessions  was  largely 
nullified  by  the  restriction  which  allowed  the  new  citizens  to  be 
enrolled  in  eight  only  of  the  thirty-five  tribes.  These  laws  applied 
to  all  Italy  south  of  the  Po,  while  the  Celts  between  the  Po  and  the 
Alps  were  invested  with  the  inferior  privileges  which  had  hitherto 
belonged  to  Latin  towns.  The  aim  of  these  measures  was  to  secure 
the  loyalty  of  the  allies  who  had  hitherto  remained  faithful,  and  to 
draw  over  deserters  from  the  enemy.  But  they  by  no  means  con- 
stituted a  complete  capitulation;  only  so  much  of  the  existing 
political  institutions  had  been  pulled  down  as  seemed  necessary  to 
arrest  the  progress  of  the  conflagration. 

In  the  second  year  of  the  war  the  tide  began  to  turn.  The 
alliance  of  her  enemies  was  gradually  weakening  before  the  Roman 
concessions,  and  by  the  end  of  the  year  the  war  was  over,  except 
in  the  southern  part  of  the  peninsula.  There  the  last  organized 
forces  of  the  insurgents  were  being  put  down  by  Sulla,  the  only 
Roman  general  who  had  added  conspicuously  to  his  laurels  in  this 
Social  War. 

While  events  were  progressing  favorably  to  Rome  during  the 
second  year,  the  internal  condition  of  the  city  was  becoming  more 
and  more  critical.  At  the  end  of  89  B.C.  it  had  become  necessary 
to  declare  war  against  Mithradates,  and  Rome  was  by  no  means 
prepared.  The  treasury  was  exhausted;  no  new  army  could  be 
raised,  but  that  of  Sulla  was  destined  to  embark  as  soon  as  it  could 


REVOLT     OF     ITALY  £09 

89-88   B.C. 

safely  be  spared ;  money  was  raised  by  the  sale  of  unoccupied  sites 
within  the  city.  In  Rome  and  in  Italy  all  classes  were  seething 
with  discontent.  The  Varian  prosecutions  had  embittered  the  strife 
between  the  moderate  and  the  extreme  parties.  The  former  was 
dissatisfied  with  the  concessions  already  made  to  the  Italians;  the 
Italians  themselves  were  dissatisfied  with  an  enfranchisement  which 
limited  their  influence  to  eight  tribes — a  limitation  all  the  more 
galling-  that  it  found  a  precedent  in  the  restriction  of  the  freedmen 
to  four  tribes.  The  revolted  communities  who  had  been  subdued 
were  in  the  position  of  dediticii — that  is,  in  the  eye  of  the  law  they 
were  prisoners  of  war,  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of  their  conquerors ; 
they  were  not  yet  admitted  to  the  citizenship,  and  they  had  forfeited 
their  ancient  treaties;  where  these  treaties  had  been  restored  they 
had  been  made  revocable  at  the  will  of  the  Roman  people.  It  was 
desirable  to  recall  the  men  exiled  by  the  Varian  commission,  who 
included  many  of  the  best  men  of  the  senatorial  order;  but  the 
canceling  of  a  legal  verdict  by  a  decree  of  the  people  was  seen  to  be 
a  most  undesirable  precedent.  Lastly,  Marius  was  thirsting  for 
fresh  command  to  recover  his  lost  influence,  and  was  ready  to  go 
to  any  length  to  accomplish  his  purpose. 

To  all  these  elements  of  disorder  must  be  added  the  decay  of 
military  discipline  and  an  economic  crisis.  The  social  war  had 
necessitated  the  enrollment  of  every  available  man  in  the  army,  and 
had  carried  party  spirit  into  the  ranks.  The  result  was  an  appalling 
slackness  of  discipline,  and  more  than  one  Roman  division  had  put 
its  commander  to  death  and  escaped  all  punishment. 

At  the  same  time  the  old  cry  of  the  oppression  of  capital  was 
heard  again.  Debtors  unable  to  pay  the  interest  on  their  loans  had 
applied  to  the  urban  pretor  Asellio  for  time  to  realize  on  their 
property,  and  were  trying  to  get  the  obsolete  laws  against  usury 
enforced.  Asellio  sanctioned  actions  to  recover  interest  under  these 
laws,  and  was  murdered  by  the  offended  creditors  under  the  leader- 
ship of  the  tribune  Lucius  Cassius.  The  debtors  now  clamored  for 
novae  tabulae — the  canceling  of  all  existing  debts. 

At  this  critical  point  the  tribune  Publius  Sulpicius  Rufus  came 
forward  with  three  laws.  He  proposed  that  every  senator  that 
owed  more  than  four  hundred  dollars  should  be  expelled  from  the 
senate;  that  those  who  had  been  exiled  by  the  Varian  commission 
should  be  recalled;  and  that  the  new  burgesses  and  the  freedmen 
should  be  distributed  among  all  the  tribes. 


210  ROME 

88    B.C. 

Sulpicius  was  no  revolutionary;  by  these  laws  he  attempted 
simply  to  carry  out  the  traditional  policy  of  the  moderate  senatorial 
party,  of  the  party  of  Crassus  and  Drusus.  During  the  early  period 
of  his  office  he  had  been  a  supporter  of  constitutional  forms,  had 
opposed  the  recall  of  the  Varian  exiles,  and  had  vehemently  resisted 
an  attempt  of  Gaius  Caesar  to  stand  for  the  consulship  before  he 
had  been  pretor.  Nor  was  the  tendency  of  his  proposals  toward 
revolution.  The  first  was  necessary  on  account  of  the  venality  of 
the  senate  and  the  dependence  of  the  poorer  senators  upon  their 
richer  colleagues.  The  second  was  necessary  if  there  was  to  be  a 
moderate  party  at  all.  The  third,  so  far  as  it  concerned  the  allies, 
was  merely  a  measure  of  justice,  and  necessary  to  render  the  Roman 
concessions  a  reality;  and  the  admission  of  the  freedmen  into  all 
the  tribes  would  extend  the  influence  of  a  class  largely  dependent 
on  the  great  aristocratic  houses.  But  though  the  proposals  of  Sul- 
picius need  not  have  alarmed  the  senate,  he  became  exasperated  by 
opposition,  kept  a  hired  bodyguard  in  his  pay,  and  carried  on  the 
struggle  with  great  violence. 

The  proposals  were  strongly  resisted  by  the  senate;  and  the 
consuls  Sulla  and  Pompeius  Rufus  suspended  all  popular  assemblies 
on  pretense  of  extraordinary  religious  observances.  Sulpicius 
replied  by  a  violent  tumult.  The  consuls  then  yielded,  and  the  pro- 
posals became  law.  But  Sulpicius  could  not  yet  feel  secure;  Sulla 
had  departed  to  the  army  in  Campania,  and  Sulpicius  feared  lest  he 
might  lead  his  legions  to  overthrow  the  recent  laws.  Accordingly 
a  fourth  Lex  Sulpicia  was  brought  forward,  and  by  decree  of  the 
people  the  supreme  command  against  Mithradates  was  transferred 
from  Sulla  to  Marius. 

On  the  arrival  of  two  tribunes  from  Rome  to  take  over  the 
command  of  the  army,  Sulla  refused  to  submit.  The  command  had 
been  conferred  upon  him  legally  and  constitutionally;  he  knew  that 
he  could  count  upon  the  devotion  of  the  legions,  and  he  had  no 
scruple  about  using  force  against  his  country.  He  laid  the  matter 
before  the  troops,  and  hinted  to  them  that  Marius  would  raise  a 
fresh  army  for  service  in  the  East.  The  superior  officers  held  aloof, 
but  the  common  soldiers  tore  the  tribunes  in  pieces,  and  clamored 
to  be  led  to  the  city.  Sulla  availed  himself  of  their  enthusiasm,  and 
for  the  first  time  a  Roman  army  was  led  against  Rome.  The  city 
was  reached  by  forced  marches,  and  troops  posted  at  the  bridge  over 
the  Tiber  and  at  the  gates ;  the  sacred  boundary  was  crossed  by  two 


REVOLT     OF     ITALY  211 

88    B.C. 

legions  in  battle  array.  Stones  were  thrown  from  the  roofs,  but 
Sulla  brandished  a  blazing  torch  and  threatened  to  fire  the  city,  and 
the  legions  steadily  advanced.  The  forces  of  Marius  and  Sulpicius 
were  overcome ;  when  they  summoned  the  slaves  to  arms  not  more 
than  three  appeared,  and  in  a  few  hours  Sulla  was  master  of  Rome. 

Sulla's  first  step  was  to  declare  the  Sulpician  laws  null  and  void ; 
his  next,  to  proscribe  Sulpicius  and  twelve  of  his  most  strenuous 
adherents.  Sulpicius  was  captured  at  Laurentum,  and  put  to  death, 
and  his  head  was  exposed  in  the  Forum  before  the  rostra.  The 
adventures  of  Marius  are  well  known.  After  escaping  successively 
the  cavalry  of  Sulla,  the  magistrates  of  Minturnae,  and  the  treachery 
of  the  Numidian  king,  he  found  a  temporary  rest  in  a  small  island 
off  the  coast  of  Tunis. 

The  legislation  which  Sulla  now  undertook  aimed  at  relieving 
the  debtors  and  strengthening  the  power  of  the  senate.  His  chief 
measures  were :  A  law  fixing  the  maximum  of  interest ;  schemes  for 
a  number  of  new  colonies ;  the  addition  of  three  hundred  new  sena- 
tors to  restore  the  reduced  numbers  of  the  senate ;  the  revival  of  the 
old  Servian  arrangement  for  voting  in  the  comitia  centuriata  by 
giving  nearly  one-half  the  votes  to  the  first  class  alone,  consisting  of 
those  who  possessed  an  estate  of  five  thousand  dollars  or  more ;  and 
the  restoration  of  the  full  probouleutic  power  of  the  senate.  No 
proposal  could  henceforth  be  submitted  to  the  people  unless  it  had 
first  been  approved  by  the  senate. 

Formally  these  laws  of  Sulla  appeared  revolutionary  in  the 
extreme.  The  proscription  of  Sulpicius  and  his  adherents  was  a 
violation  of  the  sacred  laws  of  appeal.  The  initiative  in  legislation 
was  taken  from  the  magistrates  and  given  to  the  senate,  which  had 
legally  no  privilege  but  that  of  giving  advice.  The  old  voting 
arrangements  in  the  centuries,  now  revolutionized  by  Sulla,  had 
existed  unchanged  for  a  century  and  a  half.  But  in  substance  these 
changes  contained  little  which  violated  the  spirit  of  the  constitution. 
In  occupying  Rome  and  in  proscribing  the  adherents  of  Sulpicius, 
Sulla  merely  accepted  actual  facts  and  repelled  violence  with  violence. 
The  extension  of  the  power  of  the  senate  was  but  giving  legal 
sanction  to  a  power  which  it  had  always  exercised  until  recent  times 
by  means  of  the  tribunician  or  augural  veto ;  and  the  later  practice, 
according  to  which  any  magistrate  proposed  a  law  to  the  tribes 
without  previous  deliberation  in  the  senate,  was  already  seen  to  be 
fraught  with  great  inconvenience  and  danger.     The  measures  with 


212  ROME 

87    B.C. 

regard  to  interest  and  colonization  show  that  Sulla  was  not  indiffer- 
ent to  the  wrongs  of  the  poorer  classes,  and  they  were  proposed  by 
him  after  the  victory,  and  of  his  own  free  will.  Lastly,  it  is  impor- 
tant to  remember  not  only  what  he  changed,  but  what  he  left 
unchanged.  The  principal  foundations  of  the  Gracchan  constitu- 
tion, the  corn  largesses,  and  the  equestrian  jury  courts  were  left 
untouched. 

Meanwhile  affairs  in  the  East  grew  more  threatening  every 
day,  and  Sulla  could  no  longer  postpone  his  departure.  He  endeav- 
ored to  insure  the  permanence  of  his  measures  by  procuring  the 
election  of  consuls  favorable  to  the  restored  government,  and  by 
transferring  the  army  of  the  north  from  the  doubtful  Strabo  to  his 
own  devoted  friend,  Quintus  Rufus. 

But  one  of  the  new  consuls  was  Cinna,  a  most  determined 
opponent  of  Sulla,  and  Rufus  had  no  sooner  taken  over  his  command 
than  he  was  murdered  by  the  soldiers,  and  Strabo  resumed  the 
leadership.  Sulla  himself,  on  the  expiration  of  his  consulship,  was 
summoned  to  appear  on  his  defense  before  the  people. 

Notwithstanding  these  ominous  incidents,  Sulla  merely  exacted 
an  oath  from  the  consuls  to  maintain  the  existing  constitution,  and 
immediately  embarked  for  the  East  early  in  87  b.c. 


Chapter    XXII 

THE   MITHRADATIC   WAR.    88-84   B.C. 

EVER  since  the  beginning  of  the  revolution  under  Tiberius 
Gracchus  Rome  had  been  too  much  occupied  with  her  internal 
affairs  to  bestow  much  attention  upon  the  provinces.  During 
this  period  important  changes  had  taken  place  in  the  East.  The  two 
kingdoms  of  Armenia,  which  dated  their  existence  from  the  war  with 
Antiochus,  had  been  united  under  Tigranes,  originally  king  of  the 
northeastern  portion;  and  to  him  the  title  of  Great  King  and 
the  titular  supremacy  of  Asia  now  passed.  Phrygia  became,  in  the 
time  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  an  independent  kingdom  in  connection  with 
the  Roman  province  of  Asia;  but  otherwise  Asia  remained  un- 
changed, except  for  the  oppression  of  the  Roman  tax  farmers,  which 
was  ever  growing  more  merciless  and  more  intolerable. 

The  ruler  of  the  kingdom  of  Pontus  was,  at  that  time,  Mithra- 
dates  VI.,  surnamed  Eupator.  After  the  death  of  his  father  he 
became  a  fugitive  and  a  wanderer  for  seven  years.  Eastern  legend 
ascribed  to  him  a  stature  more  than  human,  strength  and  swiftness 
surpassing  that  of  alt  other  men,  and  a  constitution  inured  alike  to 
any  fatigue  or  excess.  He  collected  Greek  and  Persian  antiquities 
and  works  of  art,  and  kept  Greek  poets  and  philosophers  in  his  train. 

As  a  ruler  he  does  not  rise  beyond  the  ordinary  Eastern  sultan. 
What  really  distinguishes  him  is  his  boundless  activity  and  energy. 
He  extended  the  limits  of  his  dominions  in  every  direction,  founded 
a  new  empire  on  the  northern  shores  of  the  Black  Sea,  and,  alone 
among  the  princes  of  the  East,  was  able  seriously  to  contend  with 
the  Roman  power. 

His  ancestral  dominion  was  Pontus,  or  Cappadocia,  on  the 
Black  Sea,  between  Bithynia  on  the  west  and  Armenia  on  the  east. 
It  was  a  rich  and  fertile  country,  producing  large  quantities  of  grain 
and  fruit,  but  almost  entirely  destitute  of  towns  properly  so  called, 
though  there  were  numerous  fortresses  where  the  peasants  might 
take  refuge,  and  where  the  king's  treasure  was  deposited.  The  real 
basis  of  his  wealth  and  power  lay  in  the  flourishing  Greek  seaports 
of  Trapezus,  Amisus,  and  Sinope. 

213 


214. 


ROME 


120-92  B.C. 

Instead  of  developing  the  resources  of  his  dominions,  Mithra- 
dates  devoted  himself  to  extending  them.  After  conquering  the 
district  of  Colchis,  east  of  Pontus,  he  proceeded  to  extend  his  sway 
over  the  region  north  of  the  Black  Sea,  the  modern  Crimea.  The 
Greek  cities  here  had  long  groaned  under  the  exactions  and  black- 
mail extorted  by  the  Sythian  and  Sarmatian  tribes  of  the  interior, 
the  ancestors  of  the  modern  Cossacks,  and  they  were  glad  to  be 
delivered  by  the  arms  of  Mithradates,  and  to  acknowledge  his  su- 
premacy. The  new  kingdom,  based,  like  Pontus,  on  a  number  of 
Greek  cities,  was  called  the  Bosporus.     It  embraced  the  peninsula 


crTte 

the    east  in  the  time  o* 
m1tiiradaxes     ans   t1chane5. 


and  the  opposite  coast,  and  paid  an  annual  tribute  of  two  hundred 
talents  ($244,000),  besides  enormous  quantities  of  grain,  to  the 
king.  The  barbarian  tribes  acknowledged  some  sort  of  dependence 
upon  Mithradates,  and  supplied  a  valuable  recruiting  ground.  At 
the  same  time  Lesser  Armenia  was  annexed  to  Pontus.  Mithradates 
gave  his  daughter  in  marriage  to  Tigranes,  king  of  Greater  Ar- 
menia, and  it  was  by  his  help  that  Tigranes  established  his  su- 
premacy in  Asia. 

The  king  now  turned  his  attention  to  Paphlagonia  and  Cap- 
padocia,  and  it  was  his  conduct  with  regard  to  these  countries  which 
made  Roman  interference  at  length  inevitable.  Paphlagonia  was 
claimed  by  Mithradates  as  having  been  left  to  his  father  by  will.  He 


MITHRADATIC     WAR  215 

92-89    B.C. 

gained  over  the  king  of  Bithynia  by  allowing  him  to  occupy  the 
western  half  of  the  kingdom.  Cappadocia  had  once  been  united 
with  Pontus,  and  after  the  murder  of  the  Cappadocian  king  Ariar- 
athes,  and  of  his  young  son,  the  reunion  was  practically  accom- 
plished. Nominally  the  country  was  ruled  by  a  pseudo-Ariarathes, 
actually  by  Gordius,  a  Cappadocian  instrument  of  Mithradates. 

The  Roman  senate  had  been  entirely  passive  during  all  these 
aggressions.  The  reunion  of  Cappadocia  at  last  aroused  them  to 
energy.  Paphlagonia  was  declared  independent,  and  Mithradates 
was  commanded  to  evacuate  Cappadocia.  No  army  was  sent  to 
enforce  these  decrees,  but  the  energy  of  Sulla,  the  governor  of 
Cilicia,  compelled  Mithradates  to  submit  at  all  points.  The  Cappa- 
docian Ariobarzanes  was  elected  king  by  the  people.  Sulla  marched 
to  the  Euphrates,  and  gained  great  fame  by  a  conference  in  which, 
as  representative  of  Rome,  he  arranged  the  relations  between  Ti- 
granes  and  the  Parthians  in  92  B.C. 

This  was  the  first  time  that  the  Romans  came  into  contact 
with  the  great  nation  with  which  they  were  destined  to  dispute  the 
sovereignty  of  the  world.  Thus  the  status  quo  in  the  East  was 
restored. 

But  Sulla  had  no  sooner  retired  than  turmoil  once  more  broke 
out,  and  Mithradates,  with  the  help  of  his  son-in-law,  Tigranes, 
renewed  his  intrigues  and  sought  once  more  to  extend  his  kingdom. 
The  Roman  commissioner  in  Asia  at  this  time,  Manius  Aquillius, 
knowing  there  was  little  hope  for  tranquillity  in  these  regions  so 
long  as  Mithradates's  power  was  not  checked,  determined  to  bring 
matters  to  a  head  by  stirring  up  Nicomedes,  the  king  of  Bithynia, 
against  him.  Accordingly  Nicomedes  invaded  Pontus  and  closed 
the  Bosporus  with  his  ships.  Mithradates  contented  himself  with 
appealing  to  the  Romans.  He  was  ordered,  in  any  case,  to  refrain 
from  war  against  Nicomedes.  Then  the  king's  decision  was  taken. 
His  son  Ariobarzanes  was  ordered  to  invade  Cappadocia  in  89  B.C., 
and  envoys  were  sent  to  the  Roman  envoys  to  demand  their  ultima- 
tum.    War  now  ensued  as  a  matter  of  course. 

Mithradates  made  the  most  energetic  preparations :  he  obtained 
a  promise  from  Tigranes  of  an  auxiliary  army;  to  the  Greeks  he 
presented  himself,  like  Philip  of  Macedon,  as  a  deliverer  from  an 
alien  yoke ;  and  he  had  hopes  of  the  revolt  of  Numidia  and  Syria,  of 
risings  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia.  The  Mediterranean  swarmed  with 
Pontic  privateers:  a  foreign  corps,  composed  chiefly  of  Italian 


216  ROME 

88    B.C. 

refugees,  was  formed  in  Asia,  armed  and  equipped  in  the  Roman 
fashion.  The  king's  infantry  is  said  to  have  amounted  to  250,000 
and  his  cavalry  to  40,000,  while  his  fleet  numbered  400  vessels. 

For  the  Romans  the  moment  was  most  unfavorable.  The 
Italian  insurrection  was  yet  unsubdued,  and  it  was  impossible  for  a 
Roman  army  from  Italy  to  arrive,  at  earliest,  till  the  summer  of  88 
B.C.  Besides  the  native  levies  there  was  but  a  small  Roman  force 
in  Asia;  but  the  Roman  officers  hoped  to  protect  the  Roman  prov- 
ince and  maintain  their  present  positions.  The  Bithynian  fleet  still 
blockaded  the  Bosporus. 

The  war  began  in  88  B.C.,  and  the  first  operations  were  all  in 
favor  of  Mithradates.  He  defeated  the  Bithynians  and  captured 
their  military  chest.  The  Roman  officers  were  everywhere  worsted, 
and  had  to  shut  themselves  up  in  fortified  towns.  To  conciliate  the 
inhabitants,  all  Asiatic  prisoners  were  immediately  dismissed  by 
the  king.  The  whole  country  to  the  Maeander  was  in  his  hands. 
The  only  hope  of  the  Romans  was  in  Sulla,  and  now  news  arrived 
of  the  Sulpician  revolution  and  of  Sulla's  march  upon  Rome.  The 
Asiatics  everywhere  sided  with  Mithradates;  the  Roman  officers, 
Quintus  Oppius  and  Aquillius,  were  delivered  into  his  hands.  In 
the  hour  of  conquest  the  savagery  of  the  king  broke  forth  in  a  stu- 
pendous crime.  Orders  were  issued  from  Ephesus  that  on  one  and 
the  same  day  all  Italians,  bond  and  free,  should  be  put  to  death. 
Severe  penalties  were  threatened  against  any  who  should  shelter  the 
proscribed,  and  while  one-half  of  their  property  was  to  go  to  the 
royal  treasury,  the  other  half  was  given  over  to  the  murderers. 
The  orders  were  strictly  carried  out,  and  by  the  smallest  computa- 
tion eighty  thousand  persons  perished  in  the  massacre.  The  act 
was  one  of  brutal  and  impolitic  revenge.  By  striking  not  merely  at 
Romans,  but  at  all  Italians,  the  king  alienated  his  most  important 
allies. 

The  new  conquests  were  now  organized.  Pergamus  became 
the  new  capital,  the  old  Pontus  was  given  over  to  the  sons  of  Mith- 
radates, and  the  other  provinces  of  Asia  Minor  became  Pontic 
satrapies.  All  arrears  of  taxes  were  forgiven,  and  exemption  from 
all  taxes  for  five  years  was  promised.  Besides  the  petty  ruler  of 
Paphlagonia,  the  only  communities  still  adhering  to  Rome  were  the 
city  leagues  of  Caria  and  Lycia  and  the  cities  of  Rhodes  and  of 
Magnesia  on  the  Maeander,  which  successfully  withstood  all  at- 
tempts to  reduce  them. 


MITHRADATIC     WAR  317 

87    B.C. 

The  king  now  determined  to  carry  the  war  into  Europe  and  to 
occupy  Hellas.  His  fleet  overran  the  Aegean  Sea,  all  the  islands 
were  occupied,  and  the  mainland  was  soon  attacked.  At  Athens, 
Aristion,  a  philosopher  by  trade,  persuaded  the  people  to  renounce 
Roman  rule;  the  Piraeus  became  a  Pontic  harbor;  and  the  other 
free  states — Achaia,  Boeotia,  Laconia — -followed  the  example  of 
Athens.  , 

The  position  of  the  Roman  government  was  critical:  three 
armies  were  required  to  keep  down  Rome,  Italy,  and  Asia ;  only  one, 
that  of  Sulla,  was  available.  Sulla  had  to  choose  between  these 
three  tasks.  He  chose  Asia,  and  in  the  spring  of  87  B.C.  he  landed 
in  Epirus — but  with  only  thirty  thousand  men:  he  was  without  a 
single  ship  and  his  treasury  was  empty.  But  his  action  was  none 
the  less  vigorous ;  as  soon  as  his  proposals  for  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  status  quo  before  the  war  were  rejected,  he  advanced  into 
Boeotia,  defeated  the  Pontic  generals,  and  quickly  possessed  himself 
of  the  whole  of  the  mainland  except  Athens  and  the  Piraeus,  which 
he  failed  to  carry  by  assault.  He  then  established  camps  at  Eleusis 
and  Megara,  and  proceeded  to  besiege  the  city  and  port  of  Athens. 
The  siege  of  Athens  was  long  and  tedious.  The  Pontic  relieving 
army  was  overthrown  under  the  walls  of  the  city ;  but  abundant  sup- 
plies arrived  at  the  Piraeus  by  sea,  and  considerable  quantities  even 
reached  Athens.  The  winter  passed  without  result :  all  the  Roman 
assaults  on  the  Piraeus  were  repulsed  and  the  siege  was  turned 
into  a  blockade.  Athens  at  length  made  overtures  of  surrender; 
but  when  there  was  delay  in  accepting  Sulla's  terms  the  city  was 
captured  by  escalade.  It  was  plundered  and  the  ringleaders  of  the 
insurrection  executed;  but  the  Athenians  were  allowed  to  retain 
their  liberty  and  their  possessions,  including  Delos,  just  presented  to 
them  by  Mithradates.  Thus  once  more  was  Athens  "  saved  by  its 
illustrious  dead." 

The  Piraeus  still  held  out,  and  a  fleet  became  imperatively 
necessary  to  prevent  supplies  from  entering  by  sea.  Lucullus  had 
been  dispatched  to  raise  ships,  but  the  Egyptian  court  refused  his 
request  for  aid.  Sulla  was  compelled  to  confiscate  the  temple  treas- 
ures to  supply  his  needs,  and  compensated  the  gods  by  devoting  to 
them  one-half  of  the  territory  of  Thebes.  The  worst  blow  was  the 
news  of  the  democratic  revolution  at  Rome,  and  the  transference 
of  the  Eastern  command  from  Sulla  to  Flaccus. 

From  these  difficulties  Sulla  was  extricated  by  the  rashness  of 


218  ROME 

86-84  B.C. 

Mithradates,  who  forbade  his  generals  to  act  on  the  defensive,  and 
ordered  them  to  crush  Sulla  at  once.  An  army  of  over  100,000 
men,  under  Taxiles,  arrived  at  Thermopylae;  Archelaus  evacuated 
the  Piraeus  and  joined  the  main  army.  In  the  plain  of  the  Cephis- 
sus  the  great  battle  of  Chaeronea  was  fought.  The  Pontic  forces 
were  three  times  as  numerous  as  the  Roman,  and  were  especially 
superior  in  cavalry,  but  after  a  stubbornly  contested  conflict  the 
forces  of  Mithradates  were  defeated,  the  Pontic  camp  was  cap- 
tured, and  the  remnant  of  the  army  pursued  to  the  Euripus. 

The  effect  of  the  victory  was  slight — partly  for  want  of  a  fleet, 
partly  because  of  the  approach  of  Flaccus,  who  was  now  in  Thes- 
saly.  For  some  days  the  two  Roman  armies  were  encamped  oppo- 
site to  each  other ;  but  the  soldiers  of  Flaccus  began  to  desert,  and 
he  turned  northwards,  intending  to  march  through  Thrace  to  Asia. 
Sulla,  from  whatever  motives,  remained  at  Athens  for  the  winter. 

In  the  spring  of  the  next  year  a  second  Pontic  army  reached 
Boeotia  by  way  of  Euboea,  where  it  was  joined  by  the  relics  of  the 
army  of  Archelaus;  the  latter  general  was  suspected  of  treason  by 
his  master,  and  the  most  peremptory  orders  were  given  to  fight  a 
decisive  battle.  The  armies  met  in  the  same  plain  of  the  Cephissus 
— near  Orchomenus.  The  Pontic  cavalry  caused  the  Roman  line  to 
waver  by  the  fury  of  its  charges;  but  Sulla  rallied  his  soldiers  in 
person, — the  horse  were  driven  back  and  the  defeat  of  the  infantry 
was  then  an  easy  task.  The  Pontic  camp  was  stormed  on  the  next 
day;  the  army  was  almost  annihilated.  The  Boeotian  communi- 
ties were  severely  punished  for  their  defection,  many  being  almost 
totally  destroyed.  The  way  was  now  open  through  Macedonia  and 
Thrace ;  Philippi  and  Abdera  were  occupied,  and  the  winter,  85-84 
b.cv  was  consumed  by  Sulla  in  preparing  a  fleet  for  the  next  year's 
campaign  in  Asia. 

During  the  course  of  the  war  in  Europe  circumstances  had 
greatly  changed  in  Asia  Minor.  The  hopes  with  which  the  Asiatic 
communities  had  hailed  their  deliverer  were  bitterly  disappointed: 
the  Roman  whips  were  as  nothing  to  the  Pontic  scorpions,  and  even 
the  long-suffering  Asiatics  were  driven  to  revolt.  The  most  anar- 
chical decrees  were  issued  by  the  new  sovereign,  giving  independ- 
ence to  the  revolting  communities,  full  remission  of  debts  to  debtors, 
lands  to  the  poor,  and  liberty  to  slaves.  All  manner  of  outrage  and 
violence  was  the  consequence.  The  most  important  mercantile 
cities,   Smyrna,   Ephesus,   Sardes,   revolted  from  the  king.      At 


MITHRADATIC     WAR  219 

86-85  B.C. 

Adramyttium  the  whole  of  the  senate  were  put  to  death  by  his 
orders.  The  Chians,  suspected  of  disloyalty,  were  first  heavily 
fined,  and  then  deported  to  the  coast  of  Colchis.  A  massacre  of 
Celtic  chiefs  in  Asia  was  planned  and  carried  out,  in  order  to  con- 
vert Galatia  into  a  Pontic  province.  But  those  who  escaped  raised 
the  powerful  Celtic  tribes  and  expelled  the  Pontic  governor. 

At  the  same  time  the  king  was  hard  pressed  by  the  Romans  on 
sea  and  land.  Lucullus  had  at  length  succeeded  in  raising  a  con- 
siderable fleet,  and  had  wrested  several  islands  from  the  enemy. 
The  army  of  Flaccus  had  reached  Chalcedon  in  86  B.C.,  but  a  mutiny 
had  deposed  Flaccus  and  placed  Fimbria  in  command,  and  the  new 
general  had  defeated  the  younger  Mithradates  and  dislodged  the  king 
himself  from  Pergamus ;  and  it  was  only  through  the  refusal  of  the 
Optimate  Lucullus  to  cooperate  with  the  democrat  Fimbria  that 
Mithradates  was  enabled  to  escape  to  Mitylene.  Thus,  by  the  end 
of  85  B.C.,  Europe  was  entirely  lost  to  Mithradates;  and  of  Asia 
Minor  the  greater  part  was  in  revolt  or  occupied  by  the  Romans. 
The  fleet  of  Lucullus  fought  two  successful  engagements  off  the 
Trojan  coast,  and,  when  joined  by  the  fresh  vessels  equipped  by 
Sulla  in  Thessaly,  completely  commanded  the  Hellespont. 

Mithradates  now  opened  negotiations  for  peace.  He  applied 
to  both  Sulla  and  Fimbria,  but  he  knew  well  that  it  was  Sulla  with 
whom  he  had  really  to  reckon.  The  king  offered  Sulla  his  aid  against 
the  democratic  party  at  Rome  in  return  for  the  cession  of  Asia  to 
himself.  But  Sulla  refused  to  cede  one  foot  of  ground,  and  would 
take  nothing  but  the  following  terms :  Restoration  of  all  the  king's 
conquests,  both  continental  and  insular ;  surrender  of  prisoners  and 
deserters,  and  of  the  Pontic  fleet ;  pay  and  provisions  for  the  army, 
and  a  war  indemnity  of  three  thousand  talents  ($3,360,000)  ;  the 
Qiians  to  be  restored  to  their  homes,  and  the  Macedonian  refugees, 
friendly  to  Rome,  to  be  allowed  to  return. 

These  negotiations  were  carried  on  at  Delium,  but  Archelaus 
could  not  at  first  persuade  his  master  to  agree.  Sulla  meanwhile 
proceeded  to  settle  Macedonian  affairs,  and  set  out  with  fleet  and 
army  for  the  Hellespont.  At  last  Mithradates  was  brought  to  con- 
sent. But  Sulla's  march  was  still  continued ;  he  crossed  the  Helles- 
pont, and  at  Dardanus  concluded  peace,  orally,  with  Mithradates. 
At  length  he  encamped  close  to  Fimbria,  at  Thyatira,  near  Perga- 
mus. Fimbria's  troops  refused  to  attack  the  Sullan  army,  and  an 
attempt  to  assassinate  Sulla  failed.      When  Sulla  refused  a  con- 


220  ROME 

84-83     B.C. 

ference,  Fimbria  gave  up  all  for  lost  and  fell  upon  his  sword ;  the 
main  body  of  the  troops  joined  Sulla,  while  those  who  were  most 
deeply  compromised  repaired  to  Mithradates. 

The  settlement  of  Asia  was  now  proceeded  with.  Two  legions 
were  left  under  command  of  Lucius  Licinius  Murena,  and  their  in- 
terference was,  in  some  cases,  necessary  to  enforce  the  Sullan  regu- 
lations. The  most  important  of  these  were  as  follows :  The  revo- 
lutionary decrees  of  Mithradates  were  canceled ;  the  most  prominent 
adherents  of  the  king  and  the  authors  of  the  massacre  of  the  Italians 
were  put  to  death ;  the  arrears  of  tithes  and  customs  for  the  last  five 
years  were  exacted,  together  with  a  war  indemnity  of  twenty  thou- 
sand talents  ($24,400,000)  ;  the  few  faithful  communities — Rhodes, 
the  province  of  Lycia,  Magnesia  on  the  Maeander — were  rewarded, 
and  compensation  was  made  to  the  Chians  and  to  the  people  of 
Ilium  for  the  exceptional  cruelty  with  which  they  had  been  treated. 

During  the  winter  of  84-83  B.C.  Sulla  allowed  his  troops  to 
enjoy  luxurious  winter  quarters  in  Asia,  and  in  the  spring  trans- 
ferred them  across  the  Aegean  and  the  Adriatic  to  Brundisium. 


Chapter    XXIII 

THE    DEMOCRATIC    REVOLUTION    AND    ITS    OVER- 
THROW BY   SULLA.     87-82  B.  C. 

THE  departure  of  Sulla  left  Italy  full  of  the  discontented  ele- 
ments from  which  revolution  might  be  expected  to  arise. 
The  Italian  revolt  still  smoldered  dangerously  in  many 
quarters,  and  the  principal  army  was  in  the  hands  of  a  general 
whose  loyalty  to  the  senate  was  doubtful.  The  capitalists  had  suf- 
fered greatly  through  the  severe  financial  crisis.  The  insurgents 
who  had  laid  down  their  arms  since  the  expiration  of  the  sixty  days 
appointed  by  the  Lex  Plautia  Papiria  were  in  the  position  of  sub- 
jects entirely  destitute  of  rights.  The  new  citizens  and  the  freed- 
men  were  exasperated  by  the  canceling  of  the  Sulpician  laws ;  while 
the  large  class  of  those  who  adhered  to  the  men  outlawed  by  Sulla 
after  the  revolution  of  Sulpicius  were  bent  on  obtaining  the  recall  of 
their  banished  friends. 

So  far  as  the  malcontents  had  a  common  aim,  they  were  united 
upon  this  last  point  of  the  recall  of  the  exiles ;  but  the  movement  was 
mainly  one  of  pure  discontent,  and  had  no  distinct  political  object. 
Its  aimlessness  is  shown  by  the  character  of  the  person  chosen  to 
lead  it — Lucius  Cornelius  Cinna.  He  was  unknown  except  as  an 
officer  in  the  social  war ;  he  had  no  political  aim  but  that  of  vulgar 
selfishness,  and  is  said  to  have  been  bought  over  by  the  party  of 
Marius  merely  because  the  restriction  of  the  power  of  tribunes  made 
it  necessary  for  the  conspirators  to  have  a  consul  as  their  instru- 
ment. There  were  abler  men  in  the  second  rank  of  the  conspiracy 
— Gnaeus  Papirius  Carbo,  a  powerful  popular  orator,  and  Quintus 
Sertorius,  a  man  of  the  highest  ability  and  integrity. 

Immediately  on  Sulla's  departure  in  87  B.C.  the  conspirators 
took  action.  Cinna,  supported  by  the  majority  of  the  tribunes, 
proposed  two  laws:  the  reenactment  of  the  Sulpician  law  permit- 
ting the  enrollment  of  the  freedmen  and  the  new  citizens  in  any  of 
the  tribes;  and  that  the  Sulpician  exiles  should  be  recalled  and  re- 
stored to  their  rights. 

Ml 


222  ROME 

87   B.C. 

On  the  day  of  voting  both  sides  appeared  in  arms.  The 
senatorial  tribunes  vetoed  the  new  law.  When  swords  were  drawn 
the  bands  of  the  other  consul,  Octavius,  cleared  the  Forum,  and 
committed  the  most  frightful  atrocities  on  the  assembled  multitude. 
Ten  thousand  persons  are  said  to  have  been  slain.  There  was  no 
legal  means  of  proceeding  against  the  conspirators,  but  a  prophet 
opportunely  gave  out  that  the  banishment  of  Cinna  and  of  six 
tribunes  was  necessary  for  the  peace  of  the  country,  and  a  decree  of 
outlawry  was  accordingly  passed  by  the  senate  against  these  per- 
sons. Lucius  Cornelius  Merula  was  chosen  consul  in  place  of 
Cinna. 

But  the  senate  omitted  to  expel  the  new  exiles  from  Italy,  and 
they  appeared  in  Tibur,  in  Praeneste,  and  in  all  the  new  burgess 
communities  of  Latium  and  Campania,  asking  money  and  arms  for 
the  common  cause.  The  army  besieging  Nola,  a  city  still  held  by 
the  Italian  insurgents,  induced  partly  by  their  own  democratic  lean- 
ings, partly  by  the  bribes  of  the  exiles,  made  common  cause  with 
Cinna,  and  furnished  a  valuable  nucleus  for  the  recruits  who  soon 
flocked  in.  Cinna  now  moved  towards  Rome,  and  was  soon  joined 
by  fresh  forces  from  the  north.  Marius  and  the  refugees  of  the 
previous  year  had  landed  in  Etruria  with  a  body  of  five  hundred 
horse.  He  now  ordered  the  ergastula,  or  prisons  in  which  the 
slaves  were  confined  at  night,  to  be  broken  open ;  and  soon  gathered 
round  him  a  force  of  six  thousand  men ;  he  also  contrived  to  collect 
a  force  of  forty  ships,  with  which  he  intercepted  the  corn  supply  of 
Rome.  He  placed  himself  at  the  disposal  of  Cinna,  though  the 
wiser  leaders,  like  Sertorius,  saw  the  imprudence  of  associating 
themselves  with  so  dangerous  a  man. 

The  democratic  forces  gathered  round  the  city,  and  the  senate 
appealed  to  Strabo  for  protection.  He  pitched  his  camp  at  the  Col- 
line  Gate,  but  refrained  from  battle,  and  allowed  the  insurgents  to 
invest  the  city.  A  decree  was  now  passed  conferring  the  franchise 
on  all  the  Italian  allies  who  had  forfeited  their  old  treaties.  This 
was  meant  to  gratify  one  large  and  important  class  of  malcontents, 
but  the  concession  did  not  produce  more  than  ten  thousand  men. 
Negotiations  were  opened  with  the  Samnites,  in  order  to  make  the 
troops  of  Metellus  in  that  quarter  available  for  the  defense  of  the 
city ;  but  the  Samnite  terms  were  too  humiliating,  and  when  Metel- 
lus marched  to  Rome,  leaving  behind  him  a  small  division,  the  latter 
.  was  at  once  attacked  and  defeated.    Moreover,  Cinna  and  Marius 


GAIUS    M  \RH"S 

(Rorn   157    b.c.      Pied    86    B.C.) 

Marble  bust  in  tlu-  Ufissi,  b'lorenct 


DEMOCRATIC     REVOLUTION  223 

87    B.C. 

granted  all  that  the  Samnites  required  and  were  reinforced  by  a 
Samnite  contingent. 

The  insurgents  were  already  in  possession  of  the  sea,  and  the 
land  communications  were  soon  cut  off  by  the  capture  of  Ariminum, 
which  shut  off  the  supplies  of  food  and  men  expected  from  the  re- 
gion of  the  Po;  they  also  held  Antium,  Lanuvium,  and  Aricia, 
which  closed  all  approaches  from  the  south.  At  the  same  time  a 
terrible  pestilence  broke  out  among  the  troops  of  the  city,  by  which 
seventeen  thousand  men  perished.  After  the  sudden  death  of 
Strabo  his  troops  were  incorporated  with  those  of  Octavius,  but 
their  temper  was  such  that  the  consul  dared  not  fight.  The  Opti- 
mates  were  at  variance  with  each  other:  Octavius  opposed  all 
concession,  while  Metellus  was  in  favor  of  compromise.  The  sol- 
diers first  besought  Metellus  to  take  over  the  command,  then,  on  his 
refusal,  deserted  in  large  numbers.  At  length  the  government  was 
compelled  to  think  of  surrender.  Envoys  were  sent  to  Cinna,  but, 
while  the  negotiations  dragged  on,  Cinna  moved  close  up  to  the  city 
gates,  and  desertions  became  so  common  that  the  senate  was  re- 
duced to  unconditional  surrender.  Cinna  promised,  at  the  entreaty 
of  the  senate,  to  abstain  from  bloodshed ;  but  Marius  kept  an  omi- 
nous silence. 

Marius  scoffingly  refused  to  set  foot  in  the  city  until  his  sentence 
of  exile  had  been  revoked ;  and  a  hurried  assembly  was  held  in  the 
Forum,  and  the  necessary  decree  passed.  The  old  man  at  length 
entered,  and  the  work  of  bloodshed  began.  The  gates  were  closed 
and  the  slaughter  was  uninterrupted  for  five  days,  but  for  months 
afterwards  individuals  who  had  escaped  at  first  were  put  to  death. 
Gnaeus  Octavius  was  the  first  victim ;  others  of  the  illustrious  slain 
were  Lucius  Caesar,  consul  in  90  b.c,  and  the  victor  of  Acerrae; 
Marcus  Antonius,  the  first  pleader  of  his  time,  Lucius  Merula, 
Cinna's  successor;  and  Quintus  Catulus,  Marius'  colleague  in  the 
Cimbrian  wars.  The  fury  of  Marius  amounted  to  madness;  he 
could  scarce  be  restrained  from  hunting  out  the  bitterest  of  his 
enemies  and  slaying  them  with  his  own  hand ;  he  forbade  the  burial 
of  the  bodies,  and  had  the  corpse  of  Gaius  Caesar  stabbed  afresh  at 
the  tomb  of  Quintus  Varius.  The  man  who  presented  to  him,  as 
he  sat  at  table,  the  head  of  Antonius  was  publicly  embraced.  His 
own  associates  were  appalled  at  his  frenzy,  but  none  had  the  courage 
or  the  power  to  oppose  him,  and  he  was  even  elected  consul  with 
Cinna  for  the  following  year.     He  lived  to  enter  upon  his  seventh 


224  ROME 

86    B.C. 

consulship;  the  few  remaining  days  of  his  life  were  passed  in  a 
delirium,  which  ended  in  a  burning  fever.  He  expired  on  Janu- 
ary 13,  86  B.C.  He  died  in  full  possession  of  what  he  called 
power  and  honor,  and  in  his  bed,  but  Nemesis  assumes  various 
shapes,  and  does  not  always  requite  blood  with  blood.  Was  there 
no  sort  of  retaliation  in  the  fact  that  Rome  and  Italy  now  breathed 
more  freely  on  the  news  of  the  death  of  the  famous  deliverer  of  the 
people,  than  at  the  tidings  of  the  battle  on  the  Raudine  plain  ? 

With  the  death  of  Marius  the  massacre  ceased,  though  there 
were  individual  instances  of  murder.  Thus  Fimbria  attempted  to 
kill  the  revered  pontifex  maximus,  Quintus  Scaevola,  whom  even 
Marius  had  spared ;  but  Sertorius  secured  the  public  tranquillity  by 
calling  together  the  Marian  slaves,  to  the  number  of  four  thousand, 
and  having  them  cut  down  by  his  Celtic  troops. 

During  the  next  three  years  Cinna  enjoyed  a  power  as  absolute 
and  despotic  as  any  ever  exercised  by  the  tyrant  of  a  Greek  city. 
He  was  consul  each  year,  and  nominated  himself  and  his  colleague 
without  going  through  the  form  of  consulting  the  people.  During 
this  period  he  gave  no  sign  of  any  definite  political  plan  or  aim ;  no 
attempt  was  made  to  reorganize  the  constitution  and  to  place  the 
new  government  on  a  firm  basis.  Only  the  reactionary  measures 
of  Sulla  were  annulled,  and  a  few  laws  passed  as  the  exigencies  of 
the  moment  demanded. 

The  law  of  Sulpicius,  granting  to  the  new  burgesses  and  to  the 
freedmen  equality  with  the  old  citizens,  was  revived  and  confirmed 
by  the  senate,  and  censors  were  appointed  to  distribute  the  Italians 
among  the  thirty-five  tribes.  It  was  at  this  time  probably  that  the 
restrictions  on  the  largesses  of  corn,  introduced  on  the  outbreak  of 
the  social  war,  were  removed.  The  old  design  of  Gracchus  for 
the  colonization  of  Capua  was  carried  out.  All  debts  were  reduced 
to  one-fourth  of  their  nominal  amount. 

No  steps  were  taken  to  secure  the  support  of  either  senate  or 
equites,  or  to  regulate  the  position  of  the  Samnites,  who,  though 
nominally  Roman  citizens,  were  really  Rome's  bitterest  enemies, 
and  whose  one  aim  was  still  their  country's  independence.  The  real 
strength  of  the  government  lay  in  the  new  citizens,  with  whose  priv- 
ileges its  existence  appeared  bound  up ;  while  many  of  the  old  citi- 
zens acquiesced,  because  they  saw  that  a  restoration  of  the  Sullan 
constitution  meant  a  fresh  reign  of  terror  under  the  opposite  party. 

Most  of  the  provinces  adhered  to  the  oligarchy.      Quintus 


DEMOCRATIC     REVOLUTION  225 

84-83   B.C. 

Metellus  and  the  young  Marcus  Crassus  attempted  to  hold  Africa 
for  the  same  party,  but  were  compelled  to  submit  to  the  revolution- 
ary governor.  Most  of  the  senatorial  refugees  fled  to  Macedonia, 
which  was  to  some  extent  in  Sulla's  power.  Sulla,  like  many  of  the 
refugees,  was  outlawed  and  deprived  of  his  command ;  but  the  gov- 
ernment took  no  adequate  steps  to  enforce  its  decrees,  so  that  Sulla 
was  enabled  to  finish  his  work  in  the  East  without  serious  opposi- 
tion. In  84  B.C.  he  addressed  a  letter  to  the  senate,  announcing  his 
return  to  Italy.  He  promised  to  respect  the  rights  of  the  new  bur- 
gesses, and  that  the  inevitable  punishment  should  fall,  not  on  the 
rank  and  file,  but  on  the  leaders  of  the  revolution.  On  the  arrival 
of  this  letter,  China  hastily  set  out  for  Ancona,  intending  to  cross 
the  Adriatic,  but  his  troops  mutinied  and  he  himself  was  killed. 
His  colleague,  Carbo,  abandoned  the  idea  of  carrying  war  into 
Greece,  and  went  into  winter  quarters  at  Ariminum.  Meanwhile 
the  moderate  party  had  tried  to  bring  about  a  compromise,  but  with- 
out success.  Sulla's  envoys  were  not  admitted  into  the  city,  and 
he  was  summoned  to  lay  down  his  arms.  For  the  year  83  B.C. 
consular  elections  were  once  more  held :  the  choice  fell  upon  Lucius 
Scipio  and  Gaius  Norbanus — neither  of  them  men  of  capacity. 
The  delay  caused  by  Sulla's  crossing  into  Asia  was  utilized  at  Rome 
in  making  energetic  preparations  for  war,  and  100,000  men  are 
said  to  have  been  under  arms  at  Sulla's  landing. 

Against  this  force  Sulla  had  barely  forty  thousand  men,  all  of 
them  veterans,  it  is  true,  and  devoted  heart  and  soul  to  their  leader, 
and  to  him  alone.  But  still  Sulla  saw  that  these  numbers  would  be 
powerless  against  a  united  Italy,  and  he  took  measures  to  gain  over 
the  strength  of  the  nation — the  mass  of  respectable  men  who  desired 
nothing  but  peace  and  quiet,  and  the  new  burgesses  who  feared  for 
their  new  privileges.  Accordingly  he  offered  unconditional  pardon 
to  all  who  would  break  off  from  the  revolutionary  government ;  he 
made  the  most  binding  declarations  to  maintain  the  privileges  of  the 
new  citizens,  and  caused  his  soldiers  to  swear  singly  to  welcome  all 
Italians  as  friends  and  fellow-citizens. 

In  the  spring  of  83  B.C.  Sulla  landed  at  Brundisium  without 
opposition;  the  town  opened  its  gates  to  him,  and  all  Apulia  fol- 
lowed its  example.  Many  members  of  the  oligarchical  party,  like 
Quintus  Metellus  and  Marcus  Crassus,  and  some  deserters  from  the 
democratic  ranks,  repaired  to  Sulla's  camp,  but  brought  no  appre- 
ciable increase  to  his  numbers. 


226  ROME 

83    B.C. 

By  far  the  most  important  accession  was  that  of  the  young 
Gnaeus  Pompeius,  by  whose  exertions  the  district  of  Picenum  was 
induced  to  declare  for  Sulla.  Pompeius  had  made  his  peace  with 
the  revolution,  but  the  part  which  his  father,  Strabo,  had  played 
against  Cinna  was  not  forgotten:  an  indictment,  charging  him  to 
give  up  the  booty  said  to  have  been  embezzled  by  his  father  at 
Asculum,  threatened  his  ruin,  from  which  he  was  only  saved  by  the 
protection  of  Carbo.  As  soon  as  Sulla  landed  in  Italy,  Pompeius 
repaired  to  Picenum,  raised  the  oligarchical  standard  at  Auximum, 
and  gathered  round  him  a  force  of  three  legions,  with  which  he 
skillfully  effected  a  junction  with  Sulla  in  Apulia.  Sulla  received 
him  with  great  honor,  and  rebuked  the  slackness  of  the  rest  of  his 
partisans  by  greeting  the  young  commander  with  the  title  of  Im- 
perator. 

Thus  reinforced,  Sulla  advanced  into  Campania;  the  army  of 
Norbanus  was  at  Capua,  that  of  Scipio  was  advancing  along  the 
Via  Appia  from  Rome.  But  before  its  arrival  Norbanus  had  been 
crushed,  and  the  remnants  of  his  army  were  blockaded  in  Capua 
and  Neapolis.  Sulla  hurried  to  Teanum,  where  Scipio  was  posted, 
and  made  proposals  for  peace;  an  armistice  was  concluded,  and  a 
personal  conference  took  place  between  the  two  generals,  while  the 
soldiers  of  the  two  armies  mingled  as  they  pleased.  An  agreement 
was  almost  concluded,  and  envoys  were  sent  to  procure  the  opinion 
of  Norbanus  at  Capua ;  but  the  negotiations,  after  all,  fell  through, 
and  Scipio  denounced  the  armistice.  Sulla  hereupon  maintained 
that  the  agreement  had  already  been  actually  concluded.  The  im- 
prudence of  allowing  the  common  soldiers  to  fraternize  was  now 
forcibly  demonstrated,  and  Scipio's  soldiers  passed  over  to  Sulla  in 
a  body.  The  consul  was  required  to  resign  his  office,  and  was 
escorted  to  a  place  of  safety.  Sulla  and  Metellus  took  up  winter 
quarters  in  Campania,  and  maintained  the  blockade  of  Capua. 

Thus  the  first  campaign  had  ended  in  the  submission  of  Apu- 
lia, Picenum,  and  Campania,  and  the  discomfiture  of  both  consular 
armies.  The  Italian  communities  already  began  to  negotiate  with 
Sulla,  and  had  their  rights  secured  to  them  by  separate  formal 
treaties.  Sulla  boasted  that  in  the  next  year  he  would  march  into 
Rome  and  overthrow  the  revolutionary  government. 

The  government  made  the  greatest  preparations  for  the  next 
campaign.  The  consuls  were  Carbo  and  the  younger  Marius; 
Sertorius  was  sent  to  raise  new  levies  in  Etruria ;  the  gold  and  silver 


DEMOCRATIC     REVOLUTION  227 

82    B.C. 

in  the  temples  was  melted  down ;  new  divisions  came  from  Umbria 
and  the  Po.  But,  most  important  of  all,  the  most  strenuous  exer- 
tions were  made  in  Samnium  and  Lucania.  It  was  well  understood 
that  Sulla  would  not,  like  the  Cinnan  government,  acquiesce  in  the 
independence  of  these  districts,  and  they  made  ready  for  a  renewal 
of  their  old  struggle  against  the  hated  Latin  race. 

For  the  campaign  of  82  B.C.  the  army  of  the  Optimates  was 
divided:  Metellus,  resting  on  Picenum,  advanced  towards  upper 
Italy;  the  main  body,  with  Sulla,  marched  straight  upon  Rome. 
Near  Signia  he  came  upon  the  enemy  under  Marius,  who  retired  to 
Sacriportus  and  drew  up  his  line  of  battle.  The  issue  was  not 
long  doubtful,  and  was  made  certain  by  the  desertion  of  one  of  the 
divisions  of  Marius.  By  this  battle  the  capital  was  lost,  and  Marius 
sent  orders  to  the  pretor  Lucius  Brutus  Damasippus  to  evacuate  it, 
after  putting  to  death  all  the  notable  men  of  the  other  party. 
Among  the  victims  of  this  latest  massacre  were  the  pontifex  maxi- 
mus,  Quintus  Scaevola,  who  had  so  narrowly  escaped  the  vengeance 
of  Fimbria.  Sulla  left  behind  Quintus  Ofella  to  blockade  Prae- 
neste,  into  which  Marius  had  thrown  himself,  and  pushed  on  to 
Rome,  which  offered  no  resistance ;  he  then  hurried  on  to  Etruria. 

In  the  north  the  campaign  resulted  in  the  complete  overthrow 
of  the  Marian  party,  and  the  Sullans  then  concentrated  all  their 
forces  for  the  capture  of  Praeneste,  where  the  young  Marius  had 
taken  refuge.  A  large  force  of  Samnites  and  Lucanians,  which, 
with  reinforcements,  is  said  to  have  amounted  to  70,000  men, 
hurried  from  the  south  to  the  relief  of  the  city,  but,  finding  that 
he  was  too  late  to  rescue  the  remnants  of  the  democratic  party  shut 
up  in  Praeneste,  the  Samnite  general,  Pontius  of  Telesia,  in  his 
desperation,  resolved  to  throw  himself  upon  Rome,  which  was 
but  one  day's  march  distant.  From  a  military  point  of  view  the 
step  was  ruinous;  even  if  successful  the  democratic  army  must  be 
crushed  at  Rome,  wedged  in  between  the  armies  of  Sulla  and  of 
Metellus.  But  the  measure  was  dictated,  not  by  policy,  but  by 
revenge;  it  was  the  last  outbreak  of  revolutionary  fury  and  of 
Samnite  hatred. 

On  November  1  Pontius,  with  the  Lucanian  general  Lam- 
ponius,  and  the  democratic  commanders  Damasippus  and  Car- 
rinas,  encamped  close  to  the  Colline  Gate.  The  force  which  sallied 
from  the  city  was  scattered  like  chaff,  and  the  citizens  gave  way 
to  despair.     But  before  morning  a  body  of  horse  appeared,  which 


228  ROME 

82-80  B.C. 

proved  to  be  Sulla's  advanced  guard  under  Balbus,  and  before  noon 
Sulla  arrived  in  person.  He  had  set  out  immediately  on  hearing  of 
the  departure  of  the  Samnites,  and,  in  spite  of  his  forced  march, 
immediately  drew  up  his  army  in  line,  and  ordered  the  attack.  The 
battle  lasted  the  whole  night  through,  and  into  the  following  morn- 
ing. The  left  wing,  under  Sulla,  was  driven  back,  and  the  battle 
was  reported  to  be  lost;  but  the  right  wing,  under  Crassus,  routed 
its  opponents  and  pursued  them  to  Antemnae,  and  gradually  the 
left  wing  likewise  gained  ground.  The  defection  of  a  division  of 
three  thousand  of  the  enemy  decided  the  issue,  and  Rome  was 
saved.  The  insurgents  were  all  but  extirpated.  The  three  or  four 
thousand  prisoners  who  were  taken — including  Damasippus,  Car- 
rinas,  and  Pontius — were,  on  the  third  day  after  the  battle,  mas- 
sacred by  Sulla's  orders,  in  the  Campus  Martius. 

Praeneste  surrendered  on  the  news  of  this  disaster,  and  the 
leaders  put  themselves  to  death.  Of  the  twelve  thousand  prisoners, 
all  the  Roman  senators,  all  the  Samnites,  and  most  of  the  Prae- 
nestines  were  slaughtered,  and  the  town  was  given  up  to  pillage. 
Capua  was  voluntarily  surrendered,  but  other  towns  made  the 
most  obstinate  resistance.  Nola  was  not  evacuated  till  the  year 
80  B.C.  As  to  Samnium,  Sulla  declared  that  the  very  name  ought 
to  be  extirpated ;  he  invaded  the  country,  and  made  it  a  waste,  as  it 
has  remained  to  this  day.  In  Etruria  a  long  resistance  was  offered 
by  some  towns.  Volaterrae  stood  a  siege  of  nearly  three  years, 
and  the  garrison  was  massacred  after  a  free  departure  had  been 
granted  to  it. 

Of  the  provinces  there  still  remained  Sicily,  Spain,  and  Africa 
to  be  subdued.  Gnaeus  Pompeius  was  sent  to  Sicily  with  six  le- 
gions in  82  B.C.,  and  the  island  was  immediately  evacuated  by  the 
governor  Perpenna.  Pompeius  then  proceeded  to  Africa,  in  80 
B.C.,  where  he  defeated  the  forces  of  the  governor  Lucius  Domitius 
Ahenobarbus,  and  Hiarbas,  the  usurping  king  of  Numidia,  and  cap- 
tured their  camp.  Hiempsal  was  restored  to  the  kingdom  of  Nu- 
midia, and  various  Gaetulian  tribes,  hitherto  independent,  were 
made  subject  to  him.  In  forty  days  the  war  in  Africa  was  at  an 
end.  In  Spain  Sertorius  was  too  weak  to  resist  the  Sullan  officers, 
and  on  his  departure  both  provinces  willingly  submitted. 

At  the  close  of  the  African  campaign  Pompeius  had  been 
ordered  to  break  up  his  army — a  command  at  which  both  general 
and  soldiers  were  discontented.    Pompeius  desired  a  triumph,  though 


DEMOCRATIC     REVOLUTION  229 

82-80    B.C. 

as  an  extraordinary  officer  he  had  no  legal  claim  to  the  honor. 
Sulla,  however,  yielded  to  his  wish,  and  Pompeius  could  boast  of 
having  been  the  first  Roman  who  had  enjoyed  a  triumph  before  he 
was  a  senator.  It  was  now  that  Pompeius  was  saluted  by  Sulla  by 
the  surname  of  Magnus. 

In  the  East  there  had  been  no  cessation  of  warfare ;  the  carry- 
ing out  of  Sulla's  regulations  had  in  many  cases  to  be  accomplished 
by  force;  and  fresh  difficulties  had  arisen  with  Mithradates.  The 
king  was  preparing  an  expedition  into  his  Bosporan  kingdom ;  and 
Murena,  the  governor  of  Asia,  perhaps  fearing  lest  the  preparations 
were  really  directed  against  Rome,  had  crossed  the  Pontic  frontier. 
Mithradates  complained  to  the  Roman  government;  and  Sulla  had 
sent  envoys  to  dissuade  the  governor,  who  nevertheless  continued 
his  advance.  Mithradates  now  resolved  to  repel  him  by  force,  and 
Murena  was  driven  over  the  frontier  with  great  loss  in  82  B.C. 

Peace  was  now  renewed  with  Mithradates,  and  at  last  the  ten 
years  of  war  and  insurrection  which  had  convulsed  the  whole 
Roman  world  were  at  end. 


Chapter    XXIV 

THE  SULLAN  CONSTITUTION.    81-78  B.  C 

THE  problem  which  lay  before  Sulla  after  his  victories  was 
vast  beyond  conception — it  was  the  reconstruction  of  a 
whole  state  in  ruins.  About  the  time  when  the  first 
pitched  battle  was  fought  between  Romans  and  Romans,  in  the 
night  of  July  6,  83  B.C.,  the  venerable  temple  which  had  been 
erected  by  the  kings,  dedicated  by  the  youthful  republic,  and 
spared  by  the  storms  of  five  hundred  years, — the  temple  of  the 
Roman  Jupiter  in  the  Capitol, — perished  in  the  flames.  It  was  no 
augury ;  but  it  was  an  image  of  the  state  of  the  Roman  Constitution. 
That,  too,  lay  in  ruins,  and  needed  reconstruction.  The  mass  of 
the  aristocratic  party  had  no  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  the  task. 
They  imagined  that  now,  when  the  revolution  had  been  suppressed, 
it  would  be  enough  to  return  to  the  old  lines,  taking  precautions 
against  similar  outbreaks  in  future.  Hence  it  was  that  Sulla  chose 
his  instruments,  with  the  exception  of  Quintus  Metellus,  from  the 
moderate  party,  or  from  the  deserters  from  the  democratic  camp — 
Lucius  Flaccus,  Lucius  Philippus,  Quintus  Ofella,  Gnaeus  Pom- 
peius.  Sulla  was  quite  in  earnest  about  restoring  the  old  constitu- 
tion ;  but  he  alone  saw  the  enormous  difficulties  of  restoration.  He 
saw  clearly  that  comprehensive  concession  and  energetic  repression 
were  alike  necessary.  He  also  saw  that  the  senate  would  mutilate 
every  measure  of  either  kind,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  accom- 
plish the  work  by  his  own  hand,  without  check  or  hindrance.  At 
the  same  time,  even  Sulla  was  far  from  grasping  the  whole  truth 
about  the  condition  of  the  empire ;  otherwise  he  must  have  given  up 
the  work  in  despair.  In  fact,  the  constitution  was  past  reconstruc- 
tion; the  ancient  polity  had  broken  down  irretrievably;  economic 
causes  had  corrupted  or  destroyed  every  class  in  the  state — aristoc- 
racy, middle  class,  and  lower  class ;  and  where  no  class  in  the  state 
remained  sound,  absolute  rule  by  the  authority  and  intelligence  of 
a  single  man  alone  remained  possible.  But  not  for  another  genera- 
tion was  this  truth  to  be  brought  home  in  all  its  remorseless  fatality. 

230 


SULLAN     CONSTITUTION  £31 

81-73  B.C. 

The  authority  with  which  Sulla  was  at  present  provided  was 
the  purely  military  proconsulship.  It  was  necessary  that  he 
should  be  endowed  with  an  office  which  should  preserve  as  far  as 
possible  constitutional  forms,  and  yet  be  powerful  enough  to  coerce 
both  friends  and  foes.  Sulla  accordingly  requested  the  senate  to 
place  the  regulation  of  the  state  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man  with 
unlimited  powers,  and  intimated  that  he  considered  himself  quali- 
fied for  the  task.  The  senate  directed  the  interrex  Lucius  Valerius 
Flaccus  to  propose  a  law  to  the  people,  conferring  upon  Sulla  the 
"  dictatorship  for  the  making  of  laws  and  the  regulation  of  the 
commonwealth,"  and  approving,  retrospectively,  of  all  his  acts  as 
consul  or  proconsul.  His  office  was  unlimited  in  point  of  time,  and 
included  absolute  power  to  dispose  of  the  lives  and  property  of  the 
citizens  and  of  the  state  lands.  He  might  alter  the  boundaries  of 
the  city,  of  Italy,  or  of  the  empire;  dissolve  or  establish  communi- 
ties in  Italy;  regulate  the  provinces  and  dependencies;  confer  the 
imperium  on  whom  he  pleased,  and  nominate  proconsuls  and  pro- 
pretors.  Lastly  he  might  regulate  the  state  by  new  laws.  The 
new  office  took  its  name  from  the  old  dictatorship,  obsolete  since  the 
Hannibalian  war.  The  boundlessness  of  its  power  recalled  that  of 
the  old  decemvirs,  but  in  reality  it  was  nothing  but  the  monarchy. 
The  protector  of  the  oligarchic  constitution  had  himself  to  come 
forward  as  a  tyrant,  in  order  to  avert  the  ever-impending  tyrannies. 
There  was  no  little  of  defeat  in  this  last  victory  of  the  oligarchy. 

The  work  of  punishment  was  first  taken  in  hand.  Sulla  was  not 
of  a  vindictive  temperament, — even  after  his  landing  in  Italy  he  had 
shown  himself  ready  to  forget  and  forgive, — but  the  democrats  had 
used  their  last  moments  of  power  to  set  on  foot  fresh  massacres,  and 
henceforth  Sulla  showed  no  mercy.  He  immediately  outlawed  all 
civil  and  military  officers  who  had  taken  part  in  favor  of  the  revo- 
lution after  the  convention  with  Scipio,  and  any  other  citizens  who 
had  actively  aided  the  cause.  A  reward  of  $2500  was  offered  to  the 
murderer  of  any  of  these  outlaws;  sheltering  them  was  forbidden 
under  the  severest  penalties;  their  property  was  forfeited  to  the 
state,  their  children  and  grandchildren  excluded  from  a  political 
career;  and  this  confiscation  was  also  extended  to  the  property  of 
those  who  had  fallen  during  the  war.  Sulla  caused  a  list  of  the 
proscribed  to  be  posted  up,  and  fixed  upon  June  1,  81  B.C.,  as  the 
day  for  closing  it.  It  was  said  at  last  to  have  amounted  to  4700 
names. 


232  ROME 

81-78  B.C. 

The  fury  of  the  persecution  fell  primarily  upon  the  Marians. 
The  tomb  of  Marius  himself  was  broken  open,  and  his  ashes  scat- 
tered. His  nephew  was  executed  with  torments  at  the  tomb  of 
Catulus.  Of  the  leaders  of  the  first  rank  few  remained ;  but  other 
classes  suffered  severely.  Sixteen  hundred  equites  who  had  specu- 
lated in  the  Marian  confiscations  were  upon  the  list,  and  the  profes- 
sional accusers  were  largely  represented.  The  heads  of  the  slain 
were  publicly  piled  at  the  junction  of  the  Vicus  Jugarius  with  the 
Forum.  Bands  of  soldiers  ravaged  all  Italy  to  earn  the  rewards  of 
murder,  and  many,  even  of  the  oligarchy,  fell  victims  to  private 
revenge. 

In  the  disposal  of  the  confiscated  property  the  greatest  abuses 
prevailed.  Sulla  himself,  and  his  immediate  dependents  and  con- 
nections, bought  largely,  and  had  the  purchase-money  wholly  or 
partially  remitted.  If  there  was  any  difference  between  the  Marian 
and  the  Sullan  reign  of  terror,  it  was  that  Marius  murdered  to 
satisfy  his  personal  vengeance,  while  Sulla  showed  no  personal 
feeling,  but  regarded  the  work  almost  as  a  political  necessity. 

With  regard  to  the  new  citizens,  the  general  rule  was  laid 
down  that  every  citizen  of  an  Italian  community  was  ipso  facto  a 
citizen  of  Rome;  all  distinctions  between  citizens  and  allies — be- 
tween citizens  old  and  new — were  abolished.  But  the  freedmen 
were  restricted,  as  before,  to  their  old  four  tribes.  There  were, 
however,  exceptions  to  the  general  rule;  particular  communities 
were  punished,  or,  less  frequently,  rewarded.  For  instance,  Brun- 
disium  obtained  exemption  from  customs;  but  of  the  guilty  com- 
munities many  had  to  pay  fines,  to  raze  their  walls,  or  to  forfeit  a 
part  or  the  whole  of  their  lands.  Praeneste  and  Spoletium,  Flor- 
entia,  Faesulae,  Arretium,  Volaterrae,  all  fell  under  the  last  penalty. 
The  dispossessed  burgesses  were  placed  in  the  position  of  Latins  of 
the  lowest  class,  with  the  additional  hardship  that  they  were  at- 
tached to  no  particular  community,  but  were  without  either  home 
or  city. 

The  lands  thus  confiscated  were  mainly  utilized  in  settling  the 
soldiers  of  the  victorious  army,  mostly  in  Etruria,  Latium,  and 
Campania;  and  in  many  cases,  as  in  the  Gracchan  colonies,  the 
settlers  were  attached  to  existing  communities.  The  number  of 
allotments  is  stated  at  120,000.  This  arrangement  was  made  by 
Sulla  with  varied  objects.  Firstly,  he  redeemed  the  pledge  given 
to  his  soldiers;  secondly,  he  carried  out  the  idea  of  the  moderate 


SULLAN     CONSTITUTION  233 

81-78   B.C. 

conservative  party  of  strengthening  the  class  of  small  proprietors  in 
Italy — an  idea  which  he  had  attempted  to  realize  in  88  B.C.  To 
accomplish  this  object  the  settlers  were  forbidden  to  sell  their  allot- 
ments. Lastly,  and  this  was  no  doubt  the  strongest  reason,  the  new 
colonists  formed  standing  garrisons,  as  it  were,  for  the  support  of 
the  restored  constitution;  and  for  this  reason,  where  they  were 
attached  to  an  old  community,  as  at  Pompeii,  the  new  citizens  were 
not  amalgamated  with  the  old,  but  formed  a  separate  body  within 
the  same  enclosing  wall.  Very  similar  in  its  aim  was  the  object 
of  another  act  of  Sulla's — the  manumission  of  a  body  of  ten  thou- 
sand of  the  slaves  of  the  proscribed,  who  formed  a  bodyguard  in 
support  of  the  oligarchy  and  a  garrison  for  the  capital. 

Sulla  now  destroyed  at  one  blow  the  constitution  so  carefully 
built  up  by  Caius  Gracchus,  and  restored  in  all  its  plenitude  the  rule 
of  the  senate.  Gracchus  had  bribed  the  mob  of  the  capital  into 
quiescence  by  introducing  free  distributions  of  corn ;  these  were  now 
completely  abolished.  Gracchus  had  organized  the  order  of  eques- 
trians, and  tried  to  give  them  a  definite  place  in  the  constitution  by 
introducing  the  system  of  farming  the  taxes  of  the  provinces,  by 
intrusting  to  them  the  functions  of  jurymen,  and  by  assigning  them 
a  special  place  in  the  theater  at  popular  festivals.  Sulla  abolished 
the  farming  system,  and  converted  the  former  taxes  into  fixed  trib- 
utes; the  jurymen  were  now  taken  from  the  senatorial  order  alone, 
and  the  equites  were  deprived  of  their  seats  of  honor  in  the  theater 
and  relegated  to  the  ordinary  benches.  The  senate  was  henceforth 
to  be  the  only  privileged  order. 

In  order  to  fill  up  the  fearfully  reduced  numbers  of  the  senate, 
probably  also  with  the  intention  of  permanently  increasing  the 
number  of  its  members,  three  hundred  new  senators  were  nominated 
by  the  tribes  from  men  of  equestrian  census — chiefly  from  the 
younger  men  of  the  senatorial  houses,  and  from  Sullan  officers 
whom  the  late  events  had  brought  into  prominence.  At  the  same 
time  the  mode  of  admission  to  the  senate  was  changed.  Hitherto 
men  had  entered  the  senate  either  by  summons  from  the  censors  or 
by  holding  one  of  the  curule  magistracies — the  consulship,  the  pre- 
torship,  or  the  edileship:  the  tribunate  and  questorship  gave  no 
right  to  a  seat,  but  the  choice  of  the  censors  was  generally  directed 
towards  men  who  had  held  these  offices.  The  censorial  functions 
of  appointing  to  the  senate  and  of  deleting  from  its  roll  were  now 
set  aside;  the  senatorial  seat  was  taken  from  the  ediles  and  given 


234.  ROME 

81-78    B.C. 

to  the  questors,  who  were  now  raised  from  eight  to  twenty  in 
number.  Several  important  results  followed  from  these  regula- 
tions. In  the  first  place,  the  abolition  of  the  censorial  deletion 
made  the  senator  irremovable.  Secondly,  the  number  of  members 
was  considerably  increased:  hitherto  the  average  number  had 
probably  been  something  below  300 ;  in  Cicero's  time  a  full  meeting 
consisted  of  417  members.  Thirdly,  as  both  the  new  extraordi- 
narily nominated  senators  and  the  augmented  body  of  questors 
were  nominated  by  the  comitia  tributa,  the  senate  was  now  thor- 
oughly based  on  popular  election. 

The  comitia  tributa  remained,  as  before,  formally  sovereign; 
but  the  initiative  of  the  senate  in  all  legislation  was  solemnly  en- 
acted. This  was  sufficient  to  exclude  the  people  from  interference 
in  administration,  or  in  criminal  jurisdiction,  and  the  voice  of  the 
people  was  confined  practically  to  giving  assent  to  alterations  in  the 
constitution. 

The  right  of  the  people  to  elect  magistrates  in  the  comitia 
centuriata  was  not  interfered  with  by  Sulla,  nor  did  he  even  attempt, 
as  in  88  B.C.,  to  restore  the  old  Servian  voting  arrangements;  but 
the  election  to  the  priestly  offices  was  entirely  taken  from  the  tribes, 
and  the  right  of  cooptation  restored  to  the  sacerdotal  colleges. 
At  the  same  time  various  restrictions  were  imposed  or  confirmed 
afresh  with  regard  to  the  qualifications  for  office.  The  limit  of  age 
for  holding  each  office  was  strictly  enforced;  and  the  first  step 
in  the  gradation  of  offices  was  in  future  to  be  the  questorship  in- 
stead of  the  edileship,  so  that  the  questorship  was  now  the  neces- 
sary step  to  the  pretorship,  and  the  pretorship  to  the  consulship. 
Two  years  at  least  must  elapse  between  the  holding  of  any  office 
and  of  the  next  above  it;  while  a  ten-years'  interval  was  required 
before  reelection  to  the  same  office. 

The  senate  was  originally,  and  was  still  in  theory,  a  council, 
from  which  the  magistrates  might  seek  advice;  but  it  had  gradu- 
ally acquired  the  right,  not  merely  of  advising,  but  of  controlling 
the  magistrates.  It  was  Sulla's  aim  to  consolidate  this  power,  and, 
accordingly,  all  magistracies  emerged  from  his  hands  with  dimin- 
ished rights. 

The  heaviest  blow  fell  upon  the  tribunate,  an  office  naturally 
most  independent  of  the  senate.  The  original  right  of  the  trib- 
unes to  veto  the  official  acts  of  magistrates,  and  the  further  right 
to  fine  and  punish  all  who  disregarded  their  veto,  were  still  left 


SULLAN     CONSTITUTION  235 

81-78  B.C. 

to  them ;  but  the  abuse  of  the  right  of  intercession  was  punished  by 
a  heavy  fine.  At  the  same  time  the  power  and  influence  of  these 
magistrates  were  heavily  fettered  by  two  ordinances,  which  forbade 
them  to  consult  the  people  or  submit  laws  to  them  without  per- 
mission from  the  senate;  and  made  the  holding  of  the  tribunate 
a  bar  to  the  holding  of  any  curule  magistracy. 

The  power  of  the  consuls  and  pretors  was  restricted  by  the 
complete  separation  of  their  civil  and  military  functions, — an  ar- 
rangement for  which  the  practice  of  recent  times  had  formed  a 
precedent.  Hitherto  there  had  devolved  upon  the  two  chief  mag- 
istrates, besides  the  proper  consular  functions,  all  official  duties  for 
which  no  special  magistrates  were  appointed.  The  administration 
of  justice  in  the  capital,  and  the  government  of  the  four  transmarine 
provinces,  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  the  two  Spains,  were  provided  for 
by  the  six  pretorships,  and  with  these  functions  the  consuls  had 
nothing  to  do.  There  remained  the  non-judicial  business  of  the  cap- 
ital, and  the  military  command  in  the  continental  possessions.  At 
times,  when  these  eight  magistrates  did  not  suffice,  and  when  there 
were  extraordinary  commands  to  be  provided  for,  there  were 
two  usual  expedients :  a  particular  military  command  was  prolonged 
after  its  term  had  expired,  or  non-military  functions  were  com- 
bined ;  as,  for  instance — the  two  judicial  departments  at  Rome 
might  be  managed  by  one  pretor  instead  of  two,  or  the  duties  of  the 
consul  in  the  capital  might  be  performed  by  the  praetor  urbanus, 
and  so  one  magistrate  set  at  liberty  for  extraordinary  duties.  But 
in  such  cases  the  senate  merely  defined  the  sphere  and  function  of 
the  extraordinary  office;  the  particular  person  who  was  to  fill  it 
was  left  to  the  magistrates  themselves  to  decide  by  agreement 
or  by  lot. 

Within  the  last  century  six  new  official  departments  had  been 
created — 'the  governorships  of  the  five  new  provinces — Macedonia, 
Africa,  Asia,  Narbo,  Cilicia — and  the  presidency  of  the  court  of 
extortions;  and  yet  the  number  of  magistrates  had  not  been  in- 
creased. The  senate  preferred  to  fill  up  vacancies  by  prolonging 
the  term  of  office;  for  this  prolongation  might  be  granted  or  re- 
fused, and  thus  the  senate  kept  a  hold  over  the  magistrates.  Usually 
those  magistrates  who  during  their  year  of  office  were  confined 
to  the  city  were  appointed  for  a  second  year  to  a  transmarine 
command. 

This  expedient  of  prolongation  was  seized  upon  by  Sulla  as 


236  ROME 

81-78    B.C. 

the  basis  for  a  complete  separation  between  the  political  authority 
of  the  magistrate  over  Roman  citizens  and  his  military  authority 
over  non-citizens.  The  consulship  and  pretorship  were  in  future 
uniformly  extended  for  a  second  year;  the  first  year  was  devoted 
to  civil,  the  second  to  military  functions.  Moreover,  as  the  Roman 
citizen  body  now  embraced  all  Italy  south  of  the  Rubicon,  the  mili- 
tary jurisdiction  of  the  magistrate  did  not  extend  south  of  that 
river,  and  it  was  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  constitution  that 
there  should  ordinarily  be  no  troops  and  no  commandant  within 
that  district. 

The  pretors  were  now  increased  from  six  to  eight;  and 
according  to  the  new  arrangement  the  ten  chief  magistrates  devoted 
themselves  in  the  first  year  of  their  office  to  the  business  of  the 
capital;  the  two  consuls  to  government  and  administration;  two 
pretors  to  the  administration  of  civil  law — the  other  six  to  the 
administration  of  the  newly  organized  criminal  justice.  During 
the  second  year  they  were  invested  with  the  command  of  the  ten 
chief  governorships,  Italian  Gaul  having  been  added  to  the  list  of 
provinces. 

The  effect  of  these  regulations  was  very  largely  to  increase  the 
power  of  the  senate  over  the  magistrates.  In  the  first  place,  all 
offices,  whether  at  home  or  abroad,  were  for  the  future  strictly 
limited  to  one  year,  whereas  in  former  times  the  same  man  had 
held  the  same  office  for  two  or  even  more  years.  Secondly,  by  the 
arrangement  as  to  military  commands,  no  one  could  in  future  be, 
as  Marius  had  been,  both  commander-in-chief  and  supreme  civil 
magistrate.  Thirdly,  the  whole  military  power  became,  formally 
at  least,  dependent  on  the  senate ;  the  people  chose  the  consuls  and 
pretors,  but  it  was  the  senate  that  conferred  on  them  the  military 
authority  by  prolonging  their  term  of  office  for  a  second  year  as 
proconsuls  or  propretors. 

The  censorship  was  not  formally  abolished,  but  its  chief  func- 
tions were  taken  from  it.  The  new  arrangement  as  to  the  questor- 
ship  provided  for  the  filling  up  of  the  senate,  and  the  register  for 
purposes  of  taxation  and  military  service  was  unnecessary  now  that 
Italy  was  tax  free,  and  the  army  was  raised  by  enlistment;  there 
remained  only  the  financial  functions,  which  were  in  future  to  be 
performed  by  the  consuls. 

The  finances  of  the  state  were  largely  affected  by  three  of 
Sulla's  acts:    the  first,  the  conversion  of  the  Asiatic  taxes  into  a 


SULLAN     CONSTITUTION  237 

81-78  B.C. 

fixed  tribute,  certainly  produced  no  gain  to  the  state,  though  the 
tax-payers  were  greatly  benefited :  but  the  resumption  of  the  Cam- 
panian  domain  lands  to  the  state,  and  the  abolition  of  the  corn 
largesses,  secured  an  ample  revenue  for  the  future. 

But  the  most  important  and  enduring  part  of  Sulla's  work  was 
the  reform  of  the  criminal  law. 

As  Sulla  found  it  the  judicial  system  was  threefold.  The 
whole  citizen  body  formed  a  court  of  appeal  from  sentences  of  the 
magistrate  affecting  the  life  of  a  citizen.  Then  there  was  the  or- 
dinary procedure  for  all  cases  civil  or  criminal,  except  treason. 
In  these  cases,  one  of  the  two  pretors  investigated  the  general  char- 
acter of  the  case,  and  determined  the  law  under  which  it  was  to 
be  tried;  he  then  nominated  a  single  judge,  who  decided  the  case 
on  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  pretor.  Thirdly,  there  was  the  ex- 
traordinary procedure  applicable  to  particular  cases  or  groups  of 
cases  of  importance,  whether  civil  or  criminal.  For  such  cases, 
not  a  single  judge,  but  a  special  body  of  judges  or  jurymen,  was 
appointed  by  a  special  law.  Such  were  the  special  tribunals  ap- 
pointed in  no  B.C.  for  the  investigation  of  the  alleged  treason  in 
connection  with  Numidian  affairs,  and  in  103  B.C.  with  regard  to 
the  treason  of  the  Roman  generals  in  Gaul,  in  105  B.C.  Such  also 
were  the  standing  commissions  for  the  investigation  of  special 
crimes,  the  earliest  of  which  was  the  court  of  extortions,  to  try 
governors  of  provinces,  established  in  149  B.C.,  and  the  so-called 
spear-court  for  dealing  with  cases  with  regard  to  inheritances. 
Special  provision  was  made  for  the  presidency  of  each  of  these 
courts,  in  the  law  constituting  them — to  some  a  pretor  was  as- 
signed, to  others  an  ex-edile  or  an  ex-pretor. 

The  reforms  introduced  by  Sulla  were  also  threefold.  First, 
he  largely  increased  the  number  of  standing  commissions  or  jury 
courts.  Henceforth  there  were  at  least  eight  of  these,  called  re- 
spectively the  commissions  on  exaction,  treason,  injuries  to  person 
or  honor,  murder,  election,  bribery,  fraud,  embezzlement,  and 
adultery.  By  these  reforms  the  judicial  power,  both  of  the  citizen 
body  and  of  the  ordinary  courts,  was  curtailed,  since  the  crime  of 
treason  was  withdrawn  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  former,  and 
many  of  the  most  serious  crimes  from  that  of  the  latter. 

Secondly,  the  presidents  of  these  new  courts  were  six  of  the 
pretors  and  other  specially  appointed  officers.  The  power  to  ap- 
point special  commissions  for  special  cases  of  course  still  remained. 


238  ROME 

81-78    B.C. 

Thirdly,  the  jurymen  (judices)  were  in  future  drawn,  not 
from  the  equites,  but  from  the  senate.  The  constitution  of  the 
spear-court  remained  unchanged. 

The  political  aim  of  these  measures  was,  of  course,  to  exclude 
the  equites  from  any  share  in  the  government;  but  they  also  con- 
stituted a  most  valuable  system  of  legal  reform.  From  this  time 
dates  the  distinction,  hitherto  unknown,  between  civil  and  criminal 
causes;  the  former  were  now  such  as  came  before  a  single  judge, 
the  latter  such  as  came  before  a  jury.  Moreover,  Sulla's  legislation 
may  be  regarded  as  forming  the  first  Roman  code  since  the  Twelve 
Tables,  and  the  first  criminal  code  which  had  ever  been  issued  at 
all.  Among  other  noteworthy  results  of  Sulla's  arrangements  was 
that  capital  punishment  fell  into  abeyance;  for  the  whole  body  of 
citizens  could  alone  pronounce  sentence  of  death,  and  the  cog- 
nizance of  cases  of  high  treason  was  now  withdrawn  from  it,  and 
given  to  a  special  commission,  which  could  sentence  neither  to 
death  nor  imprisonment.  It  may  be  added  that  new  sumptuary 
laws  were  enacted,  to  restrain  luxury  at  funerals  and  banquets,  so 
that  the  law  now  attempted  to  perforin  what  had  formerly  been 
the  functions  of  the  censors. 

To  the  Sullan  period,  though  perhaps  not  to  Sulla,  belongs  an 
important  development  of  the  municipal  system  of  Italy.  Hitherto 
the  government  of  Italy  had  been  completely  centralized  in  Rome ; 
but  from  this  period  dates  a  great  advance  in  the  direction  of  local 
self-government  by  each  particular  community.  Antiquity  was  cer- 
tainly as  little  able  to  dovetail  the  city  into  the  state  as  to  develop 
of  itself  representative  government  and  other  great  principles  of  our 
modern  state  life;  but  it  carried  its  political  development  up  to 
those  limits  at  which  it  outgrows  and  bursts  its  assigned  dimensions, 
and  this  was  the  case  especially  with  Rome,  which  in  every  respect 
stands  on  the  line  of  separation  between  the  old  and  the  new  intel- 
lectual worlds.  The  social  war  was  a  sufficiently  striking  proof  that 
the  old  Roman  polity  was  outgrown,  and  the  subsequent  arrange- 
ments were  a  great  stride  in  the  advance  from  the  city-state  to  the 
nation. 

Before  the  social  war  the  dependent  communities  were  either 
allowed  to  keep  their  municipal  constitution  by  being  formally  de- 
clared sovereign  independent  states  of  non-citizens,  or,  if  they 
obtained  the  franchise,  they  were  deprived  of  all  local  municipal 
rights,  so  that  even  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  charge  of 


SULLAN     CONSTITUTION  239 

81-78   B.C. 

building  devolved  upon  the  Roman  pretors  and  censors.  The  ut- 
most concession  ever  made  was  that  the  most  urgent  law  cases  might 
be  settled  on  the  spot  by  a  deputy  nominated  from  Rome.  After 
the  social  war,  when  all  Italy  became  one  civic  community  by  the 
extension  of  the  franchise,  it  was  necessary  to  form  smaller  com- 
munities within  the  larger;  it  was  impossible  that  the  local  affairs 
of  all  Italy  should  be  settled  by  the  magistrates  of  the  city  of  Rome. 
These  new  communities  were  formed  very  much  on  the  model  of 
Rome;  there  were  the  same  institutions,  but  with  different  names, 
and  names  such  as  implied  inferiority  to  the  institutions  of  the 
capital.  There  was  a  citizen-assembly,  which  passed  laws  and  chose 
the  local  magistrates,  and  a  council  of  one  hundred  members  repre- 
senting the  Roman  senate.  The  duumviri  corresponded  to  the 
Roman  consuls;  two  questors  managed  the  local  funds,  and  there 
were  the  local  colleges  of  pontifices  and  augurs. 

The  imperial  authority  of  Rome,  however,  existed  side  by  side 
with  the  municipal  constitution.  Taxation  might  be  imposed  or 
public  buildings  set  on  foot  by  the  Roman  authorities  as  well  as  by 
those  of  the  town;  and  in  event  of  collision  the  town,  of  course, 
gave  way.  It  is  probable  that  in  judicial  matters  a  formal  division 
of  functions  was  made  to  avoid  the  extreme  inconvenience  of  a 
collision  of  authority.  The  more  important  cases,  both  civil  and 
criminal,  would  probably  be  reserved  for  the  Roman  authorities, 
while  minor  suits,  or  such  as  were  most  urgent,  were  decided  on 
the  spot. 

Such  was  the  constitution  which  Sulla  now  presented  to  the 
Roman  state.  He  had  used  the  power  which  he  had  gained  by  the 
sword  to  introduce  really  valuable  reforms,  and  to  compel  all  classes 
in  the  state,  and  especially  the  soldiery,  to  submit  once  more  to 
civil  authority.  The  mass  of  the  community,  if  they  did  not  wel- 
come the  Sullan  arrangements,  at  any  rate  acquiesced  in  them 
without  open  opposition.  But  not  so  the  military  officers.  The  two 
most  trusted  lieutenants  of  Sulla,  Gnaeus  Pompeius  and  Quintus 
Ofella,  were  the  first  to  rebel.  The  former  had  resisted  the  com- 
mand of  the  senate  to  disband  his  army, and  had  only  been  conciliated 
by  the  concession  of  the  honor  of  a  triumph.  The  latter,  in  de- 
fiance of  the  new  ordinance,  became  a  candidate  for  the  consul- 
ship without  passing  through  the  inferior  magistracies.  In  his 
case  no  leniency  was  shown.  Sulla  had  him  cut  down  in  the  Forum, 
and  then  explained  to  the  assembled  citizens  his  reasons  for  the  act. 


240  ROME 

81-78    B.C. 

On  the  completion  of  his  work  Sulla  abdicated  the  extraor- 
dinary office  conferred  on  him  by  the  Valerian  law.  Although  en- 
dowed with  absolute  power,  he  had,  in  the  case  of  many  of  his 
enactments,  consulted  the  people  or  the  senate.  Consuls  had  been 
elected  for  81  B.C. ;  and  for  the  next  year  Sulla  himself  was  consul 
with  Quintus  Metellus,  retaining  the  regency,  but  without  exercis- 
ing it  for  the  time.  For  79  b.c.  the  elections  were  left  entirely 
free,  and  early  in  that  year  he  resigned  the  regency,  dismissed  his 
lictors,  and  invited  any  citizen  who  wished  to  call  him  to  account 
to  speak. 

The  family  to  which  Sulla  belonged  had  remained  for  many 
generations  in  comparative  obscurity,  and  his  character  at  first 
gave  no  promise  of  an  extraordinary  career.  In  person  he  was 
blue-eyed  and  of  a  fair  complexion,  with  piercing  eyes.  His  tastes 
made  him  incline  to  a  life  of  cultivated  luxury,  sometimes  descend- 
ing to  debauchery.  He  was  a  pleasant  companion  in  city  or  in 
camp,  and  even  in  the  days  of  the  regency  would  unbend  after  the 
business  of  the  day.  One  of  the  most  curious  traits  in  his  character 
was  a  vein  of  cynicism,  which  showed  itself  in  the  playful  but  dan- 
gerous irony  of  many  of  his  acts.  Thus  he  ordered  a  donation  from 
the  spoil  of  the  proscribed  to  be  given  to  a  wretched  author  who  had 
written  a  panegyric  upon  him,  upon  condition  of  never  singing 
his  praises  again.  When  he  seized  the  treasures  of  the  Greek  tem- 
ples he  declared  that  the  man  could  never  fail  whose  chest  was 
replenished  by  the  gods  themselves.  He  displayed  great  vigor  both 
of  body  and  mind;  even  in  his  last  years  he  was  devoted  to  the 
chase,  and  after  the  conquest  of  Athens  he  could  remember  to  bring 
with  him  the  writings  of  Aristotle  to  Rome.  In  religion  he  followed 
the  general  tendency  of  the  age  towards  unbelief  and  superstition. 
He  flattered  himself  that  he  was  the  chosen  favorite  of  the  gods, 
and  believed  that  he  held  intercourse  with  them  in  dreams  and 
omens.  When  at  the  summit  of  his  power  he  formally  adopted  the 
surname  of  Felix,  and  used  it  from  that  time  forward. 

Sulla's  brilliant  career  seemed  to  come  to  him  rather  by  caprice 
of  fortune  than  by  any  seeking  of  his.  He  passed,  like  the  ordinary 
aristocrat,  through  the  usual  routine  of  office ;  and  in  107  B.C.  the 
questorship  under  Marius  in  Africa  fell  to  his  lot.  He  soon  made 
himself  master  of  the  military  art,  and,  after  the  close  of  the 
Jugurthine  war,  performed  the  task  of  organizing  supplies  for  the 
Roman  army  in  the  war  with  the  Cimbri.    During  his  pretorship, 


SULLAN     CONSTITUTION  241 

81-78  B.C. 

93  B.C.,  the  first  Roman  victory  over  Mithradates  and  the  first 
treaty  with  the  Parthians  took  place.  He  took  a  prominent  part  in 
the  social  war,  and,  as  consul,  suppressed  the  Sulpician  revolution 
with  startling  energy.  Wherever  Sulla  and  Marius  had  come  into 
competition  the  result  had  always  been  loss  of  renown  to  the  elder 
general  and  increase  of  reputation  to  the  younger ;  and  the  revolu- 
tion of  88  B.C.,  which  ended  in  the  outlawry  and  flight  of  Marius, 
gave  to  Sulla  the  most  important  position  within  the  empire.  Then 
came  the  Mithradatic  war  and  the  Cinnan  revolution — and  it  was 
Sulla  who  crushed  the  enemies  of  Rome  abroad  and  put  down  an- 
archy at  home.  Now  absolute  autocrat  of  the  state,  he  abolished  the 
Gracchan  constitution  which  had  fettered  the  oligarchy  for  forty 
years,  and  compelled  all  orders  and  classes  to  yield  a  common 
obedience  to  the  law;  he  established  the  oligarchy  with  all  the 
stability,  that  laws  and  constitution  can  give,  and  provided  it  with 
a  bodyguard  and  an  army.  He  was  one  of  the  few  generals  who 
never  lost  a  battle,  nor  in  his  political  career  was  he  ever  compelled 
to  retrace  a  single  step. 

There  is  nothing  original  in  the  character  of  Sulla's  consti- 
tution ;  and  the  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  very  nature  of  his  work. 
His  task  was  to  restore,  not  to  create :  the  germ  at  least  of  every 
one  of  his  institutions  existed  before;  they  had  grown  up  out  of 
the  previous  regime,  and  were  merely  regulated  and  fixed  by  Sulla. 
But  his  constitution  could  not  last,  because  of  the  worthlessness  of 
the  aristocracy.  Sulla  might  erect  a  fortress,  but  could  not  create 
a  garrison.  The  gratitude  of  posterity  is  due  to  the  man  who,  in 
the  course  of  his  hopeless  task,  carried  out  such  admirable  isolated 
reforms  as  those  of  the  Asiatic  revenue  system  and  of  criminal 
justice. 

The  short  remainder  of  his  life  was  passed  in  the  strictest 
retirement ;  in  a  little  more  than  a  year  he  died,  at  the  age  of  sixty, 
in  full  vigor  of  body  and  mind.  Immediately  after  his  death  voices 
were  raised  in  opposition  to  the  proposal  of  a  public  burial ;  but  his 
memory  was  still  too  fresh,  and  he  was  honored  with,  perhaps,  the 
grandest  funeral  procession  Italy  had  ever  seen. 


Chapter  XXV 

ECONOMIC   CONDITION   OF  THE   EMPIRE   DURING 
THE  REVOLUTION  PERIOD.     133-78  B.  C. 

THE  general  tendency  and  result  of  the  revolution  period 
are  evident  from  the  history  of  the  time  and  from  the 
legislation  of  Sulla.  The  financial  condition  of  the  empire 
is  worth  more  particular  attention,  and  will  furnish  valuable  evi- 
dence on  many  points  with  regard  to  the  social  and  political  relations 
of  the  time. 

The  revenues  paid  into  the  state  treasury  may  be  divided  into 
two  classes:  those  received  from  Italy  and  those  contributed  by 
the  various  provinces. 

With  regard  to  the  former,  the  land-tax,  with  minor  imposts 
upon  Italians,  had  for  some  time  been  in  abeyance ;  so  that  from  the 
peninsula,  including  Cisalpine  Gaul,  the  Roman  exchequer  drew 
nothing  but  the  produce  of  the  state  lands,  chiefly  those  in  Campania, 
and  of  the  gold  mines  in  the  North;  customs  dues  on  goods  im- 
ported for  trading  purposes ;  and  taxes  levied  on  the  manumission  of 
slaves. 

The  provinces  furnished  two  sources  of  revenue  to  the  gov- 
ernment, the  proceeds  from  state  lands  and  the  returns  from  taxa- 
tion. The  state  lands  comprised  the  territory  belonging  to  cities 
destroyed  by  martial  law,  such  as  Leontini,  Carthage,  and  Corinth ; 
and  domain  lands  which  had  belonged  to  former  rulers  dispossessed 
by  the  Romans,  such  as  the  lands  of  the  kings  of  Macedonia,  Per- 
gamus,  Cyrene,  and  the  mines  in  Spain.  All  such  property  was 
leased,  like  the  state  lands  in  Italy,  by  the  state  to  tenants,  and  the 
rents  formed  a  large  part  of  the  public  revenue. 

Within  the  bounds  of  the  empire  there  were  some  states,  like 
the  kingdoms  of  Numidia  and  Cappadocia,  which  were  recognized 
as  fully  sovereign  and  independent ;  there  were  others,  like  Rhodes, 
Massilia,  and  Gades,  which  enjoyed  a  free  and  equal  alliance  by  spe- 
cial treaty  with  Rome.  Both  classes  were  exempt  from  ordinary 
taxation,  and  were  merely  bound  to  supply  ships  and  men  at  their 

fit 


ECONOMIC     CONDITION  243 

133-78  B.C. 

own  expense  in  time  of  war.  Besides  these  there  were  a  few  scattered 
cities,  like  Narbo,  on  which  the  Roman  franchise  had  been  specially 
conferred;  and  others,  such  as  Centuripa  in  Sicily,  which  were 
specially  exempted  from  taxation;  but  with  these  four  exceptions 
the  whole  extent  of  the  empire  contributed  to  the  Roman  exchequer 
by  a  regular  system  of  taxation  which  fell  under  three  principal 
heads : 

First,  the  decumae  and  scriptura.  The  former  was  a  tenth 
of  the  produce  of  arable  land ;  the  latter,  a  corresponding  tax  upon 
pasture  land.  Of  these  kinds  were  the  taxes  levied  in  the  fertile 
islands  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia. 

Second,  the  stipendium,  or  tributum — i.  c,  a  fixed  sum  paid 
annually  by  a  community  to  the  Roman  exchequer,  amounting,  for 
Macedonia,  to  about  $120,000  of  our  money;  for  Gyaros,  a  small 
island  near  Andros,  to  about  $31.  This  tax  was  usually  lower  than 
that  paid  by  the  community  to  its  former  rulers  before  the  Roman 
conquest:  the  amount  was  fixed  by  the  Roman  authorities,  while 
the  magistrates  of  each  community  were  responsible  for  collecting 
and  paying  over  the  amount  to  the  Roman  treasury. 

Third,  the  customs.  The  Romans  recognized  the  right  of  each 
community  to  levy  its  own  customs  at  its  own  ports  and  frontiers, 
and  made  no  attempt  to  set  up  a  general  tariff  for  the  whole  em- 
pire. Dues  were  levied  by  the  Romans  themselves  at  all  the  ports  of 
Italy;  most  of  the  subject  communities  in  the  same  way  levied 
dues  on  their  own  frontiers,  which  would  have  to  be  paid  even 
by  Roman  citizens,  unless  special  exemption  was  secured  by  treaty. 
But  in  the  provinces  proper,  like  Sicily  and  Asia,  where  the  Roman 
state  was  sole  ruler  and  sovereign,  the  customs,  of  course,  went  into 
the  imperial  coffers.  The  amount  raised  was  five  per  cent,  on  all 
imports  or  exports  in  Sicily,  and  two  and  a  half  in  Asia.  The 
customs,  like  the  decumae  and  scriptura,  were  invariably  leased 
to  tax  farmers. 

These,  with  the  unimportant  item  of  tolls  from  roads,  bridges, 
canals,  etc.,  were  the  only  regular  taxes  imposed  upon  the  provin- 
cials by  the  Roman  government.  But  they  are  far  from  represent- 
ing the  full  amount  of  the  burdens  borne  by  the  provinces. 

In  the  first  place,  the  expenses  of  collection  were  large;  so 
that  the  amount  paid  by  the  contributors  was  much  greater  than  that 
received  by  the  government.  Collection  by  middlemen  is  well 
known  to  be  the  most  expensive  system  of  all;   and  at  Rome  the 


244  ROME 

133-73    B.C. 

lettings  were  so  large  that  only  a  few  capitalists  could  undertake 
them,  and  consequently  the  competition  was  small,  and  the  profits 
of  the  lessees  large. 

Secondly,  there  were  the  military  requisitions  in  time  of  war, 
frequently,  also,  in  time  of  peace.  Legally,  all  transport  pay  and 
provisions  for  the  soldiers  were  provided  by  the  Roman  govern- 
ment; the  provincial  communities  had  only  to  furnish  housing, 
wood,  hay,  and  such  things.  But  in  time  of  war  the  governor  de- 
manded from  them  grain,  ships,  money,  or  anything  he  required; 
and  though  such  requisitions  were  considered  as  advances  to  be 
made  good  by  the  government,  yet  practically  they  became  a  serious 
burden.  This  is  proved  by  frequent  laws  restricting  requisitions, 
fixing  their  maximum  amount  and  the  rate  of  compensation.  At 
extraordinary  times  of  course  requisitions  assumed  the  form  of 
punishment,  as  when  Sulla  compelled  the  subjects  of  Asia  to  give 
fortyfold  pay  to  every  common  soldier  among  them,  and  seventy- 
five  fold  to  every  centurion. 

Thirdly,  there  were  all  kinds  of  extortions,  legal  or  illegal,  for 
which  the  Roman  official  had  ample  opportunity.  The  right  of 
requisition,  the  free  quartering  of  soldiers  and  of  the  clerks  and 
lictors  and  innumerable  officials  in  the  train  of  a  Roman  governor, 
gave  him  sufficient  pretext  for  amassing  a  princely  fortune.  The 
existence  of  a  standing  commission  for  the  trial  of  such  offenses 
shows  their  frequency. 

Lastly,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Rome  undertook  the  mil- 
itary expenses  only  of  her  subjects:  all  other  burdens — the  main- 
tenance of  roads  and  buildings,  the  pay  of  fleets  and  of  the  local 
contingent  to  the  Roman  army — were  supported  by  the  subject 
community,  and  must  have  formed  a  considerable  addition  to  their 
taxation.  For  instance,  in  Judea  the  Jews  paid  a  tenth  to  their 
native  princes  in  addition  to  the  temple  tribute  and  to  their  pay- 
ments to  Rome. 

The  general  conclusion  at  which  we  must  arrive  with  regard  to 
provincial  taxation  is,  that,  though  moderate  in  theory,  it  must  have 
been  extremely  oppressive  in  practice. 

The  revenues  of  the  empire  were  devoted  either  to  military  or 
administrative  purposes.  Roman  taxation,  like  the  tribute  paid  to 
Athens  by  her  subject  allies,  was  in  the  main  meant  to  defray  the 
expense  of  the  military  system  alone.  Hence  its  comparatively 
small  amount,  $10,275,000 — only  two-thirds  of  the  annual  revenue 


ECONOMIC     CONDITION  245 

148-78  B.C. 

of  the  king  of  Egypt.  Hence,  too,  it  may  be  guessed  that  the 
surplus  revenue  after  payment  of  expenses  was  small,  and  that 
provinces  like  the  Spains  and  Macedonia,  which  required  a  large 
garrison,  cost  more  than  they  yielded.  Still,  in  the  times  before 
the  revolution,  the  surplus  was  large  enough  to  defray  the  expenses 
of  public  buildings  and  to  form  a  reserve  fund.  But  the  old  princi- 
ple, that  the  Roman  hegemony  should  not  be  treated  as  a  privilege 
from  which  profit  might  be  derived,  was  infringed  upon  in  the 
latter  portion  of  this  period  in  several  ways:  the  customs  in  con- 
quered territories  were  appropriated  by  Rome,  and  the  mode  of 
levying  them  was  oppressive.  By  Gaius  Gracchus  Roman  citizen- 
ship was  treated  as  a  privilege  conferring  a  right  to  a  certain 
amount  of  corn ;  and  to  provide  the  money  for  these  largesses  the 
soil  of  Asia  was  declared  to  belong  absolutely  to  the  Roman  state, 
and  was  taxed  accordingly. 

The  earlier  portion  of  this  epoch  was  an  era  of  vast  public 
undertakings.  A  new  road  was  made,  in  132  B.C.,  from  Capua  to 
the  Straits  of  Sicily — branching  from  the  great  road  which  led 
from  Rome  through  Capua  to  Tarentum  and  Brundisium.  The 
coast  road  on  the  east  was  completed  by  extension  southward  to 
Brundisium  and  northward  to  Aquileia.  About  Rome  itself,  the 
Mulvian  bridge  over  the  Tiber  was  rebuilt  of  stone.  In  north  Italy 
the  Via  Postumia  was  constructed  in  148  B.C.,  from  Genua  to 
Aquileia  through  Placentia,  Cremona,  and  Verona,  thus  connecting 
the  two  seas.  Gaius  Gracchus  provided  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
roads  by  assigning  pieces  of  ground  by  the  side  of  them  to  which 
was  attached  the  duty  of  keeping  them  in  repair. 

To  the  same  period  belong  the  great  provincial  highways :  the 
Via  Domitia,  connecting  Italy  with  Spain ;  the  Via  Egnatia  and  the 
Via  Gabinia,  connecting  the  ports  of  the  east  coast  of  the  Adriatic 
with  the  interior.  The  draining  of  the  Pomptine  marshes  was 
undertaken  in  160  B.C.  The  two  ancient  aqueducts  were  thoroughly 
repaired,  and  two  new  ones,  the  Marcia  and  the  Calida,  constructed. 
Not  only  were  these  stupendous  works  carried  out,  but  paid  for  in 
cash;  the  Marcian  aqueduct,  which  cost  $10,000,000,  was  paid  for 
in  three  years.  Nor  did  these  costly  undertakings  prevent  the 
accumulation  of  a  reserve,  which  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  period 
amounted  to  $4,300,000. 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  said  that,  even  in  the  early  part  of 
this  epoch,  before  the  revolution,  other  duties  of  the  government  at 


246  ROME 

133-78    B.C. 

least  as  imperative  as  these  were  entirely  neglected.  Brigands  in- 
fested the  frontier  countries,  and  even  the  valley  of  the  Po.  There 
was  no  Roman  fleet,  and  the  vessels  raised  by  the  provincials  were 
not  numerous  enough  to  check  piracy,  much  less  to  carry  on  a  naval 
war.  The  traffic  of  Rome  had  still  to  depend  upon  the  old  wooden 
Janiculan  bridge  over  the  Tiber,  and  the  roadstead  of  Ostia  was 
allowed  to  become  blocked  with  sand. 

But  from  the  time  of  the  revolution  the  picture  is  far  worse. 
Public  works  were  at  a  standstill ;  either  because  the  corn  largesses 
drained  the  treasury,  or  because  the  oligarchy  were  bent  upon  ac- 
cumulating a  large  reserve  fund  in  self-defense.  This  reserve  is 
said  to  have  reached  its  highest  point  in  91  B.C.  The  social  war 
was  the  first  severe  strain  to  which  the  Roman  state  had  been  sub- 
jected since  the  Hannibalic  war.  During  the  latter  the  reserve  was 
not  touched  till  the  tenth  year,  when  the  resources  of  taxation  were 
exhausted;  the  social  war  was  supported  from  the  first  from  the 
reserve,  and  when  this  was  exhausted  the  government  preferred  to 
sell  the  public  sites  in  the  city  to  imposing  a  tax  upon  the  citizens. 

In  agriculture  the  forces  previously  at  work  are  visible  during 
this  period  in  increased  activity,  and  already  produced  startling  re- 
sults. The  smaller  holdings  were  absorbed  by  the  large  estates,  as 
the  sun  absorbs  the  drops  of  rain.  The  senatorial  government 
rather  favored  than  opposed  this  process,  which  the  opposition  con- 
stantly endeavored  to  counteract.  The  two  Gracchi  gave  80,000 
new  farmers  to  Italy,  and  Sulla  settled  120,000  of  his  veterans  on 
the  land,  but  the  process  still  went  on ;  the  small  farms  were  con- 
stantly being  absorbed,  while  the  creation  of  new  farmers  was  only 
intermittent.  In  the  provinces  the  same  evils  existed,  and  not  the 
slightest  attempt  was  made  to  check  them ;  while  they  were  attended 
with  this  additional  disadvantage,  that  the  rents  were  of  course  sent 
out  of  the  country  to  Italy. 

In  trade  and  commerce  there  is  little  but  inactivity  to  record ; 
the  Romans  destroyed  the  industries  of  Corinth,  and  created  noth- 
ing in  their  place.  Building  was,  perhaps,  an  exception  to  the  gen- 
eral stagnation,  but  produced  little  benefit  to  the  commonwealth,  as 
only  slave  labor  was  employed. 

Commerce  was  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  and 
the  political  ascendency  of  Rome  was  unscrupulously  used  to  favor 
this  monopoly.  Usury  was  one  of  the  most  lucrative  of  trades; 
for  instance,  the  indemnity  imposed  by  Sulla  upon  the  province  of 


ECONOMIC     CONDITION  247 

133-78  B.C. 

Asia  was  advanced  by  the  Roman  capitalists,  and  swelled  in  fourteen 
years  to  six  times  the  original  amount;  public  buildings,  works  of 
art,  even  their  children,  had  to  be  sold  by  the  unfortunate  communi- 
ties to  meet  their  claims.  Next  in  importance  to  money  dealing 
came  the  export  of  wine  and  oil  from  Italy  to  all  parts  of  the  Med- 
iterranean, and  the  import  of  all  kinds  of  articles  of  luxury.  The 
importation  of  slaves  was  enormous,  especially  from  Syria  and  Asia 
Minor.  The  chief  emporia  for  the  reception  of  imports  were  Ostia 
and  Puteoli,  which  traded  chiefly  with  Alexandria  and  the  cities  of 
Syria,  in  the  valuable  commodities  of  the  East. 

Thus,  side  by  side  with  the  political  oligarchy  of  senatorial 
families,  there  was  a  financial  oligarchy  of  capitalists.  These  men 
absorbed  the  rents  of  the  soil  of  Italy,  and  of  the  richest  parts  of  the 
provinces;  the  usury  and  the  commerce  of  the  whole  empire  were 
in  their  hands,  and  even  of  the  state  revenue  itself  they  drew  a  con- 
siderable share  by  their  profits  as  lessees.  Their  influence  in  the 
state  is  clearly  seen  in  the  destruction  of  Corinth  and  Carthage,  the 
commercial  rivals  of  Rome;  and  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  their 
wealth  was  based,  not  upon  sound  economic  principles  but  upon 
the  political  supremacy  of  Rome;  hence  every  political  crisis  was 
attended  by  a  financial  crisis. 

One  important  result  of  the  commercial  monopoly  of  Rome 
was  an  interchange  of  population,  greatly  to  the  disadvantage  of 
the  Roman  state.  Everywhere  in  the  provinces  there  were  large 
numbers  of  Italians  temporarily  settled,  mostly  for  commercial  rea- 
sons. We  have  seen  that  80,000  Italians  perished  in  a  single  day  in 
Asia  Minor  and  20,000  in  Delos.  Again,  the  population  of  Italy 
suffered  enormous  diminution  during  the  social  wars,  when  300,000 
persons  are  said  to  have  perished.  In  return  for  the  loss  of  these 
citizens,  Italy  received  vast  numbers  of  provincials,  chiefly  Oriental 
Greeks,  who  acted  as  physicians,  schoolmasters,  and  priests,  or  who 
came  to  her  ports  as  traders  and  mariners ;  while  the  proportion  of 
slaves  to  freemen  was  continually  increasing.  The  servile  insurrec- 
tions, the  appeals  to  slaves,  in  times  of  disturbance,  to  take  up 
arms  against  their  masters,  are  plain  enough  signs  of  the  times.  If 
we  conceive  of  England  with  its  lords,  its  squires,  above  all  its  city, 
but  with  its  freeholders  and  farmers  converted  into  proletarians  and 
its  laborers  and  sailors  converted  into  slaves,  we  shall  gain  an 
approximate  image  of  the  population  of  the  Italian  peninsula  in 
those  days. 


248  ROME 

133-78    B.C. 

Socially,  no  less  than  politically  or  financially,  the  period  is  one 
of  decadence,  and  is  marked  by  growing  extravagance  and  frivolity. 
Enjoyment  lost  all  freshness  and  spontaneity,  and  became  a  labor- 
ious and  pedantic  study.  Animal  hunts  and  gladiatorial  games  be- 
came the  chief  feature  in  the  public  festivals.  Huge  sums  were 
expended  at  every  great  funeral  on  public  games — Marcus  Aemilius 
Lepidus  left  strict  injunctions  to  his  children  to  avoid  empty  show, 
and  not  to  spend  more  at  his  obsequies  than  1,000,000  asses 
($51,000).  Houses  and  gardens  reached  fabulous  prices ;  gambling 
and  extravagance  in  dress  were  fashionable  foibles ;  but  the  favorite 
mode  of  expenditure  was  on  the  luxuries  of  the  table. 

Every  villa  along  the  coast  had  its  tanks  for  securing  a  constant 
supply  of  fish.  At  the  best  entertainments,  not  whole  birds,  but 
only  the  most  delicate  portions,  were  served  up,  and  the  guests  were 
expected  merely  to  taste  of  the  multitude  of  dishes  presented  to  them. 
There  were  sumptuary  laws  totally  prohibiting  certain  delicacies, 
regulating  the  price  of  meals  and  the  amount  of  plate,  but  of  all  the 
Roman  nobles,  only  three  are  said  to  have  kept  these  laws,  and  that 
on  account  of  regard  for  the  principles  of  Stoic  philosophy,  not  for 
the  law.  A  century  earlier  few  houses  contained  any  silver  plate 
beyond  the  traditional  salt  dish,  but  in  Sulla's  time  there  were  150 
silver  dishes  at  Rome  of  100  lbs.  weight.  Some  of  it  was  of 
such  exquisite  workmanship  as  to  be  valued  at  eighteen  times 
its  weight  of  metal,  and  Lucius  Crassus  gave  $5,250  for  a  pair  of 
silver  cups. 

Perhaps  the  most  significant  mark  of  the  corruption  of  the  age 
is  the  frequency  of  divorce  and  the  general  aversion  to  marriage. 
Even  Metellus  Macedonicus,  censor  in  131  B.C.,  a  man  renowned 
for  his  honorable  domestic  life,  urged  the  duty  of  marriage  upon 
his  fellow-citizens  in  the  following  terms:  "  If  we  could,  citizens, 
we  should  indeed  all  keep  clear  of  this  burden.  But  as  nature  has 
so  arranged  it  that  we  cannot  either  live  comfortably  with  wives  or 
live  at  all  without  them,  it  is  proper  to  have  regard  rather  to  the 
permanent  weal  than  to  our  own  brief  comfort."  These  facts  are 
important,  for  it  is  only  by  trying  to  realize  the  ignoble  private  life 
of  the  time  that  we  can  comprehend  the  political  corruption  which 
prevailed.  There  were  exceptions,  especially  among  the  rural 
towns,  but  immorality  was  the  rule.  One  of  the  censors  of 
92  B.C.  publicly  reproached  his  colleague  with  having  shed  tears 
over  the  death  of  a   favorite   fish;   the   other   retaliated  on   the 


ECONOMIC     CONDITION  249 

133-78  B.C. 

former  that  he  had  buried  three  wives  and  shed  tears  over  none 
of  them. 

In  161  B.C.  an  orator  in  the  Forum  gave  the  following"  descrip- 
tion of  the  senatorial  jurymen:  "  They  play  hazard,  delicately  per- 
fumed, surrounded  by  their  mistresses.  As  the  afternoon  advances 
they  summon  the  servant  and  bid  him  make  inquiries  at  the  comi- 
tium,  what  has  occurred  in  the  Forum,  who  has  spoken  in  favor  of 
or  against  the  new  project  of  law,  what  tribes  have  voted  for  and 
what  against  it.  At  length  they  go  themselves  to  the  judgment 
seat,  just  early  enough  not  to  bring  the  process  down  on  their 
own  neck. 

"  Reluctantly  they  come  to  the  tribunal  and  give  audience  to 
the  parties.  Those  who  are  concerned  bring  forward  their  cause. 
The  juryman  orders  the  witness  to  come  forward ;  he  himself  goes 
aside.  When  he  returns,  he  declares  that  he  has  heard  everything, 
and  asks  for  the  documents.  He  looks  into  the  writings — he  can 
hardly  keep  his  eyes  open  for  wine.  When  he  thereupon  withdraws 
to  consider  his  sentence,  he  says  to  his  boon  companions,  '  What 
concern  have  I  with  these  tiresome  people?  Why  should  we  not 
rather  go  to  drink  a  cup  of  mulse  mixed  with  Greek  wine,  and 
accompany  it  with  a  fat  fieldfare,  and  a  good  fish — a  veritable  pike 
from  the  Tiber  island  ?  '  "  All  this  was,  no  doubt,  very  ridiculous ; 
but  was  it  not  a  very  serious  matter  that  such  things  were  subjects 
of  ridicule? 

Governors  accused  of  tyrannous  maladministration  of  their 
provinces  found  it  a  simple  thing  to  bribe  their  judges,  and  all  the 
more  as  these  latter  knew  that  corresponding  charges  might  at  any 
time  be  brought  against  themselves.  Indeed,  indictments  such  as 
the  young  Julius  Caesar's  against  Dolabella  for  extortion  in  Mace- 
donia were  frequent,  but  only  represented  the  means  adopted  by 
ambitious  young  Romans  to  call  attention  to  themselves.  Seem- 
ingly the  most  noble  denunciation  had  this  ulterior  motive,  and, 
while  almost  invariably  resultless  to  the  oppressed  province,  served 
the  orator's  purpose.  It  was  commonly  estimated  that  three  years 
of  office  would  adequately  provide,  first  for  the  private  fortune  of 
the  governor,  second  for  the  satisfaction  of  his  host  of  followers, 
and  lastly  for  the  bribing  of  the  judges  and  the  purchase  of  his  own 
acquittal. 

Statesmen  and  generals  alike  were  notoriously  venal,  moved  by 
cupidity  and  ambition.     No  arts  were  considered  too  base  that 


250  ROME 

served  their  purpose.  It  is  true  there  were  noble  exceptions,  but 
the  rankness  of  the  times  was  frankly  admitted  and  attempts  to 
check  the  progress  of  corruption  by  censorial  power  and  law  were 
practically  all  in  vain.  Thus  was  Rome  sapped  by  the  very  wealth 
added  by  her  conquests,  and  the  empire  weakened  by  the  abuse  of  her 
extended  power.  It  could  be  said  that  the  misery  of  her  subject 
states  was  greater  in  time  of  peace  under  the  corrupt  rule  of  Roman 
governors  than  it  had  been  under  the  ordinary  misfortunes  of  war. 


PART  IV 

FALL  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  AND  ESTABLISH- 
ING OF  THE  MONARCHY.    78-44  B.C. 


Chapter  XXVI 

THE  RULE  OF  THE   SULLAN   RESTORATION.     78-70  B.C. 

SULLA'S  arrangements  had  been  acquiesced  in  by  all  the  chief 
classes  in  the  state,  and  on  his  death  his  constitution  had 
nothing  to  fear  from  any  organized  body  of  opponents. 
There  was,  however,  a  large  but  heterogeneous  body  of  malcontents 
opposed  to  the  present  condition  of  things  for  varied  reasons. 

This  opposition  was  made  up  of  widely  different  classes. 
There  were  the  jurists,  who  considered  the  Sullan  laws  unconstitu- 
tional, and  the  moderate  senators,  who  desired  to  compromise  with 
the  democratic  party;  there  were  the  democrats  themselves,  who 
aimed  at  the  restoration  of  the  tribunate,  and  the  disfranchised, 
who  wished  to  recover  or  obtain  political  influence;  there  were  the 
poor,  who  had  been  deprived  of  their  free  corn,  and  the  proscribed, 
who  demanded  back  their  confiscated  property;  and  there  were  the 
equestrian  capitalists,  whose  chances  for  gain  had  been  curtailed  by 
the  restoration  of  senatorial  privileges.  To  all  these  classes  one 
more  remains  to  be  added — the  men  of  ambition  and  the  men  of 
ruined  fortunes.  The  latter  included  alike  the  aristocratic  lords, 
who  had  lost  their  patrimony  by  riotous  living,  and  the  Sullan 
colonists,  who  refused  to  settle  down  to  a  life  of  husbandry  and 
were  eager  for  fresh  spoil.  The  former  included  men,  outside  the 
senatorial  circle,  who  were  eager  to  force  their  way  into  office  by 
popular  favor ;  and  men  of  more  daring  ambition,  who  might  per- 
haps emulate  Gaius  Gracchus. 

It  is  most  necessary,  for  the  understanding  of  the  history  of  the 
following  years,  that  all  these  elements  of  opposition  should  be  fully 
grasped;  and  it  may  be  well  here  to  recall  to  mind  the  two  great 
and  constant  difficulties  of  the  Roman  government — the  difficulty 
of  controlling  its  military  governors  in  the  provinces ;  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  managing  the  masses  of  slaves  and  freedmen  in  the  capital, 
without  either  police  or  troops  at  its  disposal. 

It  was,  perhaps,  the  greatest  misfortune  of  all  that  there  was 
everywhere  at  this  period  a  dearth  of  political  leaders.     The  man- 

953 


254  ROME 

106-78   B.C. 

agement  of  parties  was  in  the  hands  of  political  clubs,  a  system 
which  had  existed  for  centuries  at  Rome,  but  which  was  now  seen 
in  its  worst  and  most  aggravated  form.  These  clubs,  as  common 
among  the  rabble  as  among  the  aristocrats,  controlled  the  whole 
political  life  of  the  city  through  organized  bribery  and  intimidation. 
Such  a  system  of  faction  and  corruption,  however,  was  not  one  likely 
to  produce  statesmen,  however  much  it  might  add  to  the  bitterness 
and  violence  of  personal  and  political  struggles. 

Among  the  men  prominent  in  the  political  life  of  the  day,  three 
alone  are  worthy  of  consideration.  The  first  is  Gnaeus  Pompeius, 
born  in  106  B.C.  He  had  raised  troops  and  fought  for  Sulla  in  the 
second  civil  war,  and  had  enjoyed  the  titles  of  imperator  and  tri- 
umphator  before  his  age  permitted  him  to  stand  for  any  office. 
Already  he  began  to  be  known  by  the  title  of  Magnus.  He  was 
an  able  soldier,  but  no  genius;  cautious  to  timidity,  and  averse  to 
strike  till  he  had  established  an  immense  superiority  over  his  oppo- 
nent. In  culture,  as  well  as  in  integrity  of  character,  he  was  at  least 
up  to  the  level  of  the  time ;  he  was  a  good  neighbor,  a  good  husband 
and  father.  His  temperament  was  kind  and  humane;  and  he  was 
the  first  to  depart  from  the  custom  of  putting  to  death  captive  kings 
and  generals  after  a  triumph.  Yet  he  sent  a  divorce  to  the  wife 
whom  he  loved,  at  the  command  of  Sulla,  because  she  belonged  to 
an  outlawed  family.  For  politics  he  had  little  aptitude.  He  was 
awkward  and  stiff  in  public;  easily  managed  by  his  freedmen  and 
clients ;  eager  for  power,  but  affecting  to  despise  it.  His  relations 
to  the  parties  of  the  time  were  peculiar.  Though  a  Sullan  officer, 
he  was  opposed  to  Sulla  personally.  Nor  was  he  in  sympathy  with 
the  senatorial  government;  for  his  family  was  not  yet  fully  estab- 
lished among  the  aristocracy,  and  Pompeius  himself  had  once  been 
a  Cinnan  adherent.  He  had  no  political  sagacity,  and  little  political 
courage.  He  might  have  had  a  definite  and  respectable  position 
had  he  contented  himself  with  being  the  general  of  the  senate — 
the  office  for  which  he  was  from  the  beginning  destined.  With  this 
he  was  not  content,  and  so  he  fell  into  the  fatal  plight  of  wishing 
to  be  something  else  than  he  could  be.  He  was  constantly  aspiring 
to  a  special  position  in  the  state,  and  when  it  offered  itself,  he  could 
not  make  up  his  mind  to  occupy  it.  Constantly  tormented  by  an  am- 
bition which  was  frightened  at  its  own  aims,  his  deeply  agitated  life 
passed  joylessly  away  in  a  perpetual  inward  contradiction. 

Marcus  Crassus  was  famed  for  his  boundless  activity,  especially 


SULLAN     RESTORATION  255 

78  B.C. 

in  the  acquisition  of  wealth ;  he  was  contractor,  builder,  banker,  and 
usurer,  and  carried  on  numerous  other  trades  through  his  freedmen. 
Unlike  Pompeius,  he  was  unscrupulous  in  the  means  he  employed. 
He  was  proved  to  have  committed  a  forgery  in  the  matter  of  the 
Sullan  proscription  lists ;  he  did  not  refuse  a  legacy  because  the  will 
which  gave  it  him  was  known  to  be  forged;  and  he  allowed  his 
bailiffs  to  dislodge  the  small  farmers  adjoining  his  estates  by  force 
and  by  fraud.  He  soon  became  the  richest  man  in  Rome;  and  at 
his  death,  after  expending  enormous  sums,  he  was  still  worth 
$8,500,000.  But  his  wealth  was  only  a  means  to  the  gratification 
of  his  ambition ;  he  extended  his  connection  by  every  possible  means ; 
he  could  salute  every  burgess  of  the  capital  by  name ;  never  refused 
his  services  as  an  advocate,  and,  though  without  any  gift  of  oratory, 
overcame  all  obstacles  by  his  pertinacity  in  speaking.  He  advanced 
money  on  loan  to  influential  men  without  distinction  of  party,  and 
thus  acquired  a  power  which  none  dared  to  provoke.  His  ambition 
knew  no  bounds;  while  he  stood  alone  the  crown  of  Rome  was 
beyond  his  grasp,  but  it  was  not  impossible  that,  with  the  aid  of  a 
suitable  partner,  he  might  attain  to  supremacy  in  the  state. 

In  the  ranks  of  the  democrats  the  revolution  had  made  such 
havoc  that  scarcely  a  man  of  note  survived.  Of  the  rising  genera- 
tion, Gaius  Julius  Caesar  was  now  only  twenty-four  years  of  age, 
but  was  already  perhaps  the  third  most  important  man  in  Rome. 
His  family  connections  naturally  inclined  him  towards  the  demo- 
cratic party;  for  his  father's  sister  had  been  the  wife  of  Marius, 
and  his  own  wife  was  the  daughter  of  Cinna ;  while  his  early  career 
had  so  far  been  one  of  opposition  to  the  senatorial  rule.  He  had 
refused  to  divorce  his  wife  at  the  bidding  of  Sulla,  and  with  diffi- 
culty escaped  proscription  at  the  intercession  of  his  relatives.  But 
Caesar  could  only  be  the  hope  of  the  future,  and  the  actual  leadership 
of  the  democratic  party  fell  for  the  present  into  other  hands. 

Scarcely  was  Sulla  dead  when  the  democratic  party  began  to 
attack  his  work.  Their  candidate,  Lepidus,  was  elected  consul  for 
the  year  78  B.C.,  and  at  once  proposed  the  renewal  of  the  corn  dis- 
tribution and  a  restoration  of  the  confiscated  lands.  At  the  same 
time,  portions  of  the  party  in  Etruria  raised  the  standard  of  revolt 
and  attempted  to  resume  their  estates  by  force.  The  two  consuls 
were  sent  to  suppress  the  rising,  but  Lepidus  turned  his  arms  against 
the  government.  He  was  finally  defeated  and  driven  out  of  Italy 
by  Pompeius,  and  most  of  his  forces  joined  Sertorius  in  Spain. 


256  ROME 

80-74   B.C. 

Spain  was  now  the  only  province  of  the  empire  where  opposition  to 
the  senate  still  existed.  Sertorius  had  appeared  in  that  province 
again  in  80  B.C.,  and  soon  built  up  a  power  that  it  taxed  all  the  re- 
sources of  the  Roman  government  for  eight  years  to  subdue.  Even 
then  the  government  could  find  no  means  to  overthrow  him  but  the 
assassin's  dagger.  He  was  a  man  of  tender,  sensitive  nature,  and 
at  the  same  time  of  the  most  chivalrous  courage,  and  in  the  revolu- 
tionary war  his  military  talent  and  his  genius  for  organization  pre- 
sented a  striking  contrast  to  the  incapacity  of  the  other  democratic 
leaders.  His  Spanish  followers  called  him  the  New  Hannibal,  and 
indeed  his  adroitness  and  versatility,  in  politics  and  in  war,  savor 
far  more  of  the  Phoenician  than  of  the  Roman  genius.  He  was 
careful  always  to  act  as  Roman  governor  of  the  province;  and  he 
began  to  organize  the  country  in  the  same  spirit.  He  formed  the 
chief  men  of  the  exiles  into  a  senate  to  conduct  affairs  and  to  nom- 
inate magistrates.  The  officers  of  the  army  were  exclusively  Ro- 
man; to  the  Spaniards  he  was  the  Roman  governor  who  levied 
troops  by  virtue  of  his  office.  At  the  same  time  he  endeavored  to 
attach  the  provincials  to  Rome  and  to  himself.  The  strictest  disci- 
pline was  maintained  in  the  army,  and  the  inhabitants  were  relieved 
from  all  fear  of  outrage  on  the  part  of  the  soldiers.  The  tribute  of 
the  province  was  reduced,  and  the  soldiers  were  made  to  build  winter 
barracks  for  themselves,  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  quartering  them 
on  the  inhabitants.  The  children  of  the  noble  Spaniards  were  edu- 
cated in  an  academy  at  Osca,  where  they  learned  to  speak  Latin  and 
Greek,  and  adopted  the  Roman  dress — the  first  attempt  to  Romanize 
the  provinces  by  Romanizing  the  provincials  themselves. 

For  eight  years  Sertorius  maintained  himself  in  Spain  against 
every  army  and  every  general  sent  out  against  him.  He  defeated 
the  able  Metellus  and  confined  him  to  a  few  coast  towns,  and  even 
Pompeius,  who  had  demanded  and  received  from  the  senate  the 
Spanish  command,  with  extraordinary  powers,  was  more  than  once 
defeated,  though  he  gradually  drove  the  rebel  back  into  the  interior 
and  forced  him  to  confine  himself  mostly  to  guerrilla  warfare. 

The  losses  of  the  state  in  men  and  treasure  during  all  this  time 
are  difficult  to  estimate:  not  only  were  the  Spanish  revenues  lost, 
but  vast  sums  had  annually  to  be  sent  for  the  support  of  the  army  in 
Spain.  The  province  itself  was  devastated ;  whole  communities  had 
frequently  perished,  and  the  towns  which  adhered  to  Rome  had 
countless  hardships  to  endure.     Gaul  suffered  scarcely  less  from  the 


SULLAN     RESTORATION  257 

78-72  B.C. 

constant  requisitions  of  men  and  money,  and  from  the  burden  of 
providing  winter  quarters.  Generals  and  soldiers  were  alike  dissat- 
isfied; the  former  because  victory  was  difficult  and  of  a  kind  that 
brought  no  fame;  the  latter  because  the  booty  was  poor,  and  even 
their  pay  irregular.  At  the  same  time  the  government  was  contend- 
ing against  its  enemies  all  over  the  Mediterranean,  on  the  sea,  in 
Macedonia  and  in  Asia  Minor;  while  Sertorius  was  already  in  open 
league  with  the  pirates,  and  was  negotiating  with  Mithradates  on 
the  basis  of  mutual  assistance. 

But  the  odds  in  the  contest  were  too  great  for  Sertorius  to 
withstand  indefinitely.  The  whole  insurrection  rested  for  success 
on  his  genius  alone  and  the  love  the  Spanish  people  bore  him. 
Knowing  this,  the  Romans  set  a  price  on  his  head,  promising,  it 
is  said,  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  to  any  man  who  would  kill 
him.  A  conspiracy  was  formed  against  him  by  his  own  lieutenants, 
and  in  72.  b.c.  he  was  treacherously  stabbed  at  a  banquet  to  which 
they  had  invited  him.  After  this  the  rebellion  quickly  died  out,  and 
at  the  close  of  the  following  year  Pompeius  returned  to  Italy  with 
his  victorious  army. 

The  Sullan  constitution  had  thus  survived  the  dangers  which 
beset  it  on  the  death  of  its  author.  It  remains  to  be  seen  how  the 
senate  fulfilled  the  duties  of  government  during  its  new  lease  of 
power.  In  order  to  do  this,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  a  little,  and 
to  review  the  condition  of  other  parts  of  the  empire  during  the  last 
years  of  Sulla's  regency  and  the  first  years  after  his  death  in  78  B.C. 
The  condition  of  Spain  had  thrown  all  other  questions  into  the 
shade ;  but  there  were  other  serious  dangers  threatening — especially 
from  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  from  the  East,  and  from  the  pirates  of 
the  Mediterranean. 

In  Thrace  and  the  adjacent  regions  there  was  warfare  for  the 
space  of  twelve  years,  the  result  of  which  was  that  the  pirates  of  the 
Dalmatian  coast  and  the  tribes  between  Macedonia  and  the  Danube 
were  subdued,  while  Thrace  became  a  portion  of  the  province  of 
Macedonia. 

The  most  important  feature  in  the  history  of  the  East,  during 
the  years  succeeding  the  settlement  of  Sulla,  was  the  rapid  increase 
of  the  power  and  territory  of  Tigranes,  king  of  Armenia,  and  son- 
in-law  of  Mithradates.  Hardly  had  Sulla  left  Asia  before  the  king 
began  to  extend  his  dominions  at  the  expense  of  the  Parthians,  to 
the  south,  and  of  the  kingdoms  of  Asia  Minor  to  the  west.     Upper 


258  ROME 

75-67   B.C. 

Mesopotamia,  Cappadocia,  eastern  Cilicia,  and  upper  Syria  were 
reduced,  and  it  was  the  evident  aim  of  Tigranes  to  become  supreme 
monarch  of  the  East.  The  Romans,  anxious  to  avoid  a  conflict, 
did  not  at  first  interfere  with  these  conquests.  Even  Mithradates 
was  allowed  to  strengthen  himself  until  he  was  again  dangerous. 
He  had  felt  that  a  rupture  with  Rome  could  only  be  a  question  of 
time,  and  so,  finally  taking  advantage  of  the  Sertorian  war  in  Spain, 
he  overran  Asia  Minor  in  75  and  74  B.C.  Fortunately  the  Romans 
had  in  the  consul  Lucullus  one  of  the  ablest  generals  the  state  had 
produced,  and,  though  he  had  but  a  small  force  under  his  command, 
he  soon  recovered  Asia  and  drove  Mithradates  to  take  refuge  with 
the  king  of  Armenia.  The  latter  had  in  the  beginning  held  aloof 
from  the  war,  but  he  now  refused  to  deliver  up  his  father-in-law, 
and  Lucullus  marched  against  him  in  69  B.C.  In  a  short  and  bril- 
liant campaign  Tigranes  was  driven  from  his  capital  and  immense 
quantities  of  booty  were  secured,  enough  to  pay  all  the  expenses  of 
the  campaign  and  to  furnish  a  present  of  one  hundred  and  sixty-five 
dollars  to  each  soldier.  But  again  the  incapacity  of  the  home  gov- 
ernment was  seen  in  the  conduct  of  affairs  at  this  critical  period. 
Lucullus  was  a  cold,  unbending  man  and  a  strict  disciplinarian,  and 
his  troops  hated  him  accordingly.  Many  of  them  had  come  out  to 
the  East  with  Flaccus  and  Fimbria,  in  86  B.C.,  and  now  demanded 
their  discharge.  Their  insubordination  was  encouraged  by  the 
knowledge  that  their  general  was  in  disfavor  with  the  ruling  powers 
at  Rome.  Lucullus,  whose  honesty  was  above  reproach,  had  pro- 
tected the  natives  of  the  province  of  Asia  from  the  usury  of  the 
Roman  capitalists,  and  these  all  clamored  for  his  recall.  The  senate 
accordingly  refused  reinforcements  and  sent  out  a  new  governor 
to  supersede  him.  He  was  obliged  to  retire  west  of  the  Euphrates, 
his  army  quickly  broke  up,  and  Tigranes  and  Mithradates  once  more 
recovered  their  kingdoms,  6j  B.C.  Thus,  after  nearly  eight  years  of 
war  in  the  East,  the  Romans  were  exactly  in  the  same  position  as  at 
the  beginning. 

The  remissness  of  the  senatorial  government  is,  however,  most 
strikingly  seen  in  the  extraordinary  growth  of  piracy.  The  whole 
Mediterranean  was  infested  with  corsairs,  so  that  all  traffic  by  sea 
was  at  an  end.  The  import  of  corn  into  Italy  ceased,  while  the 
cornfields  of  the  provinces  could  find  no  vent  for  their  produce. 
Romans  of  rank  were  carried  off  for  the  sake  of  the  ransom  paid  for 
their  liberation;  merchants,  and  even  troops,  put  off  their  voyages 


SULLAN     RESTORATION  259 

75-67  B.C. 

till  the  winter  season,  preferring  the  risk  of  storm  and  tempest  to 
that  of  capture.  Worst  of  all  were  the  outrages  on  the  islands  and 
coast  towns  of  Asia  Minor,  which  were  either  sacked  or  compelled 
to  purchase  safety  by  the  payment  of  large  sums.  All  the  rich 
temples  of  this  region  were  plundered,  and  even  towns  one  or  two 
days'  march  from  the  coast  were  no  longer  safe. 

The  pirates  of  this  day  were  no  longer  mere  freebooters  or 
slave-catchers,  but  formed  a  regular  state,  with  an  organization,  a 
home  of  their  own,  and  at  least  the  germs  of  a  political  league. 
They  called  themselves  Cilicians,  but  drew  their  recruits  from  all 
sources — discharged  mercenaries,  citizens  of  destroyed  communi- 
ties, soldiers  from  the  Sertorian  or  Fimbrian  armies,  the  refugees 
of  all  vanquished  parties.  The  motto  of  the  new  state  was  ven- 
geance upon  civil  society;  its  members  were  bound  together  by  a 
strong  sense  of  fellowship — by  a  determination  to  be  true  to  each 
other,  and  by  loyalty  to  their  chosen  chiefs.  They  regarded  their 
plunder  as  military  spoil,  and  as  in  the  case  of  capture  they  were  sure 
of  the  cross,  they  too  claimed  the  right  of  executing  their  prisoners. 
Their  ships  were  small,  open,  and  swift — mostly  light  "  myo- 
parones  " — and  they  sailed  in  squadrons  under  regularly  appointed 
admirals.  Their  home  was  the  whole  Mediterranean,  but  their 
special  haunts,  where  they  kept  their  plunder  and  their  wives,  were 
Crete  and  the  southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  Here  the  native 
leagues  were  weak,  and  the  Roman  station  was  inadequate  for  the 
guardianship  of  the  whole  coast,  while  the  Armenian  king  troubled 
himself  little  about  the  sea.  In  the  prevailing  weakness  of  the  legit- 
imate governments  of  the  time  the  pirates  gained  a  body  of  client 
states  among  the  Greek  maritime  cities,  which  made  treaties  and 
carried  on  an  extensive  trade  with  them.  The  town  of  Side  in 
Pamphylia,  for  instance,  allowed  them  to  build  ships  on  its  quays 
and  to  sell  their  captures  in  its  market.  The  pirate  state  even 
formed  alliances  with  Mithradates  and  with  the  Roman  emigrants ; 
it  fought  battles  with  the  fleets  of  Sulla,  and  some  of  its  princes 
reigned  over  many  coast  towns. 

Evidently  the  Romans  had  shamefully  neglected  all  the  duties 
of  maritime  police.  Instead  of  keeping  up  a  fleet  to  guard  the 
whole  sea,  they  left  each  province  and  each  client  state  to  defend 
itself  as  it  could.  Though  the  provincials  paid  tribute  to  the  Ro- 
mans for  their  defense,  there  was  no  Italian  fleet.  The  government 
depended  on  ships  furnished  by  the  maritime  towns  at  the  expense 


260  ROME 

79-68    B.C. 

of  the  provinces,  which  were  even  called  upon  to  contribute  to  the 
ransom  of  Roman  captives  of  rank.  In  79  b.c.  one  of  the  consuls, 
Publius  Servilius,  defeated  the  pirate  fleet  and  destroyed  the  pirate 
towns  on  the  south  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  including  Olympus  and 
Phaselis,  which  belonged  to  the  prince  Zenicetes.  He  next  led  an 
army  over  the  Taurus,  captured  Isaura,  and  subdued  the  Isaurians 
in  the  northwest  of  rough  Cilicia.  His  campaigns  lasted  for  three 
years,  and  were  not  without  fruit ;  but,  naturally,  the  main  body  of 
the  pirates  simply  betook  itself  to  other  regions — especially  Crete. 
Nothing  but  the  establishment  of  a  strong  maritime  police  could 
meet  the  case,  and  this  the  Romans  would  not  undertake. 

In  74  B.C.  they  did  intrust  the  clearance  of  the  seas  to  a  single 
admiral  in  supreme  command.  But  such  appointments  were  man- 
aged by  the  political  clubs:  and  the  choice  fell  upon  the  pretor 
Marcus  Antonius,  who  was  quite  unfit  for  the  post.  Moreover, 
the  government  did  not  furnish  supplies  and  money  adequate  for  the 
purpose,  so  that  the  requisitions  of  the  admiral  were  more  burden- 
some to  the  provincials  than  were  the  pirates  themselves.  The  expe- 
dition came  to  nothing:  the  Roman  fleet  was  defeated  off  Cydonia 
by  the  pirates  and  the  Cretans  combined ;  Antonius  died  in  Crete  in 
71  b.c,  and  the  government  fell  back  upon  the  old  system  of  leaving 
each  state  to  protect  itself. 

The  defeat  of  Cydonia  roused  even  the  degenerate  Romans  of 
that  day  from  their  lethargy;  yet  the  bribes  of  the  Cretan  envoys 
would  probably  have  bought  off  Roman  vengeance  had  not  the  sen- 
ate decreed  that  the  loans  to  the  envoys  from  Roman  bankers  at 
exorbitant  interest  were  not  recoverable — thus  incapacitating  itself 
for  bribery.  The  most  humiliating  terms  were  now  offered  to  the 
Cretans,  and  on  their  rejection  Quintus  Metellus,  the  proconsul, 
appeared,  in  68  b.c,  in  Cretan  waters.  A  battle  was  fought  under 
the  walls  of  Cydonia,  which  the  Romans  with  difficulty  won,  but 
the  siege  of  the  towns  lasted  for  two  years.  With  the  conquest  of 
Crete  the  last  spot  of  free  Greek  soil  passed  under  the  power  of 
the  Romans. 

Metellus  assumed  the  surname  of  Creticus,  as  Servilius  had 
become  Isauricus;  but  the  power  of  the  pirates  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean was  never  higher  than  now.  The  coast  towns  paid  taxes  for 
defense  to  the  Roman  governor  and  blackmail  to  the  pirates  at  the 
same  time ;  the  admiral  of  the  Cilician  army  was  carried  off,  as  well 
as  two  pretors  with  all  their  retinue  and  insignia ;  the  Roman  fleet, 


SULLAN     RESTORATION  261 

73-67  B.C. 

equipped  to  clear  the  seas,  was  destroyed  by  the  pirates  in  the  port 
of  Ostia  itself:  and  so  things  went  on,  from  bad  to  worse,  until 
Pompeius  put  an  end  to  the  pest  in  67  B.C. 

The  rule  of  the  restored  oligarchy  in  Macedonia,  in  the  East, 
and  on  the  sea  has  thus  been  reviewed;  we  have  now  to  see  how 
it  fulfilled  its  duties  within  the  confines  of  Italy. 

Politically  and  economically  slavery  was  the  curse  of  all  ancient 
states,  and  it  is  to  be  remembered  that,  where  this  institution  exists, 
the  richer  and  more  prosperous  the  state,  the  greater  the  proportion 
of  slaves  to  the  free  population  becomes.  There  had  already  been 
serious  servile  wars,  and  the  evil  had  grown  with  the  growth  of 
the  plantation  system,  but  the  decade  after  the  death  of  Sulla  was 
the  golden  age  of  buccaneers  by  sea  and  land.  Violence  of  all  kinds 
was  rife  in  the  less  populated  parts  of  Italy,  but  the  crime  of  abduc- 
tion of  men  and  seizure  of  estates  was  peculiarly  dangerous  to  the 
state.  For  it  was  frequently  perpetrated  by  the  overseers  and  slaves 
of  great  landowners,  who  did  not  disdain  to  keep  what  their  offi- 
cious subordinates  had  thus  acquired  for  them;  and,  of  course, 
bands  of  slaves  and  proletarians  were  ready  enough  to  learn  their 
lesson,  and  to  carry  on  the  business  of  plunder  on  their  own  account. 
Thus  Italy  was  full  of  inflammable  material,  and  a  spark  was  not 
long  wanting  to  set  it  ablaze. 

In  73  B.C.  a  number  of  gladiators  broke  out  from  one  of  the 
training  schools  of  Capua,  and  took  up  a  position  on  Mount 
Vesuvius,  under  the  leadership  of  two  Celtic  slaves,  Crixus  and 
Oenomaus,  and  of  Spartacus,  a  Thracian  of  noble,  perhaps  even  of 
royal,  lineage.  At  first  only  seventy-four  in  number,  they  quickly 
increased,  until  aid  had  to  be  sought  from  Rome  to  repel  them.  A 
hastily  collected  army  of  three  thousand  men  blockaded  the  moun- 
tain, but  when  attacked  by  the  robbers  it  at  once  fled.  This  suc- 
cess of  course  increased  the  number  of  the  insurgents,  and  the 
pretor  Varinius  found  them  encamped  like  a  regular  army  in 
the  plain. 

The  Roman  militia  soon  became  sorely  weakened  by  disease, 
and  undermined  by  cowardice  and  insubordination.  The  greater 
number  refused  to  obey  the  order  to  attack,  and  when  at  length 
Varinius  advanced,  the  enemy  had  retreated  southward  out  of  his 
reach.  He  followed,  but  was  disastrously  defeated  in  Lucania. 
The  robber  band  soon  rose  to  the  number  of  forty  thousand  men ; 
Campania  was  overrun,  and  many  strong    towns    were    stormed. 


262  ROME 

72-71   B.C. 

The  slaves  naturally  showed  no  more  mercy  to  their  captives  than 
was  shown  to  themselves  by  their  masters ;  they  crucified  their  pris- 
oners, and  with  grim  humor  compelled  them  to  slaughter  each  other 
in  gladiatorial  combat. 

In  the  year  72  B.C.  both  consuls  were  sent  against  the  slaves. 
The  Celtic  band  under  Crixus,  which  had  separated  from  the  rest, 
was  destroyed  at  Mount  Garganus  in  Apulia,  but  Spartacus  won 
victory  after  victory  in  the  north,  and  overcame  both  consuls  and 
every  Roman  commander  who  opposed  him.  Still  the  insurgents 
remained  a  mere  band  of  robbers,  roaming  aimlessly  in  search  of 
plunder,  and  all  the  efforts  of  Spartacus  to  restrain  the  mad  orgies 
of  his  followers  and  to  induce  them  to  carry  on  a  systematic  war 
were  in  vain.  Nor  was  the  band  united  in  itself,  but  separated  into 
two  parts,  the  one  consisting  of  half-Greek  barbarians,  the  other 
of  Celts  and  Germans.  It  is  said  that  Spartacus  wished  after  his 
victories  to  cross  the  Alps,  and  lead  his  followers  to  their  old  homes, 
but  was  unable  to  persuade  them,  and  that  he  then  turned  south  to 
blockade  Rome,  which  again  was  too  arduous  an  enterprise  to  suit 
the  wishes  of  slaves. 

The  supreme  command  was  now  intrusted  by  the  Roman  gov- 
ernment to  Marcus  Crassus,  the  pretor.  He  raised  an  army  of 
eight  legions,  and  restored  discipline  by  killing  every  tenth  man  of 
the  first  division  which  ran  away.  Spartacus  was  defeated  and 
marched  south  to  Rhegium,  where  he  attempted  to  throw  a  corps 
into  Sicily,  but  without  success.  Crassus  followed,  and  made  his 
troops  build  a  wall  across  the  whole  peninsula  of  Bruttium:  but 
Spartacus  broke  through,  and  in  71  B.C.  appeared  again  in  Lucania. 
But  their  own  disunion  and  arrogance  were  more  fatal  to  the  rob- 
bers than  the  Roman  armies.  Once  more  the  Celts  and  Germans 
broke  off  from  the  rest,  and  though  after  a  narrow  escape  they  once 
more  pitched  their  camp  for  safety  near  that  of  Spartacus,  Crassus 
managed  to  compel  them  to  a  separate  engagement,  and  slaughtered 
the  whole  body.  Spartacus  even  now  gained  a  slight  success  over 
the  Roman  vanguard,  but  his  men  compelled  him  to  lead  them  into 
Apulia  and  to  fight  a  decisive  battle.  Crassus  gained  a  dearly 
bought  victory,  and  being  joined  by  the  troops  of  Pompeius 
from  Spain,  he  hunted  out  the  refugees  in  every  part  of  south- 
ern Italy:  six  thousand  crucified  slaves  lined  the  road  from  Capua 
to  Rome. 

If  the  events  of  the  ten  years  after  the  death    of    Sulla    are 


SULLAN     RESTORATION  263 

78-70  B.C. 

viewed  as  a  whole,  what  must  be  the  judgment  on  the  senatorial 
government?  The  most  striking  fact  about  all  the  movements  of 
that  period  is,  that  though  none  of  them — neither  the  insurrection 
of  Lepidus,  nor  the  Sertorian  war,  nor  the  wars  in  Asia  and  Mace- 
donia— any  more  than  the  risings  of  the  pirates  and  of  the  slaves, 
constituted  a  really  great  and  serious  danger,  yet  they  were  allowed 
to  grow  by  neglect  into  struggles  in  which  the  very  existence  of  the 
empire  was  at  stake.  It  was  no  credit  to  Rome  that  the  two  most 
celebrated  generals  of  the  government  party  had,  during  a  struggle 
of  eight  years,  marked  by  more  defeats  than  victories,  failed  to  mas- 
ter the  insurgent  chief  Sertorius  and  his  Spanish  guerrillas;  and 
that  it  was  only  the  dagger  of  his  friends  that  decided  the  Sertorian 
war  in  favor  of  the  legitimate  government.  As  to  the  slaves,  it  was 
far  less  an  honor  to  have  conquered  them  than  a  disgrace  to  have 
been  pitted  against  them  in  equal  strife  for  years.  Spartacus,  too, 
as  well  as  Hannibal,  had  traversed  Italy  with  an  army  from  the  Po 
to  the  Sicilian  straits,  beaten  both  consuls,  and  threatened  Rome 
with  blockade.  The  enterprise  which  it  required  the  greatest  gen- 
eral of  antiquity  to  undertake  against  the  Rome  of  former  days, 
could  be  undertaken  against  the  Rome  of  the  present  by  a  daring 
captain  of  banditti. 

The  external  wars  produced  a  result  less  unsatisfactory,  but 
quite  disproportionate  to  the  expenditure  of  money  and  men.  The 
Romans  were  driven  from  the  sea,  and  in  Asia,  in  spite  of  the 
genius  of  Lucullus,  the  result  was  tantamount  to  defeat.  And 
though,  to  some  extent,  every  class  in  the  Roman  state  is  responsible 
for  this  deplorable  state  of  affairs,  as  every  rotten  stone  in  the 
building  helps  to  bring  about  the  ruin  of  the  whole,  yet,  in  great 
part,  it  can  be  distinctly  traced  to  the  mismanagement  of  the  gov- 
erning body.  For  instance,  the  failure  of  the  Asiatic  war  was  due 
to  the  remissness  of  the  government  in  abandoning  their  client 
states  in  the  first  instance,  and  to  their  neglect  to  support  their  gen- 
eral after  the  war  had  begun;  while  the  power  of  the  pirates  was 
due  to  the  culpable  reluctance  of  the  government  to  deal  with  the 
evil  in  the  comprehensive  manner  by  which  alone  it  could  be  met. 
To  sum  up,  the  material  benefits  which  a  state  exists  to  confer — 
security  of  frontier,  undisturbed  peaceful  intercourse,  legal  pro- 
tection, and  regulated  administration — began,  all  of  them,  to  vanish 
for  the  whole  of  the  nations  united  in  the  Roman  state ;  the  gods  of 
blessing  seemed  all  of  them  to  have  ascended  to  Olympus,  and  to 


264  ROME 

78-70  B.C. 

have  left  the  miserable  earth  at  the  mercy  of  official  or  volunteer 
plunderers  and  tormentors.  Nor  was  this  decay  of  the  state  felt  as 
a  public  misfortune  by  such  only  as  had  political  rights  and  public 
spirit;  the  insurrection  of  the  proletariate,  and  the  prevalence  of 
brigandage  and  piracy  carried  the  sense  of  this  decay  into  the  re- 
motest valley  and  the  humblest  hut  of  Italy,  and  made  everyone  who 
pursued  trade  or  commerce,  or  who  bought  even  a  bushel  of  wheat, 
feel  it  as  a  personal  calamity. 


Chapter  XXVII 

FALL  OF  THE  OLIGARCHY— RULE  OF  POMPEIUS 

70-63  B.C. 

THE  new  government  had  survived  the  danger  of  external 
war  and  of  insurrection  in  Italy.  We  have  now  to  con- 
sider its  relations  with  parties  in  Rome  during  the  same 
decade  of  years.  With  characteristic  want  of  energy  it  had  not 
even  completed  the  half-finished  arrangements  of  Sulla.  The  lands 
destined  by  him  for  distribution  had  not  been  parceled  out;  even 
domain  lands  were  again  occupied  in  the  old  arbitrary  fashion 
which  prevailed  before  the  Gracchan  reforms.  Whatever  in  the 
new  constitution  was  inconvenient  to  the  optimates  was  ignored, 
such  as  the  disfranchisement  of  particular  communities  and  the 
prohibition  against  conjoining  the  new  farms. 

Still  the  Gracchan  constitution  remained  formally  abolished, 
and  it  was  the  aim  of  the  democratic  party  to  restore  it  in  its  main 
features,  so  the  old  watchwords  were  heard  again — the  corn 
largesses,  the  tribunician  power,  and  the  reform  of  the  senatorial 
tribunals.  The  government  consented,  in  the  year  of  Sulla's  death 
(78  B.C.),  to  a  limited  revival  of  the  corn  distributions,  and  in  73 
b,c.  a  new  corn  law  regulated  the  purchases  of  Sicilian  grain  for 
this  purpose. 

The  agitation  regarding  the  tribunician  power  was  begun  as 
early  as  76  b.cv  and  continued  in  later  years,  though  without  result. 
But  for  the  reform  of  the  tribunals  the  cry  was  louder  and  the  need 
more  pressing.  The  crime  of  extortion  had  become  habitual,  and 
the  condemnation  of  any  man  of  influence  could  scarcely  be  ob- 
tained. Not  only  was  there  a  fellow-feeling  with  the  accused  on 
the  part  of  the  senatorial  jurymen,  many  of  whom  had  either  been 
guilty  or  hoped  some  day  to  be  guilty  of  a  similar  offense,  but  the 
sale  of  the  votes  of  the  jurymen  had  become  an  established  custom. 
A  specially  flagrant  case  might  provoke  an  outcry  for  the  time,  but, 
generally  speaking,  bribery  was  so  universal  that  the  commission  as 
to  extortions  might  be  regarded  as  an  institution  for  taxing  the 

265 


266  ROME 

71    B.C. 

senators  returning  from  the  provinces  for  the  benefit  of  their  col- 
leagues that  remained  at  home.  Even  Roman  citizens  in  the 
provinces,  unless  senators  or  equites,  were  no  longer  safe  from  the 
rods  and  axes  of  the  Roman  magistrates.  The  opposition  did  not 
fail  to  avail  itself  of  this  state  of  things;  for  the  prosecution  of  a 
powerful  opponent  in  the  law  courts  was  the  only  weapon  left  to  it. 
So  Caesar  prosecuted  Gnaeus  Dolabella  and  Gaius  Antonius,  and 
Cicero  made  himself  famous  by  his  indictment  of  Verres;  while 
the  whole  party  loudly  demanded  the  restoration  of  the  tribu- 
nician  power  and  of  the  equestrian  tribunals,  and  the  renewal 
of  the  censorship  as  the  only  means  of  purifying  the  governing 
board. 

With  all  this  no  progress  was  made;  the  restoration  of  corn 
distributions  had  conciliated  the  mob  of  the  capital,  and  the  senate 
could  afford  to  be  resolute  on  the  other  points.  Some  slight  con- 
cession was  made  with  regard  to  the  exiles  of  the  insurrection  of 
Lepidus;  and  the  influence  of  Gaius  Cotta,  leader  of  the  moderate 
reform  party  in  the  senate,  abolished  the  provision  which  forbade 
the  tribunes  of  the  plebs  to  stand  for  other  magistracies;  but  the 
other  restrictions  remained,  and  neither  party  was  satisfied. 

The  present  condition  of  affairs,  so  happy  for  the  government, 
was  completely  changed  by  the  return  of  Pompeius  from  Spain  in 
71  B.C.  Pompeius  belonged  to  the  optimates,  but  he  was  very  little 
at  home  in  his  own  party.  He  had  ambition  above  that  of  the 
ordinary  aristocrat,  and  could  not  be  content  with  passing  through 
the  regular  routine  of  office,  with  nothing  before  him  but  a  luxuri- 
ous and  indolent  retirement.  Yet  this  was  all  that  his  own  party 
could  offer.  The  command  in  the  Mithradatic  war,  which  he 
ardently  desired,  he  knew  the  senate  would  never  give  him.  The 
interests  of  the  oligarchy  could  not  permit  him  to  add  fresh  laurels 
to  those  he  had  already  gained  in  Africa  and  Europe;  they  dared 
not  intrust  the  Eastern  command  to  any  but  the  most  approved  and 
stanchest  aristocrat.  And  there  were  other  grounds  of  dissension. 
It  was  only  with  reluctance  that  the  senate  had  conferred  upon  him 
the  Spanish  command;  while,  in  return,  the  general  accused  the 
government  of  neglecting  the  Spanish  armies  and  endangering  the 
expedition.  Moreover,  he  demanded  for  himself  a  triumph  and 
the  consulship,  and  for  his  soldiers  assignations  of  land.  But 
Pompeius  had  never  filled  any  of  the  subordinate  magistracies,  and 
therefore  could  not  legally  be  consul.     Nor  could  he  triumph,  for, 


CNAF.rS     POMPEIUS     THE     GREAT 

(Rorn  1 06  b.  r.   Died  48  n.  r.) 
/?•«.?/  in  Cafiloline  Museum,  Rome 


FALL    OF     OLIGARCHY  267 

71    B.C. 

in  spite  of  his  extraordinary  commands,  he  had  never  been  invested 
with  the  ordinary  supreme  power.  There  were  but  two  courses 
open  to  him :  he  could  either  make  his  demands  openly  at  the  head 
of  his  army  and  intimidate  the  senate  into  compliance,  or  he  could 
ally  himself  with  the  democrats.  The  timid  nature  of  Pompeius 
and  his  want  of  political  adroitness  inclined  him  to  the  latter  course ; 
he  thus  gained  for  himself  able  political  adjutants  like  Gaius 
Caesar,  while  the  forlorn  democratic  party  were  only  too  glad  of 
the  alliance — they  knew  that  the  government  could  refuse  no 
demand  presented  by  so  formidable  a  combination. 

There  was  still  one  man  whose  influence,  though  it  might  not 
be  able  to  give  victory  to  either  side,  was  yet  considerable.  This 
was  Marcus  Crassus,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  army  with  which 
he  had  crushed  the  servile  rising,  and  who,  moreover,  was  the  rich- 
est man  in  Rome,  and  had  great  influence  in  the  political  clubs.  He, 
like  Pompeius,  was  a  Sullan,  but  had  personal  aims,  quite  outside 
the  ordinary  constitutional  routine.  He  chose  the  safer  course  of 
joining  the  coalition,  and  was  welcomed  by  the  democrats,  who 
were  not  unpleased  to  find  in  him  a  possible  counterpoise  to  the  now 
all-powerful  Pompeius.  This,  the  first  coalition,  took  place  in  the 
summer  of  71  B.C.  The  terms  were  simple.  The  generals  adopted 
the  democratic  programme,  while  they  were  to  have  the  consulship 
for  the  following  year.  Pompeius,  in  addition,  was  to  get  his 
triumph  and  the  allotments  promised  to  his  soldiers,  and  Crassus 
the  honor  of  a  solemn  entrance  into  the  capital.  The  senate  had 
nothing  to  oppose  to  the  coalition,  for  Metellus  had  already  dis- 
banded his  troops.  They  granted  the  necessary  dispensations,  and 
Pompeius  gave  formal  adherence  to  the  democratic  proposals  in  an 
assembly  of  the  people. 

The  Sullan  constitution  was  now  speedily  abolished.  Pompeius 
himself,  as  consul,  introduced  a  law  restoring  to  the  tribunes  all 
their  old  prerogatives,  especially  the  right  of  initiating  legislation. 
The  law-courts  were  reformed,  probably  with  the  consent  of  the 
moderate  senatorial  party,  for  the  senators  were  not  altogether  ex- 
cluded from  the  roll  of  jurymen,  who  in  future  were  to  be  com- 
posed one-third  of  senators,  two-thirds  of  equestrians;  but,  of  the 
latter,  one-half  must  have  filled  the  office  of  district  presidents.  As 
these  officers  were  elected  by  the  tribes,  one-third  of  the  jurymen 
were  now  indirectly  elective.  The  farming  system  was  reintro- 
duced for  the  taxes  of  the  Asiatic  province ;  this,  of  course,  was  to 


268  ROME 

70-67  B.C. 

conciliate  the  capitalists  at  the  expense  of  the  provincials.  Finally, 
the  censorship  was  restored — probably  without  the  earlier  limitation 
which  restricted  the  term  of  office  to  eighteen  months.  The  con- 
stitution of  Sulla  had  been  based  on  a  monopoly  of  power  by  the 
senate,  and  on  the  political  annihilation  of  every  other  class  in  the 
state ;  but  under  the  new  arrangement  the  senate  was  held  in  check 
by  fear  of  the  censors  and  of  the  equestrian  jurymen.  The  tribunes 
of  the  people  could  propose  new  laws  and  overturn  any  existing 
arrangements  at  will,  while  the  moneyed  classes,  as  farmers  of  the 
revenue  and  as  judges  of  the  provincial  governors,  again  raised 
their  heads  beside  the  senate.  The  further  aims  of  the  democrats 
were  not  for  the  present  attained. 

Meanwhile  the  armies  of  the  two  generals  still  lay  before  the 
walls  of  Rome,  and  the  danger  was  great  lest  Pompeius  should  yield 
to  the  temptation  of  making  himself  absolute  master  of  the  city  and 
of  the  empire.  The  coalition  had  only  one  bond  of  union — the  de- 
sire to  destroy  the  Sullan  constitution ;  that  work  being  now  accom- 
plished, the  combination  was  in  reality  dissolved.  Crassus  had 
throughout  played  an  inferior  part,  and  his  terror  became  so  great 
that  he  began  to  make  advances  to  the  senate  and  to  attempt  to 
gain  over  the  mob  by  immense  largesses.  But  Pompeius  really 
lacked  the  courage  to  take  a  decisive  step;  he  wished  to  be  master 
of  Rome  and  loyal  citizen  at  the  same  time.  The  adroit  leaders  of 
the  democratic  party  plied  him  with  flatteries,  urged  him  to  surpass 
his  former  services  to  the  state  by  a  still  greater  victory,  and  to 
banish  the  fearful  specter  of  civil  war.  Crassus  was  induced  to 
make  the  first  overtures  for  disbandment,  and  at  length  the  great 
general  yielded,  and  the  troops  dispersed.  The  Mithradatic  war 
appeared  now  at  an  end,  and  as  Pompeius  would  not  accept  a 
province  he  retired  at  the  expiry  of  his  consulship  wholly  from 
public  affairs. 

During  the  next  few  years  the  condition  of  parties  was  very 
much  what  it  had  been  before  the  time  of  Sulla.  The  direction  of 
affairs  lay  with  the  senate,  while  the  constitution  through  which  it 
governed  was  pervaded  by  a  hostile  spirit.  The  democrats  were 
impotent  without  a  leader,  and  the  chief  feature  of  the  period  is  the 
increase  of  the  influence  of  the  capitalist  party,  which,  though 
courted  by  both  sides,  on  the  whole  drew  closer  to  the  senate.  Their 
influence  is  seen  in  the  law  of  the  year  67  B.C.,  which  restored  to 
them  the  fourteen  special  benches  in  the  theater  and  in  the  fact 


FALL     OF     OLIGARCHY  269 

67-66  B.C. 

that  the  senate  withdrew,  at  their  instance,  the  administration  of 
Asia  from  Lucius  Lucullus. 

But  the  course  of  the  war  in  the  East  soon  brought  about  a 
change.  All  the  conquests  there  were  lost,  and  the  sea  was  given 
up  to  the  undisputed  sway  of  the  pirates.  The  democrats  eagerly 
seized  the  opportunity  of  settling  accounts  with  the  senate,  and 
Pompeius  saw  once  more  before  him  an  opportunity  of  gratifying 
his  ambition.  Accordingly,  in  67  B.C.,  two  projects  of  law  were 
introduced  in  the  assembly  of  the  tribes  at  his  instigation.  The  first 
measure  decreed  the  discharge  of  the  soldiers  in  the  East  who  had 
served  their  term,  and  the  substitution  of  Glabrio,  one  of  the  con- 
suls of  the  year,  for  Lucullus  in  the  command.  The  second  pro- 
posed a  comprehensive  plan  for  clearing  the  seas  of  pirates. 

The  terms  of  the  proposal  are  extraordinary,  and  require  close 
attention.  First,  a  generalissimo  was  to  be  appointed  by  the  senate 
from  the  consulars,  to  hold  supreme  command  over  the  whole 
Mediterranean  and  over  all  the  coasts  for  fifty  miles  inland,  con- 
currently with  the  ordinary  governors,  for  three  years.  Second, 
he  might  select  from  the  men  of  senatorial  rank  twenty-five  lieuten- 
ants with  pretorian  powers,  and  two  treasurers  with  questorian 
power.  Third,  he  might  raise  an  army  of  120,000  infantry  and 
7000  cavalry,  and  a  fleet  of  500  ships,  and  for  this  purpose  might 
dispose  absolutely  of  all  the  resources  of  the  provinces.  Besides 
this,  a  large  sum  of  money  and  a  considerable  force  of  men  and 
ships  were  at  once  handed  over  to  him. 

By  the  introduction  of  this  law  the  government  was  practically 
taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  senate ;  it  was  the  final  collapse  of  the 
oligarchic  rule.  But  it  was  more  than  this — it  was  practically  the 
institution  of  an  unlimited  dictatorship. 

Like  all  extraordinary  commands,  this  new  office  no  doubt 
required  the  confirmation  of  the  people;  but  it  was  an  undoubted 
prerogative  of  the  senate  to  define  the  sphere  of  every  command, 
and,  in  fact,  to  control  and  limit  it  in  all  ways.  The  people  had 
hitherto  interfered  only  on  the  proposition  of  the  senate,  or  at  any 
rate  of  a  magistrate  himself  qualified  for  the  office  of  general.  Even 
during  the  Jugurthan  war,  when  the  command  was  transferred  to 
Marius  by  popular  vote,  it  was  only  to  Marius  as  consul  for  the 
year.  But  now  a  private  man  was  to  be  invested  by  the  tribes  with 
extraordinary  authority,  and  the  sphere  of  his  office  was  defined 
by  themselves.     The  new  commander  was  empowered   to   confer 


270  ROME 

67-66   B.C. 

pretorian  powers — that  is,  the  highest  military  and  civil  authority 
— upon  adjutants  chosen  by  himself,  though  hitherto  such  authority 
could  only  be  conferred  with  the  cooperation  of  the  burgesses; 
while  the  office  of  general,  which  was  usually  conferred  for  one 
year  only,  with  strict  limitations  as  to  forces  and  supplies,  was  now 
committed  almost  without  reserve  to  one  man,  who  could  draw 
upon  the  whole  resources  of  the  state. 

Thus  at  one  stroke  the  government  was  taken  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  senate,  and  the  fortunes  of  the  empire  committed  for  the  next 
three  years  to  a  dictator.  The  step,  no  doubt,  was  in  accordance 
with  the  wishes  of  Pompeius,  for  it  would  naturally  lead  in  the  end 
to  the  command  against  Mithradates,  and  it  gave  him  an  extraor- 
dinary position  in  the  state  without  violating  constitutional  forms. 
Still,  it  was  probably  due  immediately  to  the  instigation  of  his  bold 
adherents,  in  particular  of  Aulus  Gabinius,  the  tribune,  who  pro- 
posed the  law,  who  grasped  the  situation  more  completely  than 
Pompeius  himself,  and  took  the  decision  out  of  his  hands.  The 
senate  and  the  moneyed  aristocracy  alike  were  furious,  while  the 
democrats,  though  they  could  not  but  dislike  a  bill  which  threatened 
to  annihilate  all  parties,  dared  not  break  with  their  ally;  accordingly, 
Caesar  and  Lucius  Quinctius  supported  the  measure.  The  scarcity 
of  corn,  and  the  rumors  as  to  the  conduct  of  Lucullus  were  enough 
to  secure  the  support  of  the  multitude. 

On  the  day  of  the  voting,  the  Forum  and  even  the  roofs  of  the 
buildings  around  were  covered  with  men.  All  the  colleagues  of 
Gabinius  had  promised  to  veto  the  measure;  but  only  one,  Lucius 
Trebellius,  had  the  courage  to  keep  his  pledge.  Gabinius  immedi- 
ately proposed  to  deal  with  him  as  Tiberius  Gracchus  had  dealt 
with  Octavius,  but  after  seventeen  tribes  had  voted,  Trebellius 
withdrew  his  veto.  All  was  now  lost;  attempts  were  made  to 
secure  the  appointment  of  two  generals  instead  of  one,  and  to  have 
the  twenty-five  lieutenant-generals  elected  by  the  tribes,  but  the  bill 
passed  without  alteration. 

Pompeius  and  Glabrio  immediately  set  out.  The  success  of 
Pompeius  was  rapid  and  complete ;  indeed,  such  was  the  confidence 
in  his  powers  that  the  price  of  grain  had  fallen  to  the  ordinary  rate 
as  soon  as  the  law  was  passed.  But  in  Asia  the  condition  of  affairs 
passed  from  bad  to  worse;  Glabrio,  instead  of  taking  command  of 
the  forces,  contented  himself  with  fomenting  the  discontent  of  the 
soldiers  against  Lucullus,  who,  of  course,  was  powerless.    It  seemed 


FALL     OF     OLIGARCHY  271 

67-66  B.C. 

the  most  natural  course  to  appoint  Pompeius  to  the  Asiatic  com- 
mand, which  he  was  known  to  ardently  desire.  But  no  party  in  the 
state  was  willing  to  increase  his  already  enormous  authority.  At 
this  juncture,  Gaius  Manilius,  a  tribune,  who  was  without  influence 
in  either  party,  wishing  to  force  himself  into  the  favor  of  the  great 
general,  brought  forward,  in  66  B.C.,  a  proposal  to  recall  Glabrio 
from  Pontus  and  Bithynia,  and  Marcius  Rex  from  Cilicia,  and  to 
confer  both  their  offices — apparently  without  limit  of  time — 
together  with  free  authority  to  conclude  peace  and  alliance,  upon 
the  proconsul  of  the  seas  and  coasts.  The  proposal  was  repugnant 
to  every  party,  and  yet  was  passed  almost  unanimously.  The  demo- 
crats concealed  their  fears,  and  openly  supported  it;  the  moderate 
optimates  declared  themselves  on  the  same  side;  they  saw  that  re- 
sistance was  hopeless,  and  that  their  best  policy  was  to  try  to  bind 
Pompeius  to  the  senate.  Marcus  Cicero  made  his  first  political 
speech  in  support  of  it,  and  the  only  opposition  was  from  the  strict 
aristocratic  party  headed  by  Quintus  Catulus.  Thus,  by  the  action 
of  an  irresponsible  demagogue,  Pompeius,  in  addition  to  his  former 
powers,  obtained  command  of  the  most  important  Eastern  prov- 
inces, and  the  conduct  of  a  war  of  which  no  man  could  foresee  the 
end.  Never  since  Rome  stood  had  such  power  been  united  in  the 
hands  of  a  single  man. 

The  two  laws  of  Gabinius  and  Manilius  terminate  the  struggle 
between  the  senate  and  the  popular  party,  which  was  begun  sixty- 
seven  years  before  by  Tiberius  Gracchus.  The  first  breach  in  the 
existing  constitution  was  made  when  the  veto  of  Octavius  was  dis- 
regarded by  Tiberius  Gracchus;  and  the  last  bulwark  of  senatorial 
rule  fell  in  like  manner  with  the  withdrawal  of  Trebellius.  But  the 
struggle,  which  was  begun  by  men  of  high  ideals  and  of  noble  per- 
sonal character,  was  brought  to  a  close  by  venal  and  intriguing 
demagogues.  And  the  contrast  was  but  an  indication  of  the  change 
which  the  whole  state  had  undergone;  everything — law,  military 
discipline,  life  and  manners — had  changed.  A  comparison  between 
the  Gracchan  ideal  and  its  later  realization  could  only  provoke  a 
painful  smile. 

But  the  end  of  the  first  struggle  was  but  the  beginning  of  a 
second — of  a  new  struggle  between  the  allies  who  had  overthrown 
their  common  enemy  the  senate,  between  the  democratic  civil  oppo- 
sition and  the  military  power.  The  exceptional  position  of 
Pompeius  was  incompatible  with  a  republican  constitution:  he  was 


272  ROME 

66-55  B.C. 

not  general,  but  regent  of  the  empire.  If  at  the  close  of  his  Eastern 
campaign  he  should  stretch  forth  his  arm  and  seize  the  crown,  who 
was  to  prevent  him  ?  "  Soon,"  exclaimed  Catulus,  "  it  would  be 
necessary  once  more  to  flee  to  the  rocks  of  the  Capitol,  in  order  to 
save  liberty."  It  was  not  the  fault  of  the  prophet  that  the  storm 
came  not,  as  he  expected,  from  the  East,  but  that,  on  the  contrary, 
fate,  fulfilling  his  words  more  literally  than  he  himself  anticipated, 
brought  on  a  destroying  tempest  a  few  years  later  from  Gaul. 

Pompeius  began  the  work  of  subjugating  the  pirates  by  di- 
viding the  whole  field  of  operations  into  thirteen  districts,  each  of 
which  was  assigned  to  a  lieutenant,  who  equipped  vessels,  searched 
the  coast,  and  captured  the  ships  of  the  freebooters.  He  himself, 
with  the  best  of  his  ships,  swept  the  Sicilian,  African,  and  Sardinian 
waters,  while  his  lieutenants  dealt  with  the  coasts  of  Spain  and 
Gaul.  Within  forty  days  the  western  Mediterranean  was  free,  and 
the  dearth  at  Rome  relieved.  The  general  now  repaired,  with  sixty 
of  his  vessels,  to  Lycia  and  Cilicia.  The  pirates  everywhere  disap- 
peared from  the  sea  on  his  approach,  and  many  even  of  the  moun- 
tain strongholds  of  Lycia  accepted  the  terms  offered  to  them,  and 
opened  their  gates.  But  the  Cilicians,  after  placing  their  families 
and  their  treasures  in  their  strongholds,  awaited  the  Romans,  with 
a  large  fleet,  off  the  western  frontier  of  Cilicia.  Pompeius  gained  a 
complete  victory,  landed  and  subdued  the  strongholds,  and  in  forty- 
nine  days  after  his  first  appearance  in  the  Eastern  seas  brought  the 
war  to  a  close.  The  whole  affair  was,  of  course,  rather  an  energetic 
and  skillful  police-raid  than  a  victorious  war ;  but  the  rapidity  of  the 
achievement  was  astounding,  and  made  a  great  impression  on  the 
public  mind.  Thirteen  hundred  pirate  vessels  are  said  to  have  been 
destroyed;  ten  thousand  pirates  perished,  and  more  than  twenty 
thousand  were  captured,  while  numerous  captive  Romans,  among 
them  Publius  Clodius,  regained  their  liberty.  Pompeius  caused  a 
fleet  to  be  maintained  to  protect  the  Asiatic  coasts,  and  on  his  return 
to  Rome  persuaded  the  senate  to  take  similar  measures  for  Italy; 
and  though  there  were  subsequent  expeditions  in  58  B.C.  and  in  55 
b.cv  piracy  never  regained  its  old  predominance  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. 

As  soon  as  Pompeius  was  invested  by  the  Manilian  law  with 
the  command  he  had  so  long  desired,  he  began  strenuously  to  pre- 
pare for  his  new  campaign.  At  the  outset  a  great  piece  of  good 
fortune  befell  him.     A  son  of  the  great  king  Tigranes,  who  bore 


FALL     OF     OLIGARCHY  273 

66-63   B.C. 

the  same  name  as  his  father,  rebelled,  and  took  refuge  at  the 
Parthian  court,  and  by  his  influence  determined  that  power  to 
adhere  to  the  Roman  side  and  to  renew  with  Pompeius  the  agree- 
ment formed  with  Lucullus  to  accept  the  Euphrates  as  the  boundary 
of  the  two  empires.  At  the  same  time  the  great  king  suspected 
Mithradates  of  secretly  encouraging  his  rebellious  son,  and  the 
good  understanding  between  the  two  monarchs  was  disturbed. 
Meanwhile  Pompeius  completed  his  preparations,  and  collected  a 
force  of  from  40,000  to  50,000  men,  many  of  whom  were  dis- 
charged Fimbrian  veterans  who  had  enlisted  again  as  volunteers. 

In  the  spring  of  66  B.C.  Pompeius  took  over  the  command  of 
the  legions  from  Lucullus,  and  the  war  that  followed  was  an  easy 
one.  The  power  both  of  Mithradates  and  of  Tigranes  had  already 
been  broken  by  Lucullus,  and  it  now  required  only  an  energetic 
commander,  backed  with  the  necessary  resources  in  troops  and  sup- 
plies, to  deal  the  final  blows.  The  old  king  of  Pontus  saw  his  army 
quickly  destroyed,  and  fled  to  his  Bosporan  kingdom,  north  of  the 
Black  Sea.  From  there  he  planned  to  lead  a  force  up  the  valley  of 
the  Danube,  collect  the  various  tribes  on  his  way,  and  invade  Italy 
from  the  north.  But  his  favorite  son,  Pharnaces,  in  hopes  of  curry- 
ing favor  with  the  Romans,  led  an  insurrection  against  him,  and, 
seeing  that  all  was  lost,  Mithradates  committed  suicide,  to  avoid 
falling  into  his  enemies'  hands.  Thus  ended,  in  63  B.C.,  the  career 
of  Rome's  most  potent  enemy  in  the  East. 

Meantime,  Pompeius  had  turned  his  attention  to  Tigranes,  and 
settled  matters  with  that  monarch,  who  was  resolved  to  purchase 
peace  at  any  price.  He  was  compelled  to  pay  a  fine  of  seven  million 
dollars,  besides  making  a  present  of  nine  dollars  to  each  of  the 
Roman  soldiers,  and  forced  to  surrender  all  his  conquests  to  Rome, 
becoming  once  more  merely  the  petty  king  of  Armenia. 

After  arranging  the  affairs  of  Armenia  and  Pontus,  Pompeius, 
in  the  summer  of  64  B.C.,  set  out  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  Syria. 
The  Syrian  provinces  were  now  in  the  hands  of  three  powers — the 
Bedouins,  the  Jews,  and  the  Nabataeans.  The  Bedouins,  who  were 
masters  of  northern  Syria,  had  their  home  in  the  desert  which 
stretches  from  the  peninsula  of  Arabia  up  to  the  Euphrates,  where 
they  lived  under  their  emirs,  the  most  noted  of  whom  were  Abgarus 
and  Sampsiceramus.  The  Jews,  under  Jannaeus  Alexander,  who 
died  79  B.C.,  had  extended  their  dominion  southward  to  the  Egyptian 
frontier,  and  northward  to  the  Lake  of  Gennesareth,  including  a 


274,  ROME 

70-63    B.C. 

considerable  stretch  of  coast.  Their  further  expansion  was  checked 
by  internal  dissension  between  the  Pharisees  and  the  Sadducees. 
Their  fierce  religious  and  political  contentions  broke  out  with  vio- 
lence after  the  death  of  Jannaeus,  and  a  civil  war  ensued,  in  which 
the  Pharisees  supported  one  of  his  sons,  Hyrcanus,  and  the  Sad- 
ducees another,  Aristobulus,  a  strong  and  able  prince.  These  divi- 
sions gave  an  opportunity  to  the  Nabataeans,  who  were  settled  in 
the  region  of  Petra,  to  obtain  a  footing  in  southern  Syria.  At  the 
invitation  of  the  Pharisees,  the  Nabataean  king  Aretas  advanced 
with  a  large  force  and  besieged  Aristobulus  in  Jerusalem. 

To  put  an  end  to  the  anarchy,  Pompeius  resolved  to  annex 
Syria,  and  in  the  person  of  Antiochus  Asiaticus,  who  had  been 
acknowledged  by  the  senate  and  by  Lucullus,  the  house  of  Seleucus 
was  ejected  from  the  throne  it  had  held  for  two  hundred  and  fifty 
years.  At  the  same  time  Pompeius  advanced  with  his  army  into 
the  province,  and  enforced  his  regulations,  where  necessary,  by 
arms.  The  Jews  alone  refused  to  obey,  and  when  Aristobulus, 
after  much  hesitation,  resolved  to  submit,  the  more  fanatical  portion 
of  his  army  would  not  comply  with  his  orders,  and  sustained  a  siege 
of  three  months  on  the  steep  temple  rock.  The  Nabataeans  still 
remained.  King  Aretas  retired  from  Judaea,  but  retained  the  city 
of  Damascus,  and  would  not  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  Rome. 
The  expedition  against  him  was  intrusted  to  Marcus  Scaurus;  it 
obtained  only  trifling  successes,  but  ultimately  Aretas  was  persuaded 
to  purchase  for  a  sum  of  money  a  guarantee  for  all  his  possessions, 
including  Damascus,  from  the  Roman  governor. 

In  his  settlement  with  the  Parthians,  Pompeius  was  true  to  the 
old  Roman  policy  of  favoring  the  humbled  foe  at  the  expense  of  the 
powerful  ally.  The  province  of  Corduene,  which  was  claimed  by 
both  Phraates,  the  Parthian  king,  and  Tigranes,  was  occupied  by 
Roman  troops  for  the  latter.  What  was  most  serious  of  all  was 
the  fact  that  the  Romans  did  not  respect  the  agreement  by  which 
the  Euphrates  was  fixed  as  the  boundary.  Oruros,  a  point  between 
Nisbis  and  the  Tigris,  and  220  miles  east  of  the  Euphrates,  was 
fixed  as  the  limit  of  the  Roman  dominion.  When,  in  64  B.C., 
Phraates  declared  war  upon  Tigranes  on  the  question  of  the  frontier, 
it  seemed  certain  that  he  had  resolved  to  defy  the  power  of  Rome, 
but  he  yielded  and  acquiesced  in  the  Roman  award. 

Thus  the  work  begun  by  Lucullus  was  completed  by  Pompeius. 
The  system  of  protectorates  had  been  exchanged  for  that  of  direct 


FALL    OF     OLIGARCHY  275 

70-63  B.C. 

sovereignty  over  the  more  important  dependent  territories — 
Bithynia,  Pontus,  and  Syria ;  while  to  the  indirect  dominion  of  Rome 
were  added  Armenia  and  the  district  of  the  Caucasus,  and  the  king- 
dom of  the  Cimmerian  Bosporus. 

From  the  new  territories  four  new  provinces  were  formed: 
Bithynia  with  Pontus ;  Cilicia,  which  was  an  enlargement  of  the  old 
province  of  that  name,  and  which  now  embraced  Pamphylia  and 
Isauria;  Syria;  Crete.  The  government  of  the  mass  of  countries 
now  added  to  the  empire  probably  remained  substantially  as  before, 
only  Rome  stepped  into  the  place  of  the  former  monarchs;  and  the 
new  dominion  included  a  number  of  kingdoms,  princedoms,  and 
lordships  of  various  kinds,  all  in  different  relations  of  dependence 
upon  Rome.  Such  were  the  kingdoms  of  Cappadocia  and  Com- 
magene ;  the  tetrarchies  ruled  by  Deiotarus  and  Bogodiatarus ;  the 
territories  of  the  high  priest  of  the  mother  of  the  gods  at  Pessinus, 
and  of  the  two  high  priests  of  the  goddess  Ma,  in  Comana.  There 
were  also  leagues,  like  that  of  the  twenty-three  Lycian  cities,  whose 
independence  was  secured  by  charter. 

Both  Lucullus  and  Pompeius  did  everything  in  their  power  to 
protect  and  extend  the  urban  communities  in  the  East.  They  were 
centers  of  Romanization,  of  the  civilization  of  trade  and  commerce 
as  opposed  to  the  Oriental  military  despotism.  Cyzicus,  Heraclea, 
Sinope,  and  Amisus,  all  received  a  number  of  new  inhabitants  and 
extensions  of  territory,  and  everything  was  done  to  repair  the  devas- 
tation they  had  suffered  in  the  late  war.  Many  of  the  captured 
pirates  were  settled  in  the  desolated  cities  of  Plain  Cilicia,  especially 
at  Soli ;  and  many  new  towns  were  founded  in  Pontus  and  Cappa- 
docia, the  most  famous  of  which  were  Nicopolis  in  Pontus,  Megal- 
opolis on  the  Cappadocian  frontier,  and  Ziela.  In  fact  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  domain  land  of  these  provinces  must  have  been  used 
for  these  settlements.  At  the  same  time  many  existing  cities  ob- 
tained an  extension  of  rights :  autonomy  was  conferred  upon  Antioch 
on  the  Orontes,  upon  Selucia  in  Pieria,  upon  Gaza,  Mitylene,  and 
Phanagoria. 

Pompeius  had  done  good  work  for  Rome,  but  he  had  not  per- 
formed miracles,  and  had  done  nothing  to  call  forth  the  absurd 
exaggerations  of  his  triumph  or  the  fulsome  adultation  of  his  adher- 
ents. His  triumphal  inscriptions  enumerated  twelve  millions  of 
people  as  subjugated,  1538  cities  and  strongholds  taken,  while  his 
conquests  were  made  to  extend  from  the  Sea  of  Azov  to  the  Caspian 


276  ROME 

70-63    B.C. 

and  to  the  Red  Sea,  not  one  of  which  he  had  ever  seen.  Coins  were 
struck  in  his  honor,  exhibiting  the  globe  itself  surrounded  by  triple 
laurels  plucked  from  three  continents,  and  surmounted  by  the  golden 
chaplet  which  was  conferred  upon  him  by  the  citizens.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  were  voices  which  affirmed  that  he  had  only  worn 
the  laurels  which  another  had  plucked,  and  that  the  honors  belonged 
of  right  to  Lucullus.  What  really  deserves  praise  in  the  conduct  of 
Pompeius  is  his  rare  self-restraint.  The  most  brilliant  undertakings 
against  the  Bosporus,  or  the  Parthians,  or  Egypt,  offered  them- 
selves on  all  sides,  but  he  had  resisted  all  temptations,  and  had  turned 
to  the  less  glorious  task  of  regulating  the  territories  already  acquired. 
But  his  conduct  towards  the  Parthians  deserves  grave  censure;  he 
might  have  made  war  upon  them,  but  when  once  he  had  decided 
against  this  course  he  should  have  loyally  observed  the  agreement 
to  regard  the  Euphrates  as  the  boundary,  instead  of,  by  his  silly 
perfidy,  sowing  seeds  of  hatred  which  were  to  bear  bitter  fruit  for 
Rome  at  a  later  time. 

The  financial  gain  to  Rome  from  the  arrangements  of  Pom- 
peius was  immense,  and  her  revenues  were  raised  by  one-half.  And 
if  the  exhaustion  of  Asia  was  severe,  and  if  both  Pompeius  and 
Lucullus  brought  home  large  private  fortunes,  the  blame  falls  rather 
upon  the  government  at  home  and  on  the  system  by  which  the 
provinces  were  regularly  plundered  for  the  benefit  of  Rome  than 
upon  the  generals  themselves. 

After  the  departure  of  Pompeius  peace  was  on  the  whole  main- 
tained in  the  East;  but  the  governors  of  Cilicia  had  constantly  to 
fight  against  mountain  tribes,  and  those  of  Syria  against  the  tribes 
of  the  desert.  There  were  also  dangerous  revolts  among  the  Jews, 
which  were  with  difficulty  suppressed  by  the  able  governor  of  Syria, 
Aulus  Gabinius,  and  after  which  the  Jews  were  subjected  to  a 
specially  heavy  taxation. 

Egypt,  with  its  dependency  of  Cyprus,  now  remained  the  only 
independent  state  in  the  East.  It  had  indeed  been  formally  be- 
queathed to  Rome,  but  was  still  governed  by  its  own  kings,  who 
were  themselves  controlled  by  the  royal  guard  which  frequently 
appointed  or  deposed  its  rulers.  The  isolation  of  Egypt,  surrounded 
as  it  is  by  the  desert  and  the  sea,  and  its  great  resources,  which  gave 
its  rulers  a  revenue  almost  equal  to  that  of  Rome  even  after  its 
recent  augmentation,  made  the  oligarchy  unwilling  to  intrust  the 
annexation  of  the  kingdom  to  any  one  man.     Propositions  were 


FALL    OF    OLIGARCHY  277 

59-56  B.C. 

frequently  made  at  Rome  for  its  incorporation  of  the  empire,  partic- 
ularly by  the  democratic  party,  but  the  Egyptian  ruler  succeeded 
always  in  purchasing  a  respite  by  heavy  bribes.  Cyprus  was  an- 
nexed by  decree  of  the  people  in  58  B.C.,  and  the  measure  was  carried 
out  by  Cato  without  the  interference  of  an  army.  But  in  59  B.C. 
Ptolemy  Auletes  purchased  his  recognition  from  the  masters  of 
Rome — it  is  said  for  the  sum  of  six  thousand  talents  ($7,300,000). 
On  account  of  the  oppression  which  the  payment  of  this  money 
brought  upon  the  people  of  Egypt  the  king  was  chased  from  his 
throne,  but  after  the  conference  of  Luca,  in  56  B.C.,  and  on  the 
promise  of  a  further  sum  of  twelve  million  dollars,  Aulus  Gabinius 
was  ordered  to  restore  him.  Victory  was  secured  by  a  decisive  bat- 
tle on  the  Nile,  and  Ptolemy  once  more  sat  on  the  throne.  The 
sum  promised  could  not  possibly  be  paid  in  full,  though  the  last 
penny  was  exacted  from  the  miserable  inhabitants.  At  the  same 
time  the  pretorians  were  replaced  by  a  force  of  regular  Roman 
infantry,  with  Celtic  and  German  cavalry. 


Chapter  XXVIII 

PARTY  STRUGGLES  IN  ROME— POMPEIUS,  CAESAR  AND 
CRASSUS.     65-58  B.C. 

A  FTER  the  departure  of  Pompeius  the  optimates  remained 
I  \  nominally  in  possession  of  the  government;  that  is,  they 
X  JL  commanded  the  elections  and  the  consulate.  But  the  con- 
sulship was  no  longer  of  primary  consequence  in  the  face  of  the 
new  military  power;  and  the  best  of  the  aristocrats — men  like 
Quintus  Metellus  Pius  and  Lucius  Lucullus — retired  from  the  lists 
and  devoted  themselves  to  the  elegant  luxury  of  their  private  life. 
The  younger  men  either  followed  their  example  or  turned  to  court 
the  favor  of  the  new  masters  of  the  state. 

There  was  one  exception — Marcus  Porcius  Cato.  Born  in  95 
B.C.,  he  was  now  about  thirty  years  of  age.  He  was  by  nature  a 
man  of  great  courage  and  firmness,  and  of  the  strictest  integrity, 
but  dull  of  intellect  and  destitute  of  imagination  or  passion.  The 
two  influences  which  molded  his  character  were  Stoicism,  the  prin- 
ciples of  which  he  adopted  with  the  greatest  ardor,  and  the  example 
of  his  great-grandfather,  the  famous  censor.  Like  him,,  he  went 
about  the  capital  rebuking  the  sins  of  the  times,  a  living  model  of 
the  prisca  virtus  of  the  good  old  days — the  Don  Quixote  of  the 
aristocracy.  In  a  corrupt  and  cowardly  age  his  courage  and  integ- 
rity gave  him  an  influence  which  was  warranted  neither  by  his  age 
nor  his  capacity,  and  he  soon  became  the  recognized  champion  of 
the  optimates.  He  did  good  work  in  the  region  of  finance,  check- 
ing the  details  of  the  public  budget  and  waging  constant  war  with 
the  farmers  of  the  taxes ;  but  he  had  none  of  the  higher  qualities  of 
a  statesman;  he  failed  completely,  if  indeed  he  ever  tried,  to  grasp 
the  political  situation.  All  his  policy  consisted  in  steadfastly  oppos- 
ing everyone  who  appeared  to  deviate  from  the  traditional  aristo- 
cratic creed. 

During  the  next  few  years  the  activity  of  the  democrats  showed 
itself  in  two  ways:  by  attacks  upon  individuals  of  the  senatorial 
party,  and  upon  the  abuses  of  which  the  senate  was  guilty;  and  by 

278 


PARTY     STRUGGLES  279 

65-58  B.C. 

efforts  to  complete  the  realization  of  the  democratic  ideas  which  had 
been  in  the  air  ever  since  the  time  of  the  Gracchi. 

Among  the  senatorial  abuses  against  which  measures  were 
passed  were  the  acceptance  of  bribes  from  foreign  envoys ;  the  grant- 
ing of  dispensations  from  the  laws  in  particular  cases;  and  the 
pretor's  frequent  failure  to  adminster  justice  according  to  the  rules 
he  laid  down  on  entering  office.  Various  senators  were  prosecuted 
for  malfeasance,  and  the  strength  of  the  popular  party  was  seen  in 
63  B.C.  in  the  election  of  Gaius  Caesar  to  the  supreme  pontificate 
against  two  of  the  leading  aristocrats. 

At  the  same  time  the  democratic  restoration  was  pressed  on. 
The  election  of  pontiffs  and  augurs  by  the  tribes  was  restored  in 
63  B.C.  An  agitation  was  begun  for  the  complete  restoration  of  the 
corn  laws.  The  criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  comitia  was  restored. 
The  Transpadani  were  taken  under  the  protection  of  the  populares, 
and  an  agitation  was  set  on  foot  for  conferring  upon  them  the  full 
franchise,  just  as  Gracchus  had  supported  the  enfranchisement  of 
the  Latins.  Finally,  the  long  proscribed  heroes  and  martyrs  of  the 
democracy  were  rehabilitated  in  the  public  memory,  and  Gaius  Mar- 
ius's  memory  was  restored  to  public  honor  through  the  audacity  of 
his  nephew,  Gaius  Caesar.  The  latter  had  dared  to  display  the  fea- 
tures of  his  uncle,  in  spite  of  prohibitions,  at  the  burial  of  the  widow 
of  Marius  in  68  B.C.,  and'  now  the  emblems  of  victory  erected  by 
Marius  and  thrown  down  by  Sulla  were  restored  to  their  old  places 
in  the  Capitol. 

Such  were  the  successes  of  the  democrats,  but,  after  all,  they 
did  not  amount  to  much.  In  their  contest  with  the  aristocracy  the 
democrats  had  conquered,  and  it  was  but  natural  that  they  should 
insult  the  prostrate  foe.  But  they  knew  that  the  real  reckoning  was 
to  come, — not  with  the  vanquished  oligarchy,  but  with  the  too- 
powerful  ally  by  whose  aid  they  had  conquered.  Their  schemes 
were  directed  ostensibly  against  the  optimates,  but  really  against 
Pompeius.  If  direct  proofs  of  this  are  few,  it  is  because  both  the 
present  and  the  succeeding  age  had  an  interest  in  throwing  a  veil 
over  the  events  of  this  period ;  but  such  proofs  are  not  wanting.  It 
is  stated  by  Sallust  that  the  Gabinian  and  Manilian  laws  inflicted  a 
grievous  blow  on  the  democracy.  Again,  the  Servilian  rogation 
was  directed  against  Pompeius,  as  is  clear  from  the  character  of  the 
bill  itself,  and  from  the  statements  of  Sallust  and  Cicero.  Finally, 
the  more  than  suspicious  attitude  of  Caesar  and  Crassus  towards  the 


280  ROME 

67-63    B.C. 

Catilinarian  conspiracies  is  proof  enough  in  itself.  The  object  of 
the  democratic  party  during  the  years  67-63  b.c.  was  to  possess 
themselves  of  the  reins  of  government  by  securing  the  return  of  one 
or  more  members  of  the  conspiracy  for  the  consulship,  and  then  to 
intrust  one  of  their  leaders  with  the  conquest  of  Egypt,  or  some  such 
commission,  which  would  give  an  opportunity  for  raising  a  military 
power  capable  of  counterbalancing  that  of  Pompeius. 

The  first  object  of  the  democratic  leaders  was  the  overthrow 
of  the  existing  government  by  means  of  an  insurrection  in  which 
they  would  not  themselves  appear.  Materials  for  such  a  conspiracy 
existed  in  abundance  in  the  capital.  There  were  the  slaves;  there 
was  the  herd  of  free  paupers  who  lived  by  the  corn  distributions  and 
who  were  always  ready  for  any  scheme  which  promised  anarchy  and 
license.  Again,  there  were  numbers  of  young  men  of  rank,  ruined 
in  fortunes,  ruined  in  body  and  mind  by  a  life  of  fashionable  de- 
bauchery, who  sighed  openly  for  a  return  of  the  times  of  Cinna  and 
for  release  from  their  burden  of  debt.  Among  them  two  men  were 
marked  out  as  leaders  by  their  superior  ability — Gnaeus  Piso  and 
Lucius  Catilina.  The  latter,  in  spite  of  a  dissoluteness  conspicuous 
even  in  that  dissolute  age,  had  courage,  military  talent,  and  a  certain 
criminal  energy  which  gave  him  an  ascendency  over  other  men.  He 
had  been  one  of  Sulla's  executioners,  and  had  hunted  down  the  pro- 
scribed at  the  head  of  a  band  of  Celts;  but  he  had  now  a  special 
quarrel  with  the  aristocracy  because  they  had  opposed  his  candida- 
ture for  the  consulship.  A  secret  league  was  formed,  numbering 
more  than  four  hundred  members  and  including  associates  in  all  the 
urban  districts  of  Italy. 

In  December,  66  b.c,  the  two  consuls-elect  for  65  b.c.  were 
rendered  ineligible  for  office  by  conviction  for  electoral  bribery. 
They  immediately  joined  the  association,  and  it  was  determined  to 
procure  the  consulship  for  them  by  force.  Accordingly  on  January 
1,  65  b.c,  the  senate  house  was  to  be  assailed  and  the  new  consuls 
were  to  be  killed ;  Crassus  was  to  be  invested  with  the  dictatorship, 
Caesar  with  the  mastership  of  the  horse.  But  the  signal  was  never 
given  and  the  plot  was  foiled.  A  similar  plan  for  February  5  was 
also  a  failure,  and  the  secret  became  known.  Guards  were  as- 
signed to  the  new  consuls,  and  Piso  was  got  rid  of  by  a  mission 
to  Hither  Spain  with  pretorian  powers ;  but  farther  the  government 
dared  not  go. 

For  the  present  no  further  attempt  was  made  by  the  conspira- 


PARTY     STRUGGLES  281 

64-63  B.C. 

tors;  but  in  64  B.C.  Pompeius  was  in  Syria,  and  approaching  the 
conclusion  of  his  task;  and  it  was  therefore  resolved  to  set  up  as 
candidates  for  the  consulship  of  63  B.C.  Catilina  and  Gaius  Antonius 
— an  ex-Sullan  and  an  ex-senator,  who  was  willing  to  lend  himself 
to  the  conspiracy.  The  plan  was  to  seize  the  children  of  Pompeius, 
and  to  arm  in  Italy  and  in  the  provinces  against  him.  Piso  was  to 
raise  troops  in  Hither  Spain;  and  to  secure  communications  with 
him  negotiations  were  entered  into  with  the  Transpadani  and  with 
several  Celtic  tribes. 

The  optimates  had  no  one  of  their  own  order  who  possessed 
the  requisite  courage  and  influence  to  defeat  the  democratic  candi- 
dates ;  they  therefore  supported  Marcus  Cicero,  who  as  yet  belonged 
properly  to  no  political  party,  but  was  always  a  supporter  of  the 
party  of  material  interests.  The  result  was  the  election  of  Cicero 
and  Antonius,  and  for  the  moment  the  conspiracy  was  checked.  A 
little  before  this  Piso  had  been  put  to  death  by  his  escort  in  Spain ; 
and  now  Cicero  gained  over  Antonius  by  voluntarily  giving  up  to 
him  the  lucrative  governorship  of  Macedonia,  instead  of  insisting 
on  his  privilege  of  having  the  provinces  determined  by  lot. 

Meanwhile  the  settlement  of  Syria  proceeded  rapidly,  and  it 
was  more  than  probable  that  Pompeius  would  soon  advance  into 
Egypt.  Caesar's  attempt  to  get  the  settlement  of  Egypt  intrusted 
to  himself  was  foiled.  A  bold  stroke  was  imperatively  necessary, 
and  as  soon  as  the  new  tribunes  entered  on  their  office  the  Servilian 
rogation  was  brought  forward.  The  nominal  object  of  this  bill 
was  the  founding  of  colonies  in  Italy ;  the  Campanian  domain  land 
was  to  be  parceled  out,  and  other  land  was  to  be  acquired  by  pur- 
chase. The  money  necessary  for  this  purpose  was  to  be  provided  in 
various  ways,  and  the  execution  of  the  measure  was  to  be  intrusted 
to  decemviri  armed  with  special  jurisdiction  and  with  the  imperium, 
who  were  to  remain  in  office  for  five  years,  and  to  choose  two  hun- 
dred subordinate  officers  from  the  equestrian  ranks.  All  candidates 
were  to  announce  themselves  personally,  and  only  seventeen  tribes 
were  to  vote. 

The  real  object  of  the  bill  was  to  create  a  power  which  might 
counterbalance  that  of  Pompeius ;  but  it  pleased  no  class ;  the  mob 
preferred  to  subsist  on  the  corn  largesses  rather  than  by  tilling  the 
soil ;  the  masses  of  the  democrats  were  afraid  to  offend  Pompeius, 
and  the  measure  was  withdrawn  by  its  author,  January  1,  63  B.C. 

Catilina  now  determined  to  strike  a  decisive  blow.     All  through 


os  2  ROME 

63-62    B.C. 

the  summer  preparations  for  civil  war  went  on.  Faesulae  was  to 
be  the  headquarters  of  the  insurrection — thither  arms  and  money 
were  sent,  and  troops  were  raised  by  Gaius  Manlius,  an  old  Sullan 
captain.  The  Transpadani  seemed  ready  to  rise;  bodies  of  slaves 
were  ready  for  insurrection  in  the  Bruttian  land,  on  the  east  coast, 
and  in  Capua.  The  plan  of  the  conspirators  was  to  put  to  death 
the  presiding  consul  and  the  rival  candidates  on  the  day  of  the  con- 
sular elections  for  62  B.C.  (October  20),  and  to  carry  the  election  of 
Catilina. 

But  on  the  day  fixed  Cicero  denounced  the  conspiracy  in  full 
senate;  and  Catilina  did  not  deny  the  accusation.  On  the  21st  the 
senate  invested  the  consuls  with  the  exceptional  powers  usual  in 
such  crises.  On  the  28th,  to  which  day  the  elections  had  been  post- 
poned, Cicero  appeared  in  the  Campus  Martius  with  an  armed  body- 
guard, and  the  plots  of  the  conspirators  again  failed. 

But  on  the  27th  the  standard  of  insurrection  had  been  raised 
by  Manlius  at  Faesulae,  and  proclamations  had  been  issued  demand- 
ing the  liberation  of  debtors  from  their  burdens,  and  the  reform  of 
the  law  of  insolvency,  which  still,  in  some  cases,  permitted  the 
enslavement  of  the  debtor.  But  the  rising  was  isolated.  The  gov- 
ernment had  time  to  call  out  the  general  levy,  and  to  send  officers 
to  various  regions  of  Italy  in  order  to  suppress  the  insurrection  in 
detail.  Meantime  the  gladiatorial  slaves  were  ejected  from  the 
capital,  and  patrols  were  kept  in  the  streets  to  prevent  incendiarism. 

Catilina  was  in  a  difficult  position.  The  outbreak  in  the  city, 
which  should  have  been  simultaneous  with  the  rising  at  Faesulae, 
had  miscarried.  He  could  hardly  remain  longer  in  Rome,  and  yet 
there  was  no  one  among  his  associates  who  could  be  trusted  to  carry 
out  his  design  with  courage  and  capacity,  or  who  could  command 
sufficient  influence  to  induce  the  conspirators  in  the  city  to  strike  an 
effective  blow  at  once.  So  he  remained,  brazening  out  the  situation 
with  the  most  audacious  insolence.  The  spies  of  the  government 
had  made  their  way  into  the  circle  of  the  conspirators,  and  kept  it 
informed  of  every  detail  of  the  plot.  An  attempt  to  surprise 
Praeneste  failed.  On  the  night  of  November  6  a  conference  was 
held,  and  in  accordance  with  the  resolution  passed  by  those  who  met, 
an  attempt  was  made  early  in  the  morning  to  murder  the  consul 
Cicero.  But  the  man  selected  found  the  guard  round  his  house 
reinforced — the  consul  was  already  aware  of  the  result  of  the  con- 
ference. 


as     <o 

a.     a 


c  ^ 


PARTY     STRUGGLES  283 

63-62  B.C. 

On  the  8th  Cicero  convoked  the  senate  and  acquainted  them 
with  the  events  of  the  last  few  days.  Catilina  could  not  obtain  a 
hearing,  and  departed  at  once  for  Etruria.  The  government  de- 
clared Catilina,  Manlius,  and  such  of  their  followers  who  should  not 
lay  down  their  arms  by  a  certain  day  to  be  outlaws,  and  called  out 
new  levies,  which,  with  incredible  folly,  were  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  Antonius. 

It  had  been  arranged,  before  Catilina's  departure,  that  Cethegus 
should  make  another  attempt  to  kill  Cicero  in  the  night,  and  that 
Gabinius  and  Statilius  should  set  fire  to  the  city  in  twelve  places. 
Meanwhile  Catilina  was  to  advance  toward  Rome.  But  now  that 
their  leader  was  gone  the  conspirators  seemed  incapable  of  action, 
though  the  government  took  no  measures  against  them. 

At  last  the  decisive  moment  came.  Lentulus  had  entered  into 
relations  with  the  deputies  of  the  Allobroges — a  Celtic  canton,  which 
was  deeply  in  debt — and  had  given  them  letters  to  carry  to  his  asso- 
ciates. On  the  night  of  December  2  the  envoys  were  seized  as 
they  were  leaving  the  city — probably  in  accordance  with  a  precon- 
ceived plan ;  and  from  their  evidence  and  from  the  documents  they 
carried  full  details  of  the  plot  were  furnished  to  Cicero.  Some  of 
the  conspirators  saved  themselves  by  flight ;  but  Lentulus,  Cethegus, 
Gabinius,  and  Statilius  were  arrested.  The  evidence  was  laid  before 
the  senate ;  the  prisoners  and  other  witnesses  were  heard ;  and  other 
proofs,  such,  as  deposits  of  arms  in  the  houses  of  the  conspirators 
and  threatening  expressions  used  by  them,  were  afterwards  pro- 
cured. The  most  important  documents  were  published,  to  convince 
the  public  of  the  facts  of  the  plot. 

The  plans  of  the  conspirators  were  now  made  bare,  and  their 
leaders  arrested.  In  a  well-ordered  commonwealth  there  would 
have  been  an  end  of  the  matter.  The  military  and  the  legal  tribunals 
would  have  done  the  rest.  But  the  government  of  Rome  was  so 
disorganized  that  for  the  moment  the  most  difficult  question  for  set- 
tlement was  the  custody  of  the  prisoners.  These  had  been  given 
into  the  keeping  of  certain  eminent  private  men — two  of  whom  were 
Caesar  and  Crassus — who  were  responsible  for  their  safety.  But 
the  freedmen  of  the  prisoners  were  stirring;  the  air  was  full  of 
rumors  of  schemes  for  liberating  them  by  force;  Rome  was  full  of 
desperadoes,  and  the  government  had  no  efficient  force  of  military 
or  of  police  at  its  disposal.  Finally,  Catilina  was  near  enough  to 
attempt  a  coup  de  main.     Accordingly  the  idea  was  suggested  of 


284  ROME 

63-62    B.C. 

executing  the  prisoners  at  once.  By  the  constitution  of  Rome  no 
citizen  could  be  put  to  death  except  by  sentence  of  the  whole  body  of 
citizens,  and  as  such  sentences  had  fallen  into  disuse,  capital  punish- 
ment was  now  no  longer  carried  out.  Cicero  shrank  from  the  step ; 
he  convoked  the  senate  and  left  to  it  the  decision,  although  it  had 
even  less  title  to  act  than  the  consul,  and  therefore  could  not  possibly 
relieve  him  of  the  responsibility.  All  the  consulars  and  the  great 
majority  of  the  senate  had  already  declared  for  the  execution,  when 
Caesar,  in  a  speech  full  of  covert  threats,  violently  opposed  the  pro- 
posal ;  and  probably  the  limits  of  the  law  would  have  been  observed 
had  not  Cato,  by  throwing  suspicion  upon  those  who  were  for 
milder  measures,  and  by  throwing  the  waverers  into  fresh  alarm, 
secured  a  majority  for  the  immediate  execution  of  the  prisoners. 
On  the  night  of  December  5  they  were  conducted  under  strong 
guards  to  the  Tullianum,  a  dungeon  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol,  and 
there  put  to  death. 

Never  perhaps  had  a  commonwealth  more  lamentably  declared 
itself  bankrupt  than  did  Rome  through  this  resolution  to  put  to 
death  in  all  haste  a  few  political  prisoners,  who  were  no  doubt  culpa- 
ble according  to  the  laws,  but  who  had  not  forfeited  life;  because, 
forsooth,  the  security  of  prisons  was  not  to  be  trusted,  and  there  was 
no  sufficient  police. 

There  still  remained  the  insurrection  in  Etruria.  Catilina  had 
now  under  him  nearly  ten  thousand  men,  of  whom  scarcely  more 
than  a  fourth  were  armed.  On  the  news  of  the  failure  at  Rome, 
the  mass  of  them  dispersed,  and  the  remnant  of  desperate  men  deter- 
mined to  cut  their  way  through  the  passes  of  the  Apennines  into 
Gaul.  But  on  their  arrival  at  the  foot  of  the  mountains  near  Pis- 
toria  they  were  confronted  by  the  troops  of  Quintus  Metellus,  who 
had  come  up  from  Ravenna  and  Ariminum.  In  their  rear  was 
Antonius,  and  there  was  nothing  left  but  to  throw  themselves  upon 
his  army.  The  battle  took  place  in  a  narrow  rocky  valley  where 
superiority  of  numbers  was  of  small  avail,  and  there  the  conspirators, 
with  Catilina  at  their  head,  fell  almost  to  the  last  man. 

The  plot  was  suppressed ;  but  the  blow  had  fallen,  not  merely 
on  the  conspirators  themselves,  but  on  the  whole  democratic  party. 
If  the  complicity  of  the  democratic  leaders,  Caesar  and  Crassus,  is 
not  an  ascertained  fact,  they  are  at  any  rate  open  to  the  gravest 
suspicion.  That  they  were  accused  of  complicity  by  Catulus,  and 
that  Caesar  spoke  and  voted  against  the  judicial  murder  of  the 


PARTY     STRUGGLES  285 

63-62  B.C. 

prisoners,  is  of  course  no  proof ;  but  there  are  other  facts  of  greater 
weight.  Crassus  and  Caesar  supported  the  candidature  of  Catilina 
for  the  consulship.  When  Caesar,  in  64  B.C.,  indicted  the  Sullan 
executioners  for  murder  he  allowed  Catilina  alone  to  be  acquitted. 
In  his  revelations  to  the  senate,  Cicero  did  not  indeed  include  the 
names  of  Caesar  and  Crassus;  but  it  is  known  that  he  erased  the 
names  of  many  "  innocent  persons,"  and  in  later  years  he  named 
Caesar  as  among  the  accomplices.  The  fact  that  Gabinius  and 
Statilius  were  intrusted  to  the  custody  of  Crassus  and  Caesar  is 
probably  to  be  explained  by  the  wish  of  the  government  to  place 
them  in  a  dilemma.  If  they  allowed  the  prisoners  to  escape  they 
would  be  regarded  as  accessories;  if  they  detained  them  they  would 
incur  the  hatred  and  vengeance  of  their  fellow-conspirators.  After 
the  arrest  of  Lentulus  a  messenger  from  him  to  Catilina  was  arrested 
and  brought  before  the  senate;  but  when,  in  his  evidence,  he  men- 
tioned Crassus  as  having  commissioned  him,  he  was  interrupted, 
his  whole  statement  was  canceled  at  the  suggestion  of  Cicero,  and 
he  was  committed  to  prison  until  he  should  confess  who  had  suborned 
him.  The  senate  were  clearly  afraid  to  allow  the  revelations  to  go 
beyond  a  certain  limit.  The  general  public  were  less  scrupulous, 
and  Caesar  narrowly  escaped  with  his  life  when  he  left  the  senate 
on  December  5.  When  Caesar  had  made  himself  head  of  the 
state  he  was  in  close  alliance  with  Publius  Sittius,  the  only  sur- 
viving Catilinarian,  the  leader  of  Mauretanian  banditti.  The  facts 
that  the  government  offered  no  serious  hindrance  to  the  conspiracy 
until  the  last  moment;  that  the  chief  conspirator  was  allowed  to 
depart  unmolested;  that  the  troops  sent  against  the  insurrection 
were  put  under  the  command  of  Antonius,  who  had  been  deeply 
concerned  in  the  plot, — all  point  to  the  suspicion  that  there  were 
powerful  men  behind  the  scenes,  who  threw  their  protection  over 
the  conspiracy  while  they  kept  in  the  background  themselves. 

That  the  evidence  is  not  more  abundant  is  no  matter  for  sur- 
prise. The  government  was  too  weak  to  provoke  the  democratic 
party  d  outrance;  and,  after  the  failure  of  the  plot,  the  democratic 
leaders  naturally  made  every  effort  to  conceal  their  participation  in 
it ;  and  when  Caesar  had  got  the  upper  hand  the  veil  was  only  drawn 
all  the  more  closely  over  the  darker  years  of  his  life. 

The  close  of  this  period  found  the  democratic  party  at  its 
lowest  ebb.  By  its  alliance  with  anarchists  and  murderers  it  had 
alienated,  not  only  the  party  of  material  interests,  but  even  the  city 


286  ROME 

63-61    B.C. 

mob  who,  although  having  no  objection  to  a  street  riot,  found  it 
inconvenient  to  have  their  houses  set  on  fire  over  their  heads.  The 
popular  leaders  felt  the  hopelessness  of  their  position.  Crassus  pre- 
pared to  carry  his  family  and  his  riches  to  a  safe  refuge  in  the  East; 
and  even  Caesar  declared,  in  63  B.C.,  as  he  left  his  home  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  election  for  the  office  of  pontifex  maximus,  that,  if  he 
failed  in  this,  too,  he  would  never  cross  the  threshold  again. 

The  one  question  that  agitated  men's  minds  as  the  time  ap- 
proached for  the  return  of  Pompeius  from  the  East  was  what  atti- 
tude the  victorious  general  would  take  toward  the  two  parties  in  the 
state.  His  eyes  were  fully  opened  by  recent  events  to  the  folly  and 
weakness,  if  not  the  treachery,  of  his  former  allies,  and  his  interests 
now  appeared  identical  with  those  of  the  optimates.  If  the  latter 
were  not  wholly  blind  to  their  own  interests,  they  would  see  to  it 
that  his  legitimate  demands  were  acceded  to,  and  thus  secure  the 
final  overthrow  of  the  democrats.  It  was  evident  that  the  present 
form  of  government  was  a  failure,  and  that  but  one  alternative 
remained — the  rule  of  a  single  man.  But  it  remained  to  be  seen 
whether  that  man  should  come  to  power  as  the  representative  of  the 
aristocracy  or  of  the  common  people. 

In  the  autumn  of  63  B.C.  Quintus  Metellus  Nepos  arrived  in 
the  capital  from  the  camp  of  Pompeius,  and  got  himself  elected 
tribune  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  procuring  for  Pompeius  the 
command  against  Catilina  by  special  decree,  and  afterwards  the 
consulship  for  61  b.c.  Everything  depended  upon  the  reception 
which  parties  at  Rome  might  give  to  these  proposals.  It  must  be 
remembered  that,  whatever  cause  Pompeius  might  have  to  be  dis- 
contented with  the  conduct  of  Caesar  and  his  partisans,  no  open 
rupture  had  taken  place.  The  coalition  of  70  B.C.  was  still  formally 
in  existence.  The  democracy  still  treated  Pompeius  with  the  great- 
est outward  respect,  and  this  very  year  had  granted  him,  spontane- 
ously and  by  special  decree,  unprecedented  honors.  At  the  same 
time  nothing  had  occurred  to  bridge  over  the  chasm  which  the 
coalition  had  created  between  Pompeius  and  the  optimates.  The 
senate  had  decreed  him  no  exceptional  honors,  and  two  of  its  most 
influential  members,  Lucullus  and  Metellus,  were  his  bitterest  per- 
sonal enemies.  Lastly,  the  aristocracy  were  at  present  under  the 
guidance  of  the  uncompromising  pedant  Cato,  while  the  democracy 
were  led  by  the  most  supple  master  of  intrigue — Caesar.  Accord- 
ingly the  aristocracy  at  once  showed  their  hostility  to  the  proposals 


PARTY     STRUGGLES  287 

63-61  B.C. 

of  Metellus,  and  Cato  had  himself  elected  tribune  expressly  for  the 
purpose  of  thwarting  him.  But  the  democrats  were  more  pliant, 
and  it  was  soon  evident  that  they  had  come  to  a  cordial  understand- 
ing with  the  general's  emissary.  Metellus  and  his  master  both 
adopted  the  democratic  view  of  the  illegal  executions,  and  the  first 
act  of  Caesar's  pretorship  was  to  call  Catulus  to  account  for  the 
moneys  alleged  to  have  been  embezzled  by  him  in  rebuilding  the 
Capitoline  temple,  and  to  transfer  the  superintendence  of  the  works 
to  Pompeius.  By  this  stroke  Caesar  brought  to  light  a  disgraceful 
abuse  of  public  money,  and  threw  odium  upon  the  aristocracy  in  the 
person  of  one  of  its  most  distinguished  members;  while  Pompeius 
would  be  delighted  at  the  prospect  of  engraving  his  name  upon  the 
proudest  spot  in  the  capital  of  the  Roman  state. 

On  the  day  of  voting  Cato  and  another  of  the  tribunes  put 
their  veto  upon  the  proposals  of  Metellus,  who  disregarded  it. 
There  were  conflicts  of  the  armed  bands  of  both  sides,  which  termi- 
nated in  favor  of  the  government.  The  senate  followed  up  the  vic- 
tory by  suspending  Metellus  and  Caesar  from  their  offices.  Metel- 
lus immediately  departed  for  the  camp  of  Pompeius;  and  when 
Caesar  disregarded  the  decree  of  suspension  against  himself  the 
senate  had  ultimately  to  revoke  it. 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  favorable  to  the  interests  of 
Pompeius  than  these  late  events.  After  the  illegal  executions  of 
the  Catilinarians,  and  the  acts  of  violence  against  Metellus,  he  could 
appear  at  once  as  the  defender  of  the  "  two  palladia  of  Roman  lib- 
erty " — the  right  of  appeal  and  the  inviolability  of  the  tribunate — 
and  as  the  champion  of  the  party  of  order  against  the  Catilinarian 
band.  But  his  courage  was  unequal  to  the  emergency ;  he  lingered 
in  Asia  during  the  winter  of  63-62  B.C.,  and  thus  gave  the  senate 
time  to  crush  the  insurrection  in  Italy,  and  deprived  himself  of  a 
valid  pretext  for  keeping  his  legions  together.  In  the  autumn  of  62 
B.C.  he  landed  at  Brundisium,  and,  disbanding  his  army,  proceeded 
to  Rome  with  a  small  escort.  On  his  arrival  in  the  city  in  61  B.C. 
he  found  himself  in  a  position  of  complete  isolation;  he  was  feared 
by  the  democrats,  hated  by  the  aristocracy,  and  distrusted  by  the 
wealthy  class. 

He  at  once  demanded  for  himself  a  second  consulship,  the  con- 
firmation of  all  his  acts  in  the  East,  and  the  fulfillment  of  the 
promise  he  had  made  to  his  soldiers  to  furnish  them  with  lands. 
But  each  of  these  demands  was  met  with  the  most  determined  oppo- 


288  ROME 

62-60  B.C. 

sition.  From  the  senate,  led  by  Lucullus,  Metellus,  and  Cato,  there 
was  no  hope  of  obtaining  dispensation  from  the  Sullan  law  as  to 
reelection.  As  to  the  arrangements  of  Pompeius  in  the  East, 
Lucullus  carried  a  resolution  that  they  should  be  voted  upon 
separately,  thus  opening  a  door  for  endless  annoyances  and 
defeats. 

His  promise  of  lands  to  his  soldiers  was  indeed  ratified,  but  not 
executed,  and  no  steps  were  taken  to  provide  the  necessary  funds 
and  lands.  When  the  general  turned  from  the  senate  to  the  people, 
the  democrats,  though  they  offered  no  opposition,  did  nothing  to 
assist  him,  and  when  the  proposal  for  the  grant  of  lands  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  tribes,  it  was  defeated,  early  in  60  B.C.  To  such  straits 
was  he  reduced  that  he  had  to  court  the  favor  of  the  multitude  by 
causing  a  proposal  to  be  introduced  for  abolishing  the  Italian  tolls ; 
but  he  had  none  of  the  qualifications  of  a  demagogue,  and  merely 
damaged  his  reputation  without  gaining  his  ends. 

From  this  disagreeable  position  Pompeius  was  rescued  by  the 
sagacity  and  address  of  Caesar,  who  saw  in  the  necessities  of 
Pompeius  the  opportunity  of  the  democratic  party.  Ever  since 
the  return  of  Pompeius,  Caesar  had  grown  rapidly  in  influence 
and  weight.  He  had  been  pretor  in  62  B.C.,  and,  in  61,  governor 
of  Further  Spain,  where  he  utilized  his  position  to  free  himself 
from  his  debts  and  to  lay  the  foundation  of  the  military  position 
he  desired  for  himself.  Returning  in  60  B.C.,  he  readily  re- 
linquished his  claim  to  a  triumph,  in  order  to  enter  the  city  in  time 
to  stand  for  the  consulship.  At  last  the  democracy  seemed  on  the 
eve  of  realizing  its  hopes,  and  of  seeing  one  of  its  own  leaders  in- 
vested with  the  consulship  and  a  province  where  he  might  build  up  a 
military  position  strong  enough  to  make  it  independent  of  external 
allies.  But  it  was  quite  possible  that  the  aristocracy  might  be 
strong  enough  to  defeat  the  candidature  of  Caesar,  as  it  had  de- 
feated that  of  Catilina ;  and  again,  the  consulship  was  not  enough ; 
an  extraordinary  command,  secured  to  him  for  several  years,  was 
necessary  for  the  fulfillment  of  his  purpose.  Without  allies  such  a 
command  could  not  be  hoped  for ;  and  allies  were  found  where  they 
had  been  found  ten  years  before,  in  Pompeius  and  in  Crassus,  and 
in  the  rich  equestrian  class.  Such  a  treaty  was  suicide  on  the  part 
of  Pompeius,  for  he  owed  his  strength  entirely  to  his  position  as  the 
only  leader  who  could  rely  on  a  military  force ;  but  he  had  drifted 
into  a  situation  so  awkward  that  he  was  glad  to  be  released  from 


PARTY     STRUGGLES  289 

60-59  B.C. 

it  on  any  terms.  The  capitalists  were  at  the  moment  all  the  more 
inclined  to  join  the  coalition  because  of  the  severity  with  which  they 
were  being  treated  with  regard  to  their  tax  leases  by  the  senate,  at 
the  instigation  of  Cato. 

The  bargain  was  struck  in  the  summer  of  60  B.C.  Caesar  was 
promised  the  consulship  and  a  governorship  afterwards ;  Pompeius, 
the  ratification  of  his  arrangements  in  the  East,  and  land  for  his 
soldiers;  Crassus  received  no  definite  equivalent,  but  the  capitalists 
were  promised  a  remission  of  part  of  the  money  they  had  under- 
taken to  pay  for  the  lease  of  the  Asiatic  taxes.  The  parties  to  the 
coalition  were  the  same  as  in  70  B.C.,  but  their  relative  positions 
were  entirely  changed.  Then  the  democracy  was  a  faction  without 
a  head ;  now  it  was  a  strong  party  with  leaders  of  its  own,  and  could 
demand  for  itself,  not  merely  concessions  to  democratic  traditions, 
such  as  the  restoration  of  the  tribunician  power,  but  office  and  au- 
thority, the  consulship,  and  the  supreme  military  command,  while 
it  conceded  nothing  material  to  its  allies. 

In  spite  of  all  the  opposition  of  the  senate  the  plans  of  the 
coalition  were  carried  out  in  their  entirety.  Caesar  was  easily 
elected  consul  for  59  B.C.,  and  at  once  proceeded  to  fulfill  his  obli- 
gations to  Pompeius  by  carrying  an  agrarian  law.  All  remaining 
Italian  domain  land,  which  meant  practically  the  territory  of  Capua, 
was  to  be  given  up  to  allotments,  and  other  estates  in  Italy  were  to 
be  purchased  out  of  the  revenues  of  the  new  Eastern  provinces.  The 
allotments  were  to  be  small,  and  to  be  given  to  poor  burgesses, 
fathers  of  three  children.  The  soldiers  were  simply  recommended 
to  the  commission,  and  thus  the  principle  of  giving  rewards  of  land 
for  military  service  was  not  asserted.  The  execution  of  the  bill 
was  to  be  intrusted  to  a  commission  of  twenty. 

Caesar  had  thus  loyally  fulfilled  his  obligations  to  Pompeius, 
and  the  most  important  question  now  to  be  considered  was  his  own 
future  position.  The  senate  had  already  selected  for  the  year  of  his 
proconsulship  two  provinces  where  nothing  but  the  work  of  peaceful 
administration  could  be  expected;  but  it  was  determined  by  the 
confederates  that  Caesar  should  be  invested  by  decree  of  the  people 
with  a  special  command  resembling  that  lately  held  by  Pompeius. 
Accordingly  the  tribune  Vatinius  submitted  to  the  tribes  a  proposal 
which  was  at  once  adopted.  By  it  Caesar  obtained  the  governor- 
ship of  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and  the  supreme  command  of  the  three  le- 
gions stationed  there,  for  five  years,  with  the  rank  of  propretor  for 


290  ROME 

59-58    B.C. 

his  adjutants.  His  jurisdiction  extended  southward  as  far  as  the 
Rubicon,  and  included  Luca  and  Ravenna.  Subsequently  the 
province  of  Narbo  was  added  by  the  senate,  on  the  motion  of  Pom- 
peius.  Since  no  troops  could  be  stationed  in  Italy,  it  was  evident 
that  such  a  command  as  Caesar's  dominated  both  Italy  and  Rome. 
The  coalition  had  succeeded ;  it  was  master  of  the  state.  It  kept  its 
adherents  in  good  humor  by  the  most  lavish  exhibitions  of  games 
and  shows,  and  kept  the  exchequer  filled  by  selling  charters  and 
privileges  to  subject  communities  and  princes:  for  instance,  the  king 
of  Egypt  at  last  obtained  recognition  by  decree  of  the  people,  in 
return  for  a  large  sum.  The  permanence  of  the  present  arrange- 
ment was  assured  by  securing  the  return  of  Aulus  Gabinius  and 
Lucius  Piso  for  the  consulship  of  the  ensuing  year.  Pompeius 
watched  over  Italy  while  he  executed  the  agrarian  law,  and  Caesar's 
legions  in  north  Italy  were  a  guarantee  against  all  opposi- 
tion, Caesar  and  Pompeius  were  at  present  kept  united  by  commu- 
nity of  interest,  and  the  personal  bonds  between  them  were  cemented 
by  the  marriage  of  Pompeius  with  Julia,  the  only  daughter  of 
Caesar. 

The  aristocracy  were  in  despair.  "  On  all  sides,"  wrote  one 
of  them,  "  we  are  checkmated ;  we  have  already,  through  fear  of 
death  or  of  banishment,  despaired  of  '  freedom  ' ;  everyone  sighs, 
no  one  ventures  to  speak."  Nevertheless  Caesar  had  hardly  laid 
down  his  consulship  when  it  was  proposed,  in  the  senate,  to  annul 
the  Julian  laws ;  there  were  clearly  some  among  the  optimates  who 
would  not  be  content  with  the  policy  of  sighing  and  silence.  The 
regents  determined  to  make  examples  of  some  of  the  most  de- 
termined of  their  opponents,  and  to  drive  them  into  exile.  An 
infamous  attempt  was  made  to  involve  the  heads  of  the  aristocracy 
in  a  charge  of  conspiring  to  murder  Pompeius  on  the  evidence  of  a 
worthless  informer  named  Vettius ;  but  the  scheme  was  too  hollow, 
and  the  whole  matter  was  allowed  to  drop. 

Ultimately  they  were  content  with  a  few  isolated  victims. 
Cato  openly  proclaimed  his  conviction  that  the  Julian  laws  were  null 
and  void,  and  to  get  rid  of  him  he  was  intrusted  by  special  decree 
with  the  regulation  of  the  municipal  affairs  of  Byzantium,  and  with 
the  annexation  of  the  kingdom  of  Cyprus.  Cicero  was  abandoned 
to  the  vengeance  of  the  thorough-going  democrats,  who  could  not 
leave  unpunished  the  judicial  murder  of  December  5.  And  so  the 
tribune  Publius  Clodius,  his  bitter  private  enemy,  proposed  to  the 


PARTY     STRUGGLES  291 

59-58  B.C. 

tribes  a  resolution  declaring  the  execution  of  a  citizen  without  trial 
a  crime  punishable  with  banishment.  Both  this  decree  and  that  re- 
lating to  Cato  were  passed  without  opposition,  and,  though  the 
majority  of  the  senate  put  on  mourning,  and  Cicero  besought  Pom- 
peius  on  his  knees  for  mercy,  he  had  to  go  into  exile  even  before  the 
passing  of  the  law.  Cato  accepted  his  commission,  and  set  out  for 
the  East ;  and  Caesar  could  now  safely  leave  Italy,  to  face  the  heavy 
task  he  had  imposed  on  himself  in  Gaul. 


Chapter  XXIX 

CAESAR   IN   GAUL.    58-51    B.C. 

IT  has  been  too  generally  assumed  that  Caesar  regarded  Gaul 
merely  as  a  parade  ground  on  which  to  exercise  himself  and 
his  troops  for  the  impending  war;  but  though  the  conquest  of 
Gaul  was  undoubtedly  for  him  a  means  to  an  end,  yet  it  was  much 
more.  It  is  the  special  privilege  of  a  statesman  of  genius  that  his 
means  themselves  are  ends  in  their  turn.  Caesar  needed,  no  doubt, 
for  his  party  aims  a  military  power,  but  he  did  not  conquer  Gaul  as 
a  partisan.  It  was  necessary  that  Italy  should  be  protected  by  a 
barrier  against  the  ever-threatening  invasions  of  the  Germans ;  and 
it  was  also  necessary,  now  that  Italy  had  become  too  narrow  for  its 
population,  that  a  fresh  field  of  expansion  should  be  provided  else- 
where. The  Roman  state  remained  a  chaotic  mass  of  countries 
which  required  to  be  thoroughly  occupied,  and  to  have  their  boun- 
daries fixed  and  defined:  the  senate  had  done  little  or  nothing  to 
carry  out  this  great  work ;  it  was  only  when  the  democracy  assumed 
the  reins  in  6j  B.C.  and  in  66  B.C.  that  the  Roman  sovereignty  over 
the  Mediterranean  was  restored,  and  the  dominion  in  the  East 
consolidated  by  the  annexation  of  Pontus  and  Syria.  Now 
that  the  democracy  and  its  leaders  were  supreme,  another  and 
even  more  important  section  of  the  work  was  at  last  taken  in  hand. 

Something  had  been  accomplished  by  Caesar  towards  the 
subjugation  of  the  West  during  his  governorship  in  Spain  in 
61  B.C. :  the  Lusitanians  and  Gallaeci  were  subdued,  the  tribute 
of  the  subjects  reduced,  and  their  financial  affairs  regulated. 

The  term  Gallia  has  been  applied,  since  the  age  of  Augustus, 
to  the  country  bounded  by  the  Pyrenees,  the  Rhine,  the  Atlantic 
Ocean,  and  the  Mediterranean.  The  Roman  province  which  had 
been  constituted  for  sixty  years,  and  which  corresponded  pretty 
nearly  to  the  modern  Languedoc,  Dauphine,  and  Provence,  had 
seldom  been  in  a  state  of  peace.  Pompeius  had  had  to  fight  his  way 
through  the  insurgent  tribes  in  order  to  reach  Spain  in  yy  B.C.; 
while  the  connection  of  the  Allobroges  with  the  Catilinarian  con- 
spiracy is  but  one  indication  of  the  perpetual  ferment  in  which  the 
more  remote  cantons  lived.  Still  the  bounds  of  the  province  were 
not  extended,  Lugdunum  Convenarum,  Tolosa,  Vienna,  and  Genava 

292 


CAESAR     IN     GAUL 


293 


remained  the  most  remote  Roman  townships  towards  the  west 
and  north. 

But  the  importance  of  Gallia  was  continually  increasing;  its 
glorious  climate,  the  fertility  of  the  soil,  the  commercial  routes 
stretching  northward  as  far  as  Britain,  the  easy  communication 
with  Italy,  the  civilization  and  luxury  which  were  to  be  found  in  the 


^St^^^'^a^ 

— ^  ^*   A  A^' 
Tk  X      <   As  J  i 

\*    I  SB?    / / 

^7      ^S^\^^W? 

F          ^     W         XS^, 

toMMa^                                                              i 

QAU  1. 

in     THt   tiki»  or                    A 

city  of  Massilia,  all  combined  to  make  Gallia  the  most  attractive  of 
the  Roman  provinces.  Ten  years  before  Caesar's  arrival  it  was 
swarming  with  Roman  burgesses  and  merchants,  with  Roman 
farmers  and  graziers,  while  a  large  proportion  of  the  land  was 
owned  by  Roman  nobles,  who  lived  in  Italy  and  cultivated  their 
estates  by  means  of  stewards. 

This  region  had  for  a  long  time  been  under  the  influence  of 
Hellenism,  spreading  from  the  great  Greek  colony  of  Massilia; 
and  even  in  the  Roman  period  Greek  physicians  and  rhetoricians 


294  ROME 

were  employed  in  the  Gallic  cantons;  but,  as  elsewhere,  Hellenism 
was  superseded  by  the  mixed  Latino-Greek  culture.  The  Celtic  and 
Ligurian  populations  gradually  lost  their  nationality,  were  com- 
pelled to  exchange  the  sword  for  the  plow,  which  they  were  forced 
to  use  in  the  service  of  a  foreign  master,  and  they  attested  by  many 
insurrections  the  hardness  of  the  bondage  into  which  they  had 
fallen.  But  the  towns  flourished  and  grew ;  Aquae  Sextiae,  Narbo, 
and,  above  all,  Massilia,  might  be  mentioned  in  comparison  with  the 
most  prosperous  Italian  towns. 

But  as  soon  as  the  Roman  frontier  was  crossed  Roman  in- 
fluence practically  ceased.  North  of  the  Cevennes  the  great  Celtic 
race  was  found  in  all  its  native  freedom.  The  great  body  of  this 
people  had  settled  in  modern  France,  in  the  western  districts  of 
Germany  and  Switzerland,  and  in  the  south  of  England ;  but  there 
were  Celts  in  modern  Austria  and  Spain,  though  cut  off  from  their 
kinsmen  by  the  barriers  of  the  Alps  and  the  Pyrenees.  Little  can 
be  known  of  the  development  of  this  great  people;  we  have  to  be 
content  with  a  mere  outline  of  their  culture  and  political  condition 
in  the  time  of  Caesar. 

The  population  of  Gaul  appears  to  have  been  comparatively 
dense.  From  the  numbers  of  the  Belgic  levy  against  Caesar  it  may 
be  computed  that  in  those  regions  the  proportion  was  about  200 
persons  to  the  square  mile — about  the  same  rate  which  holds  at 
present  for  Wales ;  in  the  canton  of  the  Helvetii  it  was  about  245 : 
hence  in  the  more  cultivated  districts  of  the  Haedui  and  Arverni 
it  was  probably  higher.  Agriculture  was  no  doubt  known  in  Gaul, 
and  a  kind  of  beer  was  made  from  the  barley  which  was  grown 
there.  But  the  pursuit  was  despised,  and,  even  in  the  south,  was 
held  unbecoming  for  a  free  Celt.  Pastoral  husbandry  was  much 
more  esteemed.  The  Romans  availed  themselves  of  the  Celtic 
breed  of  cattle,  and  of  the  skill  of  Celtic  slaves  in  the  raising  of 
animals ;  Gallic  oxen  and  ponies  were  much  used,  and  in  the  north- 
ern districts  the  raising  of  cattle  was  almost  universal.  In  the 
northeast,  between  the  sea  and  the  Rhine,  dense  woods  covered  the 
ground,  and  on  the  plains  of  Flanders  and  Lorraine  the  Menapian 
and  Treverian  shepherd  fed  his  half-wild  swine  in  the  impenetrable 
oak  forests.  In  Britain  there  was  hardly  any  agriculture,  and 
the  culture  of  the  olive  and  the  vine  did  not  extend  beyond  the 
Cevennes. 

The  Gauls  lived  mainly  in  open  villages,  of  which  the  Helvetii 


CAESARINGAUL  295 

alone  had  four  hundred,  besides  many  single  homesteads.  But 
there  were  also  walled  towns,  of  which  the  walls  were  an  admirable 
combination  of  timber  and  stone,  while  the  buildings  were  wholly  of 
wood.  There  were  twelve  such  towns  among  the  Helvetii,  and 
the  same  number  among  the  Suessiones.  But  in  the  northern  parts 
morasses  and  forests,  and  in  Britain  a  sort  of  wooden  abatis,  were 
the  only  protection  in  time  of  war. 

Roads  and  bridges  were  numerous,  and  the  number  and  char- 
acter of  the  largest  rivers — the  Rhone,  Garonne,  Loire,  and  Seine 
— made  river  intercourse  easy  and  profitable.  In  maritime  affairs 
the  Gauls  had  attained  no  inconsiderable  skill,  and  in  one  respect 
had  surpassed  the  nations  of  the  Mediterranean.  They  were  the 
first  nation  that  regularly  navigated  the  Atlantic,  and  the  tribes 
which  bordered  on  the  ocean  employed  sailing  vessels,  with  leathern 
sails  and  iron  anchor-chains,  not  only  for  commerce,  but  for  war; 
while  the  war  vessels  of  the  Phoenicians,  Greeks,  and  Romans  were 
all,  up  to  this  time,  propelled  by  oars,  and  used  the  sail  only  as  an 
occasional  aid;  their  trading  vessels  alone  were  sailers  properly 
so-called.  In  the  Channel  the  Gauls,  still  and  for  long  afterwards, 
employed  a  sort  of  leather-covered  skiff. 

There  was  considerable  commercial  intercourse  between  even 
the  most  northern  Celtic  regions  and  the  Roman  province.  The 
people  of  modern  Brittany  brought  tin  from  the  mines  of  Corn- 
wall, and  carried  it  by  river  or  by  land  to  Narbo  and  Massilia. 
Among  the  tribes  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rhine  fishing  and  the  collec- 
tion of  birds'  eggs  was  an  important  industry.  The  tolls  levied  on 
rivers  and  at  maritime  ports  play  a  large  part  in  the  finance  of  cer- 
tain cantons. 

In  manufactures,  working  in  metals  was  the  only  important 
known  industry  pursued:  the  copper  implements  even  now  dis- 
covered in  tombs,  and  the  gold  coins  of  the  Arverni,  attest  the  skill 
of  the  Gallic  workmen;  and  they  are  even  said  to  have  taught  the 
Romans  the  arts  of  tinning  and  silvering.  Naturally  the  art  of 
mining  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  working  of  metals.  There 
were  extensive  iron  mines  on  the  Loire,  and  the  art  of  mining  was 
adapted  in  those  regions  to  the  purposes  of  war.  The  Romans  be- 
lieved that  Gaul  was  very  rich  in  gold,  but  the  idea  is  negatived  by 
the  small  amount  of  gold  discovered  in  tombs,  and  probably  arose 
from  the  fables  of  travelers.  Still  the  streams  flowing  from  the 
Alps  and  Pyrenees  may  then  have  yielded  sufficient  produce  to 


296  ROME 

have  made  the  search  for  gold  profitable  through  the  employment 
of  slave  labor. 

The  taste  of  the  Celtic  workmen  was  not  equal  to  their  me- 
chanical skill.  The  ornaments  they  produced  were  gaudy  and 
parti-colored,  and  their  coins  invariably  imitate  two  or  three  Greek 
dies.  But  the  art  of  poetry  was  highly  valued,  and  was  intimately 
connected  with  religion.  Science  and  philosophy  existed,  though  in 
subordination  to  theology.  The  knowledge  of  writing  was  general 
among  the  priests. 

Among  the  Celts  the  town  had,  as  in  the  East,  merely  mercan- 
tile and  strategic — not  political — importance.  The  Greeks  and 
Romans  had  lived,  in  early  times,  in  cantons,  each  clan  by  itself; 
they  had  villages  in  which  they  bought  and  sold,  and  strong  places 
whither  they  fled  for  refuge  in  case  of  invasion.  But  very  soon  the 
tower  of  refuge  grew  into  a  town,  and  became  the  head  and  center 
of  the  clan,  and  the  seat  of  law  and  justice.  Among  the  Celts, 
however,  this  development  never  took  place ;  they  remained  a  mere 
collection  of  clans,  and  never  took  the  step  by  which  the  clan  be- 
comes a  state  with  a  fixed  center  of  government. 

The  constitution  of  the  clan  canton  was  based  upon  three 
elements,  the  prince,  the  council  of  elders,  and  the  body  of  freemen 
capable  of  bearing  arms.  The  supreme  authority  rested  with  the 
general  assembly,  by  which,  in  important  matters,  the  prince  was 
bound.  The  council  was  often  numerous,  sometimes  reaching  the 
number  of  six  hundred,  but  had  not  more  power  than  the  Roman 
senate  in  the  regal  period.  In  some  southern  clans— the  Arverni, 
Haedui,  Sequani,  and  Helvetii — a  revolution  had  taken  place,  be- 
fore the  time  of  Caesar,  which  had  overthrown  the  power 
of  the  kings  and  set  up  that  of  the  senate  in  its  place.  In  all 
cases  their  towns,  even  when  walled,  were  destitute  of  political 
importance. 

The  dominant  feature  in  all  Celtic  commonwealths  is  the  high 
nobility — a  class  the  existence  of  which  is  almost  incompatible  with 
that  of  a  flourishing  urban  life.  This  nobility  consisted  for  the  most 
part  of  members  of  royal,  or  formerly  royal,  families.  It  monopo- 
lized all  power  in  the  state,  financial,  warlike,  or  political.  The 
nobles  forced  the  common  freemen  to  surrender  their  freedom  first 
as  debtors  and  then  as  slaves.  They  maintained  large  bodies  of 
mounted  retainers,  and  by  their  means  defied  the  government  and 
broke  up  the  commonwealth.      These  retainers  sometimes  reached 


CAESAR     IN     GAUL  297 

the  number  of  ten  thousand,  besides  the  bondmen  and  debtors,  who 
were  equally  dependent.  Moreover,  the  leading  families  in  differ- 
ent states  were  connected  by  marriage  and  by  treaty,  and  were  to- 
gether stronger  than  any  single  clan.  The  community  could  no 
longer  maintain  peace  or  protect  individuals :  only  those  who  were 
clients  of  some  powerful  noble  enjoyed  security. 

The  general  assembly  lost  its  importance;  the  monarchy 
usually  succumbed  to  the  nobility,  and  the  king  was  superseded  by 
the  vergobretus,  or  judgment-dealer,  who,  like  the  Roman  consul, 
held  office  for  a  year.  So  far  as  the  canton  held  together  it  was 
led  by  the  council,  which  was  governed  by  the  heads  of  the 
aristocracy. 

Like  the  Greeks  in  the  Persian  wars,  the  Transalpine  Gauls 
seem  to  have  become  conscious  of  their  unity  as  a  nation  only  in 
their  wars  with  Rome.  The  combination  of  the  whole  Celtic  nobil- 
ity was  favorable  to  the  development  of  the  idea,  and  there  were 
many  who  were  willing  to  sacrifice  the  independence  of  the  canton 
or  of  the  nobility  to  purchase  the  independence  of  the  nation.  The 
universal  popularity  of  the  opposition  to  Caesar  is  attested  by  the 
telegraphic  rapidity  with  which  news  was  carried  throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  Gaul. 

But  though  politically  divided,  the  Gauls  had  long  been  held 
together  by  the  bond  of  a  close  religious  union.  The  corporation 
of  Druids  embraced  the  British  islands  and  all  Gaul,  perhaps  even 
other  Celtic  countries.  It  possessed  a  special  head,  elected  by  the 
priests  themselves;  schools,  in  which  its  traditions  were  trans- 
mitted; special  privileges,  such  as  exemption  from  taxation  and 
military  service;  and  held  annual  councils  near  Chartres.  Such 
a  priesthood,  strengthened  by  the  blind  devotion  of  the  people, 
could  not  but  possess  considerable  political  power:  in  mon- 
archical cantons  it  conducted  the  government  in  case  of  an 
interregnum;  it  excluded  individuals  or  states  from  religious  and 
therefore  also  from  civil  society;  it  decided  important  suits, 
especially  with  regard  to  boundaries  and  inheritance;  it  had  an 
extensive  criminal  jurisdiction,  and  even  claimed  the  right  of 
deciding  on  war  or  peace.  The  Gauls  were  not  much  removed 
from  an  ecclesiastical  state  with  its  pope  and  councils,  its  immuni- 
ties, interdicts,  and  spiritual  courts ;  only  this  ecclesiastical  state  did 
not,  like  that  of  recent  times,  exist  apart  from  the  nation,  but  was 
on  the  contrary  preeminently  national. 


298  ROME 

But  though  the  priests  and  nobility  constituted  a  certain  union 
of  the  clans,  their  class  interests  were  too  strong  to  allow  this  union 
to  become  really  national.  The  only  attempt  at  political  union  was 
the  system  of  hegemony  among  the  cantons ;  a  stronger  clan  induced 
or  compelled  a  weaker  to  become  subordinate  to  it.  The  stronger 
had  control  of  all  external  relations  for  both,  while  the  weaker  was 
obliged  to  render  military  service,  and  sometimes  to  pay  tribute. 
Thus  a  series  of  leagues  arose — like  that  among  the  Belgae,  in  the 
northeast,  under  the  Suessiones ;  that  in  southern  and  central  Gaul, 
under  the  Arverni;  and  that  of  the  maritime  cantons  in  the  north 
and  west. 

The  union  in  these  confederacies  was  of  the  loosest  kind.  The 
league  was  represented  in  peace  by  the  federal  diet,  and  in  war  by 
the  general.  Contests  for  the  hegemony  went  on  in  every  league  and 
the  rivalry  spread  into  every  dependent  clan,  and  into  every  village 
and  house,  just  as  the  rivalry  between  Athens  and  Sparta  split  up 
every  independent  community  in  Greece. 

In  a  country  where  knighthood  was  the  predominant  social  fea- 
ture, the  strength  of  the  army  was  naturally  the  cavalry;  war- 
chariots  were  also  used  among  the  Belgae  and  in  Britain.  When 
the  general  levy  was  called  out,  every  man  who  could  keep  his  seat 
on  horseback  took  up  arms,  and,  when  attacking  an  enemy  whom 
they  despised,  they  swore,  man  by  man,  in  the  true  spirit  of  chivalry, 
to  charge  at  least  twice  through  the  enemy's  line.  There  were  also 
hired  free-lances,  who  displayed  in  its  extremest  form  the  spirit  of 
utter  indifference  to  their  own  lives  and  to  those  of  others  which 
such  a  mode  of  life  produces.  They  would  often,  we  are  told,  fight 
for  life  and  death  at  a  banquet  for  sport,  and  even  sell  themselves 
to  be  killed  for  a  fixed  sum  of  money  or  a  number  of  casks  of  wine. 

Besides  the  mounted  force  there  was  the  levy  en  masse  of 
infantry.  Their  arms  were  still  a  large  shield  and  a  long  thrusting 
spear.  There  is  no  trace  of  military  organization  or  of  tactical 
subdivisions;  each  canton  fought  en  masse,  without  other  arrange- 
ment. The  baggage  was  carried  in  wagons,  which  were  used  as  a 
barricade  at  night.  The  infantry  of  certain  cantons,  such  as  the 
Nervii,  was  more  efficient ;  but  the  Nervii  had  no  cavalry,  and  were, 
perhaps,  an  immigrant  German  tribe.  Caesar's  estimate  of  the 
Celtic  infantry  is  made  plain  enough  by  the  fact  that,  after  the 
first  battle,  he  never  employed  them  in  conjunction  with  Roman 
troops. 


CAESAR     IN     GAUL  299 

Undoubtedly  the  Celts  of  Transalpine  Gaul,  as  they  appeared 
in  Caesar's  time,  had  advanced  as  compared  with  their  kinsmen  who 
had  come  into  contact  with  the  Romans  a  century  and  a  half  pre- 
viously in  the  valley  of  the  Po.  The  militia  had  been  replaced  by 
the  cavalry  as  the  preponderating  arm.  Open  villages  had  been 
replaced  by  walled  towns.  Articles  found  in  the  tombs  of  Lom- 
bardy  are  certainly  inferior  to  those  found  in  northern  Gaul. 
Lastly,  the  sense  of  nationality,  whi<~h  scarcely  appears  in  the 
battles  fought  south  of  the  Alp?,  is  seen  with  striking  force  in  the 
struggle  against  Caesar. 

Many  aspects  of  Celtic  civilization  are  interesting  as  approach- 
ing nearly  to  modern  culture — its  sailing  vessels,  its  knighthood,  its 
ecclesiastical  constitution,  its  attempts  to  build  the  nation,  not  on 
the  city,  but  on  the  tribe ;  but  a  general  view  of  the  whole,  so  far  as 
the  materials  exist  for  it,  suggests  the  thought  that  the  Celtic  nation 
had  reached  its  culminating  point  of  development.  It  was  unable  to 
produce  from  its  own  resources  either  a  national  art  or  a  national 
state,  and  attained  at  most  to  a  national  theology  and  a  peculiar 
order  of  nobility.  Thus  the  original  simple  valor  was  no  more, 
while  the  higher  military  courage,  based  on  morality  and  organiza- 
tion, appears  but  in  a  very  stunted  form.  Again,  the  coarser  fea- 
tures of  barbarism  were  gone:  faithful  retainers  were  no  longer 
sacrificed  at  the  death  of  their  chief,  but  human  sacrifices  remained ; 
torture,  inadmissible  in  the  case  of  a  free  man,  was  still  inflicted 
upon  free  women  or  upon  slaves.  The  Celts  had  lost  the  advan- 
tages which  especially  belong  to  the  primitive  epoch  of  nations,  but 
had  not  acquired  those  which  civilization  brings  with  it  when  it 
intimately  and  thoroughly  pervades  a  people. 

The  Celts  had  long  ceased  to  press  on  the  Iberian  tribes,  and 
the  country  between  the  Pyrenees  and  Garonne  was  occupied  by 
the  Aquitani,  a  number  of  tribes  of  Iberian  descent.  The  Roman 
arms  and  the  Roman  culture  had  already  made  great  inroads  upon 
the  Celtic  nation.  The  latter  was  now  cut  off  by  the  Roman  prov- 
ince from  Italy,  Spain,  and  the  Mediterranean.  Trade  and  com- 
merce had  already  paved  the  way  for  conquest  north  of  the  Roman 
bounds.  Wine  especially,  which  the  Gauls  drank  undiluted,  was 
greatly  prized,  and  Italian  horses  were  imported.  Roman  bur- 
gesses were  already  in  possession  of  land  in  cantons  north  of  the 
frontier,  and  the  Roman  language  was  by  no  means  unknown  in 
free  Gaul. 


800  ROME 

But  the  strongest  pressure  came  from  the  Germans  on  the  north 
and  east :  a  fresh  stock  from  the  cradle  of  peoples  in  the  East,  which 
made  room  for  itself  by  the  side  of  its  elder  brethren  with  youthful 
vigor,  although  also  with  youthful  rudeness.  The  German  tribes 
nearest  the  Rhine — the  Usipetes,  Tencteri,  Sugambri,  and  Ubii — 
were  by  this  time  partly  civilized  and  inhabited  fixed  territories; 
but  in  the  interior  agriculture  was  of  small  importance;  even  the 
names  of  the  various  tribes  were  unknown  to  the  Celts,  who  called 
them  by  the  general  appellation  of  Suebi  (wanderers),  and  Mar- 
comanni  (border  warriors).  Before  this  period  the  Celts  had  been 
driven  over  the  Rhine;  the  Boii,  who  were  once  in  Bavaria  and 
Bohemia,  were  harmless  wanderers,  and  the  region  of  the  Black 
Forest,  formerly  possessed  by  the  Helvetii,  was  a  desert,  or  occupied 
by  Germans.  Nor  had  the  intruders  stopped  at  the  Rhine ;  certain 
tribes,  among  whom  were  the  Aduatuci  and  the  Tungri,  perhaps 
also  the  Nervii  and  the  Treveri,  had  formed  settlements  west  of  the 
river,  and  exacted  hostages  and  tribute  from  the  neighboring  Gauls. 
Thus  free  Gaul  was  threatened  at  once  by  two  powerful  nations,  and 
was  at  the  same  time  torn  by  internal  dissensions.  How  should 
a  nation,  which  could  name  no  day  like  those  of  Marathon  and 
Salamis,  of  Aricia  and  the  Raudine  field, — a  nation  which,  even  in 
its  time  of  vigor,  had  made  no  attempt  to  destroy  Massilia  by  a 
united  effort — now,  when  evening  had  come,  defend  itself  against 
so  formidable  foes? 

The  internal  condition  of  Gaul  readily  became  mixed  up  with 
its  external  relations.  The  Romans,  from  their  first  interference, 
had  availed  themselves  of  the  perpetual  contests  for  the  hegemony, 
by  which  every  canton  was  torn  asunder;  they  had  supported  the 
Haedui  in  their  rivalry  with  the  Arverni  for  predominance  in  the 
south,  had  reduced  to  subjection  the  Allobroges  and  many  of 
the  client  cantons  of  the  Arverni,  and  got  the  hegemony  transferred 
from  the  latter  to  the  Haedui.  But  the  power  of  Rome  was  not  the 
only  foreign  force  which  might  be  invoked.  The  Sequani  in  central 
Gaul,  who  were  at  the  head  of  the  anti-Roman  faction,  had  availed 
themselves  of  the  remissness  of  the  senatorial  government  to  make 
an  attempt  to  destroy  Roman  influence  and  to  humble  their  rivals, 
the  Haedui. 

A  dispute  arose  between  the  two  tribes  as  to  tolls  on  the 
river  Saone,  which  separated  the  two  cantons;  and  about  the 
year  yi  b.c.  the  German  prince  Ariovistus  crossed  the  Rhine  at 


CAESAR     IN     GAUL  301 

71-55  B.C. 

the  head  of  fifteen  thousand  men  in  support  of  the  Sequani.  After 
a  long  war  the  Haedui  were  reduced,  in  61  B.C.,  to  conclude  a  most 
unfavorable  peace,  by  which  they  became  tributary  to  the  Sequani, 
and  swore  never  to  invoke  the  intervention  of  Rome.  The  Romans 
talked  of  assisting  the  Haedui,  and  even  issued  orders  to  that  effect 
to  the  governors  of  Gaul;  but  nothing  was  done,  and  Ariovistus 
was  even  enrolled  upon  the  list  of  friends  of  the  Roman  people. 
The  result  of  this  inaction  was  that  numerous  bands  of  Germans 
continued  to  cross  the  Rhine,  and  that  Ariovistus  determined  to 
extend  his  power  over  the  whole  of  Gaul.  The  Celts  were  treated 
as  a  conquered  nation;  even  his  friends,  the  Sequani,  were  forced 
to  cede  a  third  of  their  territory  to  make  room  for  his  fol- 
lowers, and  a  second  third  was  soon  demanded  for  the  tribe  of  the 
Harudes. 

But  the  invasion  of  Ariovistus  was  not  the  only  movement  in 
progress.  The  Usipetes  and  Tencteri,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  hard  pressed  by  Suebian  hordes,  had  set  out  to  find  new 
settlements  lower  down  the  Rhine.  Suebian  bands  gathered  oppo- 
site the  canton  of  the  Treveri.  Lastly,  the  Helvetii,  the  most  east- 
erly of  the  Celtic  cantons,  in  modern  Switzerland,  formed  the 
desperate  resolution  of  evacuating  their  own  territory,  in  order  to 
find  a  more  spacious  and  less  exposed  habitation  west  of  the  Jura 
mountains,  hoping  at  the  same  time  to  acquire  the  hegemony  of 
central  Gaul.  The  Rauraci,  in  southern  Alsace,  and  the  remnant 
of  the  homeless  Boii  were  induced  to  make  common  cause  with  the 
Helvetii.  If  their  scheme  were  carried  out,  their  original  settle- 
ment would,  of  course,  fall  to  the  German  invader.  From  the 
source  of  the  Rhine  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean  the  German  tribes  were 
in  motion ;  the  whole  line  of  the  Rhine  was  threatened  by  them.  It 
was  a  moment  like  that  when  the  Alamanni  and  the  Franks  threw 
themselves  on  the  falling  empire  of  the  Caesars ;  and  even  now  there 
seemed  on  the  eve  of  being  carried  into  effect  against  the  Celts  that 
very  movement  which  was  successful,  five  hundred  years  after- 
wards, against  the  Romans. 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  Caesar  entered  upon  his  province, 
in  58  B.C.  He  was  now  governor  of  both  the  Gauls,  including 
Istria  and  Dalmatia ;  his  office  was  secured  to  him  for  five  years,  and 
it  was  extended,  in  55  B.C.,  for  five  years  more;  he  had  the  right  of 
nominating  ten  lieutenants  and  (at  any  rate,  according  to  his  own 
interpretation  of  his  powers)  to  fill  up  his  legions  or  form  new  ones 


302  ROME 

58-57   B.C. 

from  the  population  of  his  provinces.  His  army  consisted  of  four 
veteran  legions,  the  seventh,  eighth,  ninth,  and  tenth,  in  all  about 
24,000  men,  besides  auxiliaries ;  he  had  some  Spanish  cavalry,  and 
archers  and  slingers  from  Numidia,  Crete,  and  the  Balearic  isles. 
His  staff  contained  several  able  officers,  such  as  Publius  Crassus, 
son  of  Caesar's  old  political  ally,  and  Titus  Labienus.  Caesar  had 
not  received  definite  instructions;  to  one  who  was  discerning  and 
courageous  these  were  implied  in  the  circumstances  with  which  he 
had  to  deal.  The  negligence  of  the  senate  had  to  be  retrieved,  and, 
first  of  all,  the  stream  of  German  invasion  had  to  be  checked. 

The  invasion  of  the  Helvetii  had  just  begun;  they  had  burned 
their  towns  and  villages  to  make  return  impossible,  and  had  gath- 
ered to  the  number  of  380,000  souls  at  the  Lacus  Lemannus,  near 
Geneva.  They  attempted  first  to  cross  the  Rhone  and  proceed 
through  Roman  territory  to  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic,  where  they 
had  determined  to  settle.  Caesar  prevented  this  movement,  and 
following  them  north  into  the  territory  of  the  Haedui  there  inflicted 
on  them  such  a  defeat  that  the  remnant  submitted  and  returned  to 
their  old  homes. 

The  attention  of  Caesar  was  next  drawn  to  the  middle  Rhine, 
where  the  German  leader  Ariovistus  had  established  himself  in 
Gallic  territory  and  was  levying  heavy  tribute  on  the  tribes  of  that 
region.  They  appealed  to  the  Roman  governor,  and  after  fruitless 
negotiations  Caesar  marched  against  the  Germans  and  in  a  severe 
battle  destroyed  their  entire  army.  Only  a  few  besides  their  king 
Ariovistus  escaped.  The  line  of  the  Rhine  was  won  by  this  battle. 
Caesar  might  have  expelled  the  Germans  who  had  already  settled 
themselves  on  the  left  bank,  but  preferring,  as  everywhere,  con- 
quered foes  to  doubtful  friends,  he  allowed  them  to  remain,  and 
intrusted  them  with  the  defense  of  the  Rhine  against  their  coun- 
trymen. 

The  consequences  of  this  one  campaign  were  great  and  lasting. 
It  was  now  finally  determined  that  the  whole  of  Gaul  should  be 
under  Roman  sway,  and  that  the  Rhine  should  be  the  boundary  of 
the  empire  against  the  Germans.  People  felt  that  now  another 
spirit  and  another  arm  had  begun  to  guide  the  destinies  of 
Rome. 

After  the  first  campaign  all  central  Gaul  submitted  to  the 
Romans,  while  the  middle  and  upper  Rhine  were  rendered  safe  from 
German  incursions.     But  the  northern  cantons  were  not  affected  by 


-    0 


CAESARINGAUL  303 

57-56  B.C. 

the  blow ;  moreover,  close  relations  subsisted  between  them  and  the 
Germans  over  the  Rhine,  while  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  Germanic 
tribes  were  making  ready  to  cross.  Accordingly,  in  the  spring  of 
57  B.C.,  Caesar  set  out  with  eight  legions  against  the  Belgic 
cantons.  He  made  an  alliance  with  one  of  these,  the  Remi,  and 
succeeded  in  attacking  and  defeating  the  other  Belgic  tribes  in 
detail.  Then  turning  east  he  destroyed  the  entire  army  of  the 
Nervii  in  modern  Hainault,  and  sold  the  Aduatuci  for  slaves  en 
masse. 

The  next  year  was  occupied  with  the  subjection  of  the  Are^ 
morican  cantons  in  the  west.  Publius  Crassus  had  been  sent  to 
them  in  the  autumn  of  57  B.C.,  and  had  induced  the  powerful  Veneti 
to  submit.  But  they  soon  repented,  and  during  the  winter  detained 
as  hostages  the  Roman  officers  who  came  to  levy  grain  among  them. 
The  whole  coast  from  the  Rhine  to  Loire  rose  against  Rome,  and 
the  leaders  were  calculating  on  the  rise  of  the  Belgae  and  on  aid 
from  Britain  and  from  the  Germans. 

Caesar  sent  Labienus  with  the  cavalry  to  the  Rhine,  and  Q. 
Titurius  Sabinus  to  Normandy,  while  the  main  attack  was  directed 
against  the  Veneti  by  land  and  sea.  Decimus  Brutus  hastily  formed 
a  fleet  of  ships,  which  he  levied  from  the  maritime  cantons,  or 
caused  to  be  built  on  the  Loire,  while  Caesar  advanced  with  the 
best  of  his  infantry.  But  the  Romans  encountered  the  greatest 
difficulties  in  the  campaign.  The  ships  of  the  Veneti  carried  off 
the  goods  and  inhabitants  of  each  town  as  soon  as  it  was  about  to 
fall  into  Caesar's  hands,  and  when  Brutus's  fleet  appeared  it  could 
at  first  make  no  headway  against  the  enemy's,  on  account  of  the  size 
and  strength  of  their  sailing  vessels.  Finally  by  a  happy  inspiration 
the  Romans  managed  to  cut  down  the  sails  of  the  Venetian  vessels 
with  sickles  bound  to  the  end  of  long  poles,  and  their  ships,  being 
unprovided  with  oars,  were  then  boarded  and  captured.  After 
this  the  whole  coast  submitted,  and  the  Veneti  were  sold  into  slavery, 
as  an  example  to  the  other  Gauls. 

Communications  with  Gaul  had  hitherto  been  carried  on  by  the 
road  over  the  western  Alps,  laid  out  by  Pompeius  in  yy  B.C.  Now 
that  central  Gaul  was  open  to  intercourse  with  Italy,  a  shorter  route 
crossing  the  Alps  in  a  northerly  direction  was  required.  Accord- 
ingly, in  57  B.C.  Servius  Galba  was  sent  to  occupy  Octodurum  and 
to  subdue  the  neighboring  tribes,  in  order  to  secure  the  merchant 
route  over  the  St.  Bernard  and  along  the  lake  of  Geneva.     In  56 


304  ROME 

56-55  B.C. 

B.C.  Publius  Crassus  was  sent  into  Aquitania  with  the  similar  object 
of  conquering  the  Iberian  tribes  there,  and,  though  opposed  by 
contingents  from  beyond  the  Pyrenees  led  by  officers  trained  in  the 
Sertorian  wars,  he  succeeded  in  reducing  all  the  country  between 
the  Garonne  and  the  Pyrenees. 

The  pacification  of  Gaul,  so  far  as  it  could  be  effected  by  the 
sword,  was  now  accomplished;  but  the  work  of  defending  the 
country  from  the  Germans  was  still  unfinished.  During  the  win- 
ter peoples  of  this  nation  to  the  number  of  430,000  crossed  the 
Rhine  into  Gaul,  and  in  55  B.C.  Caesar  marched  against  them  and 
cut  them  to  pieces.  He  then  crossed  to  the  east  side  of  the 
river  and  ravaged  the  country,  but  returned  after  a  stay  of  eight- 
een days. 

The  remainder  of  the  season  was  occupied  with  an  expedition 
into  Britain,  which  furnished,  if  not  armed  assistance,  at  any  rate  a 
safe  asylum  to  the  patriots  of  the  continent.  Publius  Crassus  had 
already,  in  57  B.C.,  crossed  to  the  Scilly  islands,  and  in  the  summer 
of  55  b.c.  Caesar  himself  crossed,  in  the  narrowest  part  of  the 
Channel,  with  two  legions.  The  coast  was  covered  with  multitudes 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  war  chariots  moved  on  as  fast  by  land  as  the 
Roman  galleys  by  sea;  and  it  was  only  with  great  difficulty,  and 
under  cover  of  the  missiles  thrown  from  the  ships  of  war,  that  a 
landing  was  effected.  Some  villages  submitted,  but  soon  the 
natives  appeared  from  the  interior  and  threatened  the  camp;  a 
storm  severely  damaged  the  fleet,  and  as  soon  as  the  necessary  re- 
pairs were  accomplished  the  Romans  returned  to  Gaul. 

During  the  winter  of  55  B.C.  a  fleet  of  eight  hundred  sail  was 
fitted  out,  and  in  the  spring  Caesar  sailed  a  second  time  to  Britain, 
with  five  legions  and  two  thousand  cavalry.  The  landing  was 
unopposed ;  but  a  second  time  the  fleet  was  nearly  destroyed  by  the 
storms,  and  while  the  Romans  repaired  the  disaster  the  British 
tribes  made  preparations  for  defense.  The  resistance  was  headed 
by  Cassivellaunus,  who  ruled  in  what  is  now  Middlesex  and  the 
surrounding  counties.  He  dismissed  the  general  levy,  retaining 
only  the  war  chariots,  with  which  he  dogged  Caesar's  footsteps, 
threatening  his  communications  and  devastating  the  country 
through  which  he  was  about  to  pass.  The  Thames  was  crossed, 
but  an  attack  by  the  men  of  Kent  upon  the  fleet  warned  Caesar  of 
the  danger  to  which  he  was  constantly  subject,  and  the  storming  of 
a  huge  abatis  where  the  cattle  of  the  country  were  collected  was  an 


CAESAR     IN     GAUL  305 

54-53  B.C. 

exploit  considerable  enough  to  afford  an  excuse  for  retreat.  Cassi- 
vellaunus  promised  hostages  and  tribute,  probably  with  no  intention 
of  giving  either,  and  Caesar  recrossed  into  Gaul.  His  immediate 
object— of  "  rousing  the  islanders  from  their  haughty  security  " — 
seems  certainly  to  have  been  attained. 

The  subjection  of  Gaul  was  now  complete,  while  both  Britons 
and  Germans  had  been  impressed  with  a  sense  of  the  power  of 
Rome ;  but  many  circumstances  combined  to  make  the  Celtic  nation 
restive  under  its  yoke.  They  were  ashamed  when  they  had  to 
confess  that  a  nation  numbering  a  million  armed  men  had  been 
subdued  by  fifty  thousand  Romans.  Central  Gaul  and  the  Belgian 
confederacy  had  submitted  almost  without  striking  a  blow ;  but  the 
heroic  resistance  of  the  Veneti  and  of  the  Britons  incited  the  pa- 
triotic Celts  to  make  another  attempt  to  recover  their  freedom. 
Even  in  54  B.C.,  the  Treveri  had  absented  themselves  from  the  gen- 
eral diet,  and  Caesar  had  carried  with  him  into  Britain  their  fore- 
most men  as  hostages ;  and  when  the  Haeduan  Dumnorix  refused  to 
embark,  he  was  pursued  and  cut  down  by  Caesar's  orders.  His 
death  created  a  deep  impression  all  through  the  ranks  of  the  Celtic 
nobility;  every  man  felt  that  the  fate  of  Dumnorix  might  be  his 
own. 

The  winter  of  54-53  B.C.  found  the  Roman  legions  quartered 
in  northern  Gaul  and  wrapped. in  a  sense  of  complete  security.  But 
suddenly  the  people  arose  on  their  conquerors  and,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Ambiorix,  king  of  the  Eburones,  began  a  simultaneous 
attack  on  .the  scattered  posts.  One  division  of  troops  under  Quin- 
tus  Sabinus  was  annihilated  and  another  under  Quintus  Cicero 
would  have  met  the  same  fate  but  for  the  opportune  arrival  of 
Caesar  with  a  relieving  force.  The  Gallic  army  was  again  defeated 
and  the  various  tribes  soon  scattered  to  their  homes.  After  taking 
a  terrible  vengeance  on  the  Eburones  and  making  another  short  in- 
cursion into  Germany  as  punishment  for  aid  given  the  insurgents, 
Caesar  crossed  the  Alps  at  the  end  of  53  B.C.  to  watch  the  daily  in- 
creasing complications  of  the  capital. 

But  for  once  Caesar  had  miscalculated.  The  fire  was  smoth- 
ered, but  not  extinguished.  The  position  of  affairs  was  most 
favorable  for  revolt.  Caesar  was  at  a  distance  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Alps,  while  his  army  was  encamped  on  the  Seine.  The  Roman 
troops  might  be  surrounded  and  the  province  overrun  before  he 
could  appear,  even  if  affairs  in  Italy  did  not  prevent  his  return.    The 


306  ROME 

52    B.C. 

signal  was  given  at  Cenabum  (Orleans),  and  all  the  Romans  there 
were  massacred.  Everywhere  the  patriots  were  astir.  Even  the 
Arverni,  the  stanchest  supporters  of  the  Romans  in  all  Gaul,  were 
brought  to  join  the  insurrection,  after  a  revolution  which  overthrew 
the  government  of  the  common  council  and  made  Vercingetorix, 
the  leader  of  the  Arvernian  patriots,  king.  The  latter  soon  became 
for  the  Celts  what  Cassivellaunus  had  been  for  the  Britons.  It 
was  felt  that  he,  if  any  man,  was  to  save  the  nation.  The  insurrec- 
tion spread  in  the  west  from  the  Garonne  to  the  Loire,  and  Ver- 
cingetorix was  everywhere  recognized  as  commander-in-chief.  Long 
before  he  was  expected,  however,  Caesar  reappeared  to  direct  his 
troops ;  but  the  summer  of  52  B.C.  saw  the  severest  fighting  that  the 
Romans  had  yet  known  in  Gaul.  The  whole  country  was  roused 
and  many  advised  a  retreat  over  the  Cevennes  into  the  old  province. 
Vercingetorix  ordered  the  country  to  be  laid  waste,  and  it  seemed 
impossible  either  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement  or  even  to  pro- 
cure supplies  for  the  Roman  troops.  The  Gauls  burned  their  own 
towns,  saving  only  those  capable  of  defense,  and  in  these  they 
defied  their  enemy.  Finally  Caesar  succeeded  in  blockading 
Vercingetorix  in  a  strongly  fortified  position  at  Alesia,  and  it 
became  evident  that  here  the  fate  of  the  country  was  to  be 
decided. 

At  the  moment  when  the  Roman  lines  were  on  the  point  of  com- 
pletion, Vercingetorix  dismissed  all  his  cavalry  with  orders  to 
rouse  the  whole  nation  for  the  relief  of  the  city.  The  miserable 
inhabitants  were  turned  out  of  the  town,  and  perished  of  hunger 
between  the  lines  of  either  side.  At  last  the  huge  host  of  the 
relieving  army  appeared — in  number  amounting  to  250,000  infan- 
try and  8000  cavalry.  But  Caesar  had  prepared  himself  to  be 
besieged,  and  his  rear  was  protected  by  a  strong  line  of  entrench- 
ments. A  determined  assault  was  made  upon  the  Romans  from 
without  and  from  within;  and  on  the  second  day  the  Celts  suc- 
ceeded, at  a  point  where  the  lines  ran  over  the  slope  of  a  hill,  in 
filling  up  the  trenches  and  hurling  the  defenders  from  the  ramparts. 
Labienus  threw  himself  with  four  legions  upon  the  enemy.  It  was 
the  crisis  of  the  struggle,  and  the  assailants  were  gradually  forced 
back,  while  squadrons  of  cavalry  attacked  them  in  the  rear  and  com- 
pleted the  rout. 

The  fate  of  Alesia  and  of  the  Celtic  nation  was  decided.  The 
army  dispersed,  and  the  king  was,  by  his  own  consent,  delivered  up 


CAESARINGAUL  307 

52  B.C. 

to  the  Romans  for  punishment,  in  order  to  avert  as  far  as  possible 
destruction  from  the  nation,  by  bringing  it  upon  his  own  head. 
Mounted  on  his  steed  and  in  full  armor  the  king  of  the  Arvernians 
appeared  before  the  Roman  proconsul,  and  rode  round  his  tribunal ; 
then  he  surrendered  his  horse  and  arms,  and  sat  down  in  silence  on 
the  steps  at  Caesar's  feet.  Five  years  afterwards  he  was  led  in 
Caesar's  triumph,  and  beheaded  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol.  As 
after  a  day  of  gloom  the  sun  breaks  through  the  clouds  at 
its  setting,  so  destiny  bestows  on  nations  that  are  going  down  a 
last  great  man.  Thus  Hannibal  stands  at  the  close  of  the 
Phoenician  history,  and  Vercingetorix  at  the  close  of  the  Celtic. 
They  were  not  able  to  save  the  nations  to  which  they  belonged  from 
a  foreign  yoke,  but  they  spared  them  the  last  remaining  disgrace, 
an  inglorious  fall. 

The  whole  ancient  world  presents  no  more  genuine  knight 
than  Vercingetorix,  whether  as  regards  his  essential  character 
or  his  outward  appearance.  But  man  ought  not  to  be  a  mere 
knight,  and  least  of  all  the  statesman.  It  was  the  knight,  not 
the  hero,  who  disdained  to  escape  from  Alesia,  when  he  alone  was 
of  more  consequence  to  the  nation  than  a  hundred  thousand  ordi- 
nary brave  men.  It  was  the  knight,  not  the  hero,  who  gave  himself 
up  as  a  sacrifice,  when  the  only  thing  gained  by  the  sacrifice  was 
that  the  nation  publicly  dishonored  itself,  and  with  equal  cowardice 
and  absurdity  employed  its  last  breath  in  proclaiming  that  its  great 
historical  death-struggle  was  a  crime  against  its  oppressor.  How 
very  different  was  the  conduct  of  Hannibal  in  similar  positions !  It 
is  impossible  to  part  from  the  noble  king  of  the  Arverni  without  a 
feeling  of  historical  and  human  sympathy;  but  it  is  characteristic 
of  the  Celtic  nation,  that  its  greatest  man  was  after  all  merely  a 
knight. 

After  the  fall  of  Alesia  no  united  effort  was  made  to  continue 
the  insurrection;  the  league  fell  to  pieces,  and  every  clan  made 
what  terms  it  could  with  the  conqueror.  Caesar  was  anxious 
for  many  reasons  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close,  and  the  easy  tempera- 
ment of  the  Gauls  met  him  halfway.  Where  there  was  a  strong 
Roman  party,  as  among  the  Haedui  and  Arverni,  the  cantons  ob- 
tained a  complete  restoration  of  their  former  relations  with  Rome, 
and  their  captives  were  released  without  ransom,  while  those  of  the 
other  clans  became  the  slaves  of  the  legionaries.  But  not  a  few 
cantons  refused  to  make  submission,  until  the  Roman  troops  ap- 


308  ROME 

51-46    B.C. 

peared  within  their  borders.  Such  expeditions  were  undertaken  in 
the  winter  and  in  the  following  summer  against  the  Bituriges  and 
Carnutes,  the  Bellovaci  and  other  Belgic  cantons.  The  Bellovacian 
king  Correus  offered  a  brave  resistance,  but  was  at  last  slain  in  a 
skirmish.  On  the  Loire  strong  bands  assembled  which  required  a 
considerable  Roman  force  to  defeat  them.  The  last  remnant  of 
opposition  was  at  Uxellodunum  on  the  Lot,  where  Drappes  and 
Lucterius,  the  brave  adjutant  of  Vercingetorix,  shut  themselves  up. 
The  town  was  taken  only  after  Caesar  had  appeared  in  person,  and 
the  spring  from  which  the  garrison  derived  water  had  been  diverted. 
The  whole  garrison  were  dismissed  to  their  homes  after  their  hands 
had  been  cut  off. 

Thus  Gaul  was  finally  subdued  after  eight  years'  war.  Hardly 
a  year  later  the  Roman  troops  had  to  be  withdrawn,  owing  to  the 
outbreak  of  civil  war ;  yet  the  Celts  did  not  rise  against  the  foreign 
yoke,  and  Gaul  was  the  only  part  of  the  Roman  empire  where  there 
was  no  fighting  against  Caesar.  Later  disturbances,  like  the  rising 
of  the  Bellovaci  in  46  B.C.,  were  easily  dealt  with  by  the  local  gov- 
ernors. This  state  of  peace  was,  it  is  true,  purchased  to  a  large 
extent  by  allowing  the  more  distant  districts  to  withdraw  them- 
selves de  facto  from  the  Roman  allegiance ;  but  however  unfinished 
the  building  of  Caesar  may  have  been,  its  foundations  remained 
firm  and  unshaken. 

For  the  present  the  newly  acquired  provinces  were  united  with 
the  province  of  Narbo,  but  when  Caesar  gave  up  this  governorship, 
in  46  b.cv  two  new  governorships,  of  Gaul  proper  and  Belgica,  were 
formed.  The  individual  cantons  of  course  lost  their  independence, 
and  paid  to  Rome  a  fixed  tribute  which  they  levied  themselves. 
The  total  was  two  million  dollars,  but  masses  of  gold  from  the 
treasures  of  temples  and  of  rich  men  also  flowed  to  Rome  to 
such  an  extent  that,  as  compared  with  silver,  gold  fell  twenty-five 
per  cent. 

Existing  arrangements  were  everywhere  allowed  to  remain 
as  far  as  possible;  the  hereditary  kingships,  the  feudal  oligarchies, 
even  the  system  of  clientship  by  which  one  canton  was  dependent  on 
another  still  existed.  Caesar's  sole  object  was  to  arrange  matters 
in  the  interest  of  Rome,  and  to  bring  into  power  the  men  favorably 
disposed  to  Roman  rule.  Cantons  where  the  Roman  party  was 
strong  and  trustworthy,  such  as  the  Remi,  the  Lingones,  and  the 
Haedui,  received  the  right  of  alliance  which    gave    them    much 


CAESAR    IN     GAUL  309 

51-46  B.C. 

greater  communal  freedom,  and  were  invested  with  the  hegemony 
over  other  cantons.  The  national  worship  and  its  priests  were 
preserved  as  much  as  possible. 

At  the  same  time  Caesar  did  what  he  could  to  stimulate  the 
Romanization  of  Gaul.  A  number  of  Celts  of  rank  were  admitted 
to  Roman  citizenship — perhaps  into  the  Roman  senate;  Latin 
was  made  the  official  language  in  several  cantons ;  and  while  smaller 
money  might  be  coined  by  the  local  authorities  for  local  circulation, 
this  might  only  be  done  in  conformity  with  the  Roman  standard, 
and  the  coinage  of  gold  and  of  denarii  was  reserved  for  the  Roman 
magistrates  alone.  Hereafter  the  organization  of  the  cantons 
approached  more  nearly  to  the  Italian  urban  constitution,  and  both 
the  common  councils  and  the  chief  towns  became  of  far  greater 
importance  than  hitherto.  If  Caesar  did  little  in  the  way  of  found- 
ing colonies — only  two  settlements  can  be  traced  to  him,  that  of 
Noviodunum  and  that  of  the  Boii — it  was  because  circumstances 
did  not  allow  him  to  exchange  the  sword  for  the  plow.  No  one 
probably  saw  more  clearly  than  himself  the  military  and  political 
advantages  of  establishing  a  series  of  Transalpine  colonies  as  bases 
of  support  for  the  new  center  of  civilization. 

Gaul  as  a  nation  had  ceased  to  exist;  it  was  absorbed  in  a 
politically  superior  nationality.  The  course  of  the  war  was  signifi- 
cant enough  of  the  character  of  the  nation :  at  the  outset  only  single 
districts,  and  those  German  or  half  German,  offered  energetic  re- 
sistance;  and  when  foreign  rule  was  established,  the  attempts  to 
shake  it  off  were  either  without  plan  or  were  the  work  of  certain 
prominent  nobles,  and  with  the  death  or  capture  of  an  Indutiomarus 
or  a  Vercingetorix  the  struggle  was  at  an  end. 

But  the  ruin  of  the  Celtic  nation  was  not  the  most  important 
result  of  Caesar's  wars.  Nothing  but  the  insight  and  energy  of 
Caesar  prevented  Gaul  from  being  overrun  by  the  Germans,  in 
whom  the  Roman  statesman  saw  the  rivals  and  antagonists  of  the 
Graeco-Roman  world.  By  his  conquests  and  organization  he 
gained  time  for  the  West  to  acquire  that  culture  which  the  East  had 
already  assumed :  but  for  him  the  great  migration  of  peoples  which 
took  place  five  hundred  years  later  would  have  taken  place  under 
Ariovistus.  Had  it  so  happened,  our  civilization  would  hardly  have 
stood  in  any  more  intimate  relation  to  the  Romano-Greek  than  to 
the  Indian  and  Assyrian  culture.  That  there  is  a  bridge  connecting 
the  past  glory  of  Hellas  and  Rome  with  the  prouder  fabric  of  mod- 


310  ROME 

51-46     B.C. 

ern  history ;  that  western  Europe  is  Romanic  and  Germanic  Europe 
classic;  that  the  names  of  Themistocles  and  Scipio  have  to  us  a 
very  different  sound  from  those  of  Asoka  and  Salmanassar;  that 
Homer  and  Sophocles  are  not  merely  like  the  Vedas  and  Kalidasa 
attractive  to  the  literary  botanist,  but  bloom  for  us  in  our  own 
garden — all  this  is  the  work  of  Caesar;  and  while  the  creation  of 
his  great  predecessor  in  the  East  has  been  almost  wholly  reduced  to 
ruin  by  the  tempests  of  the  Middle  Ages,  the  structure  of  Caesar 
has  outlasted  those  thousands  of  years  which  have  changed  religion 
and  polity  for  the  human  race  and  even  shifted  the  center  of  civili- 
zation itself,  and  it  stands  erect  for  what  we  may  term  perpetuity. 


Chapter  XXX 

THE  JOINT  RULE  OF  POMPEIUS  AND  CAESAR 
57-52   B.C. 

OF  the  three  joint  rulers,  Pompeius,  Caesar  and  Crassus,  the 
first-named  was  the  foremost  in  the  eyes  of  the  Roman 
world.  Nor  is  this  surprising,  for  Pompeius  was  undoubt- 
edly the  first  general  of  his  time,  while  Caesar,  so  far  as  he  was 
known,  was  only  a  dexterous  party  leader.  In  the  eyes  of  the  multi- 
tude he  was  to  Pompeius  what  Flavius  and  Afranius  had  been — 
a  useful  instrument  for  political  purposes.  And  if  the  position  of 
Pompeius  under  the  Gabinian  law  was  compared  with  that  of  Caesar 
under  the  Vatinian,  the  comparison  was  to  the  advantage  of  the 
former;  for  Pompeius  had  almost  the  whole  resources  of  the  state 
under  his  control,  and  ruled  nearly  the  whole  empire,  while  Caesar 
had  only  certain  fixed  sums  and  four  legions,  and  ruled  two  prov- 
inces. Caesar,  again,  was  to  resign  his  command  after  five  years, 
while  Pompeius  had  fixed  his  own  time  for  retirement. 

But  Pompeius  attempted  a  task  beyond  his  powers  when  he 
undertook  to  rule  the  capital — a  problem  always  infinitely  difficult, 
because  there  was  no  armed  force  at  the  disposal  of  the  govern- 
ment, whatever  it  might  be.  The  result  was  complete  anarchy: 
after  Caesar's  departure  the  coalition  still  ruled  doubtless  the  des- 
tinies of  the  world,  but  not  the  streets  of  the  capital.  The  senate 
felt  its  impotence,  and  attempted  no  show  of  authority;  Pompeius 
shut  himself  up  and  sulked  in  silence;  the  sound  portion  of  the 
citizens,  who  had  at  heart  freedom  and  order,  kept  rigorously  aloof 
from  politics.  But  for  the  rabble  of  all  sorts,  high  and  low,  it  was 
a  time  of  carnival ;  demagogism  became  a  trade,  which  accordingly 
did  not  lack  its  professional  insignia — the  threadbare  mantle,  the 
shaggy  beard,  the  long  streaming  hair,  the  deep  bass  voice. 

Greeks  and  Jews,  freedmen  and  slaves,  were  the  most  regular 
attendants  at  the  popular  assemblies,  and  often  only  a  minority  of 
those  voting  consisted  of  burgesses  legally  constituted.  The  real 
rulers  of  Rome  were  the  armed  bands,  raised  by  adventurers  out 

311 


312  ROME 

57    B.C. 

of  gladiatorial  slaves  and  blackguards  of  all  sorts.  These  bands 
had  hitherto  been  usually  under  the  control  of  the  popular  leaders, 
but  now  all  discipline  was  at  an  end,  and  the  leaders  of  the  bands 
fought  either  for  the  democracy,  for  the  senate,  or  for  Crassus: 
Clodius  had  fought  at  different  times  for  all  three. 

The  most  noted  of  these  street  leaders  was  Publius  Clodius, 
whom  the  regents  had  already  made  use  of  against  Cato  and  Cicero. 
During  his  tribunate  he  had  exerted  all  his  great  talent,  energy,  and 
influence  to  promote  an  ultra-democratic  policy:  he  gave  the  citi- 
zens corn  gratis;  prohibited  the  obstruction  of  the  comitia  by 
religious  formalities;  reestablished  the  street-clubs,  which  consti- 
tuted a  complete  organization  of  the  whole  proletariate  of  the  city 
according  to  streets ;  and  set  the  seal  of  divine  favor  upon  his  doings 
by  erecting  a  grand  Temple  of  Liberty  on  the  Palatine. 

The  position  of  Pompeius  was  soon  seriously  compromised : 
Clodius  opposed  him  in  a  trifling  matter  about  the  sending  back 
of  a  captive  Armenian  prince,  and  the  quarrel  became  a  serious 
feud.  Pompeius  revenged  himself  by  allowing  the  return  of  Cicero, 
the  bitter  enemy  of  Clodius.  But  the  real  battleground  was  in  the 
streets,  and  here,  though  Pompeius  had  his  own  hired  gangs, 
Clodius  was  usually  victorious.  To  complete  the  spectacle,  both 
parties  in  the  quarrel  courted  the  favor  of  the  senate;  Pompeius 
pleased  it  by  recalling  Cicero,  Clodius  by  declaring  the  Julian 
laws  null  and  void.  Naturally  no  positive  result  came  from  this 
political  witches'  revel — it  was  quite  aimless;  demagogism  was  a 
mere  makeshift  in  the  interregnum  between  republic  and  mon- 
archy. It  had  not  even  the  effect  of  kindling  the  desire  for  a  strong 
government  based  on  military  power;  for  those  citizens  likely  to 
be  affected  in  this  way  lived  mostly  away  from  Rome,  and  were  not 
touched  by  the  anarchy  which  prevailed  there;  and  besides,  they 
had  already  been  thoroughly  converted  to  the  cause  of  authority 
by  the  Catilinarian  attempts.  The  only  important  result  of  all  this 
confusion  was  the  painful  position  of  Pompeius,  which  must  have 
had  considerable  influence  upon  his  future  conduct. 

Far  more  important  than  the  change  in  the  relations  of  Pom- 
peius with  Clodius  was  his  altered  position  with  regard  to  Caesar. 
While  Pompeius  had  failed  to  fulfill  the  functions  assigned  to  him, 
Caesar  had  been  brilliantly  successful:  he  had  crushed  the  threat- 
ening German  invasion,  and  in  two  years  had  carried  the  Roman 
arms  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Channel.     Already,  in  57  B.C.,  the  senate 


POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR  313 

57  B.C. 

had  voted  him  the  usual  honors  in  far  richer  measure  than  had  ever 
been  accorded  to  Pompeius.  Caesar  was  now  the  hero  of  the  day, 
master  of  the  most  powerful  Roman  army;  while  Pompeius  was 
merely  an  ex-general  who  had  once  been  famous.  No  rupture  had 
taken  place,  but  it  was  evident  that  the  alliance  must  be  at  an  end 
when  the  relative  position  of  the  parties  was  reversed.  At  any  rate 
Pompeius  found  it  necessary  to  abandon  his  attitude  of  haughty 
reserve,  and  to  come  forward  and  attempt  to  gain  for  himself  a 
command  which  would  again  put  him  on  equal  terms  with  Caesar. 
To  do  this  he  must  be  able  to  control  the  machinery  of  govern- 
ment: but  by  his  awkward  quarrel  with  Clodius  he  had  lost  com- 
mand of  the  streets,  and  therefore  could  not  count  on  carrying  his 
point  in  the  popular  assembly ;  and  at  the  same  time  it  was  doubtful 
whether  after  his  long  inaction  even  the  senate  was  sufficiently 
under  his  influence  to  grant  what  he  wished. 

The  opposition  to  the  regents  had  been  growing  in  strength 
and  importance,  and  they  were  powerless  to  check  it ;  in  consequence, 
a  change  occurred  in  the  position  of  the  senate,  which  found  itself 
largely  increased  in  importance.  The  marriage  alliance  of  Caesar 
and  Pompeius,  and  the  banishments  of  Cato  and  of  Cicero,  sug- 
gested unpleasantly  to  the  public  mind  the  decrees  and  alliances  of 
monarchs,  and  men  began  to  perceive  that  it  was  no  modification  of 
the  republican  constitution  which  was  at  stake,  but  the  existence  of 
the  republic  itself.  Many  of  the  best  men  who  had  hitherto  be- 
longed to  the  popular  party  now  passed  over  to  the  other  side. 
The  "  three  dynasts,"  the  "  three-headed  monster,"  were  phrases 
in  everybody's  mouth.  Even  the  masses  began  to  waver :  Caesar's 
consular  orations  were  listened  to  without  a  sound;  at  the  theater 
no  applause  greeted  his  entrance,  and  his  tools  and  associates  were 
publicly  hissed.  The  rulers  hinted  to  the  equites  that  their  opposi- 
tion might  cost  them  their  new  special  seats  in  the  theater,  and  that 
the  commons  might  lose  their  free  corn.  Caesar's  wealth  was 
employed  in  every  direction  to  gain  adherents ;  no  one,  unless  hope- 
lessly lost,  was  refused  assistance  in  distress,  and  the  enormous 
buildings  set  on  foot  by  Caesar  and  Pompeius  brought  gain  to  great 
numbers  of  men  in  every  position.  But  corruption  could  touch  only 
a  comparatively  small  number,  and  every  day  brought  proofs  of  the 
strong  attachment  of  the  people  to  the  existing  constitution  and  of 
their  hatred  of  monarchy.  Under  representative  institutions  the 
popular  discontent  would  have  found  an  outlet  at  the  elections,  but 


314  ROME 

57    B.C. 

under  the  existing  circumstances  the  only  course  left  for  the  sup- 
porters of  the  republic  was  to  range  themselves  under  the  banner  of 
the  senate.  Thus,  for  the  moment,  the  senate  rested  on  a  firmer 
support  than  it  had  enjoyed  for  years;  it  began  to  bestir  itself 
again.  With  its  approval  and  support  a  proposal  was  submitted 
to  the  people,  permitting  the  return  of  Cicero.  An  unusual 
number  of  good  citizens,  especially  from  the  country  towns, 
attended  on  the  day  of  voting,  August  4,  57  B.C.,  and  the  journey 
of  the  orator  from  Brundisium  to  Rome  was  made  the  occasion  of 
a  brilliant  demonstration  in  favor  of  the  senate  and  the  constitution. 
Pompeius  was  helpless,  and  his  helplessness  disarmed  the  party  in 
the  senate  favorable  to  the  regents.  Had  the  senate  possessed  a 
leader  their  cause  might  even  yet  have  won ;  they  might  have  can- 
celed the  extraordinary  powers  as  unconstitutional,  and  summoned 
all  the  republicans  of  Italy  to  arm  against  the  tyrants.  But  the  nec- 
essary leader  was  wanting,  and  the  aristocracy  were  too  indolent 
to  take  so  simple  and  bold  a  resolution.  They  preferred  to  side 
with  Pompeius  against  Caesar,  in  the  hope  that  a  rupture  between 
the  two  was  inevitable;  and  to  settle  matters  with  Pompeius,  after 
victory,  might  be  expected  to  be  no  very  difficult  matter. 

It  seemed  natural  that  an  alliance  between  Pompeius  and  the 
republicans  should  be  formed,  but  the  matter  was  brought  to  a  test 
when,  in  the  autumn  of  57  B.C.,  Pompeius  came  before  the  senate 
with  a  proposal  to  intrust  him  with  extraordinary  official  power. 
His  proposal  was  based  upon  the  price  of  corn  in  the  capital,  which 
had  again  reached  an  oppressive  height,  owing  to  the  continuance  of 
piracy  and  the  negligence  of  the  government  in  supervising  the 
supply.  He  wished  to  be  intrusted  with  the  superintendence  of  all 
matters  relating  to  corn  supply  throughout  the  whole  empire,  and 
for  this  purpose  to  be  invested  with  unlimited  control  over  the  state 
treasure,  with  an  army  and  fleet,  and  with  powers  superior  to  those 
of  the  ordinary  governor  in  every  province;  and  to  this  command 
he  hoped  that  the  conduct  of  the  impending  Egyptian  war  would 
naturally  be  added.  The  senate  accepted  the  proposal  in  principle 
with  outward  obsequiousness,  but  made  alterations  which  seriously 
curtailed  the  general's  authority.  Pompeius  obtained  no  unlimited 
power,  but  merely  certain  large  sums  and  fifteen  adjutants  for  the 
purpose  of  organizing  due  supplies  for  the  capital,  and,  in  all  mat- 
ters relating  to  grain  supply  only,  full  proconsular  power  throughout 
the  empire  for  five  years.     The  decree  of  the  senate  was  ratified 


POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR  315 

56  B.C. 

by  the  people.  The  regent  had  missed  his  object,  but  he  had  ob- 
tained definite  employment  and  an  excuse  for  leaving  the  capital, 
and  the  supply  of  corn  was  soon  in  a  more  satisfactory  condition. 
Still,  without  troops  his  proconsular  authority  was  only  a  shadow, 
and  he  got  a  second  proposal  made  in  the  senate,  conferring  upon 
him  the  charge  of  restoring  the  expelled  king  of  Egypt,  if  necessary 
by  force  of  arms.  But  the  senate  grew  less  and  less  compliant;  it 
was  discovered  in  the  Sibylline  books  that  it  was  impious  to  send 
a  Roman  army  to  Egypt.  Pompeius  was  ready  to  accept  the  mission 
even  without  an  army,  but  the  senate  refused  to  risk  so  valuable  a 
life,  and  ultimately  resolved,  in  56  B.C.,  not  to  interfere  at  all. 

These  rebuffs  of  Pompeius  were,  of  course,  regarded  as  de- 
feats of  the  regents  generally,  and  the  tide  of  opposition  rose  higher 
and  higher.  The  elections  for  56  B.C.  had  gone  only  very  partially 
according  to  the  wishes  of  the  triumvirate,  and  for  the  consulship 
of  55  B.C.  Lucius  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  announced  himself  as  a 
candidate  with  the  avowed  object  of  actively  opposing  them.  The 
senate  solemnly  deliberated  over  an  opinion  which  was  furnished 
by  certain  Etruscan  soothsayers  of  repute,  that  the  whole  power 
over  the  army  and  treasure  threatened  to  pass  to  one  ruler,  and  that 
the  state  would  lose  its  freedom.  But  they  soon  went  on  to  a  more 
practical  declaration  of  war.  As  early  as  December,  57  B.C.,  the 
opinion  had  been  expressed  in  the  senate  that  the  laws  of  Caesar's 
consulship,  especially  the  law  about  the  domain  land  of  Capua,  must 
be  cancelled;  and  in  April,  56  B.C.,  Cicero  moved  that  the  Capuan 
law  should  be  taken  into  consideration  on  May  1.  Domitius  soon 
afterwards  declared  that  he  intended  as  consul  to  propose  to  the 
burgesses  the  immediate  recall  of  Caesar;  and  in  this  manner  the 
nobility  threw  down  the  gauntlet  to  the  regents. 

The  triumvirs  had  no  time  to  lose.  Crassus  immediately  started 
north  to  confer  with  Caesar,  whom  he  found  at  Ravenna ;  at  Luca 
they  were  joined  by  Pompeius,  who  had  left  Rome  ostensibly  on 
business  connected  with  the  supply  of  grain.  The  most  noted  ad- 
herents of  the  rulers,  such  as  Metellus  Nepos,  proconsul  of  Hither 
Spain,  and  Appius  Claudius,  propretor  of  Sardinia,  followed  them. 
A  hundred  and  twenty  lictors  and  two  hundred  senators  were 
counted  at  the  conference ;  it  was  almost  a  rival  senate  of  the  mon- 
archy as  opposed  to  the  other  senate  of  the  republic.  The  decisive 
voice  lay  with  Caesar,  and  he  used  it  to  reestablish  the  joint  rule 
on  a  firmer  basis,  with  a  more  equal  distribution  of  power.     The 


S16  ROME 

55-48    B.C. 

most  important  governorships  after  Gaul,  namely  the  two  Spains 
and  Syria,  were  assigned,  the  former  to  Pompeius,  the  latter  to 
Crassus,  and  were  to  be  secured  by  decree  of  the  people  for  five 
years.  Caesar  was  to  have  his  own  office  prolonged  for  another 
five  years,  from  54  b.c.  to  the  close  of  49  B.C.;  and  to  be  allowed 
to  increase  his  legions  to  ten,  and  to  charge  the  pay  of  his  arbitrarily 
levied  troops  on  the  state  chest.  Pompeius  and  Crassus  were  to  hold 
the  consulship  for  55  B.C.,  before  departing  for  their  provinces,  and 
Caesar  was  to  be  consul  in  48  B.C.,  after  the  termination  of  his  com- 
mand. The  military  support  necessary  for  the  regulation  of  the 
capital  was  to  be  supplied  by  raising  legions  for  the  Spanish  and 
Syrian  armies,  and  keeping  them  in  Italy  as  long  as  should  seem 
convenient.  Minor  details  were  easily  settled  by  Caesar's  magic 
influence;  Pompeius  and  Crassus  were  reconciled  to  each  other, 
and  even  Clodius  was  induced  to  give  no  further  annoyance  to 
Pompeius. 

The  reasons  which  induced  Caesar  to  concede  to  his  rival  so 
powerful  a  position — a  position  which  he  had  refused  him  in  60  B.C., 
when  the  league  was  formed — can  only  be  conjectured.  It  was  not 
that  necessity  compelled  him,  for  Pompeius  was  a  powerless  sup- 
pliant at  Caesar's  feet;  and  even  if,  in  case  of  a  rupture,  he  had 
joined  the  optimates,  the  alliance  would  not  have  been  so  formidable 
as  to  demand  so  heavy  a  price  to  prevent  it.  Probably  Caesar  was 
not  yet  prepared  for  civil  war;  but  in  any  case  the  decision  of 
peace  or  war  rested,  not  with  Pompeius,  but  with  the  opposition. 
Possibly  purely  personal  motives  may  have  contributed;  Caesar 
was  not  the  man  to  be  disloyal  to  his  allies,  and  he  may  have  hesi- 
tated to  break  the  heart  of  his  beloved  daughter,  who  was  sincerely 
attached  to  her  husband.  In  his  soul  there  was  room  for  much 
besides  the  statesman.  But  the  main  reason  was  undoubtedly  the 
consideration  of  Gaul.  If  Caesar's  object  was  to  become  king  of 
Rome  as  soon  as  possible,  it  was  a  grave  blunder  to  give  up  his 
present  enormous  superiority  over  his  rivals,  and  especially  to  put 
Pompeius  in  a  position  to  settle  matters  independently  with  the 
senate.  But  Caesar's  was  no  vulgar  ambition;  the  conquest  of 
Gaul  was  an  enterprise  on  which  depended  the  external  security 
and  internal  reorganization  of  the  empire;  it  was  necessary  for 
the  repression  of  German  invasions,  and  necessary  to  furnish  new 
soil  for  Italian  civilization.  But  Caesar's  Gallic  conquests  hindered 
far  more  than  they  helped  him  on  the  way  to  the  throne,  and  it 


£ 

\  tfpt 

IK 

i 

Va 

;                  *^P 

T'^im*  ^tH 

MARCUS    TULLIUS    CICERO 

(Born    1 06    b.  c.     Died    43    b.  c.) 

Marble  bust  in   the   Ufiszi,  Florenct 


POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR  317 

66-48   B.C. 

yielded  him  bitter  fruit  that  he  postponed  the  revolution  from  56 
to  48  B.C. 

The  aristocracy  did  not  make  good  its  gage.  They  had  taken 
up  arms  only  to  lay  them  down  as  soon  as  the  adversary  merely  put 
his  hand  to  the  sheath.  Nothing  more  was  heard  about  discussion 
of  the  Julian  laws  in  the  senate ;  the  legions  raised  by  Caesar  were 
charged  on  the  public  chest,  and  the  attempts  to  take  from  him  one 
or  both  of  his  provinces  decisively  failed.  Cicero  was  among  the 
first  to  repent,  and  applied  to  himself  epithets  more  appropriate 
than  flattering.1  The  troops  for  Syria  did  indeed  depart,  but  the 
legions  for  Spain  were  dismissed  on  furlough,  and  Pompeius  re- 
mained with  them  in  Italy.  At  the  same  time  the  regents  acted 
deliberately  in  such  a  manner  as  to  withdraw  from  the  senate  what 
had  hitherto  been  its  especial  function — the  management  of  military 
matters  and  of  foreign  affairs.  The  arrangements  made  at  Luca 
with  regard  to  the  provinces  of  Gaul,  Spain,  and  Syria  were  sub- 
mitted to  and  approved  by  the  people.  The  regents  lent  and  bor- 
rowed troops  from  each  other  without  authority.  The  Transpadani 
were  apparently  treated  by  Caesar  as  full  burgesses  of  Rome,  though 
they  had  legally  only  Latin  rights.  Caesar  organized  his  conquests 
and  founded  colonies,  such  as  Novum  Comum,  without  the  consent 
of  the  senate.  The  Thracian,  Egyptian,  and  Parthian  wars  were 
conducted  by  the  generals  in  command  without  consulting  or  even 
reporting  to  the  senate. 

The  majority  of  the  senate  submitted  humbly  enough  to  ne- 
cessity. Cicero  was  now  completely  in  the  service  of  the  regents. 
His  brother  was  an  officer  in  Caesar's  army,  in  some  measure  as  a 
hostage.  Cicero  himself  was  compelled  to  accept  an  office  under 
Pompeius,  on  pretense  of  which  he  might  be  banished  at  any  mo- 
ment; and  he  submitted  to  be  relieved  from  his  pecuniary  embar- 
rassments by  loans  from  Caesar  and  by  an  appointment  to  the  joint 
overseership  of  the  vast  building  operations  in  the  capital.  Many 
prominent  members  of  the  nobility  were  kept  subservient  by  similar 
methods;  but  there  remained  a  certain  section  which  could  be 
neither  intimidated  nor  cajoled.  The  foremost  of  these  was  Cato, 
who  ceaselessly,  at  the  peril  of  his  life,  offered  the  most  determined 
opposition  in  senate-house  and  Forum.  The  regents  did  not  molest 
him  and  his  followers;  strong  measures  would  have  made  them 
martyrs,  and,  after  all,  their  activity  was  unavailing.    But  though 

1  "Me  asinum  germanum  fuisse"  (Ad  Att.,  iv.  5.  3). 


S18  ROME 

56-53    B.C. 

destitute  of  important  results,  their  action  fostered  and  gave  the 
watchword  to  the  widespread  discontent  which  fermented  in  secret : 
and  they  were  often  able  to  draw  the  majority  in  the  senate,  which 
secretly  sympathized  with  them,  into  isolated  decrees  against  its 
masters  and  their  adherents.  Thus  Gabinius  was  refused  a  public 
thanksgiving  in  56  B.C.;  Piso  was  recalled  from  his  province;  and 
the  senate  wore  mourning  when  the  tribune  Gaius  Cato  hindered 
the  elections  of  55  B.C.  as  long  as  the  republican  consul  Marcellinus 
remained  in  office.  But  the  great  fact  was  unaltered — the  regents 
were  supreme.  "  No  one,"  says  a  contemporary  writer,  "  is  of  the 
slightest  account  except  the  three;  the  regents  are  all-powerful, 
and  they  take  care  that  no  one  shall  remain  in  doubt  about  it;  the 
whole  state  is  virtually  transformed,  and  obeys  the  dictators." 

The  opposition,  powerless  in  the  field  of  government,  could  not 
nevertheless  be  dislodged  from  certain  departments  of  state  which 
had  considerable  political  influence — the  elections  of  magistrates, 
and  the  jury  courts.  The  former,  which  belong  properly  to  the 
government  of  the  state,  were,  under  the  present  regime,  when  the 
government  was  really  wielded  by  extraordinary  magistrates,  unim- 
portant ;  the  ordinary  magistrates  themselves  were  ciphers,  and  the 
elections  sank  into  mere  demonstrations.  The  regents  spared  no 
pains  to  gain  the  victory  even  here :  the  lists  of  candidates  for  some 
years  was  settled  at  Luca ;  large  sums  were  expended  upon  elections, 
and  numbers  of  soldiers  were  sent  on  furlough  from  the  armies  of 
Caesar  and  Pompeius  to  vote  at  Rome.  But  the  result  was  only 
partial  success.  For  55  b.c.  Pompeius  and  Crassus  were  elected 
only  by  open  violence  and  after  the  most  scandalous  scenes.  For  54 
b.c.  Domitius  was  elected  consul  and  Cato  pretor;  while  the  can- 
didates of  the  regents  were  convicted  of  the  most  shameful  corrup- 
tion in  the  elections  for  53  B.C.,  and  were  abandoned  by  their  prin- 
cipals. These  defeats  may  be  accounted  for  partly  by  the  wide 
discontent  at  the  rule  of  the  triumvirate ;  mainly  by  the  elaborately 
organized  system  of  political  clubs  which  were  entirely  controlled 
by  the  nobility. 

The  jury  courts  gave  even  greater  trouble  and  annoyance. 
As  at  present  composed  the  senatorial  party  was  influential  in  them, 
but  the  middle  class  was  predominant ;  and  the  fact  that  in  55  b.c. 
Pompeius  proposed  a  high-rated  census  for  jurymen  shows  that 
the  strength  of  the  opposition  was  in  the  middle  class,  and  that  the 
capitalists  were  more  easy  to  manage.     A  constant  warfare  of 


POMPEIUS    AND     CAESAR  319 

54-52  B.C. 

prosecution  was  waged  against  the  adherents  of  the  rulers,  the 
accusers  being  generally  the  younger  and  more  fiery  members  of 
the  nobility.  Still,  even  here,  where  the  regents  chose  to  insist,  the 
courts  dared  not  refuse  to  comply.  Vatinius,  the  best  hated  of  all 
Caesar's  personal  adherents,  was  acquitted  in  all  the  processes 
against  him.  But  Pompeius  did  not  know  so  well  how  to  protect 
his  clients,  and  Gabinius  was  sent  into  banishment  in  54  B.C.,  for 
extortions  in  the  provinces ;  and  even  where  unsuccessful,  impeach- 
ments by  such  masters  of  sarcasm  and  dialectics  as  Gaius  Licinius 
Calvus  and  Gaius  Assinius  Pollio  did  not  miss  their  mark. 

Still  less  controllable  was  the  power  of  literature,  which 
throughout  these  years  is  pervaded  by  a  tone  of  the  bitterest  oppo- 
sition. The  orations  of  the  accusers  in  the  law  courts  were  regu- 
larly published  as  political  pamphlets ;  the  youth  of  the  aristocracy 
and  of  the  middle  class  in  the  country  towns  kept  up  a  constant  fire 
of  pamphlets  and  epigrams;  and  the  senator's  son,  Gaius  Licinius 
Calvus,  fought  side  by  side  with  Marcus  Furius  Bibaculus  of  Cre- 
mona, and  Quintus  Valerius  Catullus  of  Verona.  The  literature 
of  the  time  is  full  of  sarcasms  against  the  "  great  Caesar,"  "  the 
unique  general,"  the  affectionate  father-in-law  and  son-in-law  who 
ransack  the  globe  to  enrich  their  dissolute  favorites.  Caesar  saw 
that  such  opposition  could  not  be  checked  by  word  of  command ;  he 
tried  rather  to  gain  over  by  his  personal  influence  the  more  eminent 
authors.  Cicero  was  treated  respectfully,  out  of  regard  for  his 
literary  reputation;  and  Catullus,  in  spite  of  his  sarcasms,  was 
treated  with  the  most  flattering  distinction.  The  commentaries  on 
the  Gallic  wars  were  intended  partly  to  meet  the  enemy  on  their 
own  ground,  and  to  set  forth  to  the  public  the  necessity  and  con- 
stitutional propriety  of  Caesar's  operations. 

The  opposition  became  more  and  more  troublesome,  and  the 
regents  at  length  determined  to  take  stronger  measures.  It  was 
resolved  to  introduce  a  temporary  dictatorship.  At  the  close  of  54 
B.C.  the  dictatorship  was  demanded  in  the  senate;  but  Pompeius 
himself  still  shrank  from  openly  asking  it.  Even  when  the  elec- 
tions for  53  b.c.  led  to  the  most  scandalous  scenes,  and  had  to  be 
postponed  for  a  full  year  beyond  the  time  fixed,  he  still  hesitated  to 
speak  the  decisive  word,  and  might  long  have  hesitated  but  for 
circumstances  which  forced  his  hand.  For  the  consulship  of  52  B.C. 
Titus  Annius  Milo  came  forward  in  opposition  to  the  candidates 
of  the  regents,  who  were  both  personally  connected  with  Pompeius. 


320  ROME 

52    B.C. 

Milo  was  the  great  rival  of  Clodius  in  the  game  of  the  streets,  the 
Hector  to  the  Achilles  of  Clodius.  As  Clodius  was  on  the  side  of 
the  regents,  Milo  was  of  course  for  the  republic ;  and  Cato  and  his 
friends  supported  his  candidature  in  return.  In  a  chance  skirmish 
between  the  rival  bands  on  the  Appian  Way,  not  far  from  the  capi- 
tal, Clodius  was  wounded  and  carried  into  a  neighboring  house, 
from  which  he  was  afterwards  dragged  to  be  murdered  by  Milo's 
orders.  The  adherents  of  the  triumvirs  saw  here  an  opportunity 
for  thwarting  the  candidature  of  Milo,  and  carrying  the  dictator- 
ship of  Pompeius.  The  bloody  corpse  was  exposed  in  the  Forum, 
speeches  were  made,  and  a  riot  broke  forth.  The  mob  set  fire  to 
the  senate-house,  and  then  besieged  the  residence  of  Milo  till  they 
were  repulsed  by  his  band.  They  then  saluted  Pompeius  as  dic- 
tator and  his  candidates  as  consuls ;  and  when  the  interrex,  Marcus 
Lepidus,  refused  to  hold  the  elections  at  once,  he  was  blockaded  in 
his  house  for  five  days.  Pompeius  certainly  desired  the  dictator- 
ship, but  he  would  not  take  it  at  the  hands  of  a  mob.  He  brought 
up  troops  to  put  down  the  anarchy  in  the  city,  and  then  demanded 
the  dictatorship  from  the  senate.  To  escape  the  name  of  dictator, 
this  body,  on  the  motion  of  Cato  and  Bibulus,  perpetrated  a  double 
absurdity,  and  appointed  the  proconsul  Pompeius  "  consul  without 
colleague."  2 

Pompeius  at  once  proceeded  energetically  to  use  his  powers 
against  the  republican  party  in  their  strongholds,  the  electioneering 
clubs,  and  the  jury  courts. 

The  existing  election  laws  were  repeated  and  enforced;  and  a 
special  law,  which  prescribed  increased  penalties  for  electioneering 
intrigues,  was  endowed  with  retrospective  force  as  far  back  as  70 
B.C.  The  governorships  were  to  be  conferred  on  the  consuls  and 
pretors,  not  as  heretofore,  immediately  on  their  retirement  from 
office,  but  after  an  interval  of  five  years.  The  years  which  must 
elapse  before  this  arrangement  could  be  brought  into  action  were 
to  be  provided  for  by  special  decrees  of  the  senate  from  time  to 
time — a  course  which  put  the  provinces  for  the  next  few  years  at 
the  disposal  of  the  person  or  persons  whose  influence  might  be 
supreme  in  the  senate.  The  liberty  of  the  law  courts  was  curtailed 
by  limiting  the  number  of  advocates  and  the  time  of  speaking 
allowed  to  each;  and  the  custom  of  bringing  forward  laudatores 

2  Consul  means  colleague,  and  a  consul  who  is  at  the  same  time  a  proconsul 
is  at  once  an  actual  consul  and  a  consul's  substitute. 


POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR  321 

52  B.C. 

as  witnesses  to  character  was  prohibited.  The  senate  decreed  that 
the  country  was  in  danger,  owing  to  the  disturbances  connected  with 
the  affair  on  the  Appian  Way,  and  accordingly  a  commission  was 
appointed  by  a  special  law  to  inquire  into  all  offenses  connected  with 
the  affray,  the  members  being  nominated  by  Pompeius.  At  the 
same  time  all  the  men  capable  of  service  in  Italy  were  called  to 
arms,  and  made  to  swear  allegiance  to  Pompeius;  troops  were 
stationed  at  the  Capitol,  and  the  place  where  the  trial  respecting  the 
murder  of  Clodius  was  going  on  was  surrounded  by  soldiers. 

By  these  measures  opposition  was  checked,  but  not,  of  course, 
destroyed.  The  reins  were  drawn  tighter  and  the  republican  party 
was  humbled.  Milo  was  condemned  by  the  jurymen,  and  Cato's 
candidature  for  the  consulship  frustrated.  But  many  mischances 
occurred  through  the  maladroitness  of  Pompeius;  he  was  attempt- 
ing an  impossible  task — to  play  at  once  the  parts  of  impartial  re- 
storer of  law  and  order  and  of  party  chief.  Thus  he  allowed  many 
subordinate  persons  belonging  to  the  republican  party  to  be  ac- 
quitted by  the  commission,  and  looked  on  in  silence  while  every 
man  who  had  taken  part  for  Clodius — that  is  for  the  regents — in 
the  late  riots  was  condemned.  At  the  same  time  he  violated  his 
own  laws  by  appearing  as  a  laudator  for  his  friend  Plancus,  and  by 
protecting  from  condemnation  several  persons  specially  connected 
with  himself,  such  as  Metellus  Scipio.  Still,  the  regents  were  on 
the  whole  satisfied,  and  the  public  acquiesced,  even  to  celebrating 
the  recovery  of  Pompeius  from  a  serious  illness  with  demonstra- 
tions of  joy.  On  August  i,  52  B.C.,  Pompeius  laid  down  his  special 
command  and  chose  Metellus  Scipio  as  his  colleague. 


Chapter  XXXI 

CRASSUS   AND  THE   RUPTURE   BETWEEN   POMPEIUS 
AND   CAESAR.    54-49   B.C. 

FOR  years  Marcus  Crassus  had  been  reckoned  one  of  the 
regents  of  Rome  without  any  claim  to  be  so  considered. 
But  after  the  conference  at  Luca  his  position  was  changed : 
Caesar  had  allowed  the  consulship  and  the  governorship  of  Syria 
to  be  assigned  to  him,  in  order  to  counterbalance  the  great  conces- 
sions he  found  it  advisable  to  make  to  Pompeius ;  and  at  the  close  of 
his  consulship  Crassus  had  an  opportunity,  as  governor  of  Syria,  of 
attaining,  through  the  Parthian  war,  the  position  acquired  by 
Caesar  in  Gaul.  Avarice  and  ambition  combined  to  inspire  him, 
at  the  age  of  sixty,  with  all  the  ardor  of  youth.  He  arrived  in 
Syria  early  in  54  B.C.,,  having  left  Rome  even  before  the  close  of  his 
consulship,  eager  to  add  the  riches  of  the  East  to  those  of  the  West, 
and  to  achieve  military  glory  as  rapidly  as  Caesar  and  with  as  little 
trouble  as  Pompeius. 

The  Parthian  war  had  already  begun.  Pompeius  had  not 
respected  his  engagements  with  regard  to  the  frontier,  and  had 
wrested  provinces  from  the  empire  to  confer  them  upon  Armenia. 
Accordingly,  after  the  death  of  King  Phraates,  his  son  Mithradates 
declared  war  upon  Armenia.  This  was,  of  course,  a  declaration  of 
war  against  Rome,  and  Gabinius,  the  governor  of  Syria,  soon  led 
his  troops  across  the  Euphrates.  But  meantime  Mithradates  had 
been  dethroned  by  the  grandees  of  the  empire  with  the  vizier  at 
their  head,  and  Orodes  now  reigned  in  his  stead.  Mithradates  took 
refuge  with  the  Romans ;  but  at  this  juncture  Gabinius  was  ordered 
by  the  regents  to  restore  the  king  of  Egypt  to  Alexandria  by  force 
of  arms,  and  he  had  to  give  up  the  Parthian  war  for  the  present. 
But  he  induced  Mithradates  to  make  war  on  his  own  account,  and 
the  prince  was  supported  by  the  cities  of  Seleucia  and  Babylon. 
Soon  afterwards,  however,  Seleucia  was  captured  by  storm,  Baby- 
lon was  reduced  to  surrender,  and  Mithradates  was  captured  and 
put  to  death.     Gabinius,  who  had  finished  the  Egyptian  campaign, 

322 


CRASSUS  — POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR    323 

54-53  B.C. 

was  on  the  eve  of  resuming  operations  against  the  Parthians  when 
Crassus  arrived  in  Syria  and  relieved  him  of  the  command. 

Crassus  spent  the  summer  of  54  B.C.  in  levying  troops  and 
contributions,  and  in  making  an  extensive  reconnaissance.  The 
Euphrates  was  crossed  and  a  victory  won  at  Ichnae ;  garrisons  were 
placed  in  several  of  the  neighboring  towns,  and  then  the  troops 
returned  to  Syria.  This  reconnaissance  determined  the  Romans  to 
march  against  the  Parthians  straight  across  the  Mesopotamian 
desert,  rather  than  by  the  circuitous  route  through  Armenia;  for 
the  numerous  Greek  and  half-Greek  towns  in  the  region  of  the 
Tigris  and  Euphrates  were  found  ready  at  once  to  shake  off  the 
Parthian  yoke. 

Next  year,  53  B.C.,  the  Euphrates  was  again  crossed,  and  after 
some  deliberation  it  was  decided  to  march  across  the  desert  to  the 
Tigris  rather  than  down  the  Euphrates  to  Seleucia,  where  the  two 
rivers  are  but  a  few  miles  apart.  The  Roman  army  consisted  of 
seven  legions,  four  thousand  cavalry,  and  four  thousand  slingers 
and  archers.  For  many  days  they  marched,  and  no  enemy  ap- 
peared. At  length,  not  far  from  the  River  Balissus,  some  horse- 
men of  the  enemy  were  descried  in  the  distance.  The  Arab  prince 
Abgarus  of  Edessa,  who  had  been  loud  in  his  protestations  of  loyalty, 
and  who  had  been  mainly  instrumental  in  determining  Crassus  to 
adopt  the  desert  route,  was  sent  out  to  reconnoiter.  The  enemy 
disappeared,  followed  by  Abgarus  and  his  men;  and  after  a  long 
interval  it  was  resolved  to  advance,  in  the  hope  of  coming  upon  the 
enemy.  The  river  was  crossed  and  the  army  was  led  rapidly  for- 
ward, when  suddenly  the  drums  of  the  Parthians  were  heard,  their 
silken  gold-embroidered  banners  were  seen  waving,  and  their 
helmets  and  coats  of  mail  blazing  in  the  sun ;  and  by  the  side  of  the 
Parthian  vizier  stood  Abgarus  and  his  Bedouins. 

The  Romans  saw  at  once  the  net  in  which  they  were  ensnared. 
The  whole  Parthian  army  consisted  of  cavalry;  the  vizier  had  seen 
that  no  Oriental  infantry  could  cope  with  that  of  Rome,  and  had 
dispensed  with  the  army  altogether.  The  mass  of  his  troops  were 
mounted  archers,  while  the  line  was  formed  of  heavy  cavalry, 
armed  with  long  thrusting  lances,  and  protected — man  and  horse — 
by  armor  formed  of  leather  or  of  metal  plates.  The  Roman 
infantry  were  quite  unable  to  bring  such  an  enemy  to  a  close  en- 
gagement, and,  even  if  they  had  been  able,  these  ironclad  hosts 
would  probably  have  been  more  than  a  match  for  them.     In  the 


324  ROME 

53    B.C. 

desert  every  advantage  was  on  the  side  of  the  enemy  and  none  on 
that  of  the  Romans.  The  strength  of  the  Roman  system  of  warfare 
lay  in  the  close  order  in  which  the  legions  fought,  and  in  the  custom 
of  forming  entrenched  camps,  which  made  every  encampment  a 
fortification.  But  the  close  order  now  only  served  to  make  them  an 
easier  mark  for  their  enemies'  missiles,  and  in  the  desert  ditches 
and  ramparts  could  often  hardly  be  formed.  It  is  curious  that  the 
irresistible  superiority  of  the  Roman  infantry  led  the  enemies  of 
Rome  at  about  the  same  time,  in  widely  different  parts  of  the  world, 
to  meet  it,  and  meet  it  successfully,  by  the  same  means — by  the  use 
of  cavalry  and  missiles.  The  Parthian  vizier  was  only  carrying 
out  on  a  larger  scale,  and  under  infinitely  more  favorable  condi- 
tions, what  had  been  completely  successful  under  Cassivelaunus  in 
Britain,  and  partially  successful  under  Vercingetorix  in  Gaul. 

Under  such  conditions  the  first  battle  between  Romans  and 
Parthians  was  fought  in  the  desert,  about  thirty  miles  south  of 
Carrhae.  The  Roman  archers,  who  began  the  attack,  were  driven 
back;  the  legions,  which  were  in  their  usual  close  order,  were  soon 
outflanked  and  overwhelmed  by  the  archers  of  the  enemy.  In 
order  that  they  might  not  be  completely  surrounded,  Publius 
Crassus,  the  same  who  had  served  with  such  distinction  under 
Caesar  in  Gaul,  advanced  with  a  select  corps  of  cavalry,  archers, 
and  infantry.  The  Parthians  retreated,  hotly  pursued,  but  when 
completely  out  of  sight  of  the  main  army  of  the  Romans  the  heavy 
cavalry  made  a  stand  and  soon  completely  surrounded  the  band  of 
Crassus.  All  the  valor  of  the  Romans  and  of  their  leader  was  in 
vain;  they  were  driven  to  a  slight  eminence,  where  their  destruc- 
tion was  completed.  Crassus  and  many  of  his  officers  put  them- 
selves to  death ;  out  of  the  whole  number  of  six  thousand  only  five 
hundred  were  taken  prisoners ;  not  one  was  able  to  escape.  Mean- 
while the  main  army  was  left  comparatively  unmolested,  but  when 
it  advanced  to  discover  the  fate  of  the  detached  corps  the  head  of 
the  young  Crassus  was  displayed  on  a  pole  before  his  father's  eyes, 
and  the  terrible  onslaught  was  at  the  same  time  renewed.  Night 
alone  put  an  end  to  the  slaughter.  Fortunately  the  Parthians  re- 
tired from  the  field  to  bivouac;  and  the  Romans  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity to  retreat  to  Carrhae.  They  left  the  wounded  and  the 
stragglers — said  to  have  been  four  thousand  in  number— on  the 
field,  and  as  the  Parthians  stayed  to  massacre  these,  and  the  in- 
habitants of  Carrhae  marched  forth  in  haste  to  succor  the  fugitives, 


CRASSUS  — POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR    325 

53-51   B.C. 

the  remnant  of  the  army  was  saved  from  destruction.  But  the 
Romans,  either  from  want  of  provisions  or  from  the  precipitation 
of  Crassus,  soon  set  out  from  Carrhae  and  marched  towards  the 
Armenian  mountains.  Marching  by  night  and  resting  by  day  the 
main  body  arrived  at  Sinnaca,  within  a  day's  march  of  safety. 
There  the  vizier  came  to  offer  peace  and  friendship,  and  to  propose 
a  conference  between  the  two  generals.  The  offer  was  accepted  and 
terms  were  discussed ;  a  richly  caparisoned  horse  was  produced — a 
present  from  the  king  to  Crassus,  and  as  the  servants  of  the  vizier 
crowded  to  assist  the  Roman  general  to  mount,  the  suspicion  arose 
among  the  Roman  officers  that  it  was  a  design  to  seize  the  person 
of  their  leader.  Octavius  snatched  a  sword  from  a  Parthian  and 
stabbed  the  groom.  In  the  tumult  which  followed  all  the  Roman 
officers  were  killed,  Crassus  refused  to  survive  as  a  prisoner,  and  the 
whole  Roman  force  left  behind  in  the  camp  was  either  captured  or 
dispersed.  Only  one  small  body,  which  had  broken  off  from  the 
main  force,  and  some  straggling  bands  found  their  way  back  to 
Syria.  Ten  thousand  Roman  prisoners  were  settled  in  the  oasis 
of  Merv ;  one-half  of  the  whole  force  had  perished. 

This  disaster  to  the  Roman  arms  seemed  likely  to  shake  the 
very  foundations  of  the  Roman  power  in  the  East.  Armenia  be- 
came completely  dependent  upon  Parthia,  and  the  Hellenic  cities 
were  again  enslaved.  More  than  this,  the  Parthians  prepared  to 
cross  the  Euphrates  and  to  dislodge  the  Romans  from  Syria.  But, 
fortunately  for  Rome,  the  leaders  on  each  side  had  changed.  The 
vizier  was  executed  by  the  Sultan  Orodes,  and  the  command  of  the 
invading  army  given  to  the  young  Prince  Pacorus,  while  the  ad 
interim  command  of  Syria  was  assumed  by  the  able  questor  Gaius 
Cassius.  For  two  years  the  Parthians  sent  only  flying  bands,  which 
were  easily  repulsed.  Owing  to  the  negligence  of  the  Roman  gov- 
ernment the  great  Parthian  invasion,  which  came  at  last  in  51  B.C., 
found  nothing  to  oppose  it  but  two  weak  legions  which  Cassius  had 
formed  from  the  remains  of  the  army  of  Crassus,  and  which  could, 
of  course,  do  nothing  to  oppose  the  advance.  However,  under  an 
ordinary  general  the  Parthians  were  no  more  formidable  than  any 
other  Oriental  army;  and  though  the  Syrian  command  soon  de- 
volved upon  the  incapable  Bibulus,  nothing  was  effected  by  the 
invaders,  and  Pacorus  soon  came  to  an  agreement  with  the  Roman 
commander,  and  turned  his  arms  against  his  father  Orodes  instead. 

It  is  an  ominous  sign  of  the  times  that  the  national  disasters 


326  ROME 

54-53  B.C. 

of  Carrhae  and  Sinnaca  attracted  almost  less  attention  at  Rome 
than  the  pitiful  brawl  upon  the  Appian  Way.  But  it  is  hardly  won- 
derful; the  breach  between  the  regents  was  now  becoming  immi- 
nent. Like  the  boat  of  the  ancient  Greek  mariners'  tale,  the  vessel 
of  the  Roman  community  now  found  itself,  as  it  were,  between  two 
rocks  swimming  towards  each  other;  expecting  every  moment  the 
crash  of  collision,  those  whom  it  was  bearing,  tortured  by  nameless 
anguish  gazed  into  the  eddying  surge  that  rose  higher  and  higher 
and  were  benumbed;  and  while  every  slightest  movement  there  at- 
tracted a  thousand  eyes,  not  one  ventured  to  give  a  glance  to  the 
right  or  left. 

After  the  conference  at  Luca  it  seemed  that  the  division  of 
power  was  made  on  a  basis  sufficiently  firm  to  ensure  its  endurance, 
provided  that  both  parties  were  disposed  to  act  in  good  faith.  This 
was  the  case  with  Caesar,  at  any  rate  during  the  interval  necessary 
for  the  completion  of  his  Gallic  conquests;  but  probably  Pompeius 
was  never  even  provisionally  in  earnest  about  the  collegiate  scheme. 
Still,  though  he  never  meant  to  acknowledge  Caesar's  equality  with 
himself,  the  idea  of  breaking  with  him  formed  itself  but  slowly  in 
his  mind.  In  54  B.C.  the  death  of  Julia,  followed  closely  by  that 
of  her  child,  destroyed  the  personal  bond  between  the  rivals;  and 
when  Pompeius  refused  Caesar's  overtures  for  fresh  marriage  con- 
nections, and  himself  married  the  daughter  of  Quintus  Metellus 
Scipio,  the  breach  had  unmistakably  begun.  Still  the  political  alli- 
ance remained,  and  Pompeius,  after  the  disaster  of  Aduatuca  in  54 
B.C.,  lent  Caesar  one  of  his  Italian  legions,  while  Caesar  gave  his 
consent  and  support  to  the  dictatorship  of  Pompeius.  But  as  soon  as 
the  latter  found  himself  in  a  position  completely  outweighing  in  in- 
fluence that  of  Caesar,  and  when  all  the  men  of  military  age  in  Italy 
had  tendered  their  military  oath  to  himself  personally,  it  became 
clear  that  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  a  rupture.  The  proceedings 
of  the  dictatorship  told  largely  against  the  partisans  of  Caesar. 
This  might  have  been  accident ;  but  when  Pompeius  selected  for  his 
colleague  in  office  his  dependent  Metellus  Scipio  instead  of  Caesar, 
still  more  when  he  got  his  governorship  of  the  two  Spains  pro- 
longed for  five  years  more,  and  a  large  sum  of  money  assigned  to 
him  for  the  payment  of  troops,  without  procuring  similar  arrange- 
ments for  Caesar,  it  was  impossible  to  mistake  his  intention.  Lastly, 
the  new  regulations  as  to  the  holding  of  governorships  had  the 
ulterior  object  of  procuring  Caesar's  premature  recall.    No  moment 


CRASSUS  — POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR    327 

53   B.C. 

could  have  been  more  unfavorable  to  Caesar.  In  June,  53  B.C.,  the 
death  of  Crassus  occurred — and  Crassus  had  always  been  the 
closest  ally  of  Caesar,  and  a  bitter  personal  enemy  of  Pompeius.  A 
few  months  later  the  Gallic  insurrection  broke  out  with  renewed 
violence,  and  for  the  first  time  Caesar  had  to  encounter  an  equal 
opponent  in  Vercingetorix.  Pompeius  was  dictator  of  Rome  and 
master  of  the  senate;  what  might  have  occurred  if,  instead  of 
intriguing  obscurely  against  Caesar,  he  had  boldly  recalled  him 
from  Gaul? 

The  impending  struggle  was,  of  course,  not  between  republic 
and  monarchy,  but  between  Pompeius  and  Caesar  for  the  crown 
of  Rome.  Nevertheless,  each  of  the  rivals  found  it  convenient  to 
adopt  one  of  the  old  party  battle  cries;  neither  dared  to  alienate 
from  himself  the  mass  of  respectable  conservative  citizens,  who 
desired  the  continuance  of  the  republic,  by  openly  aiming  at 
monarchy.  Caesar,  of  course,  inscribed  upon  his  banner,  "  The 
people  and  democratic  progress."  He  had  been  from  the  outset  an 
earnest  democrat,  and  the  monarchy  meant  to  him  something  which 
differed  in  little  but  name  from  the  Gracchan  government  of  the 
people.  To  Caesar  this  subterfuge  brought  little  advantage,  except 
that  he  thus  escaped  the  necessity  of  directly  employing  the  name 
of  king.  But  Pompeius,  who,  of  course,  proclaimed  himself  the 
champion  of  the  aristocracy  and  of  the  legitimate  constitution, 
gained  besides  a  large  and  influential  body  of  allies.  In  the  first 
place,  he  rallied  round  him  the  whole  republican  party,  and  the 
majority,  or,  at  any  rate,  the  soundest  part  of  the  burgesses  of  Italy. 
Secondly,  what  was  no  mean  advantage  for  so  awkward  a  poli- 
tician, it  relieved  him  of  the  difficulty  of  finding  a  plausible  pretext 
for  provoking  the  war.  His  new  allies  would  be  willing  enough 
to  provoke  a  conflict  with  Caesar,  and  to  intrust  the  conduct  of  the 
war  to  Pompeius,  who  would  then  come  fonvard,  in  obedience  to 
the  general  wish,  as  the  protector  of  the  constitution  against  the 
designs  of  anarchists  and  monarchists — as  the  regularly  appointed 
general  of  the  senate  against  the  imperator  of  the  streets. 

Thus  the  republican  party  became  once  more  a  factor  in  the 
politics  of  Rome,  owing  to  the  rupture  between  the  rulers.  The 
heart  and  core  of  the  republican  opposition  was  the  small  circle  of 
the  followers  of  Cato,  who  were  resolved  to  enter  on  the  struggle 
against  monarchy  under  any  circumstances.  The  mass  of  the 
aristocracy,  though  averse  to  monarchy,  desired,  above  all  things, 


328  ROME 

53-49    B.C. 

peace,  and  could  not  be  counted  on  for  decisive  action.  Hence 
Cato's  only  hope  lay  in  a  coalition  with  one  of  the  regents.  In 
alliance  with  Pompeius  he  might  compel  the  timid  majority 
to  declare  war;  and  though  Pompeius  was  not  in  earnest  in  his 
fidelity  to  the  constitution,  yet  the  war  would  train  a  really  repub- 
lican army  and  republican  generals,  and  it  would  be,  at  any  rate, 
easier  to  settle  matters  with  Pompeius  after  victory  than  with 
Caesar.  The  rapprochement  between  the  general  and  the  senate 
was  made  easy  by  the  events  of  the  dictatorship.  Pompeius  had 
refused  to  accept  the  office  except  from  the  senate;  he  had  shown 
unrelenting  severity  against  disorder  of  every  kind,  and  surprising 
indulgence  towards  Cato  and  his  followers;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  was  directly  from  the  hands  of  Cato  and  Bibulus  that 
Pompeius  received  the  undivided  consulship.  An  outward  and 
visible  sign  that  the  alliance  was  already  practically  concluded  was 
given,  when,  for  the  consulship  of  51  B.C.,  one  of  Cato's  pronounced 
adherents,  Claudius  Marcellus,  was  elected,  evidently  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  regent. 

Caesar  was  kept  constantly  informed  of  all  that  happened  at 
Rome,  and  formed  his  plans  accordingly.  He  had  doubtless  long 
determined  to  take  for  himself,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the 
supreme  power  after  the  conclusion  of  his  Gallic  wars;  but  he 
wished  earnestly  to  avoid  the  deep  disorganization  which  civil  war 
must  produce  in  a  state ;  and  even  if  civil  war  could  not  be  avoided, 
no  time  could  be  more  unfavorable  for  it  than  the  present,  when 
the  insurrection  in  Gaul  was  at  its  height,  and  when  the  constitu- 
tional party  was  dominant  in  Italy.  If  he  became,  according  to  the 
arrangement  at  Luca,  consul  for  the  year  48  B.C.,  he  might  confi- 
dently reckon  on  outmaneuvering  his  awkward  and  vacillating 
rival,  and  with  the  compliant  majority  in  the  senate  at  his  disposal, 
might  either  reorganize  the  state  by  peaceful  means  or  at  least 
enter  upon  the  war  with  far  greater  prospects  of  success.  Mean- 
while he  armed,  certainly,  and  raised  his  legions  during  the  winter 
of  52-51  b.c.  to  the  number  of  eleven.  But  at  the  same  time  he 
publicly  approved  of  all  Pompeius's  acts  as  dictator,  and  took  no 
steps  when  he  saw  the  alliance  gradually  formed  between  his  rival 
and  the  aristocracy,  only  adhering  immovably  to  the  one  demand, 
that  the  consulship  for  48  b.c.  should  be  granted  him,  according  to 
the  agreement. 

It  was  upon  this  demand  that  the  diplomatic   war   between 


CRASSUS  — POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR    329 

59-49  B.C. 

Caesar  and  the  senate  began,  and  it  is  important  to  grasp  fully  and 
accurately  the  exact  point  in  dispute. 

If  there  should  be  any  interval  between  the  day  on  which 
Caesar  resigned  his  Gallic  command  and  the  day  on  which  he 
entered  upon  his  consulship,  he  would  be  liable  during  that  interval 
to  criminal  impeachment,  which,  according  to  Roman  law,  was  al- 
lowable only  against  a  man  not  in  office;  and  in  that  case  it  was 
extremely  probable  that  he  would  meet  the  same  fate  as  Milo,  and 
be  compelled  to  go  into  exile.  Was  it  necessary  that  there  should 
be  such  an  interval  ?  According  to  the  usual  mode  of  reckoning,  a 
provincial  command  began  in  theory  on  March  i,  of  the  magis- 
trate's year  of  office  in  Rome,  so  that  Caesar's  Gallic  command 
theoretically  began  on  March  I,  59  B.C.,  the  year  of  his  consulship, 
and  the  ten  years  for  which  it  was  secured  to  him  would  expire  on 
the  last  day  of  February,  49  B.C.  Accordingly  there  would  be  an 
interval  of  ten  months  between  the  end  of  the  Gallic  command  and 
the  beginning  of  the  consulship.  Caesar's  opponents  aimed,  both 
directly  and  indirectly,  at  preventing  him  from  retaining  his 
provinces  during  this  interval. 

Firstly,  according  to  the  old  custom,  Caesar's  successor  would 
have  been  appointed  from  among  the  magistrates  for  the  year  49 
B.C.,  and  could  not,  therefore,  have  taken  over  the  command  until 
the  beginning  of  48  b.c.  ;  and  by  the  same  old  custom  Caesar  would 
have  had  the  right  to  the  command  for  the  remaining  ten  months  of 
the  year  49  B.C.,  pending  the  arrival  of  his  successor.  But  by  the 
new  regulation,  made  specially  for  this  purpose  during  the  dicta- 
torship of  Pompeius  in  52  B.C.,  the  senate  might  immediately  fill  up 
any  legally  vacant  governorship,  and  Caesar  might  therefore  be 
relieved  of  his  command  on  March  1,  49  B.C. 

Secondly,  even  without  this  special  regulation  passed  for  the 
purpose,  the  senate  had  a  very  simple  means  of  compelling  Caesar 
to  leave  his  command  before  entering  upon  his  consulship.  The 
law  required  every  candidate  for  the  consulship  to  appear  in  person 
before  the  presiding  magistrate,  and  to  enter  his  name  upon  the 
official  list  before  the  election;  that  is,  about  half  a  year  before  en- 
tering on  office.  It  was  probably  assumed  at  Luca  that  Caesar 
should  be  exempted  from  this  regulation,  as  was  often  done  with 
regard  to  particular  candidates.  At  any  rate,  during  the  dictator- 
ship of  Pompeius  in  52  B.C.,  Caesar's  appearance  in  person  was  dis- 
pensed with  by  a  tribunician  law;  but  when  the  new  election  ordi- 


330  ROME 

51-50   B.C. 

nance  was  passed,  the  obligation  to  appear  in  person  was  repeated 
in  general  terms,  and  no  exemption  in  Caesar's  case  was  mentioned. 
Caesar  complained,  and  an  exempting  clause  was  interpolated  by 
Pompeius,  but  not  confirmed  by  the  people,  and  was  therefore 
legally  of  no  effect.  The  whole  matter  is  a  good  example  of 
Pompeius's  tortuous  methods.  Where  he  might  have  simply  kept 
by  the  law,  he  had  preferred  first  to  make  a  spontaneous  concession, 
then  to  recall  it,  and  lastly  to  palliate  this  recall  in  a  manner  most 
illegal.  The  remaining  events  of  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war  may 
be  viewed  in  three  separate  stages:  the  discussion  at  the  beginning 
of  51  B.C.,  the  discussions  of  the  year  50  B.C.,  and  Caesar's  ulti- 
matum. 

In  accordance  with  custom,  the  governorships  of  the  year  49 
B.C.,  which  were  to  be  filled  by  consuls,  would  be  deliberated  upon 
in  the  beginning  of  51  B.C.  On  this  occasion  the  consul  Marcus 
Marcellus  proposed  that  the  two  provinces  of  Caesar  should  be 
handed  over  on  March  1,  49  B.C.,  to  the  two  consuls  who  were  to 
hold  governorships  for  that  year.  The  long  repressed  torrent  of 
indignation  against  Caesar  burst  forth.  The  followers  of  Cato 
demanded  that  the  exemption  of  Caesar  from  appearing  to  an- 
nounce his  name  in  person  should  be  held  invalid ;  that  the  soldiers 
of  his  legions  who  had  served  their  time  should  be  at  once  dis- 
charged; and  that  the  bestowal  by  him  of  burgess-rights  and  the 
establishment  of  colonies  in  upper  Italy  should  be  considered  null 
and  void.  Marcellus,  in  accordance  with  this  last  proposal,  caused 
a  local  senator  of  the  Caesarian  colony  of  Comum  to  be  scourged  as 
a  non-burgess. 

On  the  other  side,  the  supporters  of  Caesar  affirmed  that  both 
equity  and  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Gaul  required  that  Caesar 
should  be  allowed  to  hold  his  command  and  his  consulship  simulta- 
neously ;  they  pointed  out  that  Pompeius  had  in  time  past  combined 
the  Spanish  provinces  and  the  consulship,  and  was  even  now  in 
possession  of  proconsular  power  for  the  purpose  of  the  supply  of 
grain,  of  the  Spanish  governorships,  and  of  the  supreme  command 
in  Italy.  The  timid  majority  in  the  senate  prevented  any  resolution 
being  taken  for  months.  Pompeius  at  last  declared  on  the  whole 
in  favor  of  the  proposal  of  Marcellus,  while  hinting  at  certain  con- 
cessions which  might  perhaps  be  made  to  Caesar;  and  ultimately, 
on  September  29,  51  B.C.,  the  nomination  of  successors  was  post- 
poned to  the  last  day  of  February,  50  B.C. 


CRASSUS  — POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR    331 

50-49  B.C. 

Meanwhile  the  republicans  tried  to  break  up  Caesar's  army  by 
inducing  the  veterans  to  apply  for  their  discharge,  and  the  elections 
for  the  next  year  were  thoroughly  unfavorable  to  Caesar.  The 
latter  had  at  length  quelled  the  insurrection  in  Gaul,  and  had  moved 
one  of  his  legions  to  north  Italy.  War  was  clearly  inevitable,  but 
even  now  he  was  willing  to  make  great  sacrifices;  it  was  still  ad- 
visable to  keep  the  legions  for  some  time  in  Gaul,  and  he  had  still 
perhaps  some  hope  in  the  strong  desire  for  peace  which  the  majority 
of  the  senate  entertained.  When  the  senate,  at  the  suggestion  of 
Pompeius,  requested  each  general  to  furnish  a  legion  for  the 
Parthian  war,  and  when  Pompeius  at  the  same  time  demanded  from 
Caesar  the  legion  lent  him  some  years  before,  Caesar  complied,  and 
the  two  legions  from  his  army  were  kept  by  the  government  at 
Capua.  For  the  discussions  of  50  B.C.  Caesar  had  succeeded  in 
buying  the  services  of  one  consul,  Lucius  Aemilius  Paullus,  and, 
above  all,  one  of  the  tribunes,  Gaius  Curio,  a  man  of  brilliant 
talents,  but  of  the  most  profligate  character.  Caesar  paid  this  man's 
debts,  amounting  to  $2,875,000,  and  thenceforth  his  great  gifts  of 
eloquence  and  energy  were  exerted  for,  instead  of  against,  the 
enemy  of  the  senate. 

In  March,  50  B.C.,  when  the  question  of  Caesar's  successors 
arose,  Curio  approved  of  the  decree  of  the  year  before  superseding 
Caesar  on  March  1,  49  B.C.,  but  demanded  that  it  should  be  ex- 
tended to  Pompeius ;  he  argued  that  the  constitution  could  be  ren- 
dered safe  only  by  the  removal  of  all  exceptional  positions ;  and  at 
the  same  time  declared  that  he  would  prevent  any  one-sided  action 
against  Caesar  by  his  tribunician  veto.  Caesar  at  once  declared  his 
consent  to  Curio's  proposal,  but  Pompeius  would  only  reply  that 
Caesar  must  resign,  and  that  he  himself  meant  soon  to  do  so,  though 
he  mentioned  no  definite  term.  The  decision  was  delayed  for 
months,  but  at  last  Curio's  proposal  was  adopted  by  370  votes 
against  20 — all  that  the  extreme  republican  party  could  muster. 
All  good  citizens  rejoiced,  and  the  party  of  Cato  was  in  despair. 
The  latter  had  undertaken  to  force  the  senate  to  a  declaration  of 
war,  and  they  were  bitterly  reproached  for  their  failure  by 
Pompeius.  As  matters  stood,  Pompeius  and  Caesar  were  both 
recalled  by  the  senate,  and  while  Caesar  was  ready  to  comply, 
Pompeius  refused — the  champion  of  the  constitution  and  the 
aristocracy  treated  the  constitutional  decisions  of  the  senate  as  null ! 
But  the  extreme  republicans  were  determined  to  bring  matters  to  a 


W>  ROME 

50-49  B.C. 

crisis.  A  rumor  arose  that  Caesar  had  moved  four  legions  across 
the  Alps,  and  stationed  them  at  Placentia.  This  was  an  act  quite 
within  his  prerogative,  and  the  rumor  was  shown  to  be  groundless, 
and  yet  the  consul  Marcus  Marcellus  proposed,  on  the  strength  of  it, 
to  give  Pompeius  orders  to  march  against  Caesar.  When  the 
senate  rejected  the  proposal,  Marcellus,  in  concert  with  the  two 
consuls  designate  for  49  B.C.,  who  were  also  Catonians,  proceeded 
to  Pompeius  and  requested  him,  on  their  own  authority,  to  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  the  legions  at  Capua,  and  to  summon  the 
Italian  militia  to  arms.  No  more  informal  authorization  for  the 
commencement  of  civil  war  could  be  imagined,  but  it  was  enough 
for  Pompeius,  and  he  left  Rome  in  December,  50  B.C. 

Caesar  had  fully  attained  his  object  of  throwing  upon  his 
opponents  the  onus  of  declaring  war,  and  while  himself  keeping  on 
legal  ground,  he  had  compelled  Pompeius  to  begin  the  struggle  as 
the  general  of  a  revolutionary  minority  of  the  senate  which  over- 
awed the  majority.  It  was  now  his  interest  to  strike  a  blow  as  soon 
as  possible ;  his  opponents  were  only  just  beginning  to  make  prep- 
arations, and  it  might  be  possible  to  surprise  the  city  undefended, 
or  even  to  seize  all  Italy  and  shut  them  off  from  their  best  resources. 
Curio  represented  these  considerations  strongly  to  his  chief,  and 
Caesar  at  once  sent  to  hurry  on  the  nearest  legion  to  Ravenna. 
Meanwhile  he  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Rome,  in  which  he  dropped  all 
counterdemands,  offered  to  resign  Transalpine  Gaul  and  dismiss 
eight  of  his  ten  legions,  if  only  the  senate  would  allow  him  either 
Cisalpine  Gaul  and  Illyria  with  one  legion,  or  Cisalpine  Gaul  alone 
with  two — and  that  not  up  to  his  investiture  with  the  consulship, 
but  only  till  the  close  of  the  consular  elections  for  48  B.C.  It  may 
almost  be  doubted  whether  Caesar  can  possibly  have  been  sincere 
in  these  proposals ;  but  it  is  probable  that  he  committed  the  fault  of 
playing  too  bold  a  game,  and  that  if  his  ultimatum  had  been 
accepted  he  would  have  made  good  his  word.  The  ever-available 
Curio  undertook  once  more  to  enter  the  lion's  den.  January  1,  49 
B.C.,  he  delivered  his  master's  letter  in  a  full  meeting  of  the  senate. 
The  grave  words  of  Caesar,  in  which  he  set  forth  the  imminence  of 
civil  war,  the  general  wish  for  peace,  the  arrogance  of  Pompeius,  and 
his  own  yielding  disposition  with  all  the  irresistible  force  of  truth ; 
the  proposals  for  a  compromise,  of  a  moderation  which  doubtless 
surprised  his  own  partisans ;  the  distinct  declaration  that  this  was  the 
last  time  that  he  should  offer  his  hand  for  peace — all  made  the  deep- 


CRASSUS  — POMPEIUS     AND     CAESAR    333 

49  B.C. 

est  impression.  The  sentiment  of  the  majority  was  so  doubtful  that 
the  consuls  would  not  allow  a  vote  to  be  taken,  even  on  the  proposal 
of  Marcus  Marcellus,  to  defer  the  determination  till  the  Italian  levy 
could  be  under  arms  to  protect  the  senate.  The  consul  Lentulus 
said  openly  that  he  would  act  on  his  own  authority  whatever  the 
senate  might  decree,  and  Pompeius  let  it  be  known  that  he  would 
take  up  the  cause  of  the  senate  now  or  never.  Thus  overawed,  the 
senate  decreed  that  Caesar  should,  at  no  distant  day,  give  up 
Transalpine  Gaul  to  Lucius  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  and  Cisalpine 
Gaul  to  Marcus  Servilius  Novianus,  and  should  dismiss  his  army, 
failing  which  he  should  be  esteemed  a  traitor.  The  Caesarian 
tribunes  who  tried  to  veto  the  decree  were  menaced  with  death  in 
the  senate-house,  and  had  to  fly  in  slave's  clothing  from  the  capital. 
On  January  7,  49  B.C.,  the  senate  declared  the  country  in  danger, 
called  all  citizens  to  arms,  and  all  magistrates,  faithful  to  the  con- 
stitution, to  place  themselves  at  their  head. 

Hesitation  was  now  no  longer  possible  for  Caesar.  He  called 
together  the  soldiers  of  the  thirteenth  legion,  which  had  now  ar- 
rived at  Ravenna,  and  set  before  them  the  whole  circumstances.  He 
spoke  not  to  the  dregs  of  the  city,  but  to  young  men  from  the  towns 
and  villages  of  northern  Italy  who  were  capable  of  real  enthusiasm 
for  liberty,  who  had  received  from  Caesar  the  burgess  rights  which 
the  government  had  refused  them,  and  whom  Caesar's  fall  would 
leave  once  more  at  the  mercy  of  the  fasces.  He  set  before  them 
the  thanks  which  the  nobility  were  preparing  for  the  general  and 
the  army  which  had  conquered  Gaul,  the  overawing  of  the  senate 
by  the  extreme  minority,  and  the  last  violation  of  the  tribunate  of 
the  people,  wrested  five  hundred  years  ago  by  their  fathers  from  the 
nobility.  And  when  he  summoned  them,  as  the  general  of  the  popu- 
lar party,  to  follow  him  in  the  last  inevitable  struggle  against  the 
despised,  perfidious  aristocracy,  not  an  officer  or  soldier  held  back. 
At  the  head  of  his  vanguard  Caesar  crossed  the  Rubicon,  the  nar- 
row brook  which  separated  his  province  from  Italy,  and  which  it 
was  forbidden,  by  the  constitution,  to  the  proconsul  of  Gaul  to 
pass. 


Chapter    XXXII 

THE   CIVIL   WAR.    49-46   B.C. 

BEFORE  describing  the  course  of  the  struggle  between  the 
.two  aspirants  to  the  crown  of  Rome,  it  will  be  well  to 
'  examine  the  resources  at  the  disposal  of  each. 

Caesar's  authority  was  wholly  unlimited  within  his  own  party ; 
in  all  matters,  military  and  political,  the  decision  lay  with  him.  He 
had  no  confederates,  only  adjutants,  who,  as  a  rule,  were  soldiers 
trained  to  obey  unconditionally.  So,  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  one 
officer  alone,  and  he  the  foremost  of  all,  refused  him  obedience. 
Titus  Labienus  had  shared  with  Caesar  all  his  political  and  military 
vicissitudes  of  defeat  and  victory.  In  Gaul  he  had  always  held  an 
independent  command,  and  had  frequently  led  half  the  army.  As 
late  as  the  year  50  B.C.  Caesar  had  given  to  him  supreme  command 
in  Cisalpine  Gaul;  but  from  this  very  position  he  entered  into  a 
treaty  with  the  other  side,  and  on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  went 
at  once  to  the  camp  of  Pompeius.  It  was  the  one  great  disad- 
vantage on  Caesar's  side  that  he  had  no  officers  to  whom  he  could 
intrust  a  separate  command,  but  this  was  quite  outbalanced  by  the 
unity  of  the  supreme  leadership — the  indispensable  condition  of 
success. 

The  army  numbered  nine  legions — at  most  fifty  thousand  men, 
two-thirds  of  whom  had  served  in  all  the  campaigns  against  the 
Celts.  The  cavalry  consisted  of  mercenaries  from  Germany  and 
Noricum,  and  had  been  well  tried  in  the  war  against  Vercingetorix. 
The  physical  condition  of  the  soldiers  was  beyond  all  praise;  by 
the  careful  selection  of  recruits  and  by  training  they  had  been 
brought  to  a  perfection  never  perhaps  surpassed  in  marching  power 
and  in  readiness  for  immediate  departure  at  any  moment.  Their 
courage  and  their  esprit  de  corps  had  been  equally  developed  by 
Caesar's  system  of  rewards  and  punishments — a  system  so  perfectly 
carried  out  that  the  preeminence  of  particular  soldiers  or  divisions 
was  acquiesced  in  even  by  their  less  favored  comrades.  Their 
discipline  was  strict,  but  not  harassing ;  and  while  maintained  with 

334 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  335 

49  B.C. 

unrelenting  rigor  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  was  relaxed  at  other 
times,  especially  after  victory,  when  even  irregularities  and  out- 
rages of  a  very  questionable  kind  went  unpunished.  Mutiny  was 
never  pardoned,  in  either  the  ringleaders  or  their  dupes.  Caesar 
took  care  that  victory  should  be  associated  in  the  minds  of  both 
officers  and  soldiers  with  hopes  of  personal  gain ;  everyone  had  his 
share  of  the  spoil,  and  the  most  lavish  gifts  were  promised  at  the 
triumph.  At  the  same  time  that  unquestioning  obedience  was  ex- 
acted from  all,  yet  all  were  allowed  some  glimpse  at  the  general's 
aims  and  springs  of  action,  so  that  each  might  feel  that  he  was 
doing  his  part  towards  the  attainment  of  the  common  object,  and  no 
one  could  complain  that  he  was  treated  as  a  mere  instrument.  Dur- 
ing the  long  years  of  warfare  a  sense  of  comradeship  grew  up 
between  soldiers  and  leader.  They  were  his  clients,  whose  services 
he  was  bound  to  requite,  and  whose  wrongs  he  was  bound  to 
revenge.  The  result  was  that  Caesar's  soldiers  were,  and  knew 
themselves  to  be,  a  match  for  ten  times  their  number,  and  that  their 
fidelity  to  him  was  unchangeable  and  unparalleled.  With  one  ex- 
ception no  Roman  soldier  or  officer  refused  to  follow  him  into  the 
civil  war,  and  the  legionaries  even  determined  to  give  credit  for 
the  double  pay  which  Caesar  promised  them  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  while  every  subaltern  officer  equipped  and  paid  a  trooper 
out  of  his  own  purse. 

Thus  Caesar  had  two  requisites  for  success — unlimited  author- 
ity and  a  magnificent  and  trustworthy  army.  But  his  power  ex- 
tended over  a  very  limited  space.  It  was  based  essentially  on  the 
province  of  upper  Italy,  which  was  indeed  devoted  to  him  and 
furnished  an  ample  supply  of  recruits.  But  in  Italy  the  mass  of  the 
burgesses  were  all  for  his  opponents,  and  expected  from  Caesar  only 
a  renewal  of  the  Marian  and  Cinnan  atrocities.  His  only  friends  in 
Italy  were  the  rabble  and  the  ruined  of  all  classes — friends  infinitely 
more  dangerous  than  foes.  The  newly  conquered  territory  in  Gaul 
could  not,  of  course,  be  relied  on,  and  in  Narbo  the  constitutional 
party  had  many  adherents.  Among  the  independent  princes 
Caesar  had  tried  to  effect  something  by  gifts  and  promises,  but 
without  important  result  except  in  the  case  of  Voctio,  king  of 
Noricum,  from  whom  cavalry  recruits  were  obtained. 

Caesar  thus  began  the  war  without  other  resources  than  effi- 
cient adjutants,  a  faithful  army,  and  a  devoted  province.  Pompeius, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  chief  of  the  Roman  commonwealth  and 


356  ROME 

49   B.C. 

master  of  all  the  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the  legitimate  govern- 
ment of  the  empire.  But  unity  of  leadership  was  inconsistent  with 
the  nature  of  a  coalition ;  and  though  Pompeius  was  nominated  by 
the  senate  sole  generalissimo  by  land  and  sea,  he  could  not  prevent 
the  senate  itself  from  exercising  the  political  supremacy,  or  from 
occasionally  interfering  even  in  military  matters.  Twenty  years  of 
antagonism  made  it  impossible  for  either  party  of  the  coalition  to 
place  complete  confidence  in  the  other. 

In  resources  Caesar's  opponents  had  an  overwhelming  superi- 
ority. They  had  exclusive  command  of  the  sea,  and  the  disposal 
of  all  ports,  ships,  and  naval  material.  The  two  Spains  were 
specially  devoted  to  Pompeius,  and  the  other  provinces  had  during 
recent  years  been  put  into  safe  hands.  The  client  states  were  all 
for  Pompeius;  many  of  them  had  been  brought  into  close  personal 
relations  with  him  at  different  times.  He  had  been  the  companion 
in  arms  of  the  kings  of  Numidia  and  of  Mauretania;  he  had  re- 
established the  kingdoms  of  Bosporus,  Armenia,  and  Cappadocia, 
and  created  that  of  Deiotarus.  He  had  caused  the  rule  of  the 
Lagidae  to  be  reestablished  in  Egypt,  and  even  Massilia  was 
indebted  to  him  for  an  extension  of  territory.  Moreover,  the  demo- 
cratic policy  handed  down  from  Gaius  Gracchus  of  uniting  the 
dependent  states  and  of  setting  up  provincial  colonies  was  dreaded 
by  the  dependent  princes,  more  especially  by  Juba,  king  of  Numidia, 
whose  kingdom  Curio  had  lately  proposed  to  annex.  Even  the 
Parthians  by  the  convention  between  Pacorus  and  Bibulus  were 
practically  in  alliance  with  the  aristocracy. 

In  Italy,  not  only  the  aristocracy,  but  the  capitalists,  were 
bitterly  opposed  to  Caesar,  together  with  the  men  of  small  means, 
and  the  landowners,  and  generally  all  classes  who  had  anything 
to  lose. 

The  army  of  Pompeius  consisted  chiefly  of  the  seven  Spanish 
legions — troops  in  every  way  trustworthy — and  of  scattered  di- 
visions in  Syria,  Asia,  Macedonia,  Africa,  and  Sicily.  In  Italy 
there  were  the  two  legions  lately  given  over  by  Caesar — not  more 
than  seven  thousand  men,  and,  of  course,  of  doubtful  trustworthi- 
ness. There  were  also  three  legions  remaining  from  the  levies  of 
54  B.C.,  and  the  Italian  levy,  which  had  been  sworn  to  allegiance 
and  then  dismissed  on  furlough.  Altogether  the  Italian  troops 
which  might,  within  a  very  short  time,  be  made  available  amounted 
to  about  sixty  thousand  men.      Cavalry   there  was  none,   but   a 


THE     CIVIL    WAR  337 

49  B.C. 

nucleus  of  three  hundred  men  was  soon  formed  by  Pompeius,  out 
of  the  mounted  herdsmen  of  Apulia. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  war  began,  early  in  January,  49 
B.C.  Caesar  had  only  one  legion — five  thousand  men  and  three 
hundred  cavalry — at  Ravenna,  distant  by  road  about  240  miles 
from  Rome.  Pompeius  had  two  weak  legions — seven  thousand  in- 
fantry and  a  small  force  of  cavalry — at  Luceria,  about  equally 
distant  from  Rome.  The  remainder  of  Caesar's  troops  were  either 
on  the  Saone  and  Loire  or  in  Belgica,  while  Pompeius's  reserves 
were  already  arriving  at  their  rendezvous.  Nevertheless  Caesar 
resolved  to  assume  the  offensive :  in  the  spring  Pompeius  would  be 
able  to  act  with  the  Spanish  troops  in  Transalpine  and  with  his 
Italian  troops  in  Cisalpine  Gaul;  but  at  the  moment  he  might  be 
disconcerted  by  the  suddenness  of  the  attack. 

Accordingly  Marcus  Antonius  pushed  forward  across  the 
Apennines  to  Arretium,  while  Caesar  advanced  along  the  coast. 
The  recruiting  officers  of  Pompeius  and  their  recruits  fled  at  the 
news  of  his  approach;  several  small  successes  were  gained,  and 
Caesar  resolved  to  advance  upon  Rome  itself,  rather  than  upon  the 
army  of  Luceria.  A  panic  seized  the  city  when  the  news  arrived ; 
Pompeius  decided  not  to  defend  it,  and  the  senators  and  consuls 
hurried  to  leave,  not  even  delaying  to  secure  the  state  treasure.  At 
Teanum  Sidicinum  new  proposals  from  Caesar  were  considered,  in 
which  he  again  offered  to  dismiss  his  army  and  hand  over  his 
provinces  if  Pompeius  would  depart  to  Spain  and  if  Italy  were 
disarmed.  The  reply  was  that  if  Caesar  would  at  once  return  to  his 
province  the  senate  would  bind  itself  to  procure  the  fulfillment  of 
his  demands.  As  to  the  war,  Pompeius  was  ordered  to  advance 
with  the  legions  from  Luceria  into  Picenum,  and  personally  to  call 
together  the  levy  of  that  district,  and  try  to  stop  the  invader. 

But  Caesar  was  already  in  Picenum.  Auximum,  Camerinum, 
and  Asculum  fell  into  his  hands;  and  such  of  the  recruits  as  were 
not  dispersed  left  the  district  and  repaired  to  Corfinium,  where  the 
Marsian  and  Paelignian  levies  were  to  assemble.  Here  Lucius 
Domitius  Ahenobarbus  was  in  command ;  and  instead  of  conducting 
the  recruits,  who  now  amounted  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  to  Luceria 
according  to  the  instructions  of  Pompeius,  he  remained  where  he 
was,  expecting  Pompeius  to  come  to  his  relief.  Instead  of  Pompeius 
Caesar  arrived,  now  at  the  head  of  forty  thousand  men.  Domitius 
had  not  the  courage  to  hold  the  place;  neither  did  he  resolve  to 


338  ROME 

49  B.C. 

surrender  it,  but  rather  to  escape  during  the  night  with  his  aristo- 
cratic officers.  But  his  dastardly  plan  was  betrayed;  the  troops 
mutinied,  arrested  their  staff,  and  handed  over  the  town  to  Caesar. 
Thereupon  the  forces  in  Alba  and  in  Tarracina  laid  down  their 
arms;  a  third  division,  of  3500  men,  in  Sulmo  had  previously 
surrendered. 

As  soon  as  Picenum  was  lost,  Pompeius  had  determined  to 
abandon  Italy,  and  had  set  out  at  once  for  Brundisium.  Here  all 
the  available  troops  were  assembled,  to  the  number  of  twenty-five 
thousand ;  part  of  them  were  at  once  conveyed  across  in  the  ships ; 
the  remaining  ten  thousand  were  besieged  by  Caesar  in  Brundisium, 
but  were  skillfully  withdrawn  by  Pompeius  before  Caesar  could 
close  the  harbor. 

In  two  months  Caesar  had  broken  up  an  army  of  ten  legions, 
and  made  himself  master  of  the  state  chest,  of  the  capital,  and  of 
the  whole  peninsula  of  Italy.  But  though  his  resources  were  thus 
largely  increased,  the  military  difficulties  of  the  situation  were  pro- 
portionately complicated.  He  had  now  to  leave  behind  a  large 
garrison  in  Italy,  and  to  guard  against  the  closing  of  the  seas  and 
the  cutting  off  of  grain  supplies  by  his  opponents.  Financial  diffi- 
culties, too,  soon  arose,  now  that  Caesar  had  to  feed  the  population 
of  the  capital  while  the  revenues  of  the  East  were  still  in  the 
enemy's  hands. 

The  general  expectation  was  that  confiscations  and  proscrip- 
tions would  be  resorted  to.  Friends  and  foes  saw  in  Caesar  a  second 
Catilina;  and  it  must  be  allowed  that  neither  his  own  antecedents 
nor  the  character  of  the  men  who  now  surrounded  him — men  of 
broken  reputation  and  ruined  fortunes  like  Quintus  Hortensius, 
Curio,  and  Marcus  Antonius — were  reassuring.  But  both  friends 
and  foes  were  soon  undeceived ;  from  the  beginning  of  hostilities 
the  common  soldiers  were  forbidden  to  enter  a  town  armed  and  the 
people  were  everywhere  protected  from  injury.  When  Corfinium 
was  surrendered  late  at  night,  Caesar  postponed  the  occupation  of 
the  town  until  the  next  day,  to  prevent  confusion  and  outrage  in 
the  darkness.  Everywhere  the  officers  captured  were  allowed  to 
carry  off  their  private  property,  and  in  his  worst  financial  straits 
Caesar  preferred  borrowing  from  his  friends  to  levying  exactions 
from  his  foes.  The  aristocrats  indeed,  far  from  being  appeased  by 
Caesar's  moderation,  were  only  goaded  to  more  frantic  hatred,  but 
the  mass  of  quiet  people,  in  whose  eves  material  interests  were  more 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  339 

49  B.C. 

important  than  politics,  were  completely  gained  over.  Even  the 
senators  who  had  ventured  to  remain  behind  acquiesced  in  Caesar's 
rule.  His  object  was  fully  attained:  anarchy,  and  even  the  alarm 
of  anarchy,  had  been  kept  under — an  incalculable  gain  with  regard 
to  the  future  reorganization  of  the  state.  The  anarchists,  of  course, 
were  bitterly  disappointed,  and  showed  a  spirit  which  might  be 
expected  at  some  future  time  to  give  trouble.  The  republicans  of 
all  shades  were  neither  converted  nor  disarmed.  In  their  eyes  their 
duty  to  the  constitution  absolved  them  from  every  other  considera- 
tion. The  less  decided  members  of  the  party  who  accepted  peace 
and  protection  from  the  monarch  were  none  the  more  friendly  to 
him  in  their  hearts,  and  the  consciences  of  the  more  honorable 
among  them  smote  them  when  they  thought  of  other  members  of 
the  party  who  had  gone  into  exile  rather  than  compromise  their 
principles.  Besides,  emigration  had  become  fashionable;  it  was 
plebeian  to  remain  and  perhaps  take  a  seat  in  the  Caesarian  senate 
of  nobodies,  instead  of  emigrating  with  the  Domitii  and  the  Metelli. 

Caesar  had  begun  the  war  as  the  protector  of  the  overawed 
senate  against  the  violent  minority;  but  the  same  inertness  which 
had  made  it  possible  for  Caesar  to  prevent  strong  action  on  the  part 
of  his  opponent  prevented  him  from  obtaining  aid  from  the  senate 
himself.  The  first  meeting  was  on  April  i,  but  Caesar  could  not 
procure  approval  of  his  acts  or  power  to  continue  the  war ;  he  then 
tried  in  vain  to  be  named  dictator.  When  he  sent  men  to  take  pos- 
session of  the  treasure,  the  tribune  Lucius  Metellus  attempted  to 
protect  the  state  chest  with  his  person,  and  had  to  be  removed  by 
force.  And  at  length  Caesar  was  obliged  to  tell  the  senate  that, 
since  it  refused  him  its  assistance,  he  would  proceed  without  it.  He 
appointed  Marcus  Aemilius  Lepidus  prefect  of  the  city,  and 
hastened  to  resume  the  war. 

Pompeius,  for  whatever  reason,  had  preferred  to  remain  in 
Greece  rather  than  to  go  to  Spain,  where  he  had  able  lieutenants,  a 
strong  army,  and  provinces  devoted  to  him.  Accordingly  Caesar 
had  the  option  of  directing  his  first  attack  against  Pompeius  himself 
in  the  East,  or  against  the  strong  Spanish  army  under  his  lieuten- 
ant. He  had  already  collected  on  the  lower  Rhone  nine  of  his  best 
legions  and  six  thousand  cavalry;  but  his  enemies  had  been  active 
in  the  same  region.  Lucius  Domitius  had  induced  Massilia  to  de- 
clare against  him  and  to  refuse  a  passage  to  his  troops,  and  the  five 
best  Spanish  legions,  together  with  forty  thousand  Spanish  infantry 


340  ROME 

49  B.C. 

and  five  thousand  cavalry,  were  on  their  way,  under  the  command 
of  Afranius  and  Petreius,  to  close  the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees.  But 
Caesar  anticipated  them,  and  the  line  of  the  Pyrenees  was  lost  to 
the  Pompeians.  The  latter  now  established  themselves  at  Ilerda  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Sicoris,  about  twenty  miles  north  of  its 
junction  with  the  Ebro.  To  the  south  of  the  town  the  mountains 
approach  pretty  close  to  the  river;  to  the  north  stretches  a  plain 
commanded  by  the  town.  Connection  with  the  left  bank  of  the 
Sicoris  was  maintained  by  means  of  a  single  solid  bridge  close  to 
the  town.  The  Caesarians  were  stationed  above  Ilerda,  between  the 
River  Sicoris  and  its  tributary,  the  Cinga,  which  joins  it  below  the 
town;  but  they  could  not  make  good  their  ground  between  the 
Pompeian  camp  and  the  town,  which  would  have  given  them  com- 
mand of  the  stone  bridge,  and  consequently  they  depended  for  their 
communications  upon  two  temporary  bridges  twenty  miles  higher 
up  the  river.  These  were  swept  away  by  the  floods,  and  the  whole 
army  was  now  cooped  up  in  the  narrow  space  between  the  two 
streams. 

Famine  and  disease  appeared.  A  body  of  reinforcements 
from  Gaul,  together  with  foraging  parties  on  their  way  back  to  the 
camp,  to  the  number  of  six  thousand,  were  attacked  and  dispersed 
under  the  eyes  of  the  Caesarians  on  the  other  side  of  the  river.  Had 
the  river  been  adequately  guarded  the  Pompeians  could  hardly  have 
failed  of  success ;  but  the  further  bank  was  observed  to  be  unoccu- 
pied ;  Caesar  succeeded  in  restoring  the  bridges  without  much  diffi- 
culty, and  provisions  again  entered  the  camp  in  abundance.  Soon 
his  superior  cavalry  scoured  the  country  far  and  wide,  and  the  most 
important  Spanish  communities  to  the  north,  some  even  to  the 
south,  of  the  Ebro  passed  over  to  him,  while  the  Pompeians  began 
to  feel  the  want  of  supplies.  They  determined  to  retreat  south  of 
the  Ebro,  but  it  was  necessary  first  to  build  a  bride  of  boats  over 
that  river.  This  was  done  at  a  point  below  the  mouth  of  the  Sicoris. 
Caesar  sought  by  all  means  to  detain  the  enemy,  but  wras  unable  to 
do  so  as  long  as  he  had  not  control  of  the  bridge  of  Ilerda,  since 
there  was  no  ford.  His  soldiers  worked  night  and  day  to  draw  off 
the  river  by  canals,  so  that  infantry  might  wade  it,  but  the 
Pompeians  had  finished  their  bridge  over  the  Ebro  before  Caesar 
had  completed  his  canals,  and  he  could  only  order  his  cavalry  to 
follow  them  and  harass  their  rear.  But  when  the  legions  saw  the 
enemy  retreating  they  called  upon  the  general  to  lead  them  on;  they 


THE     CIVIL    WAR  341 

49  B.C. 

entered  the  river,  and  though  the  water  reached  their  shoulders  it 
was  crossed  in  safety.  The  Pompeians  were  now  within  five  miles 
of  the  mountains  which  lined  the  north  bank  of  the  Ebro,  and  would 
soon  be  in  safety.  But,  harassed  by  the  enemy's  attacks  and  ex- 
hausted with  marching,  they  pitched  their  camp  in  the  plain ;  here 
Caesar's  troops  overtook  them  and  encamped  opposite,  and  in  this 
position  both  armies  remained  for  the  next  day.  On  the  morning 
of  the  third  day  Caesar's  infantry  set  out  to  turn  the  position  of  the 
Pompeians  and  bar  the  way  to  the  Ebro,  and,  in  spite  of  all  the 
latter  could  do,  they  found  themselves  anticipated.  They  were  now 
strategically  lost,  and,  in  spite  of  ample  opportunity,  Caesar  re- 
frained from  attacking  them.  The  soldiers  of  the  two  armies  began 
to  fraternize  and  to  discuss  terms  of  surrender,  but  Petreius  cut 
short  the  negotiations  and  began  to  retreat  towards  Ilerda,  where 
were  a  garrison  and  magazines.  Shut  in  between  the  Sicoris  and 
the  enemy,  their  difficulties  increased  at  every  step :  Caesar's  cavalry 
occupied  the  opposite  bank  and  prevented  them  from  crossing  the 
river  to  gain  the  fortress,  and  at  last,  on  August  2,  49  B.C.,  the 
inevitable  capitulation  took  place.  Caesar  granted  to  soldiers  and 
officers  life,  liberty,  and  property,  and  did  not,  as  in  Italy,  com- 
pulsorily  enroll  the  captives  in  his  army.  The  native  Spaniards  at 
once  returned  to  their  homes,  and  the  Italians  were  disbanded  at 
the  borders  of  Transalpine  and  Cisalpine  Gaul. 

In  Farther  Spain  Varro  determined  to  shut  himself  up  in 
Gades;  but  when  this  town,  together  with  all  the  most  notable 
places  in  the  province,  gave  itself  up  to  Caesar,  and  when  even 
Italica  closed  its  gates  against  the  Pompeian  general,  he  himself 
resolved  to  capitulate. 

About  the  same  time  Massilia  surrendered.  By  sea  Caesar's 
lieutenant,  Decimus  Brutus — the  same  who  had  conquered  the 
Veneti — had  defeated  with  his  improvised  fleet  the  far  stronger 
force  of  the  Massiliots.  He  gained  a  second  victory  not  long  after- 
wards, over  a  small  squadron  of  Pompeians  under  Lucius  Nasidius, 
who  had  arrived  to  reinforce  the  Massilian  squadron,  and  completely 
shut  the  besieged  from  the  sea.  On  land  Gaius  Trebonius  pressed 
forward  the  siege  with  energy;  the  works  were  pushed  up  to  the 
very  walls  of  the  city,  when  the  besieged  promised  to  desist  from  the 
defense  if  Trebonius  would  suspend  operations  until  Caesar  arrived. 
The  armistice  was  granted,  but  was  used  by  the  Massiliots  to  make  a 
treacherous  sally ;  the  struggle  was  renewed,  and  the  city  once  more 


342  ROME 

49  B.C. 

invested.  On  Caesar's  arrival  it  was  reduced  to  surrender  on  any 
terms.  Domitius  stole  away  in  a  boat.  The  garrison  and  inhabitants 
were  protected  by  Caesar  from  the  fury  of  his  legions,  but  the  city, 
while  it  retained  its  freedom  and  nationality,  lost  a  portion  of  its 
territory  and  privileges. 

While  Caesar  was  occupied  in  Spain  his  lieutenants  had  been 
at  work  to  prevent  the  other  great  danger  which  was  imminent, 
namely,  the  starvation  of  Italy.  The  Pompeians  commanded  the 
sea  and  the  corn  provinces,  Sardinia  and  Corsica  through  Marcus 
Cotta,  Sicily  through  Cato,  Africa  through  Varus  and  Juba,  king 
of  Numidia.  Sardinia  was  quickly  recovered  for  Caesar,  by  Quin- 
tus  Valerius;  the  conquest  of  Sicily  and  Africa  was  intrusted  to 
Curio.  He  occupied  Sicily  without  a  blow,  and,  leaving  two  legions 
in  the  island,  he  embarked  with  the  remaining  two  and  with  five 
hundred  horse  for  Africa.  He  effected  a  landing,  and  pitched  his 
camp  near  Utica:  his  legions  were  for  the  most  part  composed  of 
men  taken  over  from  the  enemy,  but  he  knew  well  how  to  gain  their 
affections,  and  at  the  same  time  showed  himself  a  capable  officer. 
He  was  successful  in  several  minor  engagements,  and  at  length  put 
to  flight  the  whole  forces  of  Varus,  and  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to 
Utica.  But  there  came  news  that  King  Juba  was  advancing  with  all 
his  forces  to  its  relief,  and  Curio  raised  the  siege  and  returned  to 
his  former  camp  to  wait  for  reinforcements.  Soon  afterwards  came 
a  second  report,  that  the  king  had  turned  back,  and  was  sending 
on  only  a  moderate  corps  under  Saburra.  Curio  immediately  sent 
forward  his  cavalry,  which  surprised  and  inflicted  much  damage 
upon  this  body;  he  then  hastened  himself  to  complete  their  defeat, 
and  succeeded  in  putting  them  to  flight.  But  Saburra  was  not 
destitute  of  support.  Only  five  miles  distant  was  the  Numidian 
main  force,  which  was  now  seen  rapidly  approaching.  The  Roman 
cavalry  were  by  this  time  dispersed  in  pursuit,  all  but  a  band  of  two 
hundred,  who  with  the  infantry  were  completely  surrounded  in  the 
plain.  In  vain  Curio  attempted  to  cut  his  way  through  :  the  infantry 
were  cut  down  to  a  man ;  only  a  few  of  the  cavalry  escaped.  Curio, 
unable  to  bear  the  shame  of  defeat,  fell  sword  in  hand,  and  on  the 
following  day  the  force  in  camp  near  Utica  surrendered  on 
receiving  news  of  the  disaster. 

The  expedition  had  been  successful  in  relieving  the  most  urgent 
wants  of  the  capital  by  the  occupation  of  Sicily,  but  the  loss  of  Curio 
was  irreparable.     He  was  the  only  one  of  Caesar's  subordinates 


THE     CIVIL     WAR 

49  B.C. 

who  had  a  touch  of  genius  and  a  certain  magnetic  power  over  the 
minds  of  men. 

It  is  uncertain  what  had  been  Pompeius's  plan  of  campaign  for 
the  year  49  b.c.  Probably  the  Spanish  army  was  meant  to  stand 
on  the  defensive  until  the  Macedonian  army  was  ready  to  march; 
a  junction  would  then  have  been  effected  between  the  two  armies, 
and  a  combined  attempt  made  by  land  and  sea  to  recover  Italy. 
In  pursuance  probably  of  some  such  plan,  the  admirals  of  Pompeius 
in  the  Adriatic,  Marcus  Octavius  and  Lucius  Scribonius  Libo,  at- 
tacked Caesar's  fleet  under  Dolabella,  destroyed  his  ships  and  shut 
up  Gaius  Antonius  with  the  two  Illyrian  legions  in  the  island  of 
Curicta.  All  attempts  to  rescue  the  latter  failed,  and  the  majority 
had  to  lay  down  their  arms  and  were  incorporated  in  the  Pompeian 
army.  Octavius  proceeded  to  reduce  Ulyria ;  most  of  the  towns  gave 
themselves  up  to  him,  but  the  Caesarians  maintained  themselves 
obstinately  in  Salonae  and  Lissus. 

This,  the  only  result  obtained  by  the  Pompeian  fleet  in  the  year 
49  B.C.,  is  miserably  small,  considering  the  superiority  of  the  party 
by  sea,  and  suggests  an  appalling  picture  of  the  discord  and  mis- 
management which  prevailed  in  the  ranks  of  the  coalition.  The 
general  result  of  the  campaign  had  been  complete  success  for  the 
Caesarians  in  one  quarter  and  partial  success  in  another,  while  the 
plan  of  Pompeius  had  been  completely  frustrated  by  the  destruction 
of  the  Spanish  army. 

But  though  nothing  was  done  to  obstruct  Caesar  in  the  West, 
no  effort  was  spared  to  consolidate  the  power  of  the  republican 
party  in  Macedonia.  Hither  flocked  the  emigrants  from  Brundis- 
ium,  and  the  refugees  from  the  West:  Marcus  Cato  from  Sicily, 
Lucius  Domitius  from  Massilia,  Afranius  and  Varro  from  Spain. 
The  senate  of  the  emigration  which  met  at  Thessalonica  counted 
nearly  two  hundred  members,  including  almost  all  the  consulars. 
Out  of  scrupulous  regard  to  formal  law  they  called  themselves 
— not  the  senate,  for  that  could  not  exist  beyond  the  sacred  soil  of 
the  city — but  "  the  three  hundred,"  the  ancient  normal  number  of 
senators.  The  majority  indeed  were  lukewarm,  and  only  obstructed 
the  energy  of  others  by  their  querulousness  and  sluggishness ;  but  the 
violent  minority  showed  no  want  of  activity.  With  them  the  indis- 
pensable preliminary  of  any  negotiations  for  peace  was  the  bringing 
over  of  Caesar's  head ;  his  partisans  were  held  to  have  forfeited  life 
and  property,  and  it  was  even  proposed  to  punish  every  senator  who 


344  ROME 

49   B.C. 

had  remained  neutral  in  the  struggle  or  had  emigrated  without 
entering  the  army.  Bibulus  and  Labienus  caused  all  soldiers  and 
officers  of  Caesar  who  fell  into  their  hands  to  be  executed,  and 
probably  the  main  reason  why  no  counter-revolution  broke  out  in 
Italy  during  Caesar's  absence  was  the  fear  of  the  unbridled  fury 
of  the  extreme  section  of  the  aristocracy.  Cato  alone  had  the 
force  and  the  courage  to  check  such  proceedings ;  he  got  the  senate 
to  prohibit  the  pillage  of  subject  towns  and  the  putting  to  death  of 
burgesses  otherwise  than  in  battle,  and  confessed  that  he  feared  the 
victory  of  his  own  party  ever  more  than  their  defeat. 

The  position  of  Pompeius  became  more  and  more  disagreeable 
after  the  events  of  the  year  49  B.C.  All  the  failures  of  his  lieuten- 
ants were  visited  upon  himself,  while  the  newly  formed  senate  took 
up  its  abode  almost  in  his  headquarters,  and  impeded  his  action  at 
every  step.  There  was  no  man  of  sufficient  mark  to  put  a  stop  to 
these  preposterous  doings;  Cato,  who  alone  might  have  effected 
something,  was  jealously  kept  in  the  background  by  Pompeius,  and 
Pompeius  himself  had  not  the  necessary  intellect  or  decision. 

The  flower  of  the  troops  were  the  legions  brought  from  Italy, 
out  of  which,  with  recruits,  five  legions  were  formed.  Two  others 
were  on  their  way  from  Syria  and  one  from  Cilicia,  and  three  more 
were  formed  from  Romans  settled  in  Crete,  Macedonia,  and  Asia 
Minor.  Finally  there  were  two  thousand  volunteers,  and  the  con- 
tingents of  the  subjects.  The  militia  of  Epirus,  Aetolia,  and 
Thrace  were  called  out  to  guard  the  coast,  and  a  body  of  archers 
and  slingers  were  drawn  from  Greece  and  Asia  Minor.  Of  cavalry 
there  was  a  considerable  body  formed  from  the  young  aristocracy 
of  Rome  and  from  the  Apulian  slave  herdsmen;  the  rest  consisted 
of  contingents  from  the  subjects  and  clients — Celts  from  the  garri- 
son of  Alexandria  and  from  the  princes  of  Galatia,  Thracians,  Cap- 
padocians,  mounted  archers  from  Commagene,  Armenians,  and 
Numidians,  amounting  in  all  to  seven  thousand. 

The  fleet  numbered  five  hundred  sail,  one-fifth  of  which  were 
Roman  vessels,  and  the  rest  from  the  Greek  and  Asiatic  maritime 
states.  Immense  stores  of  corn  and  war  material  were  collected  at 
Dyrrachium,  and  for  money  the  whole  Roman  and  non-Roman 
population  within  reach,  subjects,  senators,  and  tax  farmers,  were 
laid  under  contribution.  The  temper  of  the  soldiers  was  good,  but 
a  great  part  of  the  army  consisted  of  newly  raised  troops,  and 
required  time  for  training  and  discipline. 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  345 

48  B.C. 

The  design  of  the  commander  was  to  unite  his  whole  force, 
naval  and  military,  during  the  winter  along  the  coast  of  Epirus. 
The  land  army  moved  slowly  from  its  winter  quarters  at  Berrhoea 
towards  Dyrrachium;  the  Syrian  legions  were  not  expected  until 
the  spring.  The  admiral  Bibulus  was  already  at  Corcyra  with  no 
ships. 

The  Pompeians  were  taking  their  time,  but  Caesar  was  not 
slow  to  act.  On  the  conclusion  of  the  western  campaign  he  had 
ordered  the  best  of  his  troops  to  set  out  immediately  for  Brundisium, 
where  ships  of  war  and  transports  were  already  collected.  These 
unparalleled  exertions  thinned  the  ranks  of  the  legions  more  than 
their  conflicts,  and  the  mutiny  of  the  ninth  legion  at  Placentia 
showed  the  dangerous  temper  of  the  soldiers;  it  was  mastered 
by  the  personal  authority  of  Caesar,  and  at  present  the  evil  spread 
no  further.  But  at  Brundisium  only  twelve  ships  of  war  were 
found,  and  the  transports  were  scarcely  sufficient  to  convey  a  third 
of  the  army,  which  numbered  twelve  legions  and  ten  thousand 
cavalry,  while  the  enemy  commanded  the  Adriatic  and  all  the  islands 
and  harbors  of  the  opposite  coast.  Nevertheless,  on  January  4, 
48  B.C.,  Caesar,  with  a  temerity  which  is  not  justified  by  the  success 
of  the  immediate  enterprise,  set  sail  with  six  legions  and  six  hun- 
dred horse.  The  Pompeians  were  not  ready  to  attack,  and  the  first 
freight  was  landed  in  the  middle  of  the  Acroceraunian  cliffs.  The 
vessels  returned  to  bring  over  the  remainder  of  the  army.  Caesar 
at  once  began  to  disperse  the  Epirote  militia,  and  succeeded  in  taking 
Oricum  and  Apollonia,  while  Dyrrachium,  the  arsenal  of  Pompeius, 
was  in  the  greatest  danger. 

But  the  further  course  of  the  campaign  did  not  fulfill  the 
promise  of  this  brilliant  beginning.  Thirty  of  Caesar's  transports 
were  captured  by  Bibulus,  and  destroyed  with  every  living  thing 
on  board.  The  whole  coast,  from  the  island  of  Sason  to  Corcyra, 
was  closely  watched,  and  for  a  time  even  Brundisium  was  block- 
aded. Nor  was  Dyrrachium  captured,  for  Pompeius  had  hastened 
his  march  and  secured  it  in  time.  Thus  Caesar  was  wedged  in 
among  the  rocks  of  Epirus,  between  the  immense  fleet  of  the  enemy 
and  a  land  army  twice  as  strong  as  his  own.  Pompeius  was  in  no 
hurry  to  attack,  but  established  himself  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
River  Apsus,  between  Dyrrachium  and  Apollonia,  facing  Caesar 
on  the  left  bank,  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  Syrian  legions  which 
had  wintered  at  Pergamus. 


346  ROME 

48    B.C. 

Caesar  was  rescued  from  this  perilous  position  by  the  energy 
of  Marcus  Antonius,  the  commandant  of  Italy.  Again  the  trans- 
port fleet  set  sail,  with  four  legions  and  eight  hundred  horse.  The 
wind  fortunately  carried  it  past  the  galleys  of  Libo,  the  Pompeian 
admiral ;  but  the  same  wind  carried  it  northward,  past  the  camps  of 
Caesar  and  Pompeius  to  Lissus,  which  still  adhered  to  Caesar, 
where  it  was  enabled  to  land  only  by  the  most  marvelous  good 
fortune.  At  the  moment  when  the  enemy's  squadron  overtook  the 
ships  of  Antonius,  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  the  wind  veered  and 
drove  them  back  into  the  open  sea.  Pompeius  was  unable  to  pre- 
vent the  junction  of  Caesar's  forces,  and  now  took  up  a  new  posi- 
tion on  the  Genusus,  between  the  River  Apsus  and  Dyrrachium. 
When  he  refused  to  give  battle,  Caesar  succeeded  in  throwing  him- 
self with  his  best  marching  troops  between  the  enemy's  camp  and 
the  town  of  Dyrrachium,  on  which  it  rested;  and  Pompeius  again 
changed  his  position,  and  encamped  upon  a  small  plain  enclosed 
between  the  fork  formed  by  the  main  chain  of  the  Balkans,  which 
ends  at  Dyrrachium,  and  a  lateral  branch  which  runs  to  the  sea  in  a 
southwesterly  direction.  His  communication  with  the  town  was 
secured  by  the  fleet,  and  there  was  therefore  no  difficulty  about 
supplies,  while  to  Caesar's  camp  provisions  were  brought  at 
intervals  only  by  strong  detachments  sent  into  the  interior,  and 
flesh,  barley,  and  even  roots  had  to  be  eaten  by  the  legions  instead 
of  wheat. 

Under  these  circumstances  inaction  meant  destruction  to  the 
Caesarians,  and  they  proceeded  to  occupy  the  heights  commanding 
the  plain  on  which  Pompeius  lay.  They  invested  his  army  with  a 
chain  of  posts  sixteen  miles  long,  and  cut  off  the  rivulets  which 
flowed  into  the  plain,  thus  hoping  to  compel  him  either  to  fight  or 
to  embark.  At  the  same  time,  as  at  Alesia,  Caesar  caused  a  second, 
outer  line  of  entrenchments  to  be  formed,  to  protect  himself  against 
attacks  from  Dyrrachium  or  from  attempts  to  turn  his  position. 
The  works  advanced  amid  incessant  conflicts,  in  which  the  tried 
valor  of  the  Caesarians  had  usually  the  advantage.  At  one  point, 
for  instance,  a  single  cohort  maintained  itself  against  four  legions 
for  several  hours  until  help  arrived.  At  length  the  want  of  fodder 
and  water  began  to  be  so  severely  felt  by  the  Pompeians  that  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  for  them  to  strike  a  decisive  blow.  The 
general  was  informed  by  some  Celtic  deserters  that  the  enemy  had 
neglected  to  secure  the  beach  between  his  two  lines  of  entrench- 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  Ml 

48  B.C. 

ments,  six  hundred  feet  distant  from  each  other.  Pompeius  could 
thus  attack  from  three  sides  at  once.  Whiie  the  inner  line  was 
attacked  from  the  camp  and  the  outer  line  by  light-armed  troops, 
conveyed  in  vessels  and  landed  beyond  it,  a  third  division  landed  in 
the  space  between  the  two  lines  and  attacked  in  the  rear  the  defend- 
ers who  were  already  sufficiently  occupied.  The  entrenchment  next 
the  sea  was  taken,  and  the  second  was  with  difficulty  held  by  Anton- 
ius  against  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  Soon  afterwards  Caesar 
eagerly  seized  an  opportunity  of  attacking  a  Pompeian  legion,  which 
had  become  isolated,  with  the  bulk  of  his  infantry;  but  a  valiant 
resistance  was  made,  and  as  the  ground  had  been  already  used  for 
the  encampment  of  several  successive  divisions,  it  was  much  inter- 
sected by  mounds  and  ditches.  Caesar's  right  wing  and  cavalry 
missed  their  way;  Pompeius,  advancing  with  five  legions  to  the 
aid  of  his  troops,  found  the  two  wings  of  the  enemy  separated  and 
one  of  them  isolated.  A  panic  seized  the  Caesarians ;  a  disorderly 
flight  ensued,  and  the  matter  ended  with  the  loss  to  Caesar  of  one 
thousand  of  his  best  soldiers.  But  the  results  of  the  day's  fighting 
were  more  serious  than  this.  Caesar's  lines  were  broken.  The 
cavalry  of  Pompeius  now  ranged  at  will  over  the  adjacent  country, 
and  rendered  it  almost  impossible  for  him  to  obtain  provisions. 
Gnaeus  Pompeius  the  younger  had  destroyed  his  few  ships  of  war 
which  lay  at  Oricum,  and  soon  afterwards  burned  the  transports  at 
Lissus.  Caesar  was  thus  cut  off  from  the  sea  more  than  ever,  and, 
in  fact,  was  completely  at  the  mercy  of  Pompeius. 

It  was  now  open  to  Pompeius  to  attack  or  to  blockade  his 
enemy,  or  to  cross  in  person  to  Italy  with  the  main  army  and  try  to 
recover  the  peninsula.  But  he  left  his  opponent  to  make  the  first 
move,  and  Caesar  had  no  choice.  He  began  immediately  to  retreat 
to  Apollonia,  followed  by  the  enemy,  who,  however,  after  four  days, 
had  to  give  up  the  pursuit.  Many  voices  now  advised  Pompeius 
to  cross  to  Italy;  but  this  plan  would  necessitate  the  abandonment 
of  the  Syrian  legions,  now  in  Macedonia  under  Metellus  Scipio; 
and,  besides,  he  hoped  to  capture  the  corps  of  Calvinus,  whom 
Caesar  had  detached  to  encounter  Metellus.  Calvinus  was  now  on 
the  Via  Egnatia  at  Heraclea  Lyncestis,  and  only  learned  the  condi- 
dition  of  things  just  in  time  to  escape  destruction  by  a  quick  depar- 
ture in  the  direction  of  Thessaly.  Caesar,  who  had  arrived  at 
Apollonia,  and  had  deposited  his  wounded  there,  now  set  out  for 
Thessaly,  in  order  to  get  beyond  the  reach  of  the  enemy's  fleet. 


348  ROME 

48    B.C. 

He  crossed  the  mountain  chain  between  Epirus  and  Thessaly, 
effected  a  junction  with  Calvinus  at  Aeginium,  near  the  source  of 
the  Peneus,  and,  after  storming  and  pillaging  Gomphi,  the  first 
Thessalian  town  before  which  he  appeared,  quickly  received  the 
submission  of  the  others. 

Thus  the  victories  of  Dyrrachium  had  borne  little  fruit  to  the 
victors.  Caesar  and  Calvinus  had  escaped  pursuit,  and  stood  united 
and  in  full  security  in  Thessaly.  But  the  former  caution  of  the 
Pompeians  was  succeeded  by  the  most  boundless  confidence.  They 
regarded  the  victory  as  already  won,  and  were  resolved  at  any  price 
to  fight  with  Caesar  and  crush  him  at  the  first  opportunity.  Cato 
was  left  in  command  at  Dyrrachium  and  in  Corcyra.  Pompeius 
and  Scipio  marched  southward  and  met  at  Larissa. 

Caesar  was  encamped  near  Pharsalus,  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
River  Enipeus,  which  intersects  the  plain  stretching  southward  from 
Larissa.  Pompeius  pitched  his  camp  on  the  right  bank,  along 
the  slope  of  Cynoscephalae.  His  entire  army  was  assembled,  and 
he  had  now  eleven  legions,  numbering  47,000  men  and  7000  horse, 
while  Caesar  was  still  expecting  two  legions  from  Aetolia  and 
Thessaly,  and  two  which  were  arriving  by  way  of  Illyria  from 
Italy ;  his  eight  legions  did  not  number  more  than  22,000  men  and 
his  cavalry  but  1000  troopers.  All  military  reasons  urged  Pom- 
peius to  fight  soon,  and  the  impatience  of  the  emigrants  had  doubt- 
less more  weight  than  these  reasons.  The  senators  considered  their 
triumph  secure.  Already  there  was  strife  about  filling  up  Caesar's 
pontificate,  and  houses  were  hired  in  the  Forum  for  the  next  elec- 
tions. Great  indignation  was  excited  when  Pompeius  hesitated 
to  cross  the  rivulet  which  separated  the  camps.  He  was  only  delay- 
ing the  battle,  they  alleged,  in  order  to  perpetuate  his  part  of 
Agamemnon  and  to  rule  the  longer  over  so  many  noble  lords. 
The  general  yielded,  and  prepared  to  attack.  The  battlefield 
was  almost  the  same  as  that  on  which,  a  hundred  and  fifty  years 
before,  the  Romans  had  laid  the  foundation  of  their  Eastern 
dominion.  The  right  of  the  Pompeians  rested  on  the  Enipeus, 
Caesar's  left  upon  the  broken  ground  in  front  of  the  river.  The  other 
wings  were  both  out  in  the  plain,  and  each  was  covered  by  cavalry 
and  light  troops.  The  plan  of  Pompeius  was  to  scatter  with  his  cav- 
alry the  weak  band  of  horsemen  opposite  to  him,  and  then  to  take 
Caesar's  right  wing  in  the  rear.  But  Caesar,  foreseeing  the  rout  of 
his  cavalry,  had  stationed  behind  his  right  flank  about  two  thousand 


THE     CIVIL    WAR  349 

48  B.C. 

of  his  best  legionaries.  As  the  enemy's  cavalry  galloped  round  the 
line,  driving  Caesar's  horsemen  before  them,  they  were  met  and 
thrown  into  confusion  by  this  unexpected  infantry  attack,  and 
galloped  from  the  field  of  battle.1  This  unexpected  repulse  of  the 
cavalry  raised  the  courage  of  the  Caesarians.  Their  third  division 
which  had  been  held  in  reserve,  advanced  all  along  the  line.  Pom- 
peius,  who  had  never  trusted  his  infantry,  rode  at  once  from  the 
field  to  the  camp.  His  legions  began  to  waver  and  to  retire  over 
the  brook,  an  operation  which  was  attended  with  much  loss.  The 
day  was  lost,  but  the  army  was  substantially  intact.  Neverthe- 
less, Pompeius  lost  all  hope,  and  when  he  saw  the  troops  recross- 
ing  the  brcok  he  threw  from  him  his  general's  scarf  and  rode  off 
by  the  nearest  route  to  the  sea.  The  army,  discouraged  and  leader- 
less,  found  no  rest  within  the  camp.  They  were  driven  from  its 
shelter,  and  withdrew  to  the  heights  of  Crannon  and  Scotussa.  As 
they  attempted  to  march  along  the  hills  and  regain  Larissa  Caesar's 
troops  intercepted  their  route,  and  at  nightfall  cut  them  off  from  the 
only  rivulet  in  the  neighborhood.  Fifteen  thousand  of  the  enemy 
lay  dead  or  wounded  upon  the  field,  while  the  Caesarians  had  only 
two  hundred  men  missing.  The  next  morning  twenty  thousand 
men  laid  down  their  arms,  and  of  the  eleven  eagles  of  the  enemy 
nine  were  handed  over  to  Caesar.  Caesar  had  on  that  very  day 
reminded  his  men  that  they  should  not  forget  the  fellow-citizen  in 
the  foe ;  but  he  found  it  necessary  to  use  some  severity.  The  com- 
mon soldiers  were  incorporated  in  the  army,  fines  and  confiscations 
were  inflicted  upon  the  men  of  better  rank,  and  the  senators  and 
equites  of  note  were  with  few  exceptions  beheaded. 

The  immediate  results  of  this  memorable  day,  August  9,  48  B.C., 
were  soon  seen.  All  who  were  not  willing  or  not  obliged  to  fight 
for  a  lost  cause  now  passed  over  to  Caesar's  side.  The  client  com- 
munities and  princes  recalled  their  contingents.  Pharnaces,  king 
of  the  Bosporus,  went  so  far  as  to  take  possession  of  Phanagoris, 
which  had  been  declared  free  by  Pompeius,  and  of  Little 
Armenia,  which  had  been  conferred  upon  Deiotarus.  So  also 
many   lukewarm  members   of  the   aristocracy   made  their  peace 

1  It  was  in  this  attack  that  the  well-known  direction  of  Caesar  to  his  troops 
to  strike  at  the  faces  of  the  enemy's  horsemen  was  given.  The  infantry,  acting 
in  an  irregular  way  against  cavalry,  were  not  to  throw  their  pila,  but  to  use 
them  as  spears,  and,  to  be  more  effective,  were  to  thrust  at  the  faces  of  the 
troopers.  It  was  probably  the  rough  wit  of  the  camp  which  suggested  the  idea 
that  the  Pompeian  cavalry  fled  for  fear  of  scars  on  their  faces. 


350  ROME 

48    B.C. 

with  the  conqueror.  But  the  flower  of  the  defeated  party  made  no 
compromise;  aristocrats  could  not  come  to  terms  with  monarchy. 
Into  whatever  abyss  of  degeneracy  the  aristocratic  rule  had  now 
sunk,  it  had  once  been  a  great  political  system;  the  sacred  fire,  by 
which  Italy  had  been  conquered  and  Hannibal  had  been  vanquished, 
continued  to  glow — although  somewhat  dim  and  dull — in  the 
Roman  nobility  as  long  as  that  nobility  existed,  and  rendered  a  cor- 
dial understanding  between  the  men  of  the  old  regime  and  the  new 
monarchy  impossible.  Many  submitted  outwardly,  and  retired  into 
private  life.  Marcus  Marcellus,  who  had  brought  about  the  rupture 
with  Caesar,  retired  into  voluntary  banishment  at  Lesbos;  but  in 
the  majority  passion  overwhelmed  reflection.  No  one  grasped  the 
hopelessness  of  the  situation  more  clearly  than  Marcus  Cato.  Con- 
vinced from  this  moment  that  monarchy  was  inevitable,  he  doubted 
whether  the  constitutional  party  ought  to  continue  the  struggle. 
But  when  he  resolved  still  to  fight — not  for  victory,  but  for  a 
more  honorable  fall — he  sought  to  draw  no  one  into  the  struggle 
who  chose  to  make  his  peace.  It  was,  in  his  eyes,  merely  sense- 
less and  cruel  to  compel  the  individual  to  share  the  ruin  of  the 
republic. 

Most  of  the  leading  men  who  escaped  from  Pharsalus  made 
their  way  to  Corcyra,  where  a  council  of  war  was  held,  at  which 
Cato,  Metellus  Scipio,  Titus  Labienus,  Lucius  Afranius,  and  Gnaeus 
Pompeius  the  younger  were  present.  But  the  absence  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief and  the  internal  dissensions  prevented  the  adoption 
of  any  common  resolution,  and  it  was  indeed  difficult  to  say  what 
ought  to  be  done.  Macedonia  and  Greece,  Italy  and  the  East,  were 
lost  to  the  coalition.  In  Egypt  there  was  indeed  a  large  army,  but 
it  was  soon  evident  that  the  court  of  Alexandria  was  not  to  be  relied 
on.  In  Spain,  Pompeian  sympathies  were  very  strong,  especially 
in  the  army,  so  much  so  that  the  Caesarians  had  to  give  up  the  idea 
of  invading  Africa  from  that  quarter;  in  Africa,  again,  the  coalition, 
or  rather  King  Juba,  had  been  arming  unmolested  for  more  than  a 
year;  so  that  in  two  regions  it  was  still  possible  for  the  constitu- 
tionalists to  prolong  the  struggle  in  honorable  warfare  for  some 
time  to  come.  By  sea,  too,  their  power  was  still  considerable,  even 
after  the  recall  of  the  subject  contingents,  while  Caesar  was  still 
almost  without  a  fleet.  And  there  was  yet  another  possibility — 
that  of  a  Parthian  alliance,  and  of  procuring  the  restoration  of  the 
republic  at  the  hands  of  the  common  foe. 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  351 

48  B.C. 

Meanwhile,  Caesar  was  in  hot  pursuit  of  Pompeius.  The  latter 
had  gone  first  to  Lesbos,  where  he  joined  his  wife  and  his  younger 
son  Sextus ;  thence  he  proceeded  to  Cilicia  and  to  Cyprus.  Fear  of 
the  reception  he  might  meet  with  from  his  aristocratic  allies  appears 
to  have  decided  him  to  take  refuge  with  the  Parthian  king,  rather 
than  to  fly  to  Corcyra.  He  was  in  Cyprus,  collecting  money  and 
arming  a  band  of  slaves,  when  he  heard  that  Antioch  had  declared 
for  Caesar  and  that  the  Parthian  route  was  no  longer  open;  he 
thereupon  hastened  to  Egypt,  from  the  resources  of  which  he  might 
hope  to  reorganize  the  war. 

After  the  death  of  Ptolemy  Auletes,  in  51  b.cv  his  two  children 
— Cleopatra,  aged  about  sixteen,  and  Ptolemaeus  Dionysius,  a  boy 
of  ten — had  ascended  the  throne,  according  to  their  father's  will, 
as  consorts.  But  the  brother,  with  his  guardian  Pothinus,  had 
driven  Cleopatra  from  the  kingdom,  and  was  lying  with  the  whole 
Egyptian  army  at  Pelusium,  to  protect  the  eastern  frontier  against 
her,  when  Pompeius  anchored  at  the  promontory  of  Casius  and 
asked  permission  to  land.  His  request  was  about  to  be  refused 
when  the  king's  tutor,  Theodotus,  pointed  out  that,  if  rejected, 
Pompeius  would  probably  use  his  connections  in  Egypt  to  instigate 
rebellion  in  the  army,  and  that  it  would  be  better  to  make  away  with 
him.  Accordingly,  on  September  28,  48  B.C.,  Achillas,  the  royal 
general,  and  some  of  the  old  soldiers  of  Pompeius  went  off  in  a 
large  barge  to  Pompeius,  whom  they  invited  to  come  on  board  in 
order  to  be  conveyed  to  land.  As  he  was  stepping  on  shore  the 
military  tribune,  Lucius  Septimius,  stabbed  him  in  the  back,  under 
the  eyes  of  his  wife  and  son,  who  had  to  watch  the  murder  from  the 
deck  of  their  vessel.  It  was  the  same  day  of  the  same  month  on 
which,  thirteen  years  before,  he  had  entered  the  capital  in  triumph 
over  Mithradates.  He  was  a  good  officer,  but  otherwise  a  man  of 
mediocre  gifts  of  intellect  and  of  heart.  Barely  once  in  a  thousand 
years  does  there  arise  among  the  people  a  man  who  is  a  king  not 
merely  in  name,  but  in  reality.  If  this  disproportion  between  sem- 
blance and  reality  has  never  perhaps  been  so  strongly  marked  as  in 
Pompeius,  the  fact  may  well  excite  grave  reflection  that  it  was 
precisely  he  who,  in  a  certain  sense,  opened  the  series  of  Roman 
monarchs.  When  Caesar  arrived  in  Alexandria  all  was  over.  He 
turned  away  in  deep  agitation  when  the  murderer  brought  the  head 
of  his  rival  to  his  ship.  How  Caesar  would  have  dealt  with  Pom- 
peius had  he  been  captured  alive  it  is  impossible  to  say.     But  inter- 


852  ROME 

°°  48    B.C. 

est  as  well  as  humanity  would  probably  have  counseled  clemency. 
The  death  of  Pompeius  did  not  break  up  the  Pompeians,  but  gave 
them,  in  his  sons,  Gnaeus  and  Sextus,  two  leaders,  both  of  whom 
were  young  and  active,  and  the  second  a  man  of  decided  capacity. 
To  the  newly  founded  hereditary  monarchy  the  hereditary  pretender- 
ship  attached  itself  at  once  like  a  parasite,  and  it  was  very  doubtful 
whether  by  this  change  of  persons  Caesar  did  not  lose  more  than  he 
gained. 

Caesar's  immediate  object  was  accomplished;  but  he  landed 
and  proceeded  at  once  to  settle  matters  in  Egypt.  He  was  accom- 
panied by  3200  men  and  800  cavalry,  and,  taking  up  his  abode  in 
the  royal  palace,  he  began  collecting  the  money  he  urgently  needed, 
and  regulating  the  Egyptian  succession.  No  war  contribution  was 
imposed,  and  the  arrears  of  the  sum  stipulated  for  in  59  B.C.  were 
commuted  for  a  final  payment  of  two  million  dollars.  The  brother 
and  sister  were  ordered  to  suspend  hostilities,  and  it  was  decided 
that  they  should  rule  jointly,  in  accordance  with  their  father's  will. 
The  kingdom  of  Cyprus  was  given — as  the  appanage  of  the  second- 
born  of  Egypt— to  the  younger  children  of  Auletes,  Arsinoe  and 
Ptolemy  the  younger. 

But  a  storm  was  brewing.  Alexandria  was  a  cosmopolitan 
city,  hardly  inferior  to  Rome  in  the  number  of  its  population,  and 
far  superior  in  stirring  commercial  spirit.  In  the  citizens  there  was 
a  lively  national  self-importance,  which  can  hardly  be  called  patriot- 
ism— a  turbulent  vein  which  made  them  indulge  in  street  riots  as 
heartily  as  the  Parisians  of  a  later  day.  Pothinus  and  the  boy  king 
were  much  discontented  with  Caesar's  arrangements,  and  ostenta- 
tiously sent  the  treasures  of  the  temple  and  the  royal  plate  to  be 
melted  at  the  mint.  Both  the  piety  and  the  national  feeling  of  the 
populace  were  shocked.  The  Roman  army  of  occupation  had  be- 
come denationalized  by  its  long  sojourn  in  Egypt  and  by  inter- 
marriage with  the  women  of  the  country;  they  were  indignant  at 
being  obliged  to  suspend  their  action  on  the  frontier  at  the  bidding  of 
Caesar  and  his  handful  of  legionaries,  and  numerous  assassinations 
of  his  soldiers  in  the  city  revealed  to  Caesar  the  danger  in  which  he 
was  placed.  He  contented  himself  with  ordering  up  reinforcements 
from  Asia,  and  meantime  prosecuted  the  business  in  hand.  It  was 
a  time  of  rest  after  toil,  and  never  was  there  greater  gayety  in  the 
camp.  It  was  a  merry  prelude  to  a  grave  drama.  The  Roman 
army  of  occupation  suddenly  appeared  in  Alexandria,  under  the 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  353 

48  B.C. 

leadership  of  Achillas,  and  the  citizens  at  once  made  common  cause 
with  the  newly  arrived  soldiers. 

Caesar  hastily  collected  his  scattered  troops,  seized  the  king 
and  his  minister,  and  entrenched  himself  in  the  palace  and  theater. 
The  war  fleet,  as  there  was  no  time  to  place  it  in  safety,  was  burned ; 
and  the  lighthouse  island  of  Pharos  was  occupied  by  means  of  boats. 
Thus  the  way  was  kept  cleared  for  reinforcements.  Orders  were 
at  once  issued  to  the  commandant  of  Asia  Minor  and  to  the 
nearest  subject  countries  to  send  troops  and  ships  in  all  haste.  In 
the  streets  the  insurrection  had  free  course :  fighting  went  on  from 
day  to  day;  but  Caesar  could  not  break  through  to  the  fresh  water 
lake  of  Marea,  nor  could  the  Alexandrians  master  the  besieged  or 
deprive  them  of  water.  The  canals  from  the  Nile  were  spoiled  by 
introducing  salt  water,  but  wells  dug  on  the  beach  furnished  a  suffi- 
cient supply.  The  besiegers  then  directed  their  attention  to  the 
sea.  The  island  of  Pharos  and  the  mole  which  connected  it  with 
the  mainland  divided  the  harbor  into  a  western  and  an  eastern  port. 
The  latter,  with  the  island,  were  in  Caesar's  power ;  the  former,  with 
the  mole,  in  that  of  the  Alexandrians.  The  fleet  of  the  latter  had 
been  burned,  but  they  equipped  a  small  squadron  and  attempted, 
though  in  vain,  to  prevent  the  entrance  of  transports  conveying  a 
legion  from  Asia  Minor.  But  when,  soon  after,  the  besiegers  cap- 
tured the  island  and  compelled  Caesar's  ships  to  lie  in  the  open  road- 
stead, his  position  was  indeed  perilous.  His  fleet  was  compelled  to 
fight  repeatedly,  and  if  it  should  once  be  defeated  he  would  be  com- 
pletely hemmed  in  and  probably  lost.  Accordingly  he  determined 
to  attempt  to  recover  the  island.  The  double  attack  from  the  sea 
and  from  the  harbor  was  successful,  and  both  the  island  and  the 
part  of  the  mole  nearest  it  were  captured,  and  henceforward  re- 
mained in  Caesar's  hands. 

But  relief  was  at  hand :  Mithradates  of  Pergamus,  who  claimed 
to  be  a  natural  son  of  the  old  enemy  of  Rome,  arrived  with  a  motley 
army  gathered  from  all  the  communities  of  Cilicia  and  Syria.  He 
occupied  Pelusium,  and  then  marched  towards  Memphis  to  avoid 
the  intersected  ground  of  the  Delta.  At  the  same  time  Caesar  con- 
veyed part  of  his  troops  in  ships  to  the  western  end  of  Lake  Marea 
and  marched  around  the  lake  and  along  the  river  to  join  Mithra- 
dates. The  junction  was  effected ;  and  the  combined  army  marched 
into  the  Delta,  where  the  young  king  (who  had  been  released  by 
Caesar  in  the  hope  of  allaying  the  insurrection)  was  posted  on 


354  ROME 

48    B.C. 

rising  ground  between  the  Nile  and  some  marshy  swamps.  Caesar 
attacked  from  three  sides  at  once;  the  camp  was  taken,  and  the 
insurgents  were  either  put  to  the  sword  or  drowned;  among  the 
latter  was  the  young  king.  The  inhabitants  met  Caesar  on  his  entry 
in  mourning,  and  with  the  images  of  their  gods  in  their  hands 
implored  mercy.  The  conqueror  contented  himself  with  granting 
to  the  Jews  settled  in  Alexandria  the  same  rights  as  the  Greek  popu- 
lation enjoyed,  and  with  substituting  for  the  army  of  occupation, 
which  nominally  obeyed  the  Egyptian  king,  a  regular  Roman  garri- 
son of  three  legions,  under  a  commander  nominated  by  himself, 
whose  birth  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  abuse  his  position — Rufio, 
the  son  of  a  freedman.  Cleopatra  and  her  younger  brother, 
Ptolemy,  received  the  crown,  under  the  supremacy  of  Rome;  the 
princess  Arsinoe  was  carried  off  to  Italy.  Cyprus  was  again  added 
to  the  Roman  province  of  Cilicia. 

The  Alexandrian  insurrection  is  unimportant  in  itself,  but  it 
compelled  the  man  on  whom  the  whole  empire  now  depended  to 
leave  his  proper  task  for  nearly  six  months.  In  the  meantime  acci- 
dent or  the  ability  of  individual  officers  decided  matters  everywhere. 

In  Asia  Minor  Calvinus  had  been  ordered,  on  Caesar's  depar- 
ture, to  compel  Pharnaces  to  evacuate  the  territories  he  had  occupied, 
especially  lesser  Armenia.  But  Calvinus  was  obliged  to  dispatch  to 
Egypt  two  out  of  his  three  legions,  and  was  defeated  by  Pharnaces 
at  Nicopolis.  When  Caesar  himself  arrived,  Pharnaces  promised 
submission,  but  took  no  steps  to  relinquish  his  conquests,  in  the  hope 
that  Caesar  would  soon  depart.  But  Caesar  broke  off  negotiations, 
and  advanced  against  the  king's  camp  at  Ziela.  A  complete  victory 
was  gained,  and  the  campaign  was  over  in  five  days.  The  Bosporan 
kingdom  was  bestowed  upon  Mithradates  of  Pergamus.  Caesar's 
own  allies  in  Syria  and  Asia  Minor  were  richly  rewarded,  those  of 
Pompeius  dismissed,  as  a  rule,  with  fines  and  reprimands.  But 
Deiotarus  was  confined  to  his  hereditary  domain,  and  lesser  Armenia 
was  given  to  Ariobarzanes,  king  of  Cappadocia. 

In  Illyria  there  had  been  warlike  operations  of  some  importance 
while  Caesar  was  in  Egypt.  The  interior  swarmed  with  dispersed 
Pompeians,  and  the  Dalmatian  coast  was  bitterly  hostile  to  Caesar. 
But  the  Caesarian  lieutenant,  Quintus  Cornificius,  was  able  not  only 
to  maintain  himself,  but  to  defeat  Marcus  Octavius,  the  conqueror 
of  Curicta,  in  several  engagements.  During  the  winter  Aulus  Ga- 
binius  arrived  to  take  over  the  command  of  Illyria,  and  soon  began 


THE     CIVIL    WAR  355 

47  B.C. 

a  bold  expedition  into  the  interior.  But  his  army  was  swept  away ; 
he  suffered  a  disgraceful  defeat  during  his  retreat,  and  soon  after- 
wards died  at  Salonae.  Finally,  Vatinius,  the  governor  of  Brun- 
disium,  defeated  the  fleet  of  Octavius  with  a  force  extemporized  out 
of  ordinary  ships  provided  with  beaks,  and  compelled  him  to  quit 
those  waters. 

But  the  condition  of  things  was  most  serious  in  Africa,  where 
the  most  eminent  of  the  Pompeians  had  gathered  after  the  defeat  of 
Pharsalus,  and  had  had  ample  time  to  reorganize  the  war  on  a  large 
scale.  The  fanaticism  of  the  emigrants  had,  if  possible,  increased ; 
they  continued  to  murder  their  prisoners,  and  even  the  officers  of 
Caesar  under  a  flag  of  truce.  King  Juba,  in  whom  was  combined 
all  the  fury  of  a  barbarian  and  of  a  partisan,  wished  even  to  extir- 
pate the  citizens  of  every  community  suspected  of  sympathizing  with 
the  enemy,  and  it  was  only  by  the  intervention  of  Cato  that  Utica 
itself  was  saved.  It  had  been  no  easy  task  to  fill  the  vacant  post 
of  commander-in-chief.  Juba,  Metellus  Scipio,  Varus,  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  province,  all  laid  claim  to  it,  while  the  army  desired 
Cato,  who  was  indeed  the  only  man  who  had  the  necessary  devotion, 
energy,  and  authority.  But  through  Cato's  own  influence  the  de- 
cision fell  upon  Scipio,  as  the  officer  of  highest  standing;  neverthe- 
less it  was  Cato  alone  who  confronted  the  insolent  claims  of  King 
Juba,  and  made  him  feel  that  the  Roman  nobility  came  to  him,  not 
as  suppliants  to  a  protector,  but  as  to  a  subject  from  whom  they 
were  entitled  to  demand  assistance.  With  Scipio  the  king  carried 
his  point,  that  the  pay  of  his  troops  should  be  charged  on  the  Roman 
treasury,  and  that  the  province  of  Africa  should  be  ceded  to  him 
in  the  event  of  victory. 

The  senate  of  the  "  three  hundred  "  again  appeared,  and  filled 
up  their  ranks  from  the  best  or  wealthiest  of  the  equites.  Warlike 
preparations  went  forward  with  great  activity.  Every  man  capable 
of  bearing  arms  was  enrolled,  and  the  land  was  stripped  of  its  culti- 
vators. The  infantry  numbered  fourteen  legions,  of  which  four 
were  legions  of  King  Juba  armed  in  the  Roman  manner.  The 
heavy  cavalry,  consisting  of  Celts  and  Germans  who  arrived  with 
Labienus,  was  sixteen  hundred  strong,  to  whom  must  be  added 
Juba's  squadron,  equipped  in  the  Roman  style.  The  light  troops 
were  mostly  Numidians,  and  very  numerous,  javelin  men,  and 
archers  mounted  or  on  foot.  Lastly  there  were  120  elephants, 
and  the  fleet  of  fifty-five  sail  under  Varus  and  Octavius.     Money 


356  ROME 

47   B.C. 

was  provided  by  the  self-taxation  of  the  senate,  which  included  many 
very  wealthy  men ;  huge  stores  were  accumulated  in  the  fortresses, 
while  the  open  towns  were  denuded  of  provisions. 

An  evil  star  seemed  to  preside  over  the  African  expedition  of 
Caesar.  Not  only  was  it  delayed  by  his  long  absence  in  Egypt, 
but  the  preparatory  measures  which  he  set  on  foot  before  leaving 
for  Egypt  miscarried.  From  Spain,  Quintus  Cassius  Longinus  had 
been  ordered  to  cross  into  Africa  with  four  legions,  and  to  advance 
against  Numidia  in  conjunction  with  Bogud,  king  of  western  Mau- 
retania.  But  in  this  army  were  many  native  Spaniards,  and  two  of 
the  legions  had  formerly  been  Pompeian.  Difficulties  arose,  which 
were  only  aggravated  by  the  unwise  and  tyrannical  conduct  of  the 
governor.  A  formal  revolt  broke  out,  and  was  only  repressed  on 
the  disavowal  of  Longinus  by  the  respectable  Caesarians  and  on 
the  interference  of  the  governor  of  the  northern  province.  Gaius 
Trebonius,  who  arrived  in  the  autumn  of  47  B.C.  to  supersede 
Longinus,  everywhere  received  obedience;  but  meanwhile  nothing 
had  been  done  to  hinder  the  enemy's  organizations  in  Africa. 

Still  more  serious  difficulties  occurred  among  the  troops  col- 
lected in  southern  Italy  for  the  African  campaign.  The  majority  of 
these  consisted  of  the  old  legions  which  had  "  founded  Caesar's 
throne  in  Gaul,  Spain,  and  Thessaly."  They  were  spoiled  by  victory 
and  disorganized  by  their  long  repose  in  Italy.  The  tremendous  de- 
mands made  on  them  by  their  general  had  thinned  their  ranks  to  a 
fearful  extent,  and  had  left  in  the  minds  of  the  survivors  a  secret 
rancor  which  only  wanted  an  opportunity  to  break  forth.  The  only 
man  who  had  any  influence  over  them  had  been  absent,  almost  un- 
heard of,  for  a  year ;  and  when  orders  to  embark  for  Sicily  arrived 
the  storm  burst.  The  men  refused  to  obey  unless  the  promised  pres- 
ents were  paid  to  them,  and  threw  stones  at  the  officers  sent  by 
Caesar.  The  mutineers  set  out  in  bodies  to  extort  fulfillment  of  the 
promises  from  the  general  in  the  capital.  Caesar  ordered  the  few 
soldiers  in  the  city  to  occupy  the  gates,  and  suddenly  appeared  among 
the  furious  bands,  demanding  to  know  what  they  wanted.  They 
exclaimed,  "  Discharge."  Their  request  was  immediately  granted. 
As  to  the  presents  promised  on  the  day  of  triumph,  as  well 
as  the  lands  destined  for  them,  though  not  promised,  Caesar 
added,  they  might  apply  to  him  on  the  day  when  he  and  the 
other  soldiers  should  triumph;  in  the  triumph  itself  they  could 
not  of  course  participate,  they  having  been  previously  discharged. 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  357 

47  B.C. 

The  men  were  not  prepared  for  this  turn  of  affairs.  They 
had  demanded  discharge  in  order  to  annex  their  own  condi- 
tions to  their  service  if  refused.  They  were  ashamed,  too,  at 
the  fidelity  with  which  the  imperator  kept  his  word,  even 
after  they  had  forgotten  their  allegiance,  and  at  the  generosity 
with  which  he  granted  more  than  he  had  promised.  When  they 
realized  that  they  must  appear  as  mere  spectators  at  the  triumph  of 
their  comrades,  when  their  general  addressed  them  no  longer  as 
"comrades,"  but  as  "burgesses"  (quirites) — a  name  which  de- 
stroyed, as  it  were,  at  one  blow  the  whole  pride  of  their  past  soldierly 
career — when  they  felt  once  more  the  spell  of  the  man  whose  pres- 
ence had  for  them  an  irresistible  power,  they  stood  for  a  while  mute 
and  undecided,  till  from  all  sides  a  cry  arose  that  the  general  should 
once  more  receive  them  into  favor,  and  again  permit  them  to  be 
called  Caesar's  soldiers.  After  a  sufficient  amount  of  entreaty 
Caesar  yielded;  but  the  ringleaders  had  a  third  cut  off  from  their 
triumphal  presents.  History  knows  no  greater  psychological  mas- 
terpiece, and  none  that  was  more  completely  successful. 

Thus  again  the  African  campaign  was  delayed.  When  Caesar 
arrived  at  Lilybaeum  the  ten  legions  destined  for  embarkation  had 
not  nearly  arrived,  and  the  experienced  troops  were  the  farthest 
distant.  However,  Caesar  sailed  on  December  25,  47  B.C.,  with 
six  legions,  five  of  which  were  newly  raised.  Storms  prevented 
the  enemy's  fleet  from  obstructing  their  passage,  but  the  same 
storms  scattered  Caesar's  fleet,  and  he  could  not  disembark  near 
Hadrumetum  more  than  3000  men  and  150  horsemen.  He  got 
possession  of  the  two  seaports  of  Ruspina  and  Little  Leptis,  and 
kept  his  troops  within  entrenchments,  and  ready  at  a  moment's 
notice  to  reembark  if  attacked  by  a  superior  force.  But  the  remain- 
ing ships  arrived  soon  afterwards,  and  on  the  following  day  Caesar 
made  an  expedition  with  three  legions  into  the  interior  to  procure 
supplies.  He  was  attacked  by  Labienus,  who  had  nothing  but  light 
troops;  and  the  legions  were  soon  surrounded.  By  deploying  his 
whole  line,  and  by  a  series  of  spirited  charges,  Caesar  saved  the 
honor  of  his  arms  and  made  good  his  retreat ;  but  had  not  Ruspina 
been  close  at  hand,  the  Moorish  javelin  might  have  accomplished 
the  same  result  as  the  Parthian  bow  at  Carrhae. 

Caesar  would  not  again  expose  his  soldiers  to  such  an  attack, 
and  remained  inactive  till  his  veteran  legions  should  arrive.  In 
the  interval  he  tried  to  organize  some  force  to  counterbalance  the 


358  ROME 

46  B.C. 

enormous  superiority  of  the  enemy  in  light-armed  troops.  He 
equipped  light  horsemen  and  archers  from  the  fleet,  and  succeeded 
in  raising  against  Juba  the  Gaetulian  tribes.  The  Mauretanian 
kings,  Bogud  and  Bocchus,  were  Juba's  natural  rivals,  and  there 
still  roamed  in  these  regions  a  band  of  Catilinarians  under  Publius 
Sittius  of  Nuceria,  who  had  eighteen  years  before  become  converted 
from  a  bankrupt  Italian  merchant  into  a  leader  of  free  bands. 
Bocchus  and  Sittius  fell  upon  Numidia,  occupied  Cirta,  and  com- 
pelled Juba  to  send  a  portion  of  his  troops  to  his  southern  and  west- 
ern frontiers.  Still  Caesar's  position  was  unpleasant  enough:  his 
army  was  crowded  together  within  a  space  of  six  square  miles; 
corn  was  supplied  by  the  fleet,  but  there  was  great  dearth  of  forage. 
If  Scipio  retired  and  abandoned  the  coast  towns,  he  might  at  least 
endlessly  protract  the  war;  this  plan  was  advised  by  Cato,  who 
offered  at  the  same  time  to  cross  into  Italy  and  call  the  republicans 
to  arms.  But  the  decision  lay  with  Scipio,  who  resolved  to  continue 
the  war  on  the  coast.  This  blunder  was  all  the  more  serious  because 
the  army  which  they  opposed  to  Caesar  was  in  a  troublesome  temper, 
and  the  strictness  of  the  levy,  the  exhaustion  of  the  country,  and  the 
devastation  of  many  of  the  smaller  townships  had  produced  a  feeling 
of  exasperation  in  the  region  to  which  the  war  was  transferred. 
The  African  towns  declared,  wherever  they  could,  for  Caesar,  and 
desertion  increased  continually  in  the  army.  But  Scipio  marched 
with  all  his  force  from  Utica,  appeared  before  the  towns  occupied 
by  Caesar,  and  repeatedly  offered  him  battle.  Caesar  refused  until 
all  his  veteran  legions  had  arrived,  when  Scipio  on  his  part  grew 
afraid,  and  nearly  two  months  passed  away  in  skirmishes  and  in 
efforts  to  procure  supplies. 

When  Caesar's  last  reinforcements  had  arrived  he  made  a  lat- 
eral movement  towards  the  town  of  Thapsus,  strongly  garrisoned 
by  the  enemy.  Scipio  now  commited  the  unpardonable  blunder  of 
risking  a  battle,  April  6,  46  B.C.,  to  save  the  town,  on  ground  which 
placed  the  decision  in  the  hands  of  the  infantry  of  the  line.  He 
advanced  to  a  position  immediately  opposite  to  Caesar's  camp  on 
the  shore,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  garrison  of  Thapsus  prepared 
for  a  sally.  Caesar's  campguard  sufficed  to  repulse  the  latter;  and 
his  legions,  forming  a  correct  estimate  of  the  enemy  from  their  want 
of  precision  and  from  their  ill-closed  ranks,  compelled  a  trumpeter 
to  sound  for  the  attack  even  before  the  general  gave  the  signal. 
The  right  wing,  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  line,  turned  the  ele- 


THE     CIVIL     WAR  359 

46  B.C. 

phants  opposed  to  them  back  upon  the  ranks  of  the  enemy ;  they  then 
broke  the  left  wing  of  their  opponents,  and  overthrew  the  whole  line. 
The  old  camp  of  the  enemy  was  at  a  distance,  and  the  new  one  was 
not  yet  ready,  so  that  the  defeated  army  was  almost  annihilated. 
The  legionaries  refused  all  quarter ;  they  were  tired  of  being  hurried 
from  one  continent  to  another  in  pursuit  of  an  enemy  who,  though 
always  defeated,  was  never  destroyed.  Fifty  thousand  corpses 
covered  the  field  of  Thapsus,  among  which  were  those  of  several 
Caesarian  officers  suspected  by  the  soldiers  of  sympathy  with  the 
enemy.     The  victorious  army  numbered  no  more  than  fifty  dead. 

The  struggle  was  over  in  Africa;  Cato  convoked  the  senate  at 
Utica,  and  asked  them  to  decide  whether  they  would  yield  or  con- 
tinue their  defense.  At  first  the  more  courageous  view  seemed 
likely  to  prevail,  but  ultimately  it  was  resolved  to  yield.  Faustus 
Sulla  and  Lucius  Afranius  soon  arrived  with  a  body  of  cavalry  and 
wished  to  defend  the  city  after  slaughtering  en  masse  the  untrust- 
worthy citizens.  Cato  indignantly  refused;  and  after  checking,  as 
far  as  he  could,  by  his  authority  and  by  largesses,  the  fury  of  the 
soldiery,  and  after  providing  the  means  of  flight  for  those  who 
feared  to  trust  themselves  to  the  mercy  of  Caesar,  he  at  last  held 
himself  released  from  his  command,  and,  retiring  to  his  chamber, 
plunged  his  sword  into  his  breast. 

Few  of  the  fugitive  leaders  escaped:  Afranius  and  Faustus 
were  delivered  up  to  Caesar,  and,  when  he  did  not  order  their  imme- 
diate execution,  were  cut  down  by  the  soldiers.  Metellus  Scipio 
was  captured  by  the  cruisers  of  Sittius,  and  stabbed  himself.  King 
Juba,  half  expecting  the  issue,  had  caused  a  huge  funeral  pile  to  be 
prepared  in  the  market-place  of  Zama,  upon  which  he  proposed  to 
consume  himself  with  all  his  treasures  and  the  dead  bodies  of  all  the 
citizens.  But  the  latter  had  no  desire  to  adorn  the  funeral  rites  of 
the  African  Sardanapalus,  and  closed  their  gates  when  he  appeared 
in  company  with  Marcus  Petreius.  The  king — one  of  those  natures 
that  become  savage  amid  a  life  of  dazzling  and  insolent  enjoyment, 
and  prepare  for  themselves  even  out  of  death  an  intoxicating  feast — 
resorted  with  Petreius  to  one  of  his  country  houses,  where,  after  a 
copious  banquet,  he  challenged  Petreius  to  fight  him  in  single  com- 
bat. The  conqueror  of  Catilina  fell  by  the  hand  of  the  king,  and  the 
latter  caused  himself  to  be  stabbed  by  one  of  his  slaves.  Labienus 
and  Sextus  Pompeius  fled  to  Spain,  and  betook  themselves  to  a 
piratical  warfare  by  land  and  sea. 


860  ROME 

46  B.C. 

The  kingdom  of  Massinissa  was  now  broken  up.  The  eastern 
portion  was  united  with  the  kingdom  of  Bocchus,  and  King  Bogud 
was  rewarded  with  considerable  gifts.  Cirta  was  handed  over  to 
Publius  Sittius  as  a  settlement  for  his  half-Roman  bands;  but  this 
same  district,  as  well  as  the  largest  and  most  fertile  part  of  Numidia, 
was  united  as  "  New  Africa  "  swith  the  older  province  of  Africa. 

The  struggle  which  had  lasted  for  four  years  thus  terminated  in 
the  complete  victory  of  the  new  monarch.  The  monarchy  might 
no  doubt  be  dated  from  the  moment  when  Pompeius  and  Caesar 
had  established  their  joint  rule  and  overthrown  the  aristocratic  con- 
stitution. But  it  was  only  the  battlefields  of  Pharsalus  and  Thapsus 
that  set  aside  the  joint  rule,  and  conferred  fixity  and  formal  recog- 
nition on  the  new  monarch.  Pretenders  and  conspiracies,  even 
revolutions  and  restorations,  might  ensue,  but  the  continuity  of  the 
free  republic,  uninterrupted  during  five  hundred  years,  was  broken 
through,  and  monarchy  was  established  as  an  accomplished  fact. 

That  the  constitutional  struggle  was  at  an  end  was  proclaimed 
by  Cato  when  he  fell  upon  his  sword  at  Utica.  The  republic  was 
dead,  the  treasure  was  carried  off — why  should  the  sentinels  remain  ? 
There  was  more  nobility,  and,  above  all,  more  judgment  in  the  death 
of  Cato  than  there  had  been  in  his  life.  He  was  not  a  great  man; 
he  was  the  ideal  of  unreflecting  republicanism,  and  this  has  made 
him  the  favorite  of  all  who  make  it  their  hobby ;  but  he  was  the  only 
man  who  honorably  and  courageously  defended  in  the  last  struggle 
the  great  system  doomed  to  destruction.  Just  because  the  shrewdest 
lie  feels  itself  inwardly  annihilated  before  the  simple  truth,  and 
because  all  the  dignity  and  glory  of  human  nature  ultimately  depend 
not  on  shrewdness,  but  on  honesty,  Cato  has  played  a  greater  part 
in  history  than  many  men  far  superior  to  him  in  intellect.  It  was  a 
fearfully  striking  protest  of  the  republic  against  the  monarchy,  that 
the  last  republican  went  as  the  first  monarch  came — a  protest  which 
tore  asunder  like  gossamer  all  that  so-called  constitutional  character 
with  which  Caesar  invested  his  monarchy,  and  exposed  in  all  its 
hypocritical  falsehood  the  shibboleth  of  the  reconciliation  of  all 
parties,  under  the  egis  of  which  despotism  grew  up.  The  unrelent- 
ing warfare  which  the  ghost  of  the  legitimate  republic  waged  for 
centuries — from  Cassius  and  Brutus  down  to  Thrasea  and  Tacitus, 
nay,  even  far  later — a  warfare  of  plots  and  literature,  was  the  legacy 
which  the  dying  Cato  bequeathed  to  his  enemies.  Immediately  after 
his  death  the  man  was  revered  as  a  saint  by  the  party  of  which  in  his 


THE     CIVIL     WAR 


861 


46  B.C. 


life  he  was  often  the  laughing-stock  and  the  scandal.  But  the 
greatest  of  these  marks  of  respect  was  the  involuntary  homage 
which  Caesar  rendered  to  him  when  he  made  an  exception  to  the 


SCENE    OF 
CAESAR'S    AFRICAN     CAMPAIGN 


contemptuous  clemency  with  which  he  was  wont  to  treat  his 
opponents,  and  pursued  him  even  beyond  the  grave  with  that 
energetic  hatred  which  practical  statesmen  are  wont  to  feel  towards 
antagonists  who  oppose  them  in  a  domain  of  ideas,  which  is  as 
dangerous  in  their  view  as  it  lies  beyond  their  reach. 


Chapter    XXXTII 

THE   OLD    REPUBLIC   AND   THE   NEW   MONARCHY 

46-44   B.C. 

CAESAR  was  in  his  fifty-sixth  year1  when  the  battle  of  Thap- 
sus  made  him  sole  monarch  of  Rome.  He  was  sprung 
from  one  of  the  oldest  noble  families  of  Latium,  and  traced 
his  lineage  back  to  the  heroes  of  the  Iliad  and  to  the  kings  of  Rome ; 
and  he  spent  the  years  of  his  boyhood  like  any  other  noble  youth  of 
the  period,  in  playing  with  literature  and  verse-making,  in  love  in- 
trigues and  the  arts  of  the  toilet,  together  with  another  art  much 
studied  at  that  period,  that  of  always  borrowing  and  never  paying. 
But  manhood  found  his  vigor  both  of  mind  and  body  unim- 
paired; in  fencing  and  riding  he  was  a  match  for  any  of 
his  soldiers,  and  the  incredible  rapidity  of  his  journeys  aston- 
ished both  friend  and  foe.  His  power  of  intuition  was  remark- 
able, and  displayed  itself  in  the  practicability  and  precision  of  his 
orders,  even  when  he  had  not  seen  with  his  own  eyes,  while 
his  memory  never  failed  him.  Although  a  gentleman,  a  man 
of  genius,  and  a  monarch,  he  had  still  a  heart.  His  love  for  his 
mother  was  deep  and  lasting,  while  he  was  sincerely  devoted  to 
his  wives,  and,  above  all,  to  his  daughter  Julia.  His  fidelity  to  his 
associates  was  unwavering,  and  several  of  them,  such  as  Aulus  Hir- 
tius  and  Gaius  Matius,  showed  their  attachment  to  him  after  his 
death.  But,  above  all,  Caesar  was  a  realist  and  a  man  of  sense; 
his  passion  was  never  stronger  than  he  could  control.  Literature 
and  verse-making  occupied  him  at  times,  but  in  his  sleepless  hours 
he  chose  to  meditate  upon  the  inflections  of  Latin  nouns  and  verbs. 
After  the  revels  of  his  youth  he  avoided  wine  entirely,  and  though 
he  enjoyed,  even  when  a  monarch,  the  society  of  women,  he  allowed 
them  no  influence  over  him.  He  prided  himself  upon  his  personal 
appearance,  and  covered  the  baldness  of  his  later  years  with  the 

1  There  is  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  exact  year  of  Caesar's  birth.  The  date 
has  been  frequently  given  as  100  b.c,  following  the  statement  of  Suetonius  and 
others,  but  various  considerations  have  led  modern  writers  to  conjecture  that  the 
true  date  is  102  B.c    This  is  the  year  accepted  by  Mommsen. 

362 


GAIUS    JULIUS    CAESAR 

(Born    ioo    b.  c.     Died    44    b.  c.) 

Bronze   bust,  Berlin    Museum 


THE     MONARCHY  363 

46-44  B.C. 

laurel  chaplet  which  he  wore  in  public.  It  was  the  result  of  this 
cool  realism  that  Caesar  possessed  the  power  of  living  keenly  in  the 
present  moment,  undisturbed  by  memory  or  expectation;  that  he 
could  at  any  moment  apply  his  whole  genius  to  the  most  incidental 
enterprise.  To  this  he  owed  his  marvellous  serenity,  his  independ- 
ence of  control  by  favorite  or  friend.  He  never  deceived  himself 
as  to  the  power  of  fate  and  the  ability  of  man;  he  felt  that  in  all 
things  fortune — accident — must  bestow  success,  and  this  perhaps 
is  the  reason  why  he  often  chose  to  play  so  desperate  a  game. 

Caesar  was  from  the  beginning  of  his  political  career  emphat- 
ically a  statesman;  his  aim  was  the  regeneration,  political,  mili- 
tary, intellectual,  and  moral,  of  his  own  and  of  the  Hellenic  nation. 
He  was  a  brilliant  and  masculine  orator,  an  author  of  an  inimitable 
purity  and  simplicity  of  style;  as  a  general  he  disregarded  routine 
and  tradition,  and  conducted  each  campaign  with  regard  to  its  own 
requirements.  Like  William  of  Orange,  he  stood  always  ready  for 
battle  after  defeat,  and  in  the  rapid  movement  of  masses  of  men — 
the  highest  and  most  difficult  element  of  warfare — he  was  unrivaled. 
But  he  was  all  these  things  only  secondarily,  and  merely  because  he 
was  a  statesman :  they  were  but  the  means  to  an  end.  His  original 
plan  had  been  to  compass  his  aim,  like  Pericles,  without  force  of 
arms,  and  it  was  not  till  the  age  of  forty  that  he  found  himself  at 
the  head  of  an  army.  This  improvised  generalship  is  seen  in  the 
temerity  with  which,  in  many  instances,  notably  when  he  landed  in 
Epirus,  he  set  aside,  without  absolute  necessity,  the  best-founded 
principles  of  war.  But,  though  a  master  of  the  art  of  war,  he  did 
his  utmost  to  avert  civil  strife,  and,  after  the  struggle,  he  allowed  no 
hierarchy  of  marshals  or  government  of  pretorians  to  arise.  He 
had  every  quality  which  makes  the  statesman.  He  was  a  born 
ruler,  and  compelled  men  of  all  natures  to  work  in  his  service.  His 
talent  for  organization  was  unsurpassed,  and  is  seen  in  the  creation 
and  management  of  his  political  alliances  and  of  his  army.  He 
never  made  the  blunder,  which  so  many  others  have  made,  of  carry- 
ing into  politics  the  tone  of  military  command ;  he  was  a  monarch, 
but  never  a  tyrant.  In  his  life  there  were  doubtless  many  mistakes, 
but  there  was  no  false  step  of  passion  for  him  to  regret ;  nothing  to 
be  compared  with  the  murder  of  Kleitos  or  the  burning  of  Persepolis, 
in  the  life  of  Alexander.  Whatever  his  task,  he  always  recognized 
its  natural  limits;  where  he  recognized  that  fate  had  spoken,  he 
always  obeyed.     Alexander  on  the  Hyphasis,  Napoleon  at  Moscow, 


864  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

turned  back  because  they  were  compelled ;  Caesar  turned  back  volun- 
tarily on  the  Thames,  and  on  the  Rhine ;  and  on  the  Danube  and  the 
Euphrates  he  thought,  not  of  unbounded  conquests,  but  of  well- 
considered  frontiers. 

Such  was  the  man — so  easy  and  yet  so  difficult  to  describe. 
Tradition  has  handed  down  copious  and  vivid  information  regarding 
him,  and  yet  no  man  is  more  difficult  to  reproduce  to  the  life.  The 
secret  lies  in  his  perfection ;  the  artist  can  paint  anything  except  only 
consummate  beauty.  Normality  admits,  doubtless,  of  being  ex- 
pressed, but  it  gives  us  only  the  negative  notion  of  the  absence  of 
defect.  In  the  character  of  Caesar,  the  great  contrasts  of  existence 
meet  and  balance  each  other.  He  was  of  the  mightiest  creative 
power,  and  yet  of  the  most  penetrating  judgment;  of  the  highest 
energy  of  will  and  the  highest  capacity  of  execution;  filled  with 
republican  ideals,  and  at  the  same  time  born  to  be  king.  He  was 
the  entire  and  perfect  man;  and  he  was  this  because  he  was  the 
entire  and  perfect  Roman;  he  was  in  the  full  current  of  his  time, 
and  possessed  in  perfection  the  special  gift  of  his  nation — practical 
aptitude  as  a  citizen. 

In  the  work  of  regenerating  the  state  Caesar  started  at  once 
from  the  principle  of  the  reconciliation  of  parties — so  far  as  antag- 
onistic principles  can  be  reconciled  at  all.  The  statues  of  Sulla, 
overthrown  by  the  mob  in  the  capital  after  Pharsalus,  were  ordered 
to  be  set  up  again ;  the  men  who  had  been  banished  in  the  Cinnan 
and  Sertorian  times  were  recalled,  and  the  children  of  those  outlawed 
by  Sulla  were  restored  to  their  full  rights.  In  the  same  way  all  who 
had  suffered  loss  of  rights  in  the  early  stages  of  the  recent  struggle, 
especially  through  the  impeachments  of  52  B.C.,  received  full  restitu- 
tion. The  only  exceptions  were  made  in  the  case  of  those  who  had 
put  to  death  the  proscribed  for  money,  and  of  Milo,  the  condottiere 
of  the  senatorial  party. 

These  steps  were  easy;  but  it  was  much  more  difficult  to  deal 
with  the  parties,  which  even  now,  after  the  war,  confronted  each 
other  with  undiminished  hatred.  Caesar's  own  adherents  were 
among  the  most  dissatisfied  with  the  results  of  the  struggle.  The 
Roman  popular  party  expected  Caesar  to  accomplish  for  them  what 
Catilina  had  attempted ;  and  loud  was  their  outcry  when  it  became 
plain  that  the  most  which  debtors  could  expect  from  him  was  some 
alleviations  of  payment  and  modifications  of  procedure.  They 
began  even  to  coquet  with  the  Pompeians,  and  during  Caesar's 


THE     MONARCHY  365 

48-44  B.C. 

long  absence  from  Italy,  in  48  and  47  B.C.,  to  instigate  a  second 
civil  war. 

Just  before  the  battle  of  Pharsalus  the  pretor  Marcus  Caelius 
Rufus  promised  to  the  people  laws  granting  to  debtors  a  respite  of 
six  years  free  of  interest  and  canceling  all  claims  from  loans  or 
house  rents.  When  deposed  by  the  Caesarian  senate  he  entered  into 
negotiations  with  Milo  for  a  rising  in  Italy.  Milo  raised  his  stand- 
ard in  the  region  of  Thurii,  and  Rufus  formed  a  plan,  which  was 
frustrated,  to  seize  Capua.  The  fall  of  the  two  leaders  put  an  end  to 
the  incident,  in  48  B.C.,  but  in  the  following  year  Publius  Dolabella 
revived  the  laws  of  Rufus,  and  disturbances  took  place,  which  had 
to  be  put  down  by  Marcus  Antonius,  the  commandant  of  Italy,  by 
military  force. 

At  the  same  time  that  Caesar  repressed  with  a  strong  hand  the 
ebullitions  of  his  own  left  wing,  he  tried  to  pave  the  way  for  the 
gradual  extinction  of  the  republican  party  by  a  policy  of  combined 
repression  and  conciliation.  He  refused  to  triumph  on  the  ground 
of  victories  won  over  his  fellow-countrymen.  The  statue  of  Pom- 
peius  was  restored  to  its  former  distinguished  place  in  the  senate- 
house,  and  political  prosecutions  of  his  opponents  were  confined 
within  the  narrowest  limits.  The  papers  found  in  the  enemy's 
headquarters  after  Pharsalus  and  Thapsus  were  burned  unread ;  all 
the  common  soldiers,  except  those  burgesses  who  had  enlisted  under 
King  Juba,  escaped  with  impunity.  Even  the  officers  obtained  free 
pardon  until  the  close  of  the  Spanish  campaign  of  49  B.C. ;  after  that 
date  all  who  served  as  officers  in  the  enemy's  army,  or  who  sat  in 
the  opposition  senate,  forfeited  property  and  political  rights,  and 
were  banished  from  Italy  for  life.  Any  who  had  fought  once  more 
after  accepting  pardon  forfeited  life  at  once.  But  these  rules  were 
applied  in  the  mildest  possible  manner;  the  punishment  of  death  was 
rarely  inflicted;  many  were  pardoned  or  escaped  with  fines,  and  in 
fact  almost  all  were  pardoned  who  could  bring  themselves  to  ask 
favor  of  Caesar.  Ultimately,  in  44  B.C.,  a  general  amnesty  was 
issued. 

But  the  opposition  was  none  the  more  reconciled.  Open  resist- 
ance there  was  none,  but  secret  agitations  and,  above  all,  the  litera- 
ture of  opposition  gave  expression  to  the  seething  republican  discon- 
tent. The  praise  of  Cato  was  the  favorite  theme  of  opposition 
pamphlets,  which  were  replied  to  by  Caesar  and  his  confidants.  The 
republican  and  Caesarian  scribes  fought  round  the  dead  hero  of 


366  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

Utica  like  the  Trojans  and  Hellenes  round  the  dead  body  of  Patro- 
clus.  But,  naturally,  the  Caesarians  had  the  worst  of  it  with  a 
republican  public.  Hence  literary  men,  like  Publius  Nigidius  Figu- 
lus  and  Aulus  Caecina,  found  more  difficulty  than  any  other  class 
in  obtaining  permission  to  return  to  Italy;  and  in  Italy  itself  they 
were  subjected  to  a  practical  censorship  whose  punishments  were 
purely  arbitrary.  But  though  risings  of  republicans  and  Pompeians 
were  perpetually  preparing  in  every  part  of  the  empire,  and  conspi- 
racies were  formed  even  in  the  capital  itself,  Caesar  was  not  induced 
to  surround  himself  by  a  bodyguard,  but  contented  himself  with 
making  known  the  plots,  when  detected,  by  public  placards.  His 
clemency  and  his  indifference  were  not  the  fruit  of  sentiment,  but 
of  the  statesmanly  conviction  that  vanquished  parties  are  absorbed 
within  the  state  more  rapidly  than  they  can  be  exterminated  by  pro- 
scription. Besides,  he  needed  for  his  own  high  objects  all  the  talent, 
culture,  and  distinction  which  the  aristocratic  party  embraced;  for 
here,  in  spite  of  all,  was  still  to  be  found  all  that  remained  of  a  free 
and  national  spirit  among  the  Roman  burgesses.  Like  Henry  IV. 
of  France  and  William  of  Orange,  Caesar  found  that  his  difficulties 
only  began  with  victory.  For  the  moment  all  parties  united  against 
their  chief,  and  against  his  own  great  ideal.  But  what  Caesar  lost 
the  state  gained;  voluntarily  or  compulsorily,  men  of  all  parties 
worked  at  the  erection  of  the  new  and  mighty  edifice;  and  if  the 
reconciliation  was  but  external,  no  one  knew  better  than  Caesar  that 
antagonisms  lose  their  keenness  when  brought  into  outward  union, 
and  that  only  in  this  way  can  the  statesman  anticipate  the  work  of 
time. 

In  attempting  to  give  a  detailed  account  of  the  mode  in  which 
the  transition  was  effected  from  the  old  to  the  new,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  Caesar  came  not  to  begin,  but  to  complete.  The 
principles  of  the  popular  party,  which  Caesar  had  from  the  beginning 
adopted  to  the  full,  were  the  principles  of  Gaius  Gracchus,  and  had, 
since  his  time,  been  the  essential  principles  of  the  democracy.  They 
were :  the  alleviation  of  the  burdens  of  debtors ;  transmarine  coloni- 
zation; equalization  of  the  differences  of  rights  existing  between 
the  classes  in  the  state ;  emancipation  of  the  executive  from  the  sen- 
ate. And  these  remained  the  principles  of  Caesar  as  monarch ;  for 
his  monarchy  was  like  the  monarchy  of  Pericles  and  of  Cromwell, 
the  representation  of  the  nation  by  the  man  in  whom  it  puts  supreme 
and  unlimited  confidence. 


THE     MONARCHY  367 

46-44  B.C. 

With  regard  to  the  judgment  to  be  passed  upon  Caesar,  too 
much  care  cannot  be  taken  to  avoid  the  common  blunder  of  using 
historical  praise  and  historical  censure,  applied  to  particular  circum- 
stances, as  phrases  of  general  application;  and,  in  the  present 
instance,  of  construing  praise  of  Caesar  as  praise  of  what  is  called 
"  Caesarianism."  History  is  instructive  with  respect  to  the  present 
only  as  she  reveals  the  necessary  organic  conditions  of  civilization — 
the  fundamental  forces  everywhere  alike,  and  the  manner  of  their 
combination  everywhere  different — the  knowledge  of  which  leads 
men.  not  to  slavish  imitation,  but  to  independent  reproduction.  The 
history  of  Roman  imperialism  is  in  reality  the  bitterest  censure  of 
modern  autocracy  which  could  be  written  by  the  hand  of  man. 
Every  constitution  which  gives  play  to  the  free  self-determination 
of  a  majority  of  citizens  infinitely  surpasses  the  most  brilliant  and 
humane  absolutism,  just  as  the  smallest  organism  is  superior  to  the 
most  artistic  machine ;  the  former  is  living  and  capable  of  develop- 
ment, but  the  latter  cannot  develop,  and  is  therefore  dead.  Caesar's 
work  could  bring  no  blessing  in  itself,  but  was  necessary  and  salu- 
tary because  the  ancient  political  organization,  based  upon  slavery 
and  ignorant  of  representative  government,  ended  logically  in  mili- 
tary monarchy  as  the  least  of  evils. 

Formally  the  position  of  the  new  monarch  assumed  a  singular 
shape. 

First,  he  was  invested  with  the  dictatorship,  at  first  temporarily, 
after  his  return  from  Spain  in  49  B.C. ;  again  for  an  indefinite 
time  after  Pharsalus;  finally  from  January  1,  45  B.C.,  as  an  an- 
nual office,  which  was  in  44  B.C.  conferred  on  him  for  life. 

Second,  he  held  the  consulship  for  48  B.C. — the  office  which 
immediately  occasioned  the  civil  war;  afterwards  he  was  appointed 
for  five  and  finally  for  ten  years — once  without  colleague. 

Third,  he  was  invested  with  tribunician  power  for  life,  in 
48  B.C. ;  with  the  first  place  and  the  leading  vote  in  the  senate ;  with 
the  title  of  imperator  for  life;  and,  though  already  pontifex  max- 
imus,  he  became  a  member  of  the  college  of  augurs. 

Fourth,  numerous  decrees  of  the  senate  intrusted  him  with 
the  right  of  deciding  on  war  and  peace,  the  disposal  of  armies  and 
treasure,  the  nomination  of  provincial  governors,  and  many  other 
privileges;  together  with  such  empty  honors  as  the  title  of  pater 
patriae,  and  the  designation  of  the  month  in  which  he  was  born 
by  the  name  of  Julius. 


368  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

It  is  difficult  in  this  confused  union  of  offices  to  determine  by 
what  formal  shape  Caesar  chose  to  express  the  new  absolute  power, 
but  the  new  name  of  imperator  is  in  every  respect  its  appropriate 
formal  expression,  just  because  it  is  new,  and  no  outward  occasion 
for  its  introduction  is  apparent.  It  expresses  concisely  all  the  func- 
tions of  the  chief  of  the  state — the  concentration  of  official  power 
in  the  hands  of  a  popular  chief  independent  of  the  senate.  The 
title  prevails  on  Caesar's  coins,  especially  those  of  the  last  period, 
by  the  side  of  the  dictatorship ;  in  his  law  as  to  political  crimes  the 
monarch  is  designated  by  this  name ;  and,  what  is  most  decisive,  the 
authority  of  imperator  was  given  to  Caesar  for  his  bodily  or  adopted 
descendants.  The  new  monarchy  was  to  be  hereditary.  The  new 
office  was  based  on  the  position  which  consuls  or  proconsuls  occu- 
pied outside  the  pomerium,  and  included  not  only  the  military,  but 
the  supreme  administrative  and  judicial  power.  Moreover,  the  im- 
perator, unlike  the  consul,  had  never  been  checked  by  the  right  of 
provocatio  or  been  obliged  to  respect  the  advice  of  the  senate. 

In  fact,  the  new  office  of  imperator  was  nothing  else  than  the 
regal  office  reestablished;  as  the  consulship  was  only  the  kingship 
with  certain  restrictions  imposed,  so  for  the  new  office  these  re- 
strictions were  once  more  removed.  Almost  every  feature  of  the 
old  monarchy  reappears  in  the  new :  the  union  of  supreme  military, 
judicial,  and  administrative  power  in  the  hands  of  the  prince;  the 
religious  presidency  over  the  commonwealth;  the  right  of  issuing 
binding  ordinances;  the  reduction  of  the  senate  to  a  council  of 
state,  the  revival  of  the  patriciate  and  of  the  prefecture  of  the  city ; 
the  power  of  the  prince  to  nominate  his  successor  under  the  form  of 
adoption.  Again,  as  the  old  kings  of  Rome  had  been  the  protectors 
of  the  commons  against  the  nobility,  so  Caesar  came  not  to  destroy 
liberty,  but  to  fulfill  it.  Nor  had  the  idea  of  the  regal  office  ever 
become  obsolete  at  Rome;  at  various  times,  in  the  republican  dic- 
tatorship, in  the  decemviral  power,  in  the  Sullan  regency — 'there 
had  been  a  practical  recurrence  to  it.  And  as  mankind  have  infinite 
difficulty  in  reaching  new  creations,  and  therefore  cherish  the  once 
developed  forms  as  sacred  heirlooms,  it  was  natural  for  Caesar  to 
connect  himself  with  Servius  Tullius,  as  Charlemagne  connected 
himself  with  Caesar,  and  as  Napoleon  attempted  to  connect  himself 
with  Charlemagne.  Accordingly,  beside  the  statues  of  the  tradi- 
tional seven  kings  on  the  Capitol,  Caesar  ordered  his  own  to  be 
erected  as  the  eighth.    He  appeared  in  public  in  the  costume  of  the 


THE     MONARCHY  S69 

46-44  B.C. 

old  kings  of  Alba;  in  the  formula  for  political  oaths  the  genius  of 
the  imperator  was  added  to  the  Jovis  and  the  Penates  of  the  Roman 
people;  from  the  year  44  B.C.  the  head  of  Caesar  appears  on  the 
coins — the  recognized  outward  badge  of  monarchy.  There  could 
be  no  doubt  as  to  Caesar's  view  of  his  position ;  it  is  even  possible 
that  he  wished  to  assume  the  title  of  king;  certainly  he  was  often 
pressed  by  his  adherents  to  assume  it — most  strikingly  when  Mar- 
cus Antonius,  as  consul,  offered  him  the  diadem  before  all  the 
people.  But  it  is  probable  that  Caesar  was  resolved  to  avoid  the 
name  as  tainted  with  a  curse,  and  as  familiar  to  the  Romans  of  his 
day  chiefly  as  applied  to  the  despots  of  the  East ;  and  the  scene  with 
Antonius  may  have  been  designed  to  put  an  end  once  and  for  all 
to  rumors  on  the  subject. 

Whatever  the  title,  the  sovereign  was  there,  and  all  the  due 
accompaniments  of  royalty  at  once  made  their  appearance.  Caesar 
appeared  in  public,  not  in  the  consular  robe  with  purple  stripes,  but 
in  the  robe  wholly  of  purple,  and  received  without  rising  from  his 
chair  the  procession  of  the  senate.  Rents  rose  in  the  quarter  of  the 
city  where  he  lived ;  personal  interviews  became  so  difficult  that 
Caesar  was  often  obliged  to  communicate  in  writing  even  with  his 
nearest  friends.  A  new  monarchical  aristocracy  arose  to  replace 
the  old  patriciate,  which  still  existed  but  had  dwindled  away  until 
not  more  than  fifteen  or  sixteen  genuine  patrician  families  remained. 
Caesar  had  the  right  of  creating  new  patrician  gentes  conferred  on 
him  by  popular  decree,  and  thus  established  a  new  nobility  entirely 
dependent  on  himself. 

Thus  the  regal  tradition  was  completely  renewed;  the  burgess 
assembly  remained  by  the  side  of  the  king  as  the  ultimate  expression 
of  the  sovereign  will  of  the  people ;  the  senate  was  reduced  to  its  old 
function  of  giving  advice  to  the  ruler  when  requested ;  and  the  whole 
magisterial  authority  of  the  state  was  concentrated  in  the  monarch. 

In  legislation  the  primitive  maxim  of  Roman  law  was  reverted 
to,  that  the  assembly  in  concert  with  the  king  can  alone  alter  the  law 
of  the  state ;  and  Caesar  regularly  had  his  enactments  confirmed  by 
the  people.  Though  the  authority  of  the  comitia  was  only  a 
shadow,  yet  their  existence  was  a  standing  acknowledgment  of  the 
principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  an  energetic  protest 
against  sultanism. 

But  at  the  same  time  the  other  maxim  of  state  law  was  revived, 
that  the  command  of  the  supreme  magistrate  is  binding  at  least  as 


370  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

long  as  he  remains  in  office ;  and  hence  the  royal  edict  now  obtained 
the  force  of  law. 

On  the  other  hand,  while  Caesar  formally  acknowledged  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people,  it  was  no  part  of  his  plan  to  divide  his 
authority  with  the  senate.  He  made  use  of  it  as  a  council  to  advise 
him  with  regard  to  new  laws,  and  for  issuing  important  administra- 
tive regulations.  The  latter  were  usually  issued  formally  in  the 
name  of  the  senate,  and  there  are  instances  of  such  decrees  of  which 
none  of  the  senators  recited  as  present  had  any  knowledge.  In 
order  to  make  it  representative  as  far  as  possible  of  all  classes,  and 
also  in  order  to  take  from  it  its  character  as  headquarters  of  the 
opposition,  it  was  raised  at  once  to  the  number  of  nine  hundred; 
and,  to  maintain  this  increase,  the  number  of  questors — all  of 
whom  became  annually  members  of  the  senate — was  raised  from 
twenty  to  forty.  Of  these,  twenty  were  nominated  by  the  im- 
perator,  who  had  also  the  privilege  of  conferring  the  honorary 
rights  of  the  questorship  on  whomsoever  he  pleased.  The  imme- 
diate extraordinary  increase  was  carried  out  solely  by  Caesar's 
nomination,  and  the  new  members  included  many  non-Italians  and 
persons  of  humble  or  dubious  origin. 

At  the  same  time,  the  whole  executive  was  concentrated  in  the 
hands  of  the  monarch.  Every  question  of  any  moment  was  de- 
cided by  the  imperator  in  person;  and  Caesar  was  able  to  carry 
personal  government  to  a  height  which  seems  incredible  to  men 
of  modern  times.  The  Roman  house  was  a  machine,  and  the  in- 
tellectual powers  of  slaves  and  freedmen  were  as  much  at  the 
disposal  of  the  master  as  their  manual  labor.  So,  whenever  cir- 
cumstances permitted,  Caesar  filled  up  any  post  demanding  special 
confidence  with  slaves,  freedmen,  or  clients  of  humble  birth.  It 
was  the  beau-ideal  of  bureaucratic  centralization. 

In  matters  strictly  political  Caesar  of  course  avoided,  when- 
ever possible,  any  delegation  of  his  functions;  when  this  was  in- 
evitable, as  when  he  was  compelled  to  be  absent  from  Rome,  his 
representative  was  usually  no  political  personage,  but  his  banker, 
the  Phoenician  Lucius  Cornelius  Balbus,  without  regular  official 
jurisdiction.  In  finance,  the  private  means  of  the  monarch  were 
kept  strictly  separate  from  the  property  of  the  state ;  but  the  whole 
financial  management,  the  levying  of  the  provincial  revenues  and 
the  coinage — were  intrusted  to  the  slaves  and  freedmen  of  the 
imperator.     The  provincial  governors,  now  that  they  were  re- 


THE     MONARCHY  371 

46-44  B.C. 

lieved  of  all  financial  business  by  the  new  imperial  tax  receivers, 
became  little  more  than  military  commanders.  Egypt,  on  account 
of  its  great  resources,  and  its  geographical  isolation,  which  ren- 
dered it  peculiarly  liable  to  be  broken  off  from  the  central  power 
under  an  able  leader,  was  intrusted  to  Rufio,  the  son  of  a  freed- 
man,  a  man  little  likely  to  abuse  his  position.  The  more  important 
of  the  other  provinces  were  given  to  those  who  had  been  consuls, 
the  others  to  those  who  had  been  pretors,  and  the  distribution  of 
provinces  among  qualified  candidates  was  vested  in  the  imperator. 
The  consuls  for  the  year  were  often  induced  to  abdicate  to  make 
room  for  other  men;  moreover  the  number  of  pretors  was  raised 
from  eight  to  sixteen,  and  the  nomination  of  them  intrusted  to  the 
imperator;  finally,  the  prince  could  nominate  titular  pretors  or 
questors,  and  by  these  various  means  could  always  count  upon  a 
sufficient  number  of  candidates  favorable  to  himself.  As  a  rule  the 
consular  governor  remained  not  more  than  two  years,  the  preto- 
rian  not  more  than  one,  in  his  province.  The  Roman  magistrates — 
consuls,  pretors,  ediles,  tribunes,  and  questors — retained  sub- 
stantially their  former  powers;  but  their  position  was  radically 
changed.  Formerly  they  had  been  magistrates  of  the  empire,  now 
they  were  magistrates  of  the  city  of  Rome,  and  the  consulship  be- 
came little  but  a  titular  post,  important  only  as  implying  the  rever- 
sion of  a  higher  governorship.  The  election  of  consuls,  tribunes, 
and  plebeian  ediles  was  free  from  restriction;  but  half  of  the  pre- 
tors, curule  ediles,  and  questors  were  nominated  by  the  monarch. 
The  tribunician  power  was  left  in  the  main  untouched,  but  a  refrac- 
tory tribune  would  of  course  be  summarily  dealt  with. 

Thus,  for  all  general  and  important  questions,  the  imperator 
was  his  own  minister;  he  controlled  the  finances  by  his  servants  and 
the  army  by  his  adjutants;  the  old  state  magistracies  were  again 
converted  into  magistracies  of  the  city  of  Rome ;  and,  in  addition  to 
all  this,  he  acquired  the  right  of  nominating  his  successor.  The 
autocracy  was  indeed  complete. 

In  spiritual  matters  Caesar  made  little  alteration,  except  to 
attach  the  supreme  pontificate  and  the  augurship  to  the  person  of 
the  monarch.  Such  support  as  religion  could  give  to  the  state  was 
now  transferred  to  the  monarchy,  but  it  can  scarcely  have  been 
worth  having. 

With  regard  to  the  administration  of  the  Jaw,  Caesar  revived 
the  ancient  regal  right  of  bringing  both  capital  cases  and  private 


372  ROME 

01  *  46-44  B.C. 

suits  before  himself  for  sole  and  final  decision.  He  often  sat,  like 
the  ancient  kings,  in  the  Forum  to  try  burgesses  in  cases  of  high 
treason;  client  princes  accused  of  the  same  offense  were  tried  in 
Caesar's  house:  so  that  the  only  privilege  of  burgesses  in  this 
respect  was  that  of  publicity.  But  for  all  ordinary  cases  the  former 
republican  procedure  was  retained.  Criminal  causes  went  before 
the  several  jury  commissions  appointed  to  deal  with  them;  civil 
cases  came  either  before  the  centumviri,  as  the  court  of  inheritance 
was  called,  or  were  referred  to  single  judges.  The  general  superin- 
tendence of  judicial  proceedings  was  conducted  in  the  capital  chiefly 
by  the  pretor,  in  the  provinces  by  the  governors.  Political  crimes 
were  still  referred  to  a  special  commission ;  the  law  on  this  subject 
was  laid  down  with  great  precision,  and  excluded  all  prosecution  of 
opinions,  while  it  fixed  as  the  penalty,  not  death,  but  exile.  The 
question  of  the  selection  of  jurymen  was  left,  as  before,  according 
to  the  law  of  Cotta,  except  that  the  rating  of  jurymen  was  twenty 
thousand  dollars. 

The  old  republican  jurisdiction  and  that  of  the  king  were  on 
the  whole  coordinate,  and  any  case  once  decided  upon  before 
either  bar  was  regarded  as  closed.  But  by  his  tribunician  power  the 
king  might  interfere  with  any  sentence  (unless  where  the  law 
specially  forbade  the  veto  of  the  tribunes)  so  as  to  cancel  it,  and 
might  then,  by  virtue  of  his  judicial  supremacy,  order  the  case  to  be 
tried  anew  before  himself.  This  was  the  germ  of  the  system  of 
appeal  to  a  higher  court,  a  thing  entirely  unknown  to  earlier  pro- 
cedure.1 

But  these  innovations — which  cannot  with  certainty  be  pro- 
nounced improvements  in  themselves — could  not  cure  the  evils 
from  which  the  Roman  administration  of  justice  was  suffering.  In 
the  first  place,  criminal  procedure  could  never  be  sound  in  a  slave 
state.  For  the  duty  of  proceeding  against  a  slave  must  be  left,  de 
facto  at  any  rate,  to  the  master,  who  will  punish  crime  in  a  slave 
only  so  far  as  it  impairs  his  value;  slave  criminals  at  Rome  were 
sold  to  the  fighting  booth,  just  as  an  ox  given  to  goring  was  sent  to 
the  butchers ;  but  punishment  for  crime  as  crime  could  scarcely  exist 
for  slaves.  Again,  during  the  long  course  of  political  disturbance 
criminal  prosecutions,  even  against  freemen,  had  become  mere 
faction  fights,  to  be  fought  out  by  means  of  favor,  money,  and 
violence.     All  classes  bear  the  blame  of  this  demoralization,  but  the 

1  This  cannot  be  proved  to  have  existed  anterior  to  Augustus. 


THE     MONARCHY  373 

46-44  B.C. 

class  of  advocates  must  take  the  lion's  share.  Among  all  the  nu- 
merous pleadings  in  criminal  causes  which  have  come  down  to  us 
from  this  epoch,  scarcely  one  makes  a  serious  attempt  to  fix  the 
crime  and  to  put  the  proof  or  counterproof  into  proper  shape. 
Civil  procedure  suffered  in  the  same  way,  though,  from  the  nature 
of  the  case,  of  course  in  a  minor  degree.  Caesar  retained  and  even 
made  more  severe  the  curb  imposed  on  forensic  eloquence  by  Pom- 
peius,  and  under  his  rule  of  course  open  corruption  and  intimida- 
tion of  the  courts  came  to  an  end.  But  he  could  not  pluck  up  the 
roots  of  the  evil,  or  reproduce  in  the  minds  of  the  people  the  sacred 
sense  of  right  and  reverence  for  law  which  alone  can  insure  the 
purity  of  judicial  administration. 

Nowhere  was  the  general  decay  of  the  state  more  conspicuously 
exemplified  than  in  the  condition  of  the  military  system.  This  was 
now  in  much  the  same  condition  as  that  of  the  Carthaginians  in  the 
time  of  Hannibal.  The  governing  classes  furnished  the  officers; 
the  subjects,  plebeians  and  provincials,  the  rank  and  file.  The 
general  was  left  practically  to  himself,  and  to  the  resources  of  his 
province.  All  civic  or  national  spirit  had  deserted  the  army ;  esprit 
de  corps  alone  held  it  together ;  it  had  ceased  to  be  the  instrument  of 
the  commonwealth,  and  had  become  that  of  the  general  who  com- 
manded it.  Under  the  ordinary  wretched  commanders  it  became  a 
rabble,  but  in  the  hands  of  a  capable  leader  it  attained  a  perfection 
of  which  the  burgess  army  was  incapable.  The  higher  ranks  in  the 
state  became  more  and  more  averse  to  arms;  so  that  the  military 
tribuneship,  once  so  keenly  competed  for,  was  open  to  any  man  of 
equestrian  rank  who  chose  to  serve.  The  staff  of  officers  usually 
gave  the  signal  for  mutiny  and  desertion.  Caesar  himself  has 
described  the  scene  at  his  own  headquarters  when  orders  were  given 
to  advance  against  Ariovistus — the  cursing  and  weeping,  the  mak- 
ing of  wills,  the  requests  for  furlough.  The  levy  was  held  with 
great  unfairness;  and  soldiers  once  levied  were  kept  thirty  years 
under  the  standards.  The  burgess  cavalry  had  degenerated  into 
an  ornamental  guard ;  the  "  burgess  "  infantry  was  a  troop  of 
mercenaries  collected  from  the  lowest  dregs  of  the  populace.  The 
subjects  furnished  the  whole  of  the  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops, 
and  began  to  be  employed  extensively  in  the  infantry.  The  post  of 
centurion  went  by  favor,  or  was  even  sold  to  the  highest  bidder :  the 
payment  of  the  soldiers  was  most  defective  and  irregular.  Of  the 
decay  of  the  navy  enough  has  been  said  before ;  here,  too,  as  else- 


874  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

where,  everything  that  could  be  ruined  had  been  reduced  to  ruin 
under  the  oligarchic  government. 

Caesar's  military  reorganization  was  limited  substantially  to 
the  tightening  and  strengthening  of  the  reins  of  discipline.  The 
system  itself  he  did  not  attempt — perhaps  he  did  not  wish — to 
reform.  He  did  indeed  enact  that,  in  order  to  hold  a  municipal 
magistracy  or  sit  on  a  municipal  council  before  the  thirtieth  year,  a 
man  must  serve,  either  three  years  as  an  officer,  or  six  years  in  the 
ranks ;  and  thus  attempted  to  attract  the  better  classes  into  the  army. 
But  he  dared  not  associate  the  holding  of  an  honorary  office  uncon- 
ditionally with  the  fulfillment  of  the  time  of  service.  The  levy  was 
better  arranged,  and  the  time  of  service  shortened ;  for  the  rest,  the 
infantry  continued  to  be  raised  chiefly  from  the  lower  orders  of 
burgesses,  the  cavalry  and  light  infantry  from  the  other  subjects. 
Two  innovations  must  be  placed  to  Caesar's  account :  one  the  use  of 
mercenaries  in  the  cavalry,  to  which  he  was  driven  by  the  untrust- 
worthiness  of  the  subject  cavalry;  the  other  the  appointment  of 
adjutants  of  the  legion  with  pretorian  powers.  Hitherto  the 
legion  had  been  led  by  its  military  tribunes,  who  were  appointed 
partly  by  the  burgesses,  partly  by  the  general,  and  who,  as  a  rule, 
commanded  the  legion  in  succession.  But  henceforward  colonels 
or  adjutants  of  the  whole  legion  were  nominated  by  the  imperator 
in  Rome,  and  were  meant  chiefly  as  a  counterpoise  to  the  gov- 
ernor's authority.  The  most  important  change  in  the  military  sys- 
tem was,  of  course,  the  new  supreme  command;  for  the  first  time 
the  armies  of  the  state  were  under  the  real  and  energetic  control 
of  the  supreme  government.  In  all  probability  the  governor  would 
still  retain  the  supreme  military  authority  in  his  own  province,  but 
subject  to  the  authority  of  the  imperator,  who  might  take  it  from 
him  at  any  moment  and  assume  it  for  himself  or  his  delegates. 
There  was  no  longer  any  fear,  either  that  the  armies  might  become 
utterly  disorganized  or  that  they  might  forget  that  they  belonged 
to  the  commonwealth  in  their  devotion  to  their  leaders. 

Perhaps  it  was  the  sole  illusion  which  Caesar  allowed  himself 
to  cherish  that  the  monarchy  he  had  founded  could  be  otherwise 
than  military.  That  a  standing  army  was  necessary  he  saw  of 
course,  but  only  because  the  nature  of  the  empire  required  per- 
manent frontier  garrisons ;  and  to  the  regulation  of  the  frontier  his 
military  plans  were  substantially  limited.  He  had  already  taken 
measures  for  the  tranquillization  of  Spain,  and  had  provided  for 


THE     MONARCHY 


375 


46-44  B.C. 

the  defense  of  the  Gallic  and  the  African  boundaries ;  he  had  similar 
plans  for  the  countries  bordering  on  the  Euphrates  and  the  Danube. 
Above  all,  he  was  determined  to  avenge  the  day  of  Carrhae,  and 
to  set  bounds  to  the  power  of  Boerebistas,  king  of  the  Getae,  who 
was  extending  his  dominions  on  both  sides  of  the  Danube.  Fabu- 
lous schemes  of  world-wide  conquest  are  ascribed  to  Caesar,  but  on 
no  respectable  authority,  and  his  conduct  in  Gaul  and  Britain  gives 
little  countenance  to  such  traditions.     At  any  rate  it  is  certain  that 


he  did  not  intend  to  rest  his  monarchy  primarily  on  the  army,  or 
to  set  the  military  power  above  the  civil.  The  magnificent  Gallic 
legions  were  dissolved  as  incompatible  with  a  civic  commonwealth ; 
only  their  glorious  names  were  perpetuated  by  newly  founded 
colonies.  The  soldiers  who  obtained  allotments  were  not  settled 
together  to  form  military  colonies,  but  scattered  throughout  Italy, 
except  where,  as  in  Campania,  aggregation  could  not  be  avoided. 
Caesar  attempted  in  every  way  to  keep  the  soldiers  within  the 
sphere  of  civil  life :  by  allowing  them  to  serve  their  term,  not  con- 
tinuously, but  by  instalments ;  by  shortening  the  term  of  service ;  by 
settling  the  emeriti  as  agricultural  colonists;  by  keeping  the  army 
aloof  from  Italy,  on  the  distant  frontiers.     No  corps  of  guards — 


376  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

the  true  criterion  of  a  military  state — was  even  formed  by  him; 
even  as  general  he  dropped  the  bodyguard  which  had  long  been 
usual;  and,  though  constantly  beset  by  assassins  in  the  capital,  he 
contented  himself  with  the  usual  escort  of  lictors.  But  this  noble 
ideal,  of  a  kingship  based  only  on  the  confidence  of  the  people, 
could  but  be  an  illusion;  amid  the  deep  disorganization  of  the 
nation  it  was  impossible  for  the  eighth  king  of  Rome  to  reign 
merely  by  virtue  of  law  and  justice.  Just  as  little  could  the  army 
which  had  placed  him  on  the  throne  be  really  absorbed  again  into 
the  state.  The  Campanian  mutiny  and  the  battlefield  of  Thapsus 
showed  how  the  legionaries  had  learned  their  lesson.  Thousands  of 
swords  still  flew  at  Caesar's  signal  from  their  scabbards,  but  they 
no  longer  returned  to  their  scabbards  at  his  signal.  Caesar's  cre- 
ation could  not  but  be  a  military  monarchy ;  he  had  overthrown  the 
regime  of  the  aristocrats  and  bankers  only  to  put  in  its  place  a  mili- 
tary regime.  Nevertheless,  it  was  important  that  at  the  outset 
Caesar  labored,  however  uselessly,  to  avoid  military  rule;  and  it  is 
owing  to  his  exertions  that  for  centuries  the  emperors  of  Rome  used 
the  army  in  the  main,  not  against  the  citizen,  but  against  the  foe. 

The  financial  embarrassment  in  which  the  state  had  found  itself 
during  recent  years  was  not  caused  by  deficiency  of  revenue,  which 
had  lately  been  increased  by  $4,250,000  since  the  formation  of  the 
provinces  of  Bithynia-Pontus  and  Syria.  The  taxation  of  foreign 
luxuries,  too,  yielded  a  constantly  increasing  revenue ;  and  immense 
sums  had  been  brought  into  the  state  chest  by  Lucullus,  Metellus, 
Pompeius,  Cato,  and  others.  But  expenditure  had  likewise  in- 
creased, and  the  whole  department  had  been  mismanaged.  The 
corn  distribution  had  gradually  come  to  absorb  one-fifth  of  the 
revenue ;  the  military  budget  had  risen  with  the  addition  of  Cilicia, 
Syria,  and  Gaul  to  the  list  of  provinces.  Again,  special  warlike 
preparations  had  swallowed  up  enormous  sums.  Still,  such  were 
the  resources  of  the  empire,  the  exchequer  might  have  met  all  these 
claims  upon  it  but  for  mismanagement  and  corruption. 

Apart  from  these  last  two  causes  there  were  two  institutions, 
both  introduced  by  Gaius  Gracchus,  which  ate  like  a  gangrene  into 
the  Roman  financial  system — the  corn  distributions  and  the  leasing 
system.  The  latter  was  retained  for  the  indirect  taxes;  but  the 
direct  taxes  were  in  future  either  paid  in  kind,  like  the  contributions 
of  corn  and  oil  from  Sardinia  and  Africa,  or  converted  into  fixed 
money  payments,  the  collection  being  intrusted  to  the  communities 


THE     MONARCHY  377 

46-44  B.C. 

themselves.  The  corn  distributions  could  hardly  be  abolished;  but 
in  their  present  form  they  were  an  assertion  of  the  principle  that 
the  ruling  community  had  a  right  to  be  supported  by  its  subjects. 
Caesar  reduced  the  number  of  persons  relieved  from  320,000  to 
150,000,  which  number  was  fixed  as  a  maximum,  and  he  excluded 
from  the  list  all  but  the  most  needy,  thus  converting  the  institution 
from  a  political  privilege  into  a  provision  for  the  poor. 

A  thorough  revision  of  income  and  expenditure  was  carried 
out.  The  ordinary  items  of  revenue  were  fixed  anew.  On  many 
communities  and  districts  total  exemption  from  taxation  was  con- 
ferred, either  directly  or  by  bestowal  of  the  franchise.  Many 
others  had  their  tribute  lowered :  that  of  Asia  was  reduced  by  one- 
third;  in  the  newly  conquered  districts  of  Illyria  and  in  Gaul  the 
tribute  was  fixed  at  a  low  rate ;  all  Gaul  paid  but  $2,000,000.  On 
the  other  hand,  some  communities,  as  Little  Leptis  in  Africa,  had 
their  tribute  raised ;  the  recently  abolished  Italian  harbor  dues  were 
reimposed.  And  to  these  ordinary  sources  of  income  were  to  be 
added  great  sums  raised  from  booty,  temple  treasures,  forced  loans 
and  fines  imposed  on  subject  communities  or  on  individuals;  above 
all,  from  the  proceeds  of  the  estates  of  the  defeated  party.  The 
fine  of  the  African  capitalists  who  sat  in  the  senate  at  Utica 
amounted  to  $5,000,000,  and  the  property  of  Pompeius  sold  for 
$3,500,000.  These  confiscations  were  necessary,  because  the 
strength  of  the  aristocrats  lay  in  their  colossal  wealth;  but  the 
proceeds  were  scrupulously  devoted  to  state  purposes,  and  the  pur- 
chase money  was  always  rigidly  exacted,  even  from  Caesar's  closest 
adherents,  such  as  Marcus  Antonius. 

The  expenditure  was  largely  diminished  by  the  restriction  of 
the  corn  distributions,  and  these,  together  with  the  supply  of  oil  for 
the  baths,  were  now  provided  for  by  contributions  in  kind  from 
Sardinia  and  Africa,  and  thus  kept  separate  from  the  exchequer. 
But  the  military  expenditure  was  increased,  both  by  the  augmenta- 
tion of  the  standing  army  and  by  the  raising  of  the  pay  from 
$25  to  $45  annually.  Both  steps  were  necessary :  the  first  owing  to 
the  want  of  any  efficient  defense  of  the  frontiers;  the  second  be- 
cause the  former  pay  of  6£  cents  per  day  had  been  fixed  at  a  time 
when  money  had  an  entirely  different  value,  and  when  the  soldier 
entered  the  army,  not  for  pay,  but  for  the  irregular  gains  which 
he  made  at  the  expense  of  the  provincials.  The  new  scale  was  fixed 
at  12  cents  per  day,  the  ordinary  day's  wages  at  the  same  period 


878  ROME 

46-44   B.C. 

being  15  cents.  Caesar's  extraordinary  expenses  during  and  after 
the  civil  wars  were  enormous.  The  war  had  cost  immense  sums; 
every  common  soldier  in  Caesar's  army  received  $1,000  at  its  close, 
every  neutral  burgess  in  the  capital,  $15.  Buildings  undertaken  in 
the  capital  cost  in  all  $8,000,000.  Yet,  in  spite  of  these  immense 
disbursements,  in  March,  44  B.C.,  there  was  in  the  public  treasury  a 
sum  of  $35,000,000,  in  that  of  Caesar  $5,000,000 — tenfold  the 
amount  which  the  treasury  had  held  in  the  most  flourishing  times 
of  the  republic. 

But  the  task  of  breaking  up  the  old  parties  and  furnishing  the 
state  with  a  suitable  constitution,  an  efficient  army,  and  well- 
ordered  finances  was  not  the  most  difficult  part  of  Caesar's  work. 
It  remained  to  regenerate  the  Italian  nation,  to  reorganize  Rome, 
Italy,  and  the  provinces. 

As  to  Rome  itself,  nothing  could  be  more  deplorable  than  the 
condition  into  which  it  had  fallen.  In  it,  as  in  all  capitals,  were 
congregated  the  upper  classes  who  regarded  their  homes  in  town 
as  mere  lodging  places,  the  foreign  settlers,  the  fluctuating  popula- 
tion of  travelers  on  business  or  pleasure,  the  mass  of  indolent, 
criminal,  bankrupt,  and  abandoned  rabble.  All  real  communal  life 
had  ceased  in  Rome;  it  was  a  center  to  which  people  flocked  from 
the  whole  extent  of  the  empire  for  speculation,  debauchery,  in- 
trigue, or  crime.  All  the  evils  inseparable  from  great  capitals  were 
found  intensified  at  Rome,  and  there  were  others  peculiar  to  itself. 
No  city,  perhaps,  was  ever  so  completely  without  free  industry  of 
any  kind,  which  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  importation  of 
foreign  commodities  and  by  the  extensive  employment  of  slaves  in 
domestic  manufacture.  Nowhere,  again,  were  such  masses  of 
slaves  congregated;  nowhere  were  the  slaves  of  so  many  different 
nationalities — Syrians,  Phrygians,  half-Hellenes,  Libyans,  Moors, 
Getae,  Iberians,  and,  of  late  years,  Celts  and  Germans  in  daily 
increasing  numbers.  Still  worse  were  the  masses  of  freedmen — 
often  free  only  de  facto — a  mixture  of  beggars  and  of  rich  par- 
venus, no  longer  slaves,  but  not  yet  burgesses,  economically  and 
even  legally  dependent  on  their  masters.  Retail  trade  and  minor 
handicrafts  were  almost  entirely  in  their  hands,  and  in  riots  and  at 
elections  their  influence  was  supreme.  The  oligarchical  govern- 
ment had  done  nothing  to  mend  these  evils.  The  law  prohibiting 
persons  condemned  for  capital  offenses  from  living  in  the  capital 
was  not  enforced ;  the  police  supervision  over  clubs  and  associations 


THE     MONARCHY  379 

46-44  B.C. 

was  first  neglected  and  then  forbidden  by  law.  Popular  festivals 
had  been  allowed  to  increase  so  largely  that  the  seven  principal 
celebrations  alone  occupied  sixty-two  days.  The  grain  supply  was 
managed  with  the  greatest  remissness,  and  the  fluctuations  in  prices 
were  fabulous  and  incalculable.  Lastly,  the  free  distributions  were 
a  standing  invitation  to  all  destitute  and  indolent  burgesses  to  come 
and  take  up  their  abode  in  the  capital.  Out  of  all  this  neglect 
sprang  the  system  of  clubs  and  bands,  the  worship  of  Isis  and  other 
religious  extravagances.  Dearth  and  famine  were  ordinary  inci- 
dents ;  life  was  nowhere  more  insecure  than  at  Rome.  The  condi- 
tion of  the  buildings  and  streets  was  equally  disgraceful;  nothing 
was  done  to  prevent  the  constant  overflows  of  the  river,  and  the 
city  was  still  content  with  one  bridge  over  the  Tiber.  The  streets 
were  narrow  and  steep,  the  footpaths  small  and  ill-paved.  Ordi- 
nary houses  were  wretchedly  built,  and  of  a  giddy  height,  while  the 
palaces  of  the  rich  formed  a  striking  contrast  to  the  decaying 
temples  of  the  gods,  with  their  images  still  carved  for  the  most  part 
in  wood.  If  we  try  to  conceive  to  ourselves  a  London  with  the 
slave  population  of  New  Orleans  in  our  mid-century  and  the  police 
of  Constantinople  about  that  time,  with  the  non-industrial  character 
of  modern  Rome,  and  agitated  by  politics  after  the  fashion  of  the 
Paris  of  1848,  we  shall  acquire  an  approximate  idea  of  the  republican 
glory,  the  departure  of  which  Cicero  and  his  associates  in  their  sulky 
letters  deplore. 

Caesar  could  not,  of  course,  alter  the  essential  character  of 
the  city,  nor  would  this  have  suited  his  plan.  To  be  the  head  of 
the  Roman  empire  it  must  remain  what  it  was,  the  denationalized 
capital  of  many  nations,  situated  at  the  meeting  point  of  East  and 
West;  and  for  this  reason  Caesar  tolerated  the  new  Egyptian 
worship,  and  even  the  strange  rites  of  the  Jews,  alongside  of  those 
of  Father  Jovis ;  while  at  his  popular  festivals  he  caused  dramas  to 
be  performed,  not  only  in  Latin  and  Greek,  but  in  Phoenician, 
Hebrew,  Syrian,  and  Spanish.  The  primary  evils  could  not  be 
eradicated ;  Caesar  could  not  abolish  slavery  or  conjure  into  exist- 
ence a  free  industry  in  the  capital.  But  by  his  extensive  building 
operations  he  at  any  rate  gave  to  the  willing  an  opportunity  of 
honorable  employment,  while  the  limitation  of  the  distributions 
must  have  stopped  the  influx  of  the  destitute  into  Rome.  The  ex- 
isting proletariate  was  reduced  by  measures  of  police  and  by  com- 
prehensive   transmarine    colonization.      Eighty    thousand    settlers 


380  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

were  sent  abroad  during  the  few  years  of  Caesar's  government. 
The  grain  supply  was  placed  upon  a  regular  and  efficient  basis, 
and  intrusted  to  the  two  newly  appointed  corn  ediles.  The  club 
system  was  checked  by  laws,  and  came  to  an  end  of  itself  as  the 
elections  ceased  to  be  of  practical  importance.  In  future,  with  some 
few  exceptions,  the  right  of  forming  associations  depended  upon 
the  permission  of  the  monarch  and  the  senate.  At  the  same  time, 
the  laws  regarding  violence  were  rendered  more  severe,  and  the 
right  of  the  convicted  criminal  to  withdraw  himself  from  part 
of  the  penalty  by  self-banishment  was  set  aside.  The  repair. of 
the  streets  and  footpaths  was  laid  as  a  burden  upon  house  pro- 
prietors, and  the  whole  regulation  of  the  streets  was  intrusted  to 
the  four  ediles,  who  each  superintended  a  distinct  police  district. 
Building  in  the  capital  received  a  stimulus  which  put  to  shame 
everything  that  had  been  accomplished  in  former  days.  And  the 
new  buildings  were  not  merely  monuments  of  splendor,  but  con- 
tributed largely  to  the  public  convenience.  The  crowded  Forum 
was  relieved  by  the  construction  of  a  new  comitium  in  the  Campus 
Martius,  and  of  a  new  place  of  judicature,  the  Forum  Julium.  In 
the  same  spirit,  oil  was  supplied  to  the  baths  free  of  cost,  as  a 
measure  of  sanitation.  Other  and  more  brilliant  projects,  such  as 
the  alteration  of  the  whole  lower  course  of  the  Tiber,  so  as  to  pro- 
vide more  space  for  public  edifices,  to  drain  the  Pomptine  marshes, 
and  to  provide  the  capital  with  a  safe  seaport,  were  cut  short  by  the 
death  of  Caesar. 

But  when  all  was  done,  Rome,  just  because  it  was  incapable 
of  a  real  municipal  life,  was  essentially  inferior  to  other  munici- 
palities of  the  period.  The  republican  Rome  was  a  den  of  rob- 
bers, but  it  was  at  the  same  time  the  state ;  the  Rome  of  the  mon- 
archy, although  it  began  to  embellish  itself  with  all  the  glories  of 
the  three  continents,  and  to  glitter  in  gold  and  marble,  was  yet 
nothing  in  the  state  but  a  royal  residence  in  connection  with  a  poor- 
house,  or,  in  other  words,  a  necessary  evil. 

The  reorganization  of  the  police  of  Rome  was,  of  course,  a 
small  task  compared  with  the  social  reorganization  of  Italy.  The 
plague  spot  in  the  condition  of  Italy  was,  as  it  had  long  been,  the 
disappearance  of  the  agricultural  and  the  unnatural  increase  of  the 
mercantile  population.  In  spite  of  numerous  attempts  to  foster  the 
system  of  small  holdings,  farm  husbandry  was  scarcely  anywhere 
predominant  in  Italy.     In  the  districts  of  Tibur  and  Tusculum, 


THE     MONARCHY  381 

46-44  B.C. 

on  the  shores  of  Terracina  and  Baiae,  where  the  Italian  farmer  had 
once  sowed  and  reaped,  there  was  now  to  be  seen  only  the  barren 
splendor  of  the  villas  of  the  nobles,  with  all  the  appurtenances  of 
gardens  and  fish-ponds,  salt  and  fresh,  nurseries  of  snails  and  slugs, 
game  preserves,  and  aviaries.  The  stock  of  a  pigeon-house  was 
valued  at  $5000 ;  the  fishes  left  behind  by  Lucius  Lucullus  brought 
$2000.  Accordingly  the  supply  of  such  luxuries  developed  into  a 
trade  which,  if  intelligently  prosecuted,  brought  large  profits.  Gar- 
dening, the  production  of  vegetables,  fruit,  and  flowers,  especially 
roses  and  violets,  in  Latium  and  Campania,  and  the  production  of 
honey,  were  the  most  profitable.  The  management  of  estates  on  the 
planter  system  gave  results  which,  from  an  economic  point  of  view, 
far  surpassed  anything  which  the  old  system  of  small  cultivators 
could  have  given,  especially  in  central  Italy,  the  districts  of  the 
Fucine  Lake,  of  the  Liris  and  Volturnus.  Even  some  branches  of 
industry,  such  as  were  suitable  accompaniments  of  a  slave  estate, 
were  taken  up  by  intelligent  landlords,  and  inns,  weaving  factories, 
and  brickworks  were  conducted  on  the  demesne.  Pastoral  hus- 
bandry, which  was  always  spreading,  especially  in  the  south  and 
southeast,  was  indeed  in  every  respect  a  retrograde  movement,  but 
it  too  participated  in  the  general  progress,  and  accomplished  much  in 
the  way  of  improvement  of  breeds. 

The  dimensions  which  money-dealing  assumed  by  the  side  of 
this  unnaturally  prosperous  estate  husbandry,  and  the  extent  to 
which  capital  flowed  to  Rome,  is  shown  by  the  singular  fact  that 
at  Rome  the  ordinary  rate  of  interest  was  six  per  cent.;  that  is, 
one-half  the  average  rate  elsewhere  in  ancient  times. 

The  result  of  this  economic  system,  based  upon  masses  of  cap- 
ital, was  the  most  fearful  disproportion  in  the  distribution  of 
wealth.  Nowhere  is  the  phrase  "  a  commonwealth  composed  of 
millionaires  and  beggars "  so  applicable  as  at  Rome  in  the  last 
stages  of  the  republic;  nowhere  has  the  essential  maxim  of  the 
slave  state,  that  the  rich  man  who  lives  by  the  exertion  of  his  slaves 
is  respectable,  and  the  poor  man  who  lives  by  the  labor  of  his  hands 
is  necessarily  vulgar,  been  so  widely  recognized.  A  real  middle 
class  there  can  never  be  in  any  fully  developed  slave  state;  the 
nearest  approach  to  it  in  the  Roman  commonwealth  was  composed 
of  men  who  were  either  too  cultivated  or  too  uncultivated  to  go 
beyond  their  own  sphere  of  activity,  and  to  take  any  share  in  public 
life.     Of  the  former  class,  Cicero's  friend,  Titus  Pomponius  At- 


;J82  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

ticus.  is  a  typical  example.  He  acquired  a  large  fortune  by  estate 
farming  and  by  extensive  money  transactions;  but  he  was  never 
seduced  into  soliciting  office,  or  even  into  money  transactions  with 
the  state;  his  table  was  ample,  but  moderate,  and  was  maintained 
at  a  cost  of  five  dollars  per  day;  he  was  content  with  an  easy  ex- 
istence, which  included  all  the  charms  of  a  country  and  a  city 
life,  together  with  intercourse  with  the  best  society  of  Rome  and 
Greece,  and  all  the  enjoyments  of  literature  and  art.  Of  the  less 
cultivated  rural  gentleman  (pater  familias  rusticanus)  an  example 
is  furnished  by  Sextus  Roscius,  who  was  murdered  in  81  B.C.  He 
manages  his  thirteen  estates  in  person,  and  comes  seldom  to  the  cap- 
ital, where  his  clownish  manners  contrast  strangely  with  those  of  the 
polished  senator.  In  such  men  and  in  their  country  towns  the  dis- 
cipline, manners,  and  language  of  their  fathers  were  best  preserved. 
Traces  of  such  a  class  appear  wherever  a  national  movement  arises 
in  politics,  and  from  it  sprang  Varro,  Lucretius,  Catullus,  and  all 
the  freshest  literature  of  the  time.  An  excellent  picture  of  this 
simple  landlord  life  may  be  found  in  the  graceful  introduction  to 
the  second  book  of  Cicero's  treatise  "  De  Legibus." 

But  the  vigorous  class  of  landlords  is  completely  outbalanced 
by  the  two  predominant  classes  in  the  state,  the  mass  of  beggars 
and  the  world  of  quality.  The  relative  proportions  of  poor  and  rich 
we  have  no  means  of  accurately  knowing.  But  fifty  years  earlier 
the  number  of  families  of  established  wealth  did  not  amount  to 
two  thousand ;  and  the  disproportion  had  probably  increased.  The 
growth  of  poverty  is  shown  by  the  crowding  into  the  army,  and 
into  the  city  for  the  corn  largesses;  that  of  wealth,  by  the  fact 
that  an  author  of  this  generation  describes  an  estate  of  $100,000  of 
the  Marian  period,  as  "  riches,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  that 
day,"  and  by  the  enormous  fortunes  possessed  by  individuals.  The 
estate  of  Pompeius  amounted  to  $3,500,000;  Crassus,  who  began 
with  a  fortune  of  $350,000,  died,  after  lavishing  enormous  sums 
on  the  people,  worth  $8,500,000.  The  result  was,  on  both  sides, 
economic  and  moral  disorganization.  The  Roman  plebeian  became 
a  lazy  mendicant,  fonder  of  gazing  in  the  theater  than  of  working. 
The  gladiatorial  games  flourished  as  never  before;  freedom  had 
so  fallen  in  value  that  freemen  often  sold  themselves  for  board  and 
wages  as  gladiatorial  slaves.  In  the  world  of  quality  essentially 
the  same  features  occur.  As  the  plebeian  lounged  on  the  pavement, 
the  aristocrat  lay  in  bed  till  late  in  the  day;  unbounded  and  taste- 


*"    PB 

C    f- 


THE     MONARCHY  383 

46-44  B.C. 

less  luxury  everywhere  prevailed;  huge  sums  were  lavished  on 
politics  and  on  the  theater,  to  the  corruption  of  both.  In  54  B.C. 
the  first  voting  division  alone  was  paid  $500,000,  and  all  intelligent 
interest  in  the  drama  vanished  amid  the  insane  extravagance  of 
decoration.  Rents  in  Rome  were  four  times  as  high  as  in  the 
country ;  the  house  of  Marcus  Lepidus,  at  the  time  of  Sulla's  death 
the  finest  in  Rome,  was,  a  generation  later,  not  the  hundredth  on 
the  list  of  Roman  palaces.  A  palatial  sepulcher  was  a  necessity  to 
every  noble  who  wished  to  die  as  became  his  rank;  horses,  dogs, 
furniture,  dress,  plate,  all  cost  outrageous  sums.  But  it  was  the 
luxury  of  the  table,  the  coarsest  luxury  of  all,  which  flourished 
most  bravely.  There  were  dining-rooms  for  winter  and  summer; 
sometimes  the  meal  was  served  on  a  platform  in  the  deer-park,  and 
the  guests  were  entertained  by  a  theatrical  Orpheus,  at  whose  notes 
trained  roes  and  wild  boars  gathered  round.  Italian  delicacies  had 
become  vulgar,  and  even  at  popular  festivals  three  sorts  of  foreign 
wine,  Sicilian,  Lesbian,  and  Chian,  were  distributed.  Emetics  were 
commonly  taken  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  a  meal.  Debauchery 
of  every  sort  had  become  a  profession,  by  which  instructors  in  the 
theory  and  practice  of  vice  could  gain  a  living.  Of  course  no  for- 
tune could  bear  the  ravages  of  such  expenditure.  The  canvass 
for  the  consulship  was  the  usual  high-road  to  ruin.  The  princely 
wealth  of  the  period  is  far  surpassed  by  the  more  than  princely 
liabilities.  Caesar  in  62  b.c.  owed  $1,250,000  more  than  his  assets. 
Marcus  Antonius  owed  at  the  age  of  twenty-four  $300,000,  four- 
teen years  later  $2,000,000;  Curio  owed  $3,000,000;  Milo, 
$3,500,000.  The  borrowing  of  the  competitors  for  the  consulship 
once  suddenly  raised  the  rate  of  interest  from  four  to  eight  per 
cent.  Insolvency  was  usually  prolonged  by  the  debtor  as  long  as 
possible,  and  when  the  final  crash  came  the  creditors  perhaps  got 
— as  in  the  case  of  Milo — four  per  cent,  of  their  lendings.  The 
only  man  who  profited  by  such  a  condition  of  things  was,  of  course, 
the  cool  banker.  The  debtors  were  either  in  servile  subjection  to 
their  creditors,  or  ready  to  get  rid  of  them  by  conspiracy  and  civil 
war.  Hence  the  cry  of  "  clear  sheets"  (novae  tabulae),  the  motto 
of  Cinna  and  Catilina,  of  Caelius  and  Dolabella. 

Under  such  circumstances  morality  and  family  life  had  be- 
come antiquated  things;  poverty  was  the  only  disgrace,  the  only 
crime ;  the  state,  honor,  freedom  were  alike  sold  for  money.  Men 
had  forgotten  what  honesty  was,  and  a  man  who  refused  a  bribe 


38*  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

was  regarded  as  a  personal  foe.  The  criminal  calendars  of  all  ages 
and  countries  could  scarcely  furnish  a  tale  of  crime  so  horrible,  so 
varied,  and  so  unnatural  as  the  trial  of  Aulus  Cluentius  reveals  in 
the  bosom  of  a  respectable  family  in  an  Italian  country  town. 
Nevertheless,  the  surface  of  life  was  overspread  with  a  veneer  of 
polish  and  professions  of  universal  friendship.  All  the  world  ex- 
changed visits.  At  houses  of  quality  the  crowds  of  visitors  were 
admitted  in  a  fixed  order,  the  more  notable  one  by  one,  the  others 
in  groups,  or  in  a  body  at  the  close.  Invitations  to  dinner  and  the 
customary  domestic  festivals  became  almost  public  ceremonials,  and 
even  at  his  death  the  Roman  was  expected  to  provide  each  of  his 
countless  friends  with  a  keepsake.  Instead  of  the  genuine  in- 
timacy of  family  ties  there  was  a  spectral  shadow  of  "  friendship/' 
not  the  least  of  the  evil  spirits  which  brooded  over  the  horrors  of 
the  age. 

Another  equally  characteristic  feature  was  the  emancipation 
of  women — not  merely  the  economic  emancipation  from  father  or 
husband,  which  had  long  ago  been  accomplished,  but  a  freedom 
which  allowed  them  to  interfere  in  every  department  of  life.  The 
ballet  dancers  and  all  their  tribe  pollute  even  the  pages  of  history; 
liaisons  in  even  the  best  circles  were  so  common  that  only  a  very 
extraordinary  scandal  could  excite  comment.  The  intrusion  of 
Publius  Clodius  at  the  women's  festival  of  the  Bona  Dea,  a  scandal 
hitherto  unparalleled,  passed  almost  without  investigation.  The 
canuval  time  for  license  of  this  sort  was  the  watering-place  season, 
in  April,  at  Baiae  and  Puteoli,  but  the  women  were  not  content 
with  their  own  domain.  They  invaded  the  realm  of  politics,  at- 
tended political  conferences,  and  took  their  part  in  all  the  coterie 
intrigues  of  the  time.  The  lightness  with  which  divorce  was  re- 
garded may  be  inferred  from  the  conduct  of  the  stern  moralist 
Cato,  who  did  not  hesitate  to  divorce  his  wife  for  a  friend  who 
wished  to  marry  her,  or  to  marry  her  again  after  the  death  of  his 
friend.  Celibacy  and  childlessness  became  increasingly  common, 
especially  in  the  upper  classes;  even  with  Cato  and  his  circle  the 
same  maxim  was  now  current  to  which  Polybius  had  traced  the 
decay  of  Hellas,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  citizen  to  keep  great  wealth 
together,  and  therefore  not  to  beget  too  many  children. 

During  all  this  period  the  population  of  Italy  was  growing 
steadily  smaller.  The  amount  of  talent  and  working  power  neces- 
sary for  the  government  of  the  empire  was  no  longer  forthcoming 


THE     MONARCHY  385 

46-44  B.C. 

from  the  peninsula,  especially  as  a  large  part  of  its  best  material 
was  continually  being  lost  forever  to  the  nation.  The  aristocracy 
lost  the  habit  of  looking  on  Italy  as  their  home.  Of  the  men  en- 
listed in  the  army  large  numbers  perished  in  the  numerous  wars, 
and  many  more  were  wholly  estranged  from  their  native  land  by 
the  long  period  of  service.  Speculation  kept  many  of  the  land- 
holders and  merchants  away  from  their  country,  and  their  itinerant 
habits  estranged  them  from  civic  and  family  life.  In  return  for 
these  sound  elements  Italy  received  a  rabble  of  slaves  and  freed- 
men,  handicraftsmen  and  tradesmen  from  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and 
Egypt,  who  moreover  flourished  chiefly  in  the  seaports  and  in  the 
capital;  in  many  parts  of  Italy  there  was  not  even  this  compensa- 
tion, and  the  population  visibly  declined.  The  pastoral  districts, 
such  as  Apulia  and  the  region  round  Rome,  became  every  year 
more  desolate :  many  towns,  such  as  Labici  and  Gabii,  could  hardly 
find  representatives  for  the  Latin  festival;  Tusculum  consisted  al- 
most solely  of  families  of  rank  who  lived  at  Rome  but  retained 
their  Tusculan  franchise.  In  some  portions  of  Italy,  especially 
Campania,  things  were  not  so  bad;  but  in  general,  as  Varro 
complains,  "  the  once  populous  cities  of  Italy  stood  desolate." 

It  is  a  terrible  picture,  but  not  one  peculiar  to  Italy ;  wherever 
the  government  in  a  slave  state  has  fully  developed  itself,  it  has 
desolated  God's  fair  world  in  the  same  way.  As  in  the  Hellas  of 
Polybius,  and  the  Carthage  of  Hannibal's  time,  the  all-powerful 
rule  of  capital  ruined  the  middle  class,  raised  trade  and  estate- 
farming  to  the  highest  prosperity,  and  ultimately  led  to  a  moral 
and  political  corruption  of  the  nation. 

The  evils  of  Italy  were  in  their  deepest  essence  irremediable ; 
the  wisest  government  cannot  give  freshness  to  the  corrupt  juices 
of  the  organism,  or  do  more  in  such  a  case  than  remove  obstruc- 
tions in  the  way  of  the  remedial  power  of  nature.  The  worst 
excrescences  vanished  under  the  new  rule,  such  as  the  pampering 
of  the  proletariate,  the  impunity  of  crimes,  the  purchasing  of 
offices.  But  Caesar  was  not  one  of  those  overwise  men  who  refuse 
to  embank  the  sea  because  no  dyke  will  keep  out  a  sudden  influx  of 
the  tide.  Though  no  one  knew  better  than  himself  the  limits  of 
his  power,  he  applied  all  his  energies  to  bring  back  the  nation  to 
home  and  family  life,  and  to  reform  the  national  economy  by  law 
and  decree. 

In  order  to  check  the  absence  of  Italians  from  Italy,  the  term 


386  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

of  military  service  was  shortened,  and  men  of  senatorial  rank  were 
prohibited  from  living  out  of  Italy  except  on  public  business.  Other 
Italians,  of  marriageable  age,  were  forbidden  to  be  absent  for  more 
than  three  consecutive  years.  In  his  first  consulship  Caesar  had 
especially  favored  fathers  who  had  several  children,  in  founding  his 
colony  of  Capua.  As  imperator  he  offered  rewards  to  fathers  of 
numerous  families,  and  treated  divorce  and  adultery  with  great 
rigor.  In  order  to  repress  some  of  the  worst  forms  of  luxury,  ex- 
travagance in  sepulchral  monuments  was  cut  down  by  law,  the  use 
of  purple  robes  and  of  pearls  was  restricted,  and  a  maximum  was 
fixed  for  the  expenditure  of  the  table.  Even  the  semblance  of  pro- 
priety enforced  by  these  police  measures  was,  under  the  circum- 
stances, not  to  be  despised.  The  laws  designed  to  meet  the  existing 
monetary  crisis,  and  for  the  better  regulation  of  monetary  dealings 
in  future,  were  more  serious  and  promised  better  results.  The  law 
which  was  produced  by  the  outcry  against  locked-up  capital,  and 
which  provided  that  no  one  should  have  on  hand  more  than  three 
thousand  dollars  in  gold  and  silver,  was  probably  only  meant  to 
allay  the  public  indignation,  and  can  hardly  have  been  enforced. 
The  treatment  of  pending  claims  was  a  more  serious  matter.  Two 
important  concessions  were  made  to  debtors  in  49  B.C.  First,  the 
interest  in  arrear  was  struck  off,  and  that  already  paid  was  de- 
ducted from  the  capital.  Secondly,  the  creditor  had  to  accept  as 
payment  the  property  of  the  debtor  at  its  estimated  value  before  the 
general  depreciation  caused  by  the  civil  war;  which  of  course  was 
only  fair,  inasmuch  as  it  compelled  the  creditor  to  bear  his  share 
of  the  general  fall  in  values.  But  the  first  provision,  which  in  prac- 
tice compelled  the  creditor  to  lose,  besides  the  interest,  an  average 
of  twenty-five  per  cent,  of  his  capital,  amounted  to  a  partial  con- 
cession to  the  cry  for  a  total  canceling  of  debts.  But  the  demo- 
cratic party  had  always  taken  their  stand  upon  the  illegality  of  all 
interest :  interest  was,  in  fact,  forbidden  by  the  Lex  Genucia,  which 
was  extorted  by  the  plebeians  in  342  B.C.,  and  which  was  still  for- 
mally valid ;  in  the  confusion  of  the  Marian  period  it  had  even  been 
enforced  for  a  time.  And  though  Caesar  can  hardly  have  shared 
the  crude  views  of  his  party,  he  could  not  entirely  repudiate  its 
traditional  maxims ;  especially  as  he  had  to  decide  this  question,  not 
as  the  conqueror  of  Pharsalus,  but  even  before  his  departure  for 
Epirus. 

Besides  assisting  the  debtor  of  the  moment,  Caesar  did  what 


THE     MONARCHY  S87 

46-44  B.C. 

he  could  permanently  to  repress  the  fearful  omnipotence  of  capital. 
According  to  Roman  law  the  insolvent  debtor  became  the  slave  of 
his  creditor ;  and  though  modified  in  secondary  points,  the  principle 
had  remained  unaltered  for  five  hundred  years.  It  was  Caesar  who 
first  gave  to  an  insolvent  the  right  of  saving  his  personal  freedom, 
though  with  diminished  political  rights,  of  ceding  his  property  to 
his  creditors,  and  beginning  a  new  financial  existence.  Claims 
arising  from  the  earlier  period  could  be  enforced  against  him  only 
if  he  could  meet  them  without  renewed  financial  ruin.  At  the  same 
time,  Caesar  did  not  disown  the  antipathy  of  his  party  to  usury.  In 
Italy,  for  the  future,  no  single  capitalist  was  allowed  to  lend  sums 
amounting  to  more  than  a  fixed  proportion  (perhaps  one-half)  of 
the  value  of  his  landed  estate.  In  consequence  of  this  law  every 
money-lender  was  compelled  to  be  also  a  landowner,  and  the  class 
of  capitalists  subsisting  wholly  on  their  interest  would  disappear 
from  Italy.  It  was  also  forbidden  to  take  a  higher  interest  than 
one  per  cent,  per  month ;  or  to  take  interest  on  arrears  of  interest, 
or  to  claim  interest  to  a  greater  amount  than  the  capital — pro- 
visions which  were  probably  first  introduced  by  Lucius  Lucullus  in 
Asia  Minor,  and  which  were  extended  to  all  the  provinces  by  decree 
of  the  senate  in  the  year  50  B.C. 

For  the  improvement  of  agriculture  the  first  necessity  was  the 
improvement  of  the  administration  of  law  and  justice.  Hitherto 
neither  movable  nor  immovable  property  had  been  secure.  The 
leaders  of  armed  bands,  when  their  services  were  not  required  in 
the  capital,  had  applied  themselves  to  rounding  out  the  country 
estates  of  their  masters  by  violently  expelling  the  rightful  owners. 
Such  proceedings  were  now  at  an  end.  A  high  road  was  made 
from  Rome  through  the  passes  of  the  Apennines  to  the  Adriatic, 
and  the  level  of  the  Fucine  Lake  was  lowered  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Marsian  farmers.  In  order  to  check  brigandage  and  encourage 
free  labor,  Italian  graziers  were  required  to  take  at  least  a  third  of 
their  herdsmen  from  free-born  adults.  In  the  encouragement  of 
small  holdings  Caesar  showed  himself  scrupulously  observant  of 
every  legitimate  title,  whether  derived  from  Gracchus  or  Sulla; 
but  the  commission  of  twenty  was  revived  to  revise  all  Italian 
titles,  and  the  whole  of  the  actual  domain  land  of  Italy  which  was 
suitable  for  agriculture  was  destined  for  distribution.  In  the  se- 
lection of  farmers  the  veterans  were  first  considered,  and  thus 
Caesar  restored  to  his  country  as  a  farmer  the  proletarian  whom  he 


388  ROME 

46-44   B.C. 

had  levied  as  a  recruit.  Desolate  Latin  communities,  such  as  Veii 
and  Capena,  were  provided  with  new  colonists.  The  new  owners 
were  forbidden  to  alienate  their  lands  for  twenty  years. 

The  newly  organized  municipal  system,  which  had  been  de- 
veloped out  of  the  crisis  of  the  social  war,  was  regulated  by  Caesar 
in  two  ordinances  of  49  B.C.  and  45  B.C.,  the  former  of  which  ap- 
plied to  Cisalpine  Gaul  only,  while  the  latter  remained  the  funda- 
mental law  for  all  succeeding  time.  It  proceeded  on  the  line  of 
purifying  the  urban  corporations  from  all  immoral  elements,  and 
of  restricting  centralization  to  the  utmost.  The  communities  were 
still  allowed  to  elect  their  own  magistrates,  and  to  exercise  a  limited 
civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction. 

Such  were  Caesar's  regulations  for  the  reform  of  the  social 
economy  of  Italy.  It  would  be  easy  to  show  that  they  were  in- 
sufficient, and  that  they  acted  in  some  respects  injuriously — still 
easier  to  show  that  the  evils  of  Italian  economy  were  incurable. 
But  Caesar  did  not  hope  or  expect  from  them  the  regeneration  of 
Italy.  This  he  attempted  to  attain  in  a  very  different  way,  for  the 
understanding  of  which  it  is  necessary  to  review  the  condition 
of  the  provinces  as  Caesar  found  them. 

The  provinces  in  existence  at  this  time  were  fourteen  in  num- 
ber: seven  European — Farther  Spain,  Hither  Spain,  Transalpine 
Gaul,  Italian  Gaul  with  Illyricum,  Macedonia  with  Greece,  Sicily, 
Sardinia  with  Corsica;  five  Asiatic — Asia,  Bithynia  with  Pontus, 
Cilicia  with  Cyprus,  Syria,  Crete;  two  African — Cyrene,  Africa. 
To  these  Caesar  added  three  more — Lugdunese  Gaul,  Belgica,  and 
Illyria,  which  was  now  erected  into  a  separate  province. 

Under  the  oligarchy  the  provinces  were  reduced  to  a  condition 
of  hopeless  misery  which  it  seems  impossible  for  any  government 
ever  to  surpass.  It  is  true  that,  before  the  Romans  had  their  day, 
the  rule  of  Greeks,  Phoenicians,  or  Asiatics  had  almost  everywhere 
driven  from  the  nations  all  sense  of  right  and  liberty.  The  Roman 
provincial,  when  accused,  was  obliged  to  appear  personally  at 
Rome;  the  Roman  governor  interfered  at  pleasure  in  every  detail 
of  administration;  the  Roman  administrators  and  their  train  were 
bound  by  no  rule  of  morality  and  justice,  and  outrages,  rapes, 
murders  with  or  without  the  form  of  law,  were  of  daily  occurrence. 
But  these  things  had  gone  on  from  time  immemorial  under  Car- 
thaginian overseers  and  Syrian  satraps,  and  the  well-being  of  the 
provincials  was  far  less  disturbed  by  them  than   by   the  financial 


THE     MONARCHY  389 

46-44  B.C. 

exactions,  in  which  the  Romans  outran  all  former  tyrants.  The 
ordinary  taxes  were  rendered  doubly  oppressive  by  the  mode  of 
levying  them.  As  to  the  quartering  of  troops,  Roman  statesmen 
themselves  confessed  that  a  town  suffered  nearly  as  much  from  it  as 
when  stormed  by  an  enemy.  The  taxation  was  properly  an  in- 
demnification for  the  burden  of  military  defense  undertaken  by 
Rome,  and  the  communities  taxed  had  a  right  to  be  exempt  at  any 
rate  from  the  ordinary  service.  But  garrison  duty  was  still  for  the 
most  part  imposed  upon  the  provincials,  as  well  as  the  whole 
burden  of  cavalry  service;  and  the  extraordinary  contributions  for 
the  supply  of  grain  to  the  capital,  the  costly  naval  armaments  and 
coast  defenses  against  the  pirates,  the  military  requisitions  in  time 
of  war,  were  frequent  and  oppressive  in  the  extreme.  In  Sicily  the 
number  of  farms  decreased  fifty-nine  per  cent,  during  three  years 
of  the  administration  of  Gaius  Verres,  and  the  ruined  cultivators 
were  not  small  farmers,  but  considerable  planters  and  Roman 
burgesses!  In  the  client  states  the  burdens  were,  if  possible, 
heavier.  In  addition  to  the  Roman  exactions  came  those  of  the 
native  courts ;  farmer  and  king  were  alike  bankrupt.  And  to  these, 
to  some  extent  regular  exactions,  are  to  be  added  the  plunderings 
of  the  governor  and  of  all  his  friends,  each  of  whom  expected  to 
return  to  Rome  a  made  man.  The  advocates  and  jurymen  at  home 
expected  to  share  the  spoil ;  so  that  the  more  the  governor  stole,  the 
greater  his  security.  And  these  were  the  successors  of  the  men  who 
had  brought  nothing  home  from  the  provinces  but  the  thanks  of 
the  subjects  and  the  approval  of  their  countrymen! 

Nor  is  this  all.  The  tyranny  of  the  Italian  men  of  business 
was  even  worse  than  that  of  the  governors.  Much  of  the  landed 
property  and  most  of  the  commerce  and  finance  of  the  provinces 
were  in  their  hands.  Usury  flourished  as  never  before.  The  small 
landowners  managed  their  estates  as  the  debtor-slaves  of  their 
creditors.  Communities  had  sometimes  to  pay  four  per  cent,  per 
month  for  loans.  Frequently  a  man  of  business  got  the  title  of 
envoy  conferred  on  him,  and  sometimes  had  men  put  at  his  dis- 
posal for  the  more  effective  prosecution  of  his  affairs.  On  one 
occasion  a  banker  who  had  a  claim  on  the  town  of  Salamis  in 
Cyprus  kept  its  council  blockaded  in  the  town-house  until  five  mem- 
bers died  of  hunger.  And  still  to  all  these  miseries  and  oppressions 
there  remains  to  be  added  general  calamities,  for  some  of  which, 
such  as  war,  brigandage,  and  piracy,  the  inefficiency  of  the  Roman 


390  ROME 

46-44   B.C. 

government  was  responsible.  The  general  result,  even  in  the  com- 
paratively prosperous  provinces  of  Spain  and  Narbonese  Gaul,  was 
total  ruin.  Towns  like  Samos  and  Halicarnassus  stood  empty; 
even  the  patient  Asiatic  was  weary  of  life.  The  statesmen  of  Rome 
allowed  that  the  Roman  name  was  unutterably  hateful  throughout 
Greece  and  Asia ;  and  when  the  men  of  Heraclea,  in  Pontus,  put  to 
death  the  whole  of  the  Roman  tax  collectors,  the  only  matter  for 
regret  was  that  such  things  did  not  occur  oftener. 

The  wounds  inflicted  could  only  be  healed  by  time ;  but  Caesar 
took  care  that  there  should  be  no  new  inflictions.  The  new  gov- 
ernors were  the  servants  of  a  stern  master,  and  were  practically 
appointed  by  him.  Their  functions  were  largely  restricted  by  the 
new  supreme  command  in  Rome  and  by  the  new  adjutants  asso- 
ciated with  them.  The  raising  of  the  taxes,  too,  was  probably  al- 
ready committed  to  imperial  officials,  so  that  the  governor  was 
now  surrounded  by  an  independent  staff,  directly  responsible  to  the 
imperator.  The  law  against  exactions  had  been  made  more 
stringent  by  Caesar  in  his  first  consulate,  and  was  applied  with  in- 
exorable severity.  At  the  same  time,  the  extraordinary  burdens 
were  limited  to  the  necessary  requirements,  and  the  ordinary 
burdens  materially  lessened.  Exemptions  from  tribute  were 
liberally  granted,  the  direct  taxes  lowered,  the  system  of  decumae 
confined  to  Africa  and  Sardinia,  and  the  system  of  middlemen  in 
the  collection  was  set  aside.  That  Caesar,  like  Sertorius,  tried  to 
free  the  subjects  from  the  burden  of  quartering  troops  cannot  be 
proved,  but  it  was  in  this  spirit  that  the  heirs  of  his  policy  created 
military  camps,  and  converted  them  into  towns  which  formed 
rallying-points  in  the  barbarian  frontier  districts. 

To  deliver  the  provincials  from  the  tyranny  of  Roman  capital 
was  a  far  more  difficult  task.  Its  power  could  not  be  directly 
broken,  and  a  radical  cure  could  only  be  hoped  for  from  the  gradual 
revival  of  prosperity.  Isolated  abuses  were  abolished,  and  palpable 
acts  of  violence  or  flagrant  wrong  were  sharply  punished ;  but  this 
was  all.  Caesar  had,  as  governor  of  Farther  Spain  in  60  B.C., 
assigned  to  the  creditors  two-thirds  of  the  income  of  their  debtors 
in  order  to  pay  themselves;  and  Lucius  Lucullus  had  in  Asia  can- 
celed a  portion  of  the  arrears  of  interest,  and  assigned  to  the 
creditors  a  fourth  part  of  the  produce  of  the  lands  of  their  debtors. 
It  is  probable  that  similar  liquidations  were  instituted  in  the 
provinces  generally  after  the  civil  wars.    As  to  the  remaining  evils 


THE     MONARCHY  391 

46-44  B.C. 

of  piracy  and  brigandage,  these  might  be  expected  to  disappear 
through  the  fresh  vigor  of  the  new  regime.  At  any  rate,  with 
Caesar  hope  dawned  afresh,  and  the  first  intelligent  and  humane 
government  which  had  appeared  for  centuries  began  to  rule. 
"  Well  might  the  subject  in  particular  mourn  along  with  the  best 
Romans  by  the  bier  of  the  great  liberator." 

We  have  now  surveyed  in  outline  the  principal  measures  by 
which  Caesar  attempted  to  reorganize  existing  institutions,  to  get 
rid  of  abuses,  and  to  reform  the  whole  system  of  government.  But 
this  was,  on  the  whole,  but  the  negative  part  of  his  task.  For  the 
regeneration,  it  might  almost  be  said  the  re-creation,  of  the  state 
he  tried  to  lay  a  firm  foundation  upon  which  might  be  realized  that 
conception  which  had  first  been  grasped  by  Gaius  Gracchus,  and 
which  was  afterwards  taken  up  by  Sertorius  in  Spain.  Like  those 
great  statesmen,  Caesar  looked  forward  to  the  time  when  the 
provinces,  as  such,  would  disappear,  and  when  a  new  Helleno- 
Italic  nation  should  arise  in  a  new  and  wider  home,  with  a  fresher, 
broader,  grander  national  life,  which  would  of  itself  be  the  ex- 
tinction of  the  sorrows  and  wrongs  of  the  nation  for  which  there 
could  be  no  redress  in  old  Italy.  The  emigration  of  Italians  to  the 
provinces  had  been  going  on  for  centuries.  Gaius  Gracchus  was 
the  first  to  guide  the  Italians  systematically  to  settle  beyond  the 
bounds  of  Italy  by  his  colonization  of  Carthage  and  Narbo. 
Sertorious  had  done  his  best  to  Latinize  the  Spaniards  of  rank,  and 
to  introduce  Italian  culture  into  Spain,  and  by  Caesar's  time  there 
was  a  large  Italian  population  ready  to  his  hand  in  nearly  every 
province  of  the  empire.  On  the  other  hand,  the  interpenetration  of 
the  Latin  and  the  Hellenic  character  was  as  old  almost  as  Rome. 
The  Roman  legionary  was  followed  everywhere  by  the  Greek 
schoolmaster,  and  the  Latin  higher  culture  was  nothing  but  Hellen- 
ism proclaimed  in  the  Latin  tongue.  Everywhere  it  was  felt  that 
Rome  was  the  protector  and  avenger  of  Hellenism.  The  idea  of  a 
new  Italo-Hellenic  empire  was  not  new,  but  Caesar  was  the  first 
to  grasp  it,  and  systematically  to  carry  it  out.  The  first  conditions 
for  the  realization  of  this  idea  were  the  extension  and  preservation 
of  the  two  nations  which  were  destined  jointly  to  rule,  and  the 
absorption  of  the  barbarian  races.  There  was,  indeed,  a  third 
nationality — the  Hebrews — which  might  almost  have  claimed  a 
place  by  the  side  of  the  other  two.  The  Jews  were  numerous  and 
powerful  in  the  city  of  Rome,  and  influential  everywhere  as  traders ; 


;}{)<>  ROME 

46-44  B.C. 

but  the  Jewish  nation  is  denied  the  gift  of  political  aptitude.  The 
Jew  stands  in  a  relation  of  indifference  to  the  state,  clothes  himself 
readily  with  any  nationality,  and  is  unfit  to  be  a  member  of  a  gov- 
erning hierarchy.  But  for  this  very  reason  he  seemed  made  for  the 
purposes  of  this  new  state,  which  was  to  be  built  upon  the  ruins  of 
a  hundred  different  nationalities,  and  accordingly  Judaism  was 
everywhere  protected  by  Caesar  as  an  effective  leaven  of  cosmo- 
politanism and  of  national  decomposition. 

The  Greek  nationality  was  protected  wherever  it  existed, 
notably  at  Massilia  and  Alexandria,  but  the  Italian  none  the  less 
remained  everywhere  in  the  ascendent.  Hellenism  was  too  dan- 
gerous by  its  intellectual  superiority,  by  its  wide  extension,  and  by 
the  firm  hold  which  it  had  obtained  in  Italy,  to  make  it  desirable  for 
the  government  to  extend  it  by  direct  action.  The  rule  of  the  Greek 
lackeys  had  already  begun  with  Theophanes,  the  confidential 
servant  of  Pompeius,  and  his  influence  was  at  once  a  sign  of  the 
times  and  a  warning  full  of  ill  omen  for  the  future.  But  the 
Roman  element  was  everywhere  promoted  by  the  government,  both 
by  means  of  colonies  and  by  Latinizing  the  provincials,  and  to 
further  this  object  the  principle  that  all  the  land  in  the  provinces 
not  ceded  by  special  act  of  the  government  to  communities  or 
private  persons  was  the  property  of  the  state,  was  retained  by 
Caesar,  and  raised  from  a  democratic  party  theory  to  a  fundamental 
maxim  of  law.  Cisalpine  Gaul  in  49  B.C.  received  de  jure  the  full 
citizenship  which  it  had  already  enjoyed  de  facto  for  forty  years, 
and  remained  for  centuries  the  headquarters  of  Italian  manners  and 
culture.  Transalpine  Gaul  henceforth  occupied  the  place  of  the 
old  sister  province,  and  became  more  and  more  an  Italian  land. 
Four  new  colonies  were  founded  in  it,  at  Baeterrae  (Beziers), 
Arelate  (Aries),  Arausio  (Orange),  and  Forum  Julii  (Frejus), 
with  which  were  connected  the  names  of  the  most  famous  of  the 
Gallic  legions.  Other  communities,  such  as  Nemausus  (Nimes), 
received  Latin  rights.  In  other  non-Greek  and  non-Latin  regions 
centers  of  Italian  civilization  were  established:  in  northern  Gaul, 
Noviodunum  (Nyon)  arose  on  the  Leman  Lake;  in  Spain,  Em- 
poriae  was  founded ;  and  the  ancient  city  of  Gades  was  admitted  to 
full  rights  in  49  B.C.  A  few  years  later  other  communities  were 
similarly  favored,  and  others  received  Latin  rights.  In  Africa,  the 
project  of  Gaius  Gracchus  was  renewed,  and  a  Roman  Carthage 
arose  on  the  old  site;  Utica  had  apparently  already  received  Latin 


THE     MONARCHY  393 

46-44  B.C. 

rights,  and  Cirta  was  constituted  as  a  Roman  military  colony.  In 
Greece  the  restoration  of  Corinth  was  energetically  carried  out,  and 
a  plan  formed  for  cutting  through  the  Isthmus.  In  the  remote 
East,  Heraclea  and  Sinope  were  reinforced  by  bodies  of  Roman 
colonists;  Berytus  in  Syria  received  an  Italian  constitution,  and 
even  in  Egypt  a  Roman  station  was  established  on  the  island  of 
Pharos. 

Through  these  arrangements  the  Italian  municipal  system  was 
carried  into  the  provinces  in  a  manner  far  more  comprehensive  than 
ever  before.  The  fully  enfranchised  communities  of  the  provinces 
were  on  an  equality  with  those  of  Italy  in  two  respects:  namely, 
that  they  administered  their  own  affairs  and  exercised  a  limited 
legal  jurisdiction,  while  the  more  important  processes  of  law  came 
before  the  Roman  authority,  usually  the  governor  of  the  province. 
The  autonomous  Latin  communities  had  probably  unlimited  juris- 
diction, as  well  as  administrative  freedom,  though  the  governor 
could  of  course  interfere  in  virtue  of  his  general  power  of  control. 
There  was  now  for  the  first  time  a  whole  province,  that  of  Cisalpine 
Gaul,  consisting  entirely  of  Roman  burgesses ;  and  this  fact  marked 
the  disappearance  of  the  first  great  difference  between  Rome  and 
the  provinces.  The  second  began  soon  to  disappear,  at  any  rate  in 
practice.  It  is  true  that  the  legal  distinction  between  Italy  as  the 
sphere  of  civil  law  and  of  the  consuls  and  pretors,  and  the  prov- 
inces as  the  sphere  of  martial  law  and  of  the  proconsuls  and  pro- 
pretors,  remained;  but  the  procedure  of  martial  and  of  civil  law 
had  for  long  been  practically  the  same :  what  had  been  the  true  and 
vital  point  of  distinction  vanished  when  legions  ceased  to  be  sta- 
tioned ordinarily  in  the  provinces,  and  were  kept  only  where  there 
was  a  frontier  to  be  guarded.  The  rule  of  the  urban  community  of 
Rome  over  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  was  at  an  end;  in  its 
stead  came  the  new  Mediterranean  state;  and  the  restoration  of 
Carthage  and  Corinth  showed  clearly  that  the  regime  of  political 
tyranny  which  had  destroyed  those  two  famous  centers  of  com- 
merce was  over,  and  that  a  new  era  of  national  and  political  equal- 
ity had  begun. 

The  new  united  empire  was,  of  course,  rather  an  inanimate 
product  of  art  than  a  vigorous  growth  of  nature;  it  needed  unity 
of  institutions  as  well  as  unity  of  government;  unity  in  constitu- 
tion and  administration,  in  religion  and  jurisprudence,  in  money, 
weights,  and  measures.    In  all  these  departments  Caesar  did  little 


394  ROME 

46-44   B.C. 

but  lay  the  foundations;  only  here  and  there  the  lines  which  he 
drew  can  still  be  traced. 

As  to  administration,  the  three  most  important  elements  of 
unity  have  already  been  noticed:  the  transition  of  the  sovereignty 
from  the  municipal  council  of  Rome  to  the  sole  master  of  the 
Mediterranean  monarchy;  the  conversion  of  that  council  into  a 
supreme  imperial  council  representing  Italy  and  the  provinces; 
above  all,  the  transference,  which  was  now  begun,  of  the  Roman 
and  Italian  municipal  organization  to  the  provinces.  One  other 
important  work  in  this  department  was  undertaken  by  Caesar — an 
improved  census  of  Italy,  which  was  to  be  taken  in  future,  not  at 
Rome,  but  simultaneously  in  each  Italian  community;  and  a  survey 
of  the  whole  empire,  which  was  ordered,  suggests  that  Caesar  in- 
tended to  make  arrangements  for  a  similar  census  in  the  provinces. 
It  was  of  the  first  importance  to  the  new  empire  that  the  govern- 
ment should  have  at  its  disposal  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  re- 
sources in  men  and  money  at  its  command. 

In  religion,  men  had  for  long  been  busied  in  forging  together 
the  Italian  and  Hellenic  worships,  a  task  which  was  rendered  easier 
by  the  abstract  formless  character  of  the  Roman  gods.  At  the 
same  time,  local  faiths  were  tolerated  and  protected. 

In  the  field  of  law,  the  criminal  department,  in  which  the  gov- 
ernment must  always  interfere  directly  to  a  large  extent,  was  easily 
made  uniform  by  judicial  enactment  throughout  the  empire.-  In 
civil  law,  commercial  intercourse  had  long  ago  developed  naturally 
the  code  which  the  united  empire  required.  Roman  urban  law 
was  still  based  formally  upon  the  Twelve  Tables.  But  commercial 
intercourse  between  Romans  and  non-Romans  had  long  ago  de- 
veloped an  international  private  law  (jus  gentium),  a  body  of 
maxims  relating  chiefly  to  commercial  matters,  according  to  which 
Roman  judges  gave  judgment  when  from  the  nature  of  the  case 
they  were  compelled  to  revert  to  the  common  notions  of  right 
underlying  all  commercial  dealings.  This  body  of  law  arose  orig- 
inally out  of  proceedings  between  Romans  and  non-Romans;  but, 
in  practice,  dealings  between  Romans  and  Romans,  particularly 
commercial  matters,  had  come  to  be  judged  by  the  standard  of 
what  was  substantially  a  compromise  between  this  new  law  and  the 
old  Twelve  Tables.  Secondly,  this  new  law  was  to  a  certain  extent 
in  use  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  the  empire  as  subsidiary 
law;  the  various  local  statutes  were  retained  for  transactions  be- 


THEMONARCHY  395 

46-44  B.C. 

tween  members  of  the  same  legal  district,  while  those  between 
members  of  different  districts  were  regulated  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  new  law  as  expressed  in  the  pretor's  edict.  Caesar's 
design  for  a  new  code  was  never  carried  out ;  but  it  is  easy  to  guess 
what  must  have  been  his  intentions.  It  was  most  necessary,  first, 
that  the  new  urban  law  should  be  extended  as  subsidiary  law  to  the 
provinces  where  it  had  properly  no  application ;  and,  secondly,  that 
the  old  law  of  the  Twelve  Tables  with  its  accretions,  which  still 
formally  outweighed  the  later  code,  should  be  set  aside  in  favor  of 
this  newer  and  spontaneous  growth. 

In  respect  of  money,  measures,  and  weights,  and  kindred 
matters  the  Roman  standard  was  alone  used  in  all  official  inter- 
course; and  the  non-Roman  systems  were  restricted  to  local  cur- 
rency, and  placed  in  a  fixed  ratio  to  the  Roman.  Under  the  re- 
public the  coinage  had  been  exclusively  silver,  gold  being  given  and 
taken  by  weight.  But  from  Caesar's  time  gold  obtained  the  first 
place;  the  new  Caesarian  gold  piece  (worth  about  five  dollars) 
was  coined  to  an  enormous  extent.  In  a  single  treasure,  buried 
only  a  few  years  after  his  death,  eighty  thousand  of  them  were 
found.  The  mint  of  Massilia  was  closed,  but  the  coining  of  small 
silver  and  copper  money  was  permitted  to  many  Western  communi- 
ties. Later  the  arrangement  found  in  existence  is  this:  that  the 
Roman  silver  coin,  the  denarius,  has  everywhere  legal  currency, 
while  local  coins  are  in  circulation  at  a  tariff  unfavorable  to  them 
as  compared  with  the  denarius. 

The  calendar,  like  every  other  institution,  had  become  hope- 
lessly confused  under  the  oligarchical  government,  and  had  come  to 
anticipate  the  solar  time  by  sixty-seven  days,  so  that,  e.  g.,  the 
festival  of  Flora  was  celebrated  on  July  II,  instead  of  on  April  28. 
This  evil  was  finally  removed  by  Caesar,  and  the  Italian  farmer's 
year  was  introduced,  together  with  a  rational  system  of  intercala- 
tion, into  religious  and  official  use.  At  the  same  time  the  begin- 
ning of  the  year  was  altered  from  March  1  to  January  1.  This 
latter  date  had  already  been  long  predominant  in  civil  life  owing  to 
the  fact  that  the  supreme  magistrates  entered  upon  office  on  that  day. 
The  new  Julian  calendar,  which  is  still  in  the  main  the  standard 
of  the  civilized  world,  came  into  use  on  January  1,  45  B.C. 

Such  was  the  manner  in  which  Caesar  attempted  to  lay  the 
foundations  for  the  regeneration  of  the  Roman  state.  There  was 
doubtless  much  corruption  in  this  regeneration ;  as  the  unity  of  Italy 


396  ROME 

46-44   B.C. 

was  accomplished  over  the  ruins  of  Samnite  and  Etruscan  nations, 
so  the  Mediterranean  monarchy  built  itself  on  the  ruins  of  countless 
states  and  tribes  once  living  and  vigorous ;  but  it  was  a  corruption 
out  of  which  sprang  a  rich  growth,  part  of  which  remains  green  to 
the  present  day.  Caesar  ruled  as  king  of  Rome  for  about  five  years 
and  a  half;  the  intervals  of  seven  great  campaigns,  which  alto- 
gether gave  him  but  fifteen  months  in  the  capital,  were  all  the  time 
allowed  him  to  regulate  the  destinies  of  the  world.  This  very 
rapidity  proves  that  the  plan  had  long  been  meditated  and  its  parts 
settled  in  detail.  The  outlines  were  laid  down,  the  future  alone 
could  complete  the  structure;  and,  indeed,  Caesar  was  heard  him- 
self to  say  that  he  had  lived  long  enough. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

SOURCES 

Only  the  more  important  sources  and  such  as  are  easily  accessible  in  English 

translation  are  here  given. 
Appian. — Trans,  by  Horace  White :    "  The  Roman  History  of  Appian  of  Alex- 
andria."    New  York,  1899.    2  vols. 
Caesar. — Trans,  by  W.  A.  McDevitte  and  W.  G.  Bohn :  "  Caesar's  Commentaries 

on  the  Gallic  and  Civil  Wars;  with  the  Supplementary  Books  attributed 

to  Histius,  including  the  Alexandrian,  African,  and  Spanish  Wars  " ;  with 

notes.     New  York,  1898. 
Cicero. — Trans,  by   E.    S.   Shuckburgh :    "  The   Letters  of   Cicero,"   the   whole 

extant   correspondence   in   chronological   order.      London,    1899-1900.     4 

vols. 
Trans,  by  C.  D.  Yonge :  "  Select  Orations  of  Cicero."   New  York.   4  vols. 
Dio,  Cassius. — Trans,  by  H.  B.  Foster :   "  Cassius  Dio's  Roman  History."   Troy, 

N.  Y.,  1905- 1906.    4  vols. 
Livy. — Trans,  by  D.  Spillan:    "The  History  of  Rome  by  Titus  Livius."     New 

York,  1890. 
Plutarch. — Trans,  by  A.  Stewart  and  G.  Long :    "  Plutarch's  Lives  of  Famous 

Greeks  and  Romans."    New  York,  1889.    4  vols. 
Polybius. — Trans,  by  E.  S.  Shuckburgh:   "The  Histories  of  Polybius,"  from  the 

Text  of  F.  Hultsch.    New  York,  1889.    2  vols. 
Sallust. — Trans,  by  A.  W.  Pollard :    "  Sallust's  Conspiracy  of  Catiline  and  the 

Jugurthine  War."    New  York,  1882. 

GENERAL  HISTORIES 

Duruy,   V. — "  History  of   Rome   and   the    Roman   People."     Trans,   by  W.   J. 
Clarke  and  ed.  by  J.  P.  Mahaffy.    Boston,  1883.    8  vols. 
Extends  from  the  earliest  times  to  the  barbarian  invasions.     One  of  the 
best  popular  histories. 
How,  W.  W,  and  Leigh,  H.  D. — "  A  History  of  Rome  to  the  Death  of  Caesar  " 
London  and  New  York,  1896. 
Interestingly  written  and  scholarly. 
Ihne,  W. — "  History  of  Rome."    London,  1882.    5  vols. 

Originally  written   in   German,  but  the   English   version   prepared  by  the 
author.     Based  on  opposition  to  Mommsen's  views.     Less  interesting  but 
more  judicial  than  the  latter.     Full  evidence  given  on  both  sides  of  con- 
troverted questions. 
Mommsen,  T. — "History  of  Rome."    Trans,  by  W.  P.  Dickson.    London,  1894. 

4  vols.    (4th  ed.  of  English  version.) 
Niebuhr,  B.  G.— "  History  of  Rome."     Trans,  by  J.  C.  Hare,  C.  Thirlwell,  W. 
Smith,  and  L.  Schmitz.    London,  1859.    3  vols. 
The  chief  importance  of  this  work  is  historiographic.     It  first  appeared  in 
Germany  in   1812  and  really  began  the  modern  study  of  Roman  history. 
Many  of  Niebuhr's  views  have  since  been  rejected. 

399 


400  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Pelham,  H.  F. — "  Outlines  of  Roman  History."    3d  ed.     London,  1900. 

The  best  single-volume  work  covering  the  whole  period  down  to  476  a.  d. 

The  author's  views  are  independent  and  authoritative. 
Shuckburgh.  E.  S.— "  A  History  of  Rome  to  the  Battle  of  Actium."   New  York, 
1894. 

A  good  one-volume  work. 

PARTICULAR   PERIODS 

Allcroft,  A.  H.,  and  Mason,  W.  F. — "History  of  Rome."  London.  4  periods: 
The  Struggle  for  Empire  (287-202  b.  c.)  ;  Rome  under  the  Oligarchs 
(202-133  b.  c.)  ;  The  Decline  of  the  Oligarchy  (133-78  b.  c.)  ;  The  Making 
of  the  Monarchy  (78-31  B.  c). 

These  small  books  give  abundant  details,  but  do  not  attempt  to  present  a 

philosophical  survey. 
Arnold,  T. — "  The  Second  Punic  War :  being  Chapters  in  the  History  of  Rome." 
Ed.  by  his  grandson,  W.  T.  Arnold.     London,  1886. 

A  republication  of  the  3d  volume  of  Arnold's  unfinished  history,  with  full 

notes.     It   is  probably   the  most   spirited   and   interesting  account   of   the 

Second  Punic  War  in  English. 
Church,  A.  J. — "The  Story  of  Carthage."    (Story  of  the  Nations  Series.)    New 
York  and  London,  1886. 

A  popular  book,  illustrated.     Deals  with  religious  and  commercial,  as  well 

as  with  political  history. 
Fustel  de  Coulanges. — "  The  Ancient  City."    Trans,  by  W.  Smalls.   Boston,  1877. 

A  brilliant  and  suggestive  study  of  the  religion  and  institutions  of  Greece 

and  Rome,  but  somewhat  vitiated  by  untenable  theories. 
Fowler,  W.  W. — "  The  City-State  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans."   New  York,  1893. 

More  sane,  though  less  brilliant,  than  the  work  of  Fustel  de  Coulanges. 
Greenidge,  A.  H.  J. — "  A  History  of  Rome  during  the  Later  Republic  and  Early 
Principate   to  Vespasian."     New  York,  1905. 

The  best  work  in  English  on  the  period.    It  is  to  be  in  6  volumes,  but  only 

the  first,  from  133-104  b.  c,  has  yet  appeared. 
Holmes,  T.  R. — "  Caesar's  Conquest  of  Gaul."    London,  1899. 

The  first  portion  gives   an   able   narrative   of  the   Gallic   campaigns;   the 

second  deals   with  the  difficult  questions   of  topography,   institutions,   etc., 

suggested  by  the  text  of  Caesar's  Commentaries. 
Ihne,  W. — "Early  Rome."     (Epochs  of  Ancient  History.)     London,  1876. 

A  small  popular  book  on  the  history  of  the  city  down  to  its  destruction 

by  the  Gauls. 
Long,  G.— "Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Roman  Republic."    London,  1864-1874.     5 
vols. 

Covers  the  period  from  the  end  of  the  Punic  Wars  to  the  time  of  Augustus. 

Dry,  but  accurate. 
Merivale,  C. — "The  Fall  of  the  Roman  Republic."    London,  1853. 

Covers  the  same  ground  as  Long,  but  is  briefer  and  more  interesting. 

"The  Roman  Triumvirates."     (Epochs  of  Ancient  History.)     New   York, 

1878. 
"  History  of  the  Romans  under  the  Empire."  London,  1850-1862.    7  vols. 

As  this  work  begins  with  the  death  of  Sulla  the  earlier  volumes  constitute 

a  history  of  the  fall  of  the  Republic. 
Smith,  R.  B. — "  Rome  and  Carthage :  The  Punic  Wars."    (Epochs  of  Ancient 
History.)     London,  1881. 

An  abridgment  of  the  author's  longer  work  on  Carthage. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  401 

Smith,  R.  B. — "  Carthage  and  the  Carthagenians."   London,  1878. 

A  careful  study  of  the  city  and  of  the  careers  of  Hamilcar    Barca,  and 
Hannibal. 

BIOGRAPHY 

Beesly,  A.  H. — "The  Gracchi,  Marius  and  Sulla."   (Epochs  of  Ancient  History.) 
New  York,  1878. 

Well  written.     Is  based  largely  on  Long  and  Mommsen. 
Beesly,  E.  S. — "  Catiline,  Clodius  and  Tiberius."    London,  1878. 

A  collection  of  essays,  originally  published  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  giving 

a  good  picture  of  the  times. 
Boissier,  G. — "  Cicero  and  his  Friends."   Trans,  by  A.  D.  Jones.    London,  1897. 

Deals  with  the  literary  rather  than  the  political  side  of  his  activity. 
Dodge,  T.  A.—"  Hannibal."   Boston,  1891. 

A  military  history. 
"Caesar."     Boston,  1892. 

A  study  of  Caesar  as  a  general. 
Forsyth,  W. — "Life  of  Marcus  Tullius  Cicero."    New  York,  1871.    2  vols. 

Rather  out  of  date,  but  describing  Cicero's  career  in  great  detail. 
Fowler,  W.  W. — "Julius  Caesar  and  the  Foundation  of  the  Roman  Imperial 
System."    New  York,  1892. 

The  best  account  of  Caesar  in  English. 
Froude,  J.  A. — "Caesar:  a  Sketch."     New  York,  1892. 

A  rather  partisan  defense  of  Caesar. 
How,  W.  W. — "Hannibal  and  the  Great  War  between  Rome  and  Carthage." 

London,  1899. 
Morris,  W.  O.—"  Hannibal."    London  and  New  York,  1807. 

An  excellent,  well-balanced  account;  in  many  ways  the  best  biography  in 

English. 
Napoleon   III,   Emperor  of  the   French. — "  History  of  Julius   Caesar."     New 
York,  1865.    2  vols. 

The  work  of  many  hands  prepared  under  the  direction  of  Napoleon  III. 

Treats  with  special  fullness  of  "Caesar's  career  in  Gaul. 
Oman,  C.  W.  C. — "  Seven  Roman  Statesmen  of  the  Later  Republic."     2d  ed. 
London,  1002. 

Gives  interesting  studies  of  the  Gracchi,  Sulla,  Crassus,  Cato,  Pompey,  and 

Caesar. 
Scott,  F.  J. — "  Portraitures  of  Julius  Caesar."    London,  1903. 

A  discussion  of  the  various  busts  and  other  representations  of  Caesar  that 

have  come  down  to  us. 
Strachan-Davidson,  J.  L. — "  Cicero  and  the  Fall  of  the  Roman  Republic."    New 
York,  1894. 

Valuable  and  charmingly  written,  but  rather  prejudiced  in  Cicero's  favor. 
Trollope,  A. — "Life  of  Cicero."     New  York,  1881.    2  vols. 

A  vivid  and  sympathetic  portraiture  of  Cicero,  giving  the  personal  rather 

than  the  political  side  of  his  career. 

INSTITUTIONS 
Abbott,  F.  F.— "Roman  Political  Institutions."     New  York,  1901. 

The  best  brief  survey  in  English  of  the  Roman  constitution. 
Arnold,  W.  T. — "  Roman   System  of  Provincial  Administration  to  the  Acces- 
sion of  Constantine."     London,  1879. 
An  interesting  study,  but  largely  superseded  by  the  dryer  but  more  scholarly 
work  of  Mommsen. 


402  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Greenidge,  A.  H.  J.— "Roman  Public  Life."     London,  1901. 

Gives  a  good  general   survey  of  the  growth   of  the   Roman   constitution 
and  an  explanation  of  its  workings. 
Hadley,  J. — Introduction  to  Roman  Law.    New  York,  1875. 
Mommsen,   T. — " Romisches  Staatsrecht."    Leipzig,    1887.     3   vols.     (Found   in 
Marquardt   and   Mommsen's   "  Handbuch   der  romischen   Alterthiimer.") 
This  is  the  great  authority  on  the  Roman  constitution,  but  it  has  not  been 
translated  into  English. 

"The  Provinces  of  the  Roman  Empire."    Trans,  by  W.  P.  Dickson.     New 

York,  1887.    2  vols. 
While  this  work  deals  with  the  provinces  under  the  emperors  much  may  be 
gathered  from  it  regarding  conditions  in  the  republican  period. 
Morey,  W.  C. — "Outlines  of  Roman  Law:     Comprising  its  History,  Growth 
and  General  Principles."     New  York,  1884. 
This  book  and  the  similar  one  by  Hadley  give  an  excellent  popular  survey 
of  the  subject. 
Muirhead,  J. — "  Historical  Introduction  to  the  Private  Law  of  Rome."     2d  ed. 
revised  and  edited  by  H.  Goudy.    London,  1899. 
A  standard  treatise. 
Sohm,  R. — "  The  Institutes :  a  Text-Book  of  the  History  and  System  of  Roman 
Private  Law."    Trans,  by  J.  C.  Ledlie,  with  an  introduction  by  E.  Grueber. 
Oxford,  190 1.    2d  ed. 
The  best  comprehensive  survey  of  the  law  in  one  volume,  giving  (1)   its 
history  and  development,  and  (2)  the  principles  of  the  law. 

LIFE  AND  MANNERS 

Church,  A.  J. — "Roman  Life  in  the  Days  of  Cicero:     Sketches  drawn  from  his 
Letters  and  Speeches."  London,  1884. 

A  picture  of  social  conditions  both  in  the  provinces  and  at  Rome  during  the 

period  100-40  b.  c. 
Cunningham,   W. — "  Western    Civilization   in   its    Economic   Aspects.      Part   I. 
Ancient  Times."    Cambridge,  1898. 

A  suggestive  book ;  the  first  attempt  to  give  a  general  survey  of  all  antiquity 

from  an  economic  point  of  view. 
Johnston,  H.  W. — "  The  Private  Life  of  the  Romans."   Chicago,  1903. 

Similar  in  purpose  to  Preston  and  Dodge. 
Lanciani,   R. — "Ancient  Rome  in  the  Light  of  Recent  Discoveries."     Boston, 
1891. 

Popular   but  interesting  account  of  the  results  of  excavations  in  Rome  up 

to  1890. 

"  Ruins  and  Excavations  of  Ancient  Rome."    Boston,  1897. 

Mackail,  J.  W.— "  Latin  Literature."    London,  1896. 

The  best  brief  account  of  the  subject,  charmingly  written. 
Middleton,  J.  H. — "The  Remains  of  Ancient  Rome."     London,  1892.    2  vols. 
Preston,  H.  W.,  and  Dodge,  L— "  Private  Life  of  the  Romans."    Boston,  1893. 

Prepared  as  a  text-book,  but  giving  an  interesting  account  of  the  daily  life 

in  Rome. 
Ramsay,  W. — "Manual  of   Roman   Antiquities."     15th  ed.   revised  and  partly 

rewritten  by  R.  Lanciani.    New  York,  1895. 
Teuffel,  W.  S.— "History  of  Roman  Literature."     Trans,  by  G.  C.  W.  Warr 
from  the  5th  German  edition.    London,  1891-1892.    2  vols. 

The  best  of  the  larger  works  on  Roman  literature  accessible  to  the  English 

reader. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abgarus  of  Edessa:  betrays  the  Roman 

army,   323 
Achaean   League:   faults  of,   138;   joins 

Rome,    140;    declares    war    against 

Sparta   (146  B.C.),   166 
Achaeans:  found  Sybaris,  26 
Achaeus:  general  in  the  slave  revolt,  173 
Achaia:  province  of,  formed,   166;   sur- 
renders to  Mithradates,  217 
Adherbal:  king  of  Numidia,  188 
Aegusa:  battle  of,  105 
Aemilius,  Lucius :   commands  campaign 

against  Tarentum,  75 
Aequi :  wars  with  Rome,  22 
Aetolian  League:   faults  of,   138;   joins 

Rome  in  third  Macedonian  War,  149 
Afranius,   Lucius:    flees   to    Macedonia, 

343;  defeated  by  Caesar,  340;  at  the 

Corcyra  council  of  war,  350;  arrival 

in  Africa,  359;  death,  359 
Africa:  province  of,  formed,  165 
Agrigentum :   founded,   28 ;   surrendered 

to  Rome,  125 ;  seized  by  the  slaves, 

173 

Ahala :  defeats  Celtic  horde,  64 

Alba :   center  of  the   Latin   League,  9 ; 

conquered  and  destroyed,  20;  battle 

of,  59 
Albinus   Spurius :  his  campaign  against 

Jugurtha,  189 
Alesia:  siege  of,  306 
Alexandria :    sends    embassy    to    Rome, 

(273   b.c),   86;    influence   of,    137; 

insurrection  of,  352 
Alexander,  the  Molossian:  his  campaign 

in  southern  Italy,  68 
Allia:  battle  of,  59 
Allobroges:  attack  Hannibal,  115 
Ambiorix,.  king  of  the  Eburones :  leader 

of  Gallic  rebellion,  305 
Ancona:   founded,  57 
Anicius,  Lucius :  captures  Scodra,  150 


Antiochus  (III)  the  Great,  king  of 
Syria:  forms  an  alliance  with  Philip 
of  Macedon,  139;  war  with  Rome, 
143;  death,  145 

Antiochus  (IV)  Epiphanes,  king  of 
Syria,  submits  to  Roman  interfer- 
ence, 151 

Antiochus  (XIII)  Asiaticus,  king  of 
Syria:  deposed,  274 

Antonius,  Gaius:  Caesar  prosecutes,  266; 
elected  consul,  281 ;  at  battle  of 
Dolabella,  343 

Antonius,  Marcus  (143-87  B.  c.)  :  com- 
missioned to  clear  the  seas  of 
pirates,  260;  death,  223,  260 

Antonius,  Marcus  (ca.  85-30  B.  c.)  :  his 
campaign  against  recruiting  officers 
of  Pompeius,  337;  joins  Caesar  in 
Greece,  346;  puts  down  insurrection 
of  Dolabella,  365;  offers  the  crown 
to  Caesar,  369 

Apennines:  boundary  of  Italy,  3 

Apollonia :  founded,  27 

Appuleian  Laws:  passed,  200;  canceled, 
202 

Apulia:  in  Rome's  hands,  70 

Aquae  Sextiae:  founded,  192;  battle  of 
(102  B.C.),  194 

Aquileia:  founded,  133;  battle  of,  193 

Aquillius,  Manius:  quells  slave  revolt 
in  Sicily,  187;  encourages  uprising 
of  Bithynian  king,  215 

Aquilonia:  battle  of  (293  B.C.),  72 

Aquitania:  conquered  by  Caesar,  304 

Aratus  of  Sicyon:  dispute  with  Sparta, 
138 

Arausio  (Orange):  battle  of,  193; 
founded,  392 

Archelaus:  at  battle  of  Chaeronea,  218 

Archidamus  III,  king  of  Sparta:  at- 
tempts to  aid  Tarentum,  68 

Archimedes:  at  the  siege  of  Syracuse, 
124 

Arelate  (Aries)  :  founded,  392 


405 


406 


INDEX 


P 


Aretas,  king  of  the  Nabateans:  refuses 
to  acknowledge  supremacy  of  Rome, 
274;  besieges  Jerusalem,  274 

Ariarathes,  king  of  Cappadocia :  mur- 
dered, 215 

Aricia:  siege  of,  56;  loses  its  independ- 
ence, 67 

Ariminum:  battle  of,  109;  captured  by 
Cinna  and  Marius,  223 

Ariobarzanes  I,  king  of  Cappadocia: 
elected  king,  215 

Ariobarzanes  III,  king  of  Cappadocia : 
receives  lesser  Armenia,  354 

Ariobarzanes,  son  of  Mithradates:  in- 
vades Cappadocia,  215 

Ariovistus:  aids  the  Sequani,  300;  de- 
feated by  Caesar,  302 

Aristobulus  II,  king  of  Judea:  civil 
war  with  his  brother,  274 

Aries:  see  Arelate 

Army,  Roman :  organization  and  drill 
of,   197;   Caesar  reforms,  373 

Arretium:  battle  of,  75 

Arverni:  league  of,  298;  join  Gallic  re-1 
bellion,  306 

Asculum:  massacre  of  all  resident 
Romans,  206 

Asellio,  urban  pretor:  murdered,  209 

Atarbas,  at  the  battle  of  Drepana,  103 

Athens:  siege  of  (87  b.  c),  217 

Athenion:  leader  of  revolt  in  Sicily, 
187 

Atlantic  Ocean:  first  regular  naviga- 
tion of,  295 

Attalus  I,  king  of  Pergamus:  becomes 
king,  138;  applies  to  Rome  for  aid 
against  Antiochus,  143;  recompensed 
by  Rome  after  war  with  Antiochus, 
145 

Atticus,  Titus  Pomponius:  life  of, 
38i 

Ausculum :  battle  of,  78 

Ausones:  in  possession  of  Campania,  7 


B 


Baecula:  battle  of,  127 
Baebian  Law :  violated,  136 
Baeterrae   (Beziers)  :  founded,  392 
Balbus,  Lucius  Cornelius:  acts  as  Cae- 
sar's representative,  370 
Barcides:  kingdom  of,  founded,  112 


Belgar :  league  of,  298 ;  defeated  by  Cae- 
sar, 302 

Bellovaci:  Caesar's  campaign  against, 
308 

Beneventum:  battle  of  (275  B.  c.)>  80 

Beziers:  see  Baeterrae 

Bibaculus,  Marcus  Furius:  orations  of, 

319 

Bibulus,  Lucius  Calpurnius :  given  com- 
mand of  army  in  the  East,  325;  ex- 
ecutes all  Caesarian  prisoners,  344; 
destroys  part  of  Caesar's  fleet,  345 

Bithynia,  Province  of:  founded,  275 

Bituriges :  Caesar's  campaign  against, 
308 

Bocchus,  king  of  Mauritania:  joins 
Rome  against  Jugurtha,  188 

Boeotia:  surrenders  to  Mithradates,  217 

Boii:  join  Helvetiian  migration,  301 

Boiorix,  king  of  the  Cimbri :  leads  inva- 
sion of  Italy,  193 

Bovianum:  captured  by  the  Romans,  71 

Brescia:  founded,  58 

Britain:  Caesar  visits,  304 

Brundisium:  founded,  108 

Brutus,  Decimus :  raises  a  fleet  for  use 
in  Gaul,  303;  naval  victories  in  the 
Civil  War,  341 


Cadiz:  first  Phoenician  colony  in  Spain, 
92 ;  admitted  to  full  rights  of  Roman 
citizenship,  392 

Caecilius,  Lucius :  at  battle  of  Arretium, 

75 

Caecina,  Aulus :  finds  difficulty  in  obtain- 
ing permission  to  return  to  Rome, 
366 

Caepio,  Quintus  Servilius:  his  campaign 
in  Spain  (140  b.  c),  162;  attempts  to 
transfer  the  courts  back  to  the  sen- 
atorial order  (106  b.  c),  186;  at 
battle  of  Arausio,  193;  opposes  the 
passage  of  the  Apulleian  laws,  200 

Caere:  conquered  by  Rome,  60 

Caesar,  Gaius  Julius:  sketch  of,  255, 
362;  prosecutes  Dolabella  and  An- 
tonius,  266;  supports  measures 
proposed  against  the  pirates,  270; 
elected  pontifex  maximus,  279;  re- 
stores   the    memory    of    Marius    to 


INDEX 


407 


public  honor,  279;  attempts  to  have 
conquest  of  Egypt  assigned  to  him- 
self, 281 ;  responsible  for  safety  of 
Catilinarian  prisoners,  283;  opposes 
execution  of  prisoners,  284;  con- 
cerned in  conspiracy  of  Catilina,  285 ; 
suspended  from  office,  287;  growth 
of  his  power,  288;  forms  the  second 
coalition,  288;  elected  consul  (59 
b.  a),  289;  in  Gaul,  292;  compared 
with  Pompeius,  311;  in  disfavor  at 
Rome,  313;  conference  with  Crassus 
and  Pompeius  (56  b.c.)»  3*5; 
breach  with  Pompeius,  325;  candi- 
date for  consul  (48  B.C.),  329;  re- 
called by  senate,  331 ;  sends  his  ul- 
timatum to  the  senate,  332;  crosses 
the  Rubicon,  333;  resources  of,  334; 
his  campaign  in  Italy,  337;  his  cam- 
paign in  Spain,  340;  his  campaign 
in  the  East,  345;  in  Egypt,  352;  re- 
forms of,  364;  powers  conferred  on, 
367 ;  offered  the  crown,  369 ;  rule  of, 
370;  reorganizes  the  army,  374;  his 
reforms  in  the  financial  system,  376; 
his  reforms  in  the  city  of  Rome, 
378;  his  social  reorganization  of 
Italy,  380;  his  reforms  in  debt  laws, 
386;  increases  the  farming  class, 
387;  his  reforms  in  the  provinces, 
388;  revises  the  calendar,  395 

Caesar,  Lucius  Julius :  author  of  the 
Lex  Julia,  208;  death,  223 

Cagliari :  founded,  92 

Calendar:  revised  by  Caesar,  395 

Calvinus,  Cneius  Domitius :  at  battle  of 
Nicopolis,  354 

Calvus,    Gaius    Licinius:     orations    of, 

319 

Campania:  location,  4;  in  Rome's  hands, 
70 

Candine  Pass :  battle  of,  69 

Cannae :  battle  of,  120 

Canuleian  Law :  passed,  47 

Capua :  captured,  65 ;  reduced  to  a  vil- 
lage, 131;  blockaded  by  Sulla,  226; 
surrenders  to  Sulla,  228 

Caralis:  see  Cagliari 

Carbo,  Gaius :  member  of  the  land  com- 
mission, 178 

Carbo,  Gnaeus  Papirius :  at  battle  of 
Aquileia,  193;  member  of  conspiracy 
against  Sulla,  221 ;  consul,  226 


Carnutes :  Caesar's  campaign  against,  308 

Carrhae:  battle  of,  324 

Carrinas :  attempts  to  succor  Rome,  227 ; 
death,  228 

Carthage:  treaty  with  Rome  (279  b.  c.)> 
79;  paramount  in  the  western  Medi- 
terranean, 81 ;  treaty  with  Rome 
(348  B.C.),  81;  sketch  of,  89;  de- 
clares war  against  Rome,  100;  re- 
volt of  the  mercenaries,  106;  the 
second  Punic  War,  Hi;  internal 
conditions  under  Roman  rule,  162; 
war  with  Rome  (149  B.  c.)»  164; 
razed,  165;  restoration  of,  183 

Carthalo:  blockades  Roman  fleet  at 
Lilybaeum,  104;  leader  of  patriotic 
party  in  Carthage,  163 

Catilina,  Lucius  Sergius :  leader  of  the 
discontented  party,  280;  plans  a  de- 
cisive blow,  281;  leaves  Rome,  283; 
defeat  and  death,  284 

Cato,  Gaius:  hinders  elections  (55  B.  c), 
3i8 

Cato,  Marcus  Porcius,  surnamed  "  the. 
Censor":  quoted  on  Hamilcar 
Barca,  112;  moving  spirit  in  the  pa- 
triotic party,  157;  desires  destruc- 
tion of  Carthage,  163 

Cato,  Marcus  Porcius,  surnamed  "  Uti- 
censis  " :  sketch  of,  278 ;  favors  exe- 
cution of  Catilinarian  prisoners,  284 ; 
elected  tribune,  287;  sent  to  Byzan- 
tium, 290;  leader  of  opposition  to 
monarchy,  327 ;  opposition  to  Caesar, 
330;  flees  to  Macedonia,  343;  de- 
cides to  stand  by  constitutional  party, 
350;  influences  choice  of  Scipio  as 
commander-in-chief,  355 ;  death,  359 ; 
estimate  of,  361 

Catullus,  Quintus  Valerius:  orations  of, 

319 
Catulus,  Gaius  Lutatius:  commands  fleet 

for  invasion  of  Africa,  105 
Catulus,  Quintus  Lutatius  (152-87  b.  c.)  : 

campaign   against   the   Cimbri,    194 ; 

death,  223 
Catulus,  Quintus  Lutatius  (d.  60  B.  c): 

opposed  to  giving  command  of  army 

in  the  East  to  Pompey,  271 ;  charged 

with  embezzlement  of  public  moneys, 

287 
Cassius,    Gaius :    assumes    command    of 

army  in  the  East,  325 


408 


INDEX 


Cassius,  Spurius:  proposed  reforms  of, 

Cassivellaunus :  his  campaign  against 
Caesar,  304 

Celtiberian  War,  161 

Celts :  invade  Italy,  57 ;  defeated  at  Tela- 
mon,  109 

Cenabum  (Orleans)  :  massacre  of  the 
Romans  at,  306 

Censorinus,  Lucius  Marcius:  orders  the 
destruction  of  Carthage,  164;  be- 
sieges Carthage,  164 

Censorship:  office  of,  established,  48; 
thrown  open  to  the  plebeians,  49 

Census :  taken  every  four  years,  34 

Centrones:   treachery  toward  Hannibal, 

"5 

Cethegus,  Caius  Cornelius:  arrested, 
283 

Chaeronea:  battle  of,  218 

Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius:  indicts  Verres, 
266;  favors  Pompey  for  command  in 
the  East,  271 ;  elected  consul,  281 ; 
denounces  conspiracy  of  CatHina, 
282 ;  attempt  to  assassinate,  282 ;  ban- 
ished, 291 ;  recalled,  312;  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  regents,  317 

Cicero,  Quintus :  in  battle  with  the  Gauls, 
305 

Cilicia:  first  steps  toward  foundation  of 
province,  187;  enlarged,  275 

Cilicians:  description  of,  259 

Cineas :  peace  envoy  to  Rome,  77 

Cinna,  Lucius  Cornelius  (d.  84  b.  c.)  : 
elected  consul  (87  b.  c),  212;  leader 
of  movement  to  recall  exiles,  221 ; 
besieges  Rome,  222;  absolute  power 
of,  224;  death,  225 

Cimbri:  migration  of,  192 

Cirta :  siege  of,  188 ;  occupied  by  Bocchus 
and  Sittius,  358 

Civil  War,  The,  337 

Gaudius  Caecus,  Appius:  speech  against 
Pyrrhus,  78 

Claudius  Caudex,  Appius:  raises  the 
siege  of  Messano,  100 

Claudius  Crassus  Regillensis  Sabinus, 
Appius :  tyranny  of,  45 

Claudius  Pulcher,  Appius  (consul  143 
b.  c.)  :  favors  reforms,  175 

Claudius  Pulcher,  Appius  (consul  54 
b.  c.)  :  at  the  conference  of  the  re- 
gents, 315 


Claudius  Pulcher,  Caius  Appius  (d.  167 
B.  c.)  :  in  the  third  Macedonian  War, 

149 

Claudius  Pulcher,  Publius:  at  the  battle 
of  Drepana,  103 

Claudius  Sabinus  Regillensis,  Appius : 
enforces  the  law  of  debt,  40 

Cleon :  leader  of  slave  revolt,  173 

Cleopatra,  queen  of  Egypt:  driven  from 
the  throne  of  Egypt,  351;  restored 
to  her  throne,  354 

Clients:  position  of,  11 

Clodius  Pulcher,  Publius:  prisoner 
among  the  pirates,  272;  proposes  the 
banishment  of  Cicero,  290;  feud 
with  Pompeius,  312;  agrees  to  give 
no  further  annoyance  to  Pompeius, 
316;  murdered,  320;  intrudes  at  fes- 
tival of  the  Bona  Dea,  384 

Cluentius,  Aulus :  trial  of,  384 

Clusium:  siege  of,  59 

Comitia  Centuriata:  increased  political 
power,  33;  under  Sulla's  constitu- 
tion, 234 

Comitia  Curiata:  description  of,  14; 
change  in  its  character,  33 

Comitia  Tributa:  established,  43 

Constitution:  growth  of,  1 1 

Consuls :  power  of,  30 ;  length  of  term  of 
office  extended,  236 

Corinth:  destruction  of,  166 

Coriolanus,  Gaius  Marcius:  story  of,  43 

Cornificius,  Quintus:  his  campaign  in  II- 
lyria,  354 

Corcyra :  Pompeians  hold  council  of  war 
at,  350 

Coronea :  capitulates  to  Rome,  149 

Correus,  king  of  the  Belloraci:  resists 
Caesar,  308 

Corfinium :  surrenders  to  Caesar,  337 

Corsica :  added  to  the  Roman  empire,  107 

Cossus,  Aulus  Cornelius :  kills  Lars 
Tolumnius,  58;  victory  in  the  Pomp- 
tine  territory,  63 

Cotta,  Gaius :  gains  the  abolition  of  de- 
cree against  tribunes  of  the  plebs, 
266 

Cotys,  ruler  of  eastern  Thrace :  forms  al- 
liance with  Perseus  of  Macedonia, 
148 

Council  of  a  Hundred :  desires  peace 
with  Rome,  m 

Crassus,  Lucius  Licinius :  leader  of  the 


INDEX 


409 


populace,  199;  aids  Drusus  in  his  re- 
forms, 203;  death,  204 

Crassus  Dives,  Marcus  Licinius :  obliged 
to  submit  to  Cinna,  225;  joins  Sulla, 
225;  sketch  of,  254;  his  campaign 
against  the  gladiators,  262;  joins  the 
democrats,  267;  responsible  for 
safety  of  Catilinarian  prisoners, 
283 ;  concerned  in  conspiracy  of  Cati- 
lina,  285;  joins  second  coalition,  288; 
conference  with  Caesar  and  Pom- 
peius  (56  B.  a),  315;  military  ambi- 
tions of,  322;  his  campaigns  in  the 
East,  323;  death,  325;  value  of  his 
estates,  382 

Crassus,  Publius  Licinius:  in  the  third 
Macedonian  War,  149 

Crassus  Dives,  Publius  Licinius:  with 
Caesar  in  Gaul,  302;  at  battle  of 
Carrhae,  324 

Cremona:  battle  of,  133 

Crete,  Province  of:  founded,  275 

Criminal  Law:  reformed  by  Sulla,  237; 
reformed  by  Caesar,  372 

Critolaus :  strategus  of  Achaean  League, 
166 

Crixus :  leader  of  Gladiatorial  war,  261 ; 
defeated  at  battle  of  Mount  Gar- 
ganus,  262 

Curia:  importance  of,  13 

Curio,  Gaius :  sells  his  services  to  Caesar, 
331 ;  his  campaigns  in  Sicily  and 
Africa,  342;  death,  342 

Cumae  (Kyme)  :  founded,  25;  battle  of, 
57;  captured  by  the  Romans,  65 

Cursor,  Lucius  Papirius:  in  command  of 
Roman  forces,  70 ;  defeats  the  Etrus- 
cans, 71 

Cydonia:  battles  of  (71  B.  c),  260;  (68 
B.C.),  260 

Cynoscephalae :  battle  of,  141 

Cyprus:  annexed  to  Roman  empire,  277 


Damasippus:  attempts  to  succor  Rome, 

227;  death,  228 
Debt,  Law  of :  suspended,  40 
Decemvirate,  The :  appointed,  44 
Decius  Mus,  Publius:  at  battle  of  Sen- 

tinum,  72 
Delos :  as  a  slave  market,  172 


Dictator:  powers  of,  31;  office  opened  to 
the  plebeians,  49 

Dionysius,  ruler  of  Syracuse  (406-367 
B.  c)  :  founds  Syracusan  colonies  on 
Illyrian  coast,  57;  his  contest  with 
Carthage    for    maritime    supremacy, 

93 

Divico:  leads  revolts  of  Helvetii,  193 

Dolabella,  Gnaeus  Cornelius:  Caesar 
prosecutes,  266 

Dolabella,  Publius  Cornelius:  defeated 
by  Pompeian  fleet,  343;  attempted 
reforms  of,  365 

Dolabella  Maximus,  Publius  Cornelius: 
expels  the  Celts  from  Italy,  75 

Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  Lucius:  defeated 
by  Pompeius,  228 ;  candidate  for  con- 
sul (56  B.C.),  315;  elected  consul 
(54  b.  c),  318;  captured  by  Caesar, 
337;  flees  to  Macedonia,  343 

Drappes :  at  siege  of  Uxellodunum, 
308 

Drepana:  battle  of,  103 

Druids :  influence  of,  in  Gaul,  297 

Drusus,  Marcus  Livius  (d.  109  b.  c.)  : 
outbids  Gaius  Gracchus  for  popular 
favor,  183 ;  reaches  the  Danube,  192 

Drusus,  Marcus  Livius  (ca.  120-91  b.  c.)  : 
reforms  of,  203;  death,  204 

Duilius,  Gaius:  at  battle  of  Mylae,  101 

Dumnorix:  effect  of  his  death  on  Gaul, 
305 


Ecnomus :  battle  of,  101 

Egnatius,  Gellius:  leader  in  Samnite 
War,  72 

Egypt :  submits  to  Roman  protection, 
151;  condition  under  Roman  rule, 
162;  schemes  to  unite  her  with 
Rome,  276;  governed  by  Rufio,  371 

Emporiae :    makes   alliance   with   Rome, 

"3 
Enna:  slave  uprising  at,   173;  siege  of, 

173;   garrison  defeated  by  revolted 

slaves,  187 
Epidamnus :  founded,  27 
Epirus :  Romans  plunder  cities  of,  151 
Etruria :  location,  4 
Etruscans:    sketch   of,   22;   league   with 

Phoenicians,   28;    collapse   of   their 

power,  56 


410 


INDEX 


Fabius  Maximus,  Quintus:  made  dic- 
tator, 118;  campaign  against  Hanni- 
bal, 119;  death,  130 

Fabius  Rullianus,  Quintus:  defeats  the 
Etruscans,  71 ;  at  battle  of  Sentinum, 
72 

Falerii:  ally  of  Rome,  60;  war  with 
Rome,  109 

Family,  Roman:  laws  regarding,  11 

Farms:  size  of,  in  early  Rome,  37 

Faustus  Sulla:  arrival  in  Africa,  359; 
death,  359 

Fidenae :  early  wars  for  possession  of,  20 

Figulus,  Publius  Nigidius:  finds  diffi- 
culty in  returning  to  Italy,  366 

Fimbria,  Caius  Flavius:  his  campaign 
against  Mithradates,  219;  death,  220; 
attempts  to  kill  Quintus  Scaevola, 
224 

Flaccus,  Lucius  Valerius:  influences 
Cato  to  enter  upon  a  political  career, 

157 

Flaccus,  Lucius  Valerius  (consul  86 
B.  c.)  :  arrives  in  Greece  with  army, 
218;  removed  from  command  by 
mutiny,  219;  aids  reforms  of  Sulla, 
230;  proposes  the  law  conferring 
the  dictatorship  on  Sulla,  231 

Flaccus,  Marcus:  member  of  the  land 
commission,  178;  proposes  that  the 
question  of  the  citizenship  of  allies 
should  be  considered  in  the  comitia, 
179;  death,  184 

Flaccus,  Quintus  Fulvius:  his  rule  in 
Spain,  136 

Flaminius,  Gaius :  defeated  at  Telamon, 
109;  at  battle  of  Lake  Trasimene, 
118;  excludes  freedmen  from  the 
centuries,   158 

Flamininus,  Titus  Quintius:  in  second 
Macedonian  War,  140;  returns  to 
Rome,  142 

Forum  Julii  (Frejus)  :  founded,  392 

Fregellae :  revolt  of,  179 

Frejus:  see  Forum  Julii 

Furius  Camillus,  Lucius :  defeats  a  Gallic 
host,  59 

Furius  Camillus,  Marcus:  founds  the 
Temple  of  Concord,  49;  heroism  of, 
59;  at  battle  of  Alba,  59;  victory  in 
the  Pomptine  territory,  63 


Gabinius,  Aulus:  proposes  measures 
against  the  pirates,  270;  subdues 
Jewish  revolts,  276;  reinstates  Ptol- 
emy Auletes  on  his  throne,  277;  ar- 
rested, 283;  elected  consul,  290;  re- 
fused a  public  thanksgiving,  318; 
banished,  319;  in  the  Parthian 
war,  322;  his  Egyptian  campaign, 
322;    defeat    and    death    in    Illyria, 

354 
Gallia,  Province  of:  description  of,  292 
Galba,    Servius:    his    campaign    in    the 

Alps,  303 
Gades :  see  Cadiz 
Gauls :  description  of,  294 
Gaul,  Cisalpine:  receives  full  citizenship, 

392 
Gaul,    Transalpine:    growth    of    Italian 

civilization  in,  392 
Genucius,  Gnaeus:  murder  of,  43 
Germans:  in  the  time  of  Caesar,  300 
Glabrio,   Manlius  Acilius:   appointed  to 

command  of  army  in  the  East,  269; 

his  campaign  in  Asia,  270 
Gladiatorial  Combats :   advent  of,  61 
Gladiatorial  War,  261 
Glaucia,  Gaius:  leader  of  the  populace, 

199 ;     rupture    with     Marius,    201 ; 

death,  201 
Gomphi :  siege  of,  348 
Gracchus,  Gaius  Sempronius :  reforms  of, 

171 ;  death,  184 ;  his  schemes  revived, 

200;  his  principles  adopted  by  Cae- 
sar, 366 
Gracchus,  Tiberius  Sempronius   (b.  210 

B.  c.)  :  his  rule  in  Spain,  136 
Gracchus,  Tiberius  Sempronius  (168-133 

B.  c.)  :  reforms  of,  171 ;  death,  176 
Great  Plains:  battle  of,  130 
Greece:    becomes    province    of    Achaia, 

166 
Greeks,  Italian:  sketch  of,  25 
Grumentum:  battle  of,  128 


H 


Haedui :  aided  by  Rome,  300 ;  made  trib- 
utary to  the  Sequani,  301 

Hamilcar  Barca :  his  African  campaign, 
102;   campaign  in  Sicily,  104;  con- 


INDEX 


411 


eludes  peace  with  Rome  (241  b.  a), 
105  ;  made  commander-in-chief  of  all 
Africa,  III;  his  career  in  Spain,  112; 
death,  112 

Hannibal :  at  battle  of  Mylae,  101 ;  swears 
enmity  to  Rome,  112;  sketch  of,  113; 
attacks  Saguntum,  114;  invades 
Italy,  1 14 ;  at  the  battle  of  Lake  Tra- 
simene,  118;  at  battle  of  Nola,  123; 
at  battle  of  Grumentum,  128;  re- 
called to  Africa,  130;  reorganizes 
Carthage,  134;  received  at  the  court 
of  Antiochus,  144;  death,  146 

Hanno:  blockades  Messano,  100 

Hasdrubal,  son-in-law  of  Hamilcar 
Barca:  his  campaign  in  Sicily,  102; 
statesmanship  of,  112;  accompanies 
Hamilcar  to  Spain,  112;  death,  113 

Hasdrubal,  Carthaginian  soldier:  defeat- 
ed by  Massinissa,  163 

Hasdrubal  Barca:  in  command  in  Spain, 
114;  at  battle  of  Cannae,  121 ;  at  bat- 
tle of  Baecula,  127;  crosses  the  Pyr- 
enees, 128;  death,  128 

Hatria :  founded,  57 

Helvetii:  revolt  of  (107  B.  c),  193;  mi- 
gration of,  301 ;  Caesar  defeats,  302 

Hernici :  alliances  with  Rome,  22,  63 

Hiarbas,  king  of  Numidia:  defeated  by 
Pompeius,  228 

Hiempsal :  restored  to  Numidian  throne, 
228 

Hiero :  attacks  Messana,  99 ;  granted  his 
independence  as  ruler  of  Syracuse, 
106 

Himilco:  at  the  siege  of  Lilybaeum, 
103 

Hirtius,  Aulus:  attachment  to  Caesar, 
362 

History,  Ancient:  definition  of,  3 

Hortensius,  Quintus  (dictator,  287  B.  c.)  : 
reforms  of,  50 

Hortensius,  Quintus  (114-50  b.  c.)  :  allied 
with  Caesar,  338 

Hostilius,  Aulus:  in  the  third  Macedo- 
nian War,  149 

Hundred,  Council  of  a:  see  Council  of  a 
Hundred 

Hyele:  see  Velia 

Hypsaeus,   Lucius:   defeated  by  slaves, 

173 

Hyrcanus,  John,  prince  of  Judea:  civil 
war  with  his  brother,  274 


I,  I  K* 

Ichnae :  battle  of,  323 

Icilian  Law:  passed,  41 

Isaura :  captured  by  the  Romans,  260 

Italy :  geography  of,  3 ;  early  migrations, 
4 ;  in  the  hands  of  Rome,  81 ;  re- 
volt against  Rome  (91-87  b.  c.)»  205; 
social  reorganization  of,  under  Cae- 
sar, 380 

Italica :  organization  of,  207 

Janiculum :  part  of  the  territory  of  Rome, 
10;  in  possession  of  Rome,  21 

Jannaeus  Alexander:  growth  of  Jewish 
kingdom  under,  273 

Jews :  influence  in  Roman  empire,  391 

Juba,  king  of  Numidia :  raises  siege  of 
Utica  (49  b.  a),  342;  fury  of,  355; 
death,  359 

Judices  :  power  of,  30 

Jugurtha:  war  with  Rome,  187;  capture 
and  death,  190 

Julian  Calendar,  395 

Julian  Laws :  declared  null  and  void,  312 

Jupiter  Latiaris :  worship  of,  9 

Karthada :  see  Carthage 

Kyme:  see  Cummae 


Labienus,  Titus:  with  Caesar  in  Gaul, 
302;  refuses  obedience  to  Caesar, 
334;  executes  all  Caesarian  prison- 
ers, 344;  at  the  Corcyra  council  of 
war,  350;  battle  with  Caesar,  357; 
becomes  a  pirate,  359 

Laconia:  surrenders  to  Mithradates,  217 

Laelius,  Gaius:  accompanies  Scipio  to 
Spain,  126 

Laenas,  Marcus  Popilus :  in  the  war  with 
Numantia,  162 

Laevinus,  Publius  Valerius:  at  battle  of 
Siris,  77 

Lake  Regillus :  victory  of,  62 

Lake  Vadimo :  battle  of,  75 

Lamponius :  Lucanian  general,  227 

Landlord  and  Tenants :  relations  between 
in  early  Rome,  38 

Land-tenure:  among  the  early  Romans, 
37 

Lanuvium:  war  with  Rome,  64;  loses  its 
independence,  67 

1  Sec  also  under  C 


412 


INDEX 


Larissa:  battle  of,  149 

Lars  Porsena :  conquers  Rome,  56 

Lars  Tolumnius,  king  of  Veii:  at  war 
against  Rome,  58 

Latin  League:  formation,  9;  Rome  be- 
comes president  of,  20 ;  dissolved,  64, 
67 

Latins:  early  settlements,  7;  wars  with 
neighboring  tribes,  63 

Latium:  location,  4;  description  of,  7; 
early  civilization  in,  8;  league  with 
Rome,  21 ;  threatened  by  the  Etrus- 
cans, 56 

Laws :  making  of,  in  early  times,  14 

Leucopetra :  battle  of,  166 

Lentulus,  Publius  Cornelius:  member  of 
Catilinarian  conspiracy,  283 

Lepidus,  Marcus  Aemilius  (consul  79 
B.C.):  elected  consul,  255;  defeated 
by  Pompeius,  255 

Lepidus,  Marcus  Aemilius  (d.  13  b.  c.)  : 
blockaded  in  his  house,  320 ;  appoint- 
ed prefect  of  the  city,  339;  splendor 
of  his  Roman  home,  383 

Lex  Julia:  passed,  208 

Lex  Plautia  Papiria:  passed,  208 

Lex  Sulplicia,  Fourth :  passed,  210 

Libo,  Lucius  Scribonius:  in  battle  with 
Dolabella  (49  b.  c),  343 

Licinius,  Gaius  Licfnius  Calvus  Stolo: 
reforms  of,  49 

Licinian  Law :  passed,  48 

Lilybaeum :  siege  of,  103 

Livian  Laws:  passed  and  repealed,  204 

Livius,  Marcus:  at  battle  of  the  Metau- 
rus,  128 

Locri :  surprised  by  Pyrrhus,  80 

Longinus,  Quintus  Cassius:  revolt  of 
his  legions,  356 

Lucanians:  victories  in  southern  Italy, 
65 

Luceres:  settle  on  the  Tiber,  9 

Luceria:  captured  by  Romans,  70 

Lucterius:  at  siege  of  Uxellodunum,  308 

Lucullus,  Lucius  Licinus,  surnamed 
"  Ponticus  "  :  attacks  Mithradates  on 
sea,  219;  campaigns  in  the  East,  258; 
recalled  from  Asia,  269;  retires  to 
private  life,  278;  value  of  his  fishes, 
381 ;  aids  debtors  in  Asia,  390 

Luna:  founded,  133 

Lyciscus:  chosen  strategus  of  Aetolian 
League,  149 


M 


Maccabees,  The :  revolt  of,  167 

Macedonia:  influence  of,  under  Philip 
V,  136;  made  a  Roman  province,  165 

Macedonian  War,  First,  125 

Macedonian  War,  Second,  140 

Macedonian  War,  Third,  147 

Magnesia:  battle  of,  144 

Mago :  his  treatise  on  agriculture,  94 

Mago  (d.  203  b.  c.)  :  at  battle  of  the  Tre- 
bia,  117;  death,  130 

Maharbal:  captures  Roman  vanguard, 
118 

Mamertines :  rise  of,  in  Sicily,  99 

Mancinus,  Lucius  Hostilius :  campaign  in 
Africa,  164 

Manilius,  Gaius:  proposes  to  invest 
Pompeius  with  the  command  in  the 
East,  271 ;  raises  troops  for  Catilina- 
rian conspiracy,  282 

Manilius,  Manius :  besieges  Carthage,  164 

Manlius,  Marcus :  bravery  of,  59 

Marcellus,  Marcus  Claudius  (ca.  268-208 
b.  c.)  :  appointed  to  the  chief  com- 
mand of  army,  123 ;  besieges  Syra- 
cuse, 124;  his  campaign  in  Spain,  161 

Marcellus,  Marcus  Claudius  (consul  51 
b.  c.)  :  elected  consul,  328;  proposes 
that  the  two  Gallic  provinces  be 
given  to  the  consuls  of  50  b.  c,  330; 
authorizes  Pompeius  to  make  war 
on  Caesar,  332;  retires  into  volun- 
tary exile,  350 

Marcian  Law :  regulates  the  censorship, 
52 

Marcius,  Quintus :  deludes  the  Rhodians, 
150 

Marius,  Gaius  (ca.  155-86  b.  c.)  :  accom- 
panies Metellus  to  Africa,  189;  as- 
sumes command  in  Africa,  190; 
nominated  as  consul,  194;  at  battle 
of  Vercellae,  195 ;  early  career,  196 ; 
reforms  of,  200;  retires  to  the  East, 
201 ;  rupture  with  Saturninus  and 
Glaucia,  201 ;  given  supreme  com- 
mand against  Mithradates,  210;  es- 
capes from  the  wrath  of  Sulla  to 
Tunis,  211 ;  joins  conspiracy  of 
Cinna,  222;  proscriptions  of,  223; 
death,  224;  his  tomb  opened  and  his 
ashes  scattered,  232;  his  memory  re- 
stored to  public  honor,  279 


INDEX 


413 


Marius,  Gaius  (109-82  b.  c.)  :  consul,  226; 
at  battle  of  Sacriportus,  227 

Marriage :  impossible  between  patricians 
and  plebeians,  35 ;  legalized  between 
patricians  and  plebeians,  47;  fre- 
quency of  divorce  in  the  second  cen- 
tury b.  c,  248 

Massilia:  founded,  28;  its  influence  on 
civilization  of  Gaul,  293;  surrenders 
to  Caesar,  341 

Massinissa,  king  of  Numidia:  joins 
Rome,  129;  sketch  of,  134;  appeals 
to  Rome  to  arbitrate  between  him 
and  Carthage,  163;  death,  164 

Massiva,  grandson  of  Massinissa :  claims 
throne  of  Numidia,  189 

Matius,  Gaius:  attachment  to  Caesar, 
362 

Maximus,  Gnaeus  Mallius:  at  battle  of 
Arausio,  193 

Megalopolis :  founded,  275 

Melpum :  captured  by  Romans,  59 

Memmius,  Gaius  (d.  100  b.  c.)  :  leads 
movement  for  war  against  Jugurtha, 
188;  leader  of  the  populace,  199; 
murdered,  201 

Merula,  Lucius  Cornelius :  chosen  consul, 
222;  death,  223 

Messana:  joins  Rome  and  Carthage 
against  Pyrrhus,  79;  siege  of,  99; 
captured  by  slaves,   187 

Metaurus:  battle  of,   128 

Metellus,  Quintus  Caecilius  (consul  137 
B.  c.)  :  defeats  the  Celtiberians,  162; 
favors  reforms,  175 

Metellus  Creticus,  Lucius  Caecilius :  at- 
tempts  to   protect   the    state    chest, 

339 

Metellus  Creticus,  Quintus  Caecilius:  at 
battle  of  Cydonia,  260;  defeats  Cati- 
lina,  284 

Metellus  Macedonicus,  Quintus  Caecil- 
ius :  urges  the  duty  of  marriage,  248 

Metellus  Nepos,  Publius:  at  the  confer- 
ence of  the  triumvirate,  315 

Metellus  Nepos,  Quintus  Caecilius: 
elected  tribune,  286;  suspended  from 
office,  287 

Metellus  Numidicus,  Quintus  Caecilius: 
his  campaign  in  Africa,  189 

Metellus  Pius,  Quintus  Caecilius :  volun- 
tarily exiles  himself  from  Rome,  200; 
returns  to  Rome,  201 ;  comes  to  the 


aid  of  Rome  against  the  forces  of 
Marius  and  Cinna,  222;  obliged  to 
submit  to  Cinna,  225 ;  joins  Sulla, 
225 ;  elected  consul,  240 ;  retires  to 
private  life,  278 

Milan:  founded,  58;  captured  by  the 
Romans,  109;  battle  of,  130 

Military  Service:  reformed  by  Servius 
Tullius,  18 

Milo,  general  of  Pyrrhus:  arrives  in 
Tarentum,  77 

Milo,  Titus  Annius  Papianus :  candidate 
for  consul  (52  b.  c),  319 

Minturnae:  established,  73 

Minucius,  Marcus :  defeats  the  Scordisci, 
192 

Minucius,  Marcus  Rufus :  made  co-dic- 
tator with  Fabius,  120 

Mithradates  I,  king  of  Parthia:  founds 
Parthian  kingdom,  167 

Mithradates  VI,  surnamed  "  Eupator  " : 
war  with  Rome,  208,  215;  sketch  of, 
213;  concludes  peace  through  Sulla, 
219;  war  with  Murena,  229;  revolts 
against  Rome,  258;  rupture  with 
Tigranes,  273;  war  with  Pompeius, 
273 ;  death,  273 

Mithradates  of  Pergamos:  comes  to  the 
aid  of  Caesar,  353 ;  receives  kingdom 
of  Bosporus,  354 

Mithradates,  son  of  Phraates :  career  of, 
322 

Mount  Garganus :  battle  of,  262 

Mucianus,  Publius  Crassus:  favors  re- 
form, 175 

Mummius,  Lucius,  surnamed  "  Achai- 
cus  " :  campaign  against  the  Achaean 
League,  166 

Murena,  Lucius  Licinius :  left  in  com- 
mand in  Asia,  220;  at  war  with 
Mithradates,  229 

Mutines:  his  campaign  in  Sicily,  124 

Mylae:  battle  of,  101 


N 


Nabis :  his  conflict  with  Roman  authority, 

141 
Narbo:  founded,  185 
Narbo,  Province  of:  created,  191 
Nasidius,  Lucius :  defeated  by  Decimus 

Brutus,  341 


414 


INDEX 


Nero,   Gaius   Gaudius:   sent  to   Spain, 

126;  at  battle  of  Grumentum,   128; 

at  battle  of  the  Metaurus,  128 
Nerva,  Publius:  governor  of  Sicily,  187 
New  Africa :  province  of,  formed,  360 
Nicomedes,   king   of   Bithynia:    invades 

Pontus,  215 
Nicopolis:  founded,  275;  battle  of,  354 
Nobilior,  Quintus  Fulvius:  his  campaign 

in  Spain,  161 
Nola :  battle  of,  123 
Nomentum:     forms    an    alliance    with 

Rome,  20;  loses  its  independence,  67 
Norbanus,    Gaius:    elected   consul,   225; 

defeated  at  Capua,  226 
Nova  Carthago:  captured  by  Scipio,  126 
Noviodunum :  founded,  309 
Novum  Comum:  founded,  317 
Nuceria:  siege  of,  82 
Numana:  founded,  57 
Numantia:  war  with  Rome,  162 
Numidia:  revolt  against  Carthage,  102; 

condition  under  Roman  rule,  162 


Octavius,  Gnaeus :  opposes  Cinna  and  his 
measures,  222;  death,  223 

Octavius,  Marcus  (tribune,  133  b.  c.)  : 
opposes  reforms  of  Gracchus,  176 

Octavius,  Marcus :  in  battle  with  Dola- 
bella  (49  b.  c),  343;  defeated  in  Illy- 
ria,  354 

Oenomaus:  leader  of  Gladiatorial  war, 
261 

Ofella,  Quintus:  blockades  Marius  in 
Praeneste,  227;  aids  reforms  of 
Sulla,  230;  rebels  against  constitu- 
tion of  Sulla,  239;  death,  239 

Ogulnian  Law:  passed,  50 

Opimius,  Lucius:  opposes  insurrection 
of  Gracchus,  184;  sent  to  divide 
Africa,  188 

Oppius,  Spurius:  death  of,  45 

Optimates:  rise  of,  172 

Orange:  see  Arausio 

Orchomenus:  battle  of,  218 

Orleans:  see  Cenabum 

Orodes :  becomes  king  of  Parthia,  322 

Ostia:  part  of  the  territory  of  Rome, 
10;  treatment  of,  by  Rome,  21 

Ovinian  Law:  regulates  composition  of 
the  senate,  53 


Pacorus,  Prince:  invades  Syria,  325;  re- 
volts against  his  father,  325 
Palaeopolis :  siege  of,  69 
Palestine:     conquered     by     Antiochus, 

143 
Papirius,  Lucius:  receives  the  surrender 

of  Tarentum,  81 
Papus :  at  battle  of  Telamon,  109 
Parthia,  Kingdom  of:  founded,  167 
Paternal  Authority,  5,  11 
Patricians :  strife  with  plebeians,  47 
Paulus,  Lucius  Aemilius:  elected  consul, 

120 
Paulus,  Lucius  Aemilius    (son  of  con- 
sul) :  in  the  Third  Macedonian  War, 
149;  refuses  to  corrupt  the  soldiers 
with  the  spoils  of  war,  156 
Paulus,  Lucius  Aemilius:  sells  his  serv- 
ices to  Caesar,  331 
Pedum:  loses  its  independence,  67 
Pennus,    Marcus :    carries    his   proposal 
that  non-burgesses  should  leave  the 
city,  179 
Pergamus :  captured  by  Mithradates,  216 
Perseus,  king  of  Macedonia:  war  with 

Rome,  148;  death,  150 
Petreius:  defeated  by  Caesar,  340 
Pharnaces,  king  of  the  Bosporus:  takes 
possession  of  Phanagoris  and  Little 
Armenia,  349 ;  war  with  the  Romans, 

354 

Pharsalus:  battle  of  (48  b.  c),  348 

Philip  V,  king  of  Macedon:  forms  alli- 
ance with  Carthage,  122;  war  with 
Rome,  125 ;  character,  139 ;  campaign 
against  Egypt,  139;  at  battle  of  Cy- 
noscephalae,  141 ;  death,  147 

Philippus,  Lucius  Marcius  (consul  91 
b.  c.)  :  opposes  reforms  of  Drusus, 
203 ;  aids  reforms  of  Sulla,  230 

Philippus,  Quintus  Marcius:  delays  Per- 
seus, 149 

Phoenicians :  league  with  the  Etruscans, 
28 

Phrygia:  becomes  an  independent  king- 
dom, 213 

Piso,  Gnaeus  Calpurnius :  leader  of  the 
discontented  party,  280;  sent  to 
Spain,  280;  death,  281 

Piso,  Lucius:  elected  consul,  290;  re- 
called from  his  province,  318 


INDEX 


415 


Piso,  Lucius  Calpurnius:  campaign 
in  Africa,  164 

Plebsr  development  of,  17;  admitted  to 
the  senate,  34 ;  become  citizens,  35 ; 
admitted  to  Decemvirate,  44;  strife 
with  patricians,  47 

Pompeius,  Gnaeus  (ca.  80-45  b.  c.)  :  joins 
Sulla,  226;  conquers  Africa,  228; 
conquers  Sicily,  228;  aids  reforms  of 
Sulla,  230;  rebels  against  constitu- 
tion of  Sulla,  239;  sketch  of,  254; 
defeats  Lepidus,  255;  his  campaigns 
in  Spain,  256;  allies  himself  with 
the  democrats,  267;  reforms  of,  267; 
retires  from  public  affairs,  268;  his 
campaign  against  the  pirates,  270; 
given  command  of  the  war  in  East, 
271 ;  his  campaigns  in  the  East,  273 ; 
his  triumph,  275;  feeling  in  Rome 
toward,  286;  returns  to  Rome,  287; 
joins  second  coalition,  288;  marries 
daughter  of  Caesar,  290;  compared 
with  Caesar,  311 ;  feud  with  Clodius, 
312;  changed  relations  with  Caesar, 
312;  invested  with  the  superintend- 
ence of  affairs  relating  to  corn  sup- 
ply, 314;  conference  with  Caesar  and 
Crassus  (56  B.C.),  315;  appointed 
"consul  with  colleague,"  320;  gives 
up  special  command,  321 ;  breach 
with  Caesar,  325 ;  refuses  to  obey 
the  senate,  331 ;  commences  war 
against  Caesar,  332;  resources  of, 
335 ;  campaign  in  the  East  against 
Caesar,  346;  resources  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Pharsalus,  350;  death,  351; 
Caesar  restores  to  the  senate-house 
the  statue  of,  365 ;  value  of  his  prop- 
erty, 382 

Pompeius,  Gnaeus,  the  Younger:  at  the 
Corcyra  council  of  war,  350 

Pompeius,  Quintus:  his  struggle  with 
Numantia,  162 

Pompeius,  Sextus:  ability  of,  352;  be- 
comes a  pirate,  359 

Pontifex  Maximus :  powers  of,  32 

Pontius,  Gaius:  at  battle  of  Caudine 
Pass,  69 

Pontius  of  Telesia :  tries  to  succor  Rome, 
227;  death,  228 

Populares :  rise  of,  172 

Populonia:  battle  of,  75 

Populus :  origin  of  name,  14 


Postumius,  Lucius :  death,  121 

Praeneste :  war  with  Rome,  64 ;  siege  of, 
227 

Pretor :  length  of  term  of  office  extended, 
236 

Privernum :  siege  of,  68 

Ptolemaeus  Dionysius :  receives  Pom- 
peius, 351 

Ptolemy  V,  Epiphanes :  war  with  Mace- 
don,  139 

Ptolemy  XI,  Auletes :  deposed  and  rein- 
stated, 277 

Publilian  Law :  passed,  43 

Publilius,  Volero :  establishes  the  comi- 
tia  tributa,  43 

Pullus,  Lucius  Junius :  commands  Roman 
fleet,  104 

Punic  War,  The  First,  99 

Punic  War,  The  Second,  111 

Pydna :  battle  of,  150 

Pyrgi :  captured  by  Syracusans,  57 

Pyrrhus :  forms  alliance  with  Tarentum, 
76;  early  history,  76;  lands  in  Italy, 
77;  leaves  Italy,  79;  his  success  in 
Sicily,  80;  death,  80 


Q,R 

Questors :  made  state  officers,  31 
Quinctius,    Lucius :    supports    measures 

proposed  against  the  pirates,  270 
Quirites :  origin  of  name,  14 
Ramnes :  ancient  name  of  Romans,  9 
Rauraci:  join  migration  of  Helvetii,  301 
Regulus,    Marcus    Atilius:    defeated   by 
Samnites,  72;   joins  fleet  for  inva- 
sion of  Africa,  101 
Regulus,  Gaius  Atilius :  at  battle  of  Tela- 

mon,  109 
Rex  :  power  of,  12 

Rhegium:  Roman  campaign  against,  99 
Rhodes:  the  champion  of  Greek  cities, 
138;  becomes  subject  to  Rome,  150 
Rome,  History  of:  Italy,  3;  Latin  settle- 
ments, 7;  the  Roman  constitution 
and  reforms  of  Servius  Tullius,  II J 
the  regal  period,  20;  establishment 
of  the  republic,  29;  the  tribunate  of 
the  plebs  and  the  decemvirate,  37; 
strife  of  the  patricians  and  plebeians, 
47;  fall  of  Etruscan  power  and  the 
coming  of  the  Celts,  56;  advance  of 


416 


INDEX 


Rome  to  the  conquest  of  Italy,  62; 
war  with  Pyrrhus  and  union  with 
Italy,  74;  Carthage,  89;  the  first 
Punic  War,  99;  the  second  Punic 
War,  1 1 1 ;  a  review  of  the  West  and 
East,  133;  war  with  Antiochus  and 
the  final  conquest  of  the  East,  143; 
the  government  and  the  governed, 
153;  the  subject  countries  down  to 
the  Gracchan  epoch,  161 ;  the  reforms 
of  the  Gracchi,  171 ;  the  rule  of  the 
restoration,  185;  Marius  as  revolu- 
tionist and  Drusus  as  reformer, 
196;  the  revolt  of  all  Italy,  205; 
the  Mithradatic  War,  213;  the 
democratic  revolution  and  its  over- 
throw by  Sulla,  221 ;  the  Sullan  con- 
stitution, 230;  economic  condition  of 
the  empire  during  the  revolution 
period,  242;  the  rule  of  the  Sullan 
restoration,  253 ;  fall  of  the  oligarchy 
and  the  rule  of  Pompeius,  265 ; 
party  struggles  in  Rome — Pompeius, 
Caesar  and  Crassus,  278;  Caesar  in 
Gaul,  292;  the  joint  rule  of  Pompeius 
and  Caesar,  311;  Crassus  and  the 
rupture  between  Pompeius  and  Cae- 
sar, 322;  the  Civil  War,  334;  the 
old  republic  and  the  new  monarchy, 
362 

Roscius,  Sextus:  a  typical  rural  gentle- 
man, 382 

Rubicon :  Caesar  crosses,  333 

Rufio:  governs  Egypt,  371 

Rufus,  Marcus  Caelius:  reforms  of,  365 

Rufus,  Pompeius :  opposes  reforms  of 
Sulpicius,  210 

Rufus,  Publius:  his  method  of  drill,  197; 
charged  with  maladministration  of 
his  province,  202 

Rufus,  Quintus:  takes  command  of  the 
army  in  the  north  of  Italy,  212; 
death,  212 

Rutulians:  wars  with  Rome,  22 


Sabines :  wars  with  Rome,  22 

Sabinus,    Quintus:    defeated    by    Gauls, 

305 
Sacred  Mount  Secession,  41 
Sacriportus :  battle  of,  227 


Saguntum:  makes  alliances  with  Rome, 

113;  attacked  by  Hannibal,  114 
Samnites:  description  of,  65 
Samnite  War,  69 
Sardinia:  added  to  the  Roman  empire, 

107 ;  conquered  for  Caesar,  342 
Saturninus,  Lucius  Appuleius:  leader  of 

the    populace,     199;     rupture    with 

Marius,  201 ;  death,  201 
Scaepio,   Quintus :   opposes   reforms   of 

Drusus,  203 
Scaevola,  Publius  Mucius :  influence  of, 

175 
Scaevola,  Quintus  Mucius :  character  of, 

202 ;  Fimbria  attempts  to  kill,  224 
Scaurus,  Marcus  Aemilius  (d.  105  b.  c.)  : 

his  campaigns  against  the  Celts,  192; 

defeated  by  the  Cimbri,  193 
Scaurus,  Marcus  Aemilius  (163-89  b.  c.)  : 

member  of  African  commission,  188 ; 

leader  of  senatorial  party,  201 ;  trial 

of,  202;  aids  Drusus  in  his  reforms, 

203 ;  leads  expedition  against  Aretas, 

274 

Scipio,  Publius  Cornelius  (d.  212  b.  c.)  : 
defeated  at  battle  of  Vercellae,  116; 
aids  his  brother  in  Spain,  122; 
death,  125 

Scipio  Aemilianus  Africanus  Minor, 
Publius  Cornelius :  reduces  Numan- 
tia,  162;  at  the  siege  of  Carthage 
(149  B.C.),  164;  made  consul,  164; 
captures  Carthage,  165;  favors  sus- 
pension of  the  land  commission, 
178 ;  death,  179 ;  establishes  the  prae- 
torian cohort,  198 

Scipio  Africanus  Major,  Publius  Corne- 
lius: chosen  extraordinary  general 
of  army,  126;  at  battle  of  Baecula, 
127;  chosen  consul,  129;  invades 
Africa,  129;  in  the  war  with  Anti- 
ochus, 144;  death,  146;  changes  the 
seating  of  members  of  the   senate, 

154 

Scipio  Asiaticus,  Lucius  Cornelius: 
elected  consul,  225;  his  soldiers  de- 
sert him  for  Sulla,  226 

Scipio  Calvus,  Gnaeus  Cornelius :  cap- 
tures Milan,  109;  his  successes  in 
Spain,  122;  death,  125 

Scipio  Nasica  Corculum,  Publius  Cor- 
nelius :  opposes  plan  to  destroy  Car- 
thage, 163 


INDEX 


417 


Scipio  Nasica  Serapio,  Publius  Corne- 
lius: begins  civil  war  against  the 
Gracchi,  176 

Scipio,  Quintus  Metellus  Pius:  becomes 
consul  (52  b.  c),  321;  Pompeius 
marries  daughter  of,  326 ;  at  the  Cor- 
cyra  council  of  war,  350;  succeeds 
to  command  of  Pompeian  army, 
355 ;  at  battle  of  Thapsus,  358 ;  death, 

359 

Scodra:   capture  of,   150 

Scordisci:  defeated  by  the  Romans,  192 

Seleucia:  siege  of,  322 

Sempronius,  Tiberius :  at  battle  of  the 
Trebia,  117 

Senate :  origin  and  character,  15 ;  pre- 
rogatives increased,  33;  influence  of, 
34,  54;  mode  of  admission  changed, 
233;  increased  powers,  234 

Sentinum:  battle  of  (295  b.  a),  72 

Septimius,  Lucius:  assassinates  Pom- 
peius, 351 

Sequani :  at  war  with  the  Haedui,  300 

Sertorius,  Quintus :  member  of  conspir- 
acy against  Sulla,  221 ;  attempts  to 
raise  new  levies  in  Etruria,  226; 
his    career    in    Spain,    256;    death, 

257 

Servian  Wall :  built,  22 

Servilian  Rogation:  directed  against 
Pompeius,  279;  proposed  and  with- 
drawn, 281 

Servilius,  Publius  (consul  400  b.  c.)  : 
suspends  the  law  of  debt,  40 

Servilius  Geminus,  Gnaeus :  his  army 
defeated  by  Hannibal,  118;  death, 
121 

Servilius  Vatia  Isauricus,  Publius :  de- 
feats the  pirate  fleet,  26b 

Servius  Tullius :  reforms  of,  18 

Sextius,  Lucius :   reforms  of,  49 

Siccius  Dentatus,  Lucius :  murder  of,  45 

Sicily:  conquered  by  Rome,  100;  inva- 
sion of  the  Carthaginians  (255  b.  c.), 
102;  surrenders  to  Pompeius,  228; 
conquered  for  Caesar,  342 

Silanus,  Marcus  Junius  (d.  196  b.  c)  :  ac- 
companies Scipio  to  Spain,  126 

Silanus,  Marcus  Junius  (consul  109 
b.  c.)  :  defeated  by  Cimbri,  193 

Sinuessa:  established,  73 

Sitlius.  Publius:  aids  Caesar,  358 

Siris :  battle  of,  77 


Slaves:  position  of,  n;  increased  use  of, 
160;  trade  in,  becomes  a  profession, 
172;  growth  of  insubordination 
among,  261 

Sopater:  comes  to  the  aid  of  Carthagin- 
ians, 129 

Sora:  Romans  capture,  65 

Spain :  becomes  a  Roman  province  (206 
B.C.),  127;  under  Roman  rule,  136; 
internal  affairs  under  Roman  gov- 
ernment, 161 ;  submits  to  Sullan  offi- 
cers, 228 

Sparta:  dispute  with  Aratus,  138 

Spartacus :  leader  of  Gladiatorial  war, 
261 ;  defeated,  262 

Statilius,  Lucius:  arrested,  283 

Strabo :  assumes  command  of  troops  in 
Rome,  222 ;  death,  223 

Sulla,  Lucius  Cornelius :  captures  Ju- 
gurtha,  190;  his  campaign  in  south- 
ern Italy  (89  B.  c),  208;  opposes 
reforms  of  Sulpicius,  210;  leads  an 
army  against  Rome,  210;  reforms 
of,  211;  embarks  for  the  East, 
212;  attempts  to  arbitrate  af- 
fairs in  the  East,  215;  at  the 
battle  of  Chaeronea,  218;  at  battle  of 
Orchomenus,  218;  concludes  peace 
with  Mithradates,  219;  returns  to 
Italy,  220, 225 ;  overthrows  the  demo- 
cratic revolution,  221 ;  constitution 
of,  230;  elected  consul,  240;  sketch 
of  his  career,  240;  death,  241;  his 
constitution  abolished,  267 

Sulpicius  Peticus,  Gaius:  defeats  a  Gal- 
lic host,  59 

Sulpicius  Rufus,  Publius:  reforms  of, 
209;  death,  211 

Suthul :  siege  ot,  189 

Sybaris :  founded,  26 

Syphax:  defeated  by  Scipio,  129 

Syracuse:  rise  of,  57 

Syria :  conquered  by  Antiochus,  143 

Syria,  Province  of :  founded,  275 


T,  U 

Tarentum :  founded,  26;  trade,  27;  forms 
alliance  with  Pyrrhus.  76;  surrenders 
to  Rome  (272  b.  c),  80 

Tarquin  *  the  Proud " :  fails  to  consult 
with  the  senate,  29 


418 


INDEX 


Tauromenium :  captured  by  Romans,  173 
Tax-farmers:  advent  of,  39 
Taxiles:  at  the  battle  of  Chaeronea,  218 
Telamon :  battle  of,  109 
Tenants:  see  Landlords  and  Tenants 
Tencteri:  migration  of,  301 
Terentilius  Arsa,  Gaius:  reforms  of,  44 
Thapsus:  battle  of,  358 
Thermopylae:  battle  of  (192  b.  c),  144 
Thessaly:  submits  to  Caesar,  348 
Thrace:    Antiochus    invades,    143;    be- 
comes part  of  province  of  Macedonia, 

257 
Thurii :  attacked  by  Lucanians,  74 
Tibur:  war  with  Rome,  64 
Tigranes    I,    king   of    Armenia:    unites 

Armenia,  213 ;  increase  of  his  power, 

257;  Lucullus  defeats,  258;  rupture 

with    Mithradates,    273;    war    with 

Pompey,  273 
Tities:  settle  on  the  Tiber,  9 
Torquatus,  Titus  Manlius:  at  battle  of 

Trifanum,  67 
Trebia:  battle  of  the,  117 
Trebellius,    Lucius:    opposes    measures 

proposed  against  the  pirates,  270 
Trebonius,  Gaius :  besieges  Massilia,  341 ; 

succeeds  to  command  in  Spain,  356 
Tribunate  of  the  Plebs :  organized,  41 
Tribunes :      declared      inviolable,      41 ; 

powers,  42;  number  increased   (471 

B.C.),  43;  (457  b.c),  44 
Trifanum:  battle  of,  67 
Truce  of  God :  among  early  Latins,  9 
Tubulus,  Gaius  Hostilius:  at  battle  of 

Grumentum,  128 
Tusculum:  war  with  Rome,  64 
Twelve  Tables,  The:  established,  44 
Usipetes:  migration  of,  301 
Utica:    made    capital    of    province    of 

Africa,  165;  siege  of  (49  B.C.),  342 
Uxellodunum :  siege  of,  308 


Valerius  Maximus,  Marcus :  defeats  the 

forces    of    Carthage    and    Syracuse, 

100 
Valerius,    Quintus:    captures    Sardinia, 

342 
Varinius :  campaign  against  the  gladia- 
tors, 261 
Varius   Hydrida,   Quintius:   proposes   a 

commission    to    investigate     Italian 

conspiracy,  207 
Varro,    Marcus    Terentius    (consul    21.6 

B.  c.)  :  elected  consul,  120 
Varro,  Marcus  Terentius  (116-28  B.C.): 

capitulates  to  Caesar,  341 ;   flees  to 

Macedonia,  343 
Varus,     Publius    Atius:     defeated     (49 

B.c),  342 
Vatinius,  Publius :  proposes  to  give  the 

governorship   of   Cisalpine   Gaul   to 

Caesar,  289;   trial  of,  319;   defeats 

Octavius  (47  b.  c),  355 
Veii :  wars  with  Rome,  58 
Velia :  settled,  28 

Velitrae :  conquered  by  Rome,  67 
Veneti :    Publius    Crassus   defeats,   303 ; 

sold  into  slavery,  303 
Venusia:  established,  73 
Vercellae:    battles   of    (218  B.c),    116; 

(101  b.  c),  195 
Vercingetorix :  made  king  of  the  Gauls, 

306;  death,  307;  sketch  of,  307 
Verginius,  Lucius :  slays  his  daughter,  45 
Verona:  founded,  58 
Verres,  Gaius :  indicted  by  Cicero,  266 ; 

governor  of  Sicily,  389 
Vettius,  Titus:  leads  slave  revolt,  186 
Viriathus:    leads    Spanish    revolt,    161; 

death,  162 
Volaterrae :  siege  of,  228 
Volscians:   wars   with   Rome,   22;   con- 
quered by  the  Romans,  63 
Volso,  Lucius  Manlius:   joins   fleet  for 

invasion  of  Africa,  101 


Vadimonian  Lake :  battle  of,  71 
Vaga:  revolts  against  Roman  rule,   189 
Valerian  Law:  passed,  31 
Valerio-Horatian  Laws:  powers  granted 

by,  45 
Valerius,   Manius:   dictator,  40 
Valerius,  Marcus:  at  battle  of  Nola,  123 


W,  X,  Y,  Z 

Woman :  status  of,  in  Rome,  1 1 ;  eman- 
cipation of,  384 

Xanthippus:  joins  Carthaginian  army, 
102 

Zama:  battle  of,  130 

Ziela:  founded,  275;  battle  of  (48  b.  c), 
354 


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